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Introduction
Radiation protection is a multidisciplinary field, the different sectors of which
have deep impact upon each other. It is therefore important for anyone working
with radiation protection to keep up a certain level of insight into all areas of
the field, in addition to being an expert in the own working area. For this
purpose, a conference gathering together participants from the whole field of
radiation protection has a valuable role to fulfil.
Nordic cooperation has long traditions in radiation protection, which is
natural considering the common way of thinking when it comes to matters of
security. As a result, Nordic regulations have been quite well harmonized long
before the implementation of international safety standards. The heads of the
Nordic radiation protection authorities meet regularly. There is also a lot of
scientific cooperation within the frames of different projects.
The Nordic Society for Radiation Protection, NSFS, is an associate
society of the International Radiation Protection Association IRPA. The
members of the society are professionals representing all different areas
related to radiation protection. Ordinary meetings are held every 3 year. The
XIII ordinary meeting was held in Turku/Åbo, Finland, in 2002. 160
professionals took part in the meeting.  The participants came from all the
Nordic countries and also from Bulgaria, Estonia, and Poland.
Separate sessions were held on protection of the environment, information
and ethics, natural radiation, reactor safety and waste management, emergency
preparedness, medical use of radiation, radiation in industrial use, education and
certification, radiation biology and epidemiology, radioecology and monitoring. An
introductory lecture was given by the recipient of the Bo Lindell-award, Professor
Sören Mattsson. In all, there were 57 oral presentations and 44 poster presentations.
The greatest number of papers were presented in the sessions on medical use (21
papers), radioecology and monitoring (20 papers), and natural radiation (13 papers).
For these proceedings, all papers presenting scientific results have been subject to
a referee process with evaluation of independent experts.
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I hereby want to express my thanks to all those presenting papers during
the conference and also to all the other participants. They all contributed to
make the conference a success. It is my sincere feeling that the conference,
bringing together people from different fields, well fulfilled the purpose of
broadening the professional views of the participants.
Helsinki, May 2003 Wendla Paile
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PAILE Wendla. STUK-A195. Säteilysuojelu 2000-luvulla – teoriaa ja
käytäntöä. Pohjoismainen säteilysuojeluseura, NSFS. XIII yleiskokous, Turku,
Suomi, 25 - 29.8. 2002. Vantaa 2003, 519 s. Englanninkielinen.
Avainsanat  NSFS, pohjoimainen, säteily
Esipuhe
Säteilysuojelu on poikkitieteellinen ala, jonka eri osa-alueet vaikuttavat voi-
makkaasti toisiinsa. Tämän vuoksi on tärkeää, että jokainen säteilysuojelun
parissa työskentelevä pysyy riittävässä määrin ajan tasalla sen kaikilla osa-
aloilla, sen lisäksi, että toimii oman alansa asiantuntijana. Konferenssi, joka
kokoaa yhteen osanottajia säteilysuojelun kaikilta aloilta, voi arvokkaalla ta-
valla palvella tätä tarkoitusta.
Pohjoismaisella yhteistyöllä on pitkät perinteet säteilysuojelussa. Tämä
on varsin luonnollista, kun ottaa huomioon yhteistä turvallisuus-
kulttuuriamme. Pohjoismaiset säännöstöt ovatkin olleet hyvin keskenään
harmonisoituja jo kauan ennen kuin kansainväliset säteilysuojelustandardit
on otettu käyttöön. Pohjoismaisten säteilysuojeluviranomaisten johtajat ta-
paavat myös säännöllisesti toisiaan. Lisäksi tehdään paljon tieteellistä yhteis-
työtä erilaisten projektien muodossa.
Pohjoismainen säteilysuojeluseura NSFS (Nordiska sällskapet för
strålskydd) on kansainvälisen säteilysuojeluyhdistyksen IRPA:n jäsen-
yhdistys. Seuran jäsenet ovat säteilysuojelun ammattilaisia ja edustavat kaik-
kia säteilysuojelun osa-alueita. Seura järjestää yleiskokouksen joka kolmas
vuosi. Kolmastoista yleiskokous pidettiin Turussa vuonna 2002. Tuolloin 160
alan ammattilaista osallistui kokoukseen ja osanottajia saapui kaikista poh-
joismaista sekä myös Bulgariasta, Virosta ja Puolasta.
Erilliset sessiot järjestettiin seuraavilta aloilta: ympäristönsuojelu, vies-
tintä ja etiikka, luonnonsäteily, reaktoriturvallisuus ja jätehuolto, valmius, sä-
teilyn lääketieteellinen käyttö, säteilyn käyttö teollisuudessa, koulutus ja
sertifiointi, säteilybiologia ja epidemiologia sekä radioekologia ja mittaus-
menetelmät. Konferenssin avausluennon piti Bo Lindell-palkinnon saaja, pro-
fessori Sören Mattsson. Kaiken kaikkiaan konferenssissa kuultiin 57 suullista
esitystä ja nähtiin 44 posteria. Eniten esityksiä kertyi seuraaviin sessioihin:
säteilyn lääketieteellinen käyttö (21 esitystä), radioekologia ja mittaus-
menetelmät (20 esitystä) ja luonnonsäteily (13 esitystä). Tätä kokousjulkaisua
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varten kaikki esitykset, joissa on esitetty tieteellisiä tutkimustuloksia, ovat
käyneet läpi referee-tarkistuksen, jossa riippumattomat asiantuntijat ovat ar-
vioineet tekstit.
Haluan tässä esittää kiitokseni kaikille niille, jotka osallistuivat konfe-
renssiin tieteellisellä esityksellä sekä myös kaikkia muita osallistujia. Kaikki
te olette osaltanne myötävaikuttaneet onnistuneen kokouksen toteutumiseen.
Uskon vilpittömästi, että tämä kokous on täyttänyt hyvin tehtävänsä tuodes-
saan yhteen eri alojen ihmisiä, täten laajentaen osanottajien ammatillista nä-
kemystä.
 
 
Helsingissä, toukokuussa 2003  Wendla Paile
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SESSION 1. OPENING OF CONFERENCE
The Bo Lindell Lecture. Radiation protection among
populations, patients, personnel, plankton and
plants – What can we learn from one another?
Sören Mattsson
Department of Radiation Physics, Malmö University Hospital and Lund Uni-
versity, SE-205 02 Malmö, Sweden
I sincerely would like to thank the Nordic Society for Radiation Protection
for inviting me to present the Bo Lindell lecture for 2002. It is a great honour
and privilege to do that. We are many friends of Bo who are grateful to him
for his objectivity and stringency and for always succeeding to combine his
leading role in national and international radiation protection with
generous support and inspiration to colleagues.
Introduction
The field of radiation protection is broad. It ranges from the management of
radiation and radioactive material at many different places of work, the use
of radiation and radiopharmaceuticals for medical investigations and
treatments and the radiation exposure of ourselves and our environment
from natural and man-made sources to the current discussion on how to
manage low-level exposures. No single person can be expert in all these
fields. They have however many things in common: basic radiobiology,
radiation detection and dosimetry, risk considerations and need to inform
other people. It might also be helpful when we form our own views on
radiation protection if we can refer to other areas than our own. In this
lecture, I will go through various fields of radiation protection and give
some personal comments. I will also try to identify some matters of
importance for the future work.
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Human populations
The protection of man will continue to dominate our efforts with a priority for
the youngest individuals (including embryo and foetuses), which we believe are
the most sensitive to radiation. Today we are around 6 000 million people in the
world. Our natural exposure gives an effective dose of  2.4 mSv per capita, the
main sources being cosmic radiation, terrestrial gamma rays, ingestion of
naturally occurring radionuclides (40K) and radon daughters in indoor air
(UNSCEAR, 2000). Seen on a global scale, we can hardly change that value
very much, just locally try to reduce the highest exposures. With increasing
standard of living, man-made radiation sources such as radiation in medicine,
releases from nuclear industries, high-level waste, consumer products and
accidents will play an increasing role. All of us, rich or poor, do still have
reasons to be afraid of the military use of nuclear weapons. The risk that non-
national groups or individuals use primitive nuclear weapons or “dirty bombs”
has become real and we can not neglect the risk for new large reactor accidents.
It is necessary to continue the efforts to improve our preparedness for all these
situations.
Patients
Medical procedures represent the largest source of human-made radiation
exposures. There are 2 000 million medical x-ray investigations and 300 million
dental x-ray investigations made each year in the world. Most of them (3/4 and
9/10 respectively) are carried out on 1/4 of the world’s population (for which the
medical investigations give an effective dose per capita of 1.2 mSv/year). On top
of that there are 32 million investigations in diagnostic nuclear medicine and
5.5 million treatments per year in radiation therapy (UNSCEAR, 2000;
Shrimpton, 2001). In our part of the world, there has been a silent but dramatic
change of CT-investigations (more procedures, more scans per procedure).
Today CT accounts for 5% of the investigations but gives rise to 50(!)% of the
collective dose from diagnostic radiology. Interventional procedures,
increasingly being used to replace surgery, can lead to very high local skin
doses, in some cases exceeding the threshold for deterministic effects (ICRP,
2000). For most X-ray examinations, there are still too large inter-hospital
variations in doses for the same type of examination. Digital radiology, which
has the potential to lower the doses, for most investigations still shows higher
doses than conventional film-screen technique. On the other hand, the
development in mammography (in many countries used for repeated breast
cancer screening) shows how real improvements can be done. The average
18
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glandular dose has been reduced from 100 mGy (3 projections) in the 1970´s
with direct film to 1 mGy as a standard today (vacuum cassette, no grid) and a
potential for 0.2-0.3 mGy with the most recent digital technique (Hemdal et al.,
2002).
Personnel
The care for the personnel in radiology was the start of the radiation protection.
Today there are 2.7 million occupationally exposed persons of which 3/4 works
in the health care sector. The doses are very low in diagnostic radiology,
somewhat higher in nuclear medicine and still somewhat higher at nuclear
power stations. For personal dosimetry, there are some remaining dosimetric
problems related to the weighting of the neutron components in reactor
environments, at waste handling and at high-energy accelerators for
radiotherapy as well as for physics research.
“Plankton and plants” - organisms other than man
Up to now the radiation protection criteria have been based on minimising the
risk to humans. Today, the efforts are closely related to the discussion about a
sustainable environment which most of us welcome. It s a challenge to obtain
tools to assess and evaluate long-term consequences of radiation exposure to
the whole biosphere. Today much work is going on to define a limited set of
reference organisms with their relevant reference dose models and data sets
(Pentreath and Woodhead, 2001). We have to realise that this is a real long-
term project, with many parallels to the development of a “standard man”,
standard human biokinetic models and dose catalogues for man during the last
30 years.
What do we have in common and what can we learn from one another?
There are basic knowledge which is common for all branches of radiation
protection:
Radiobiology: The rapid development of cellular biochemistry and
molecular biology will have great impact on the understanding of the action of
radiation on cells, of DNA damage, repair processes and dose rate effects. It is
important that this information is translated into the theory and practice of
radiation protection as soon as there is consensus about the new data.
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Epidemiology: The current knowledge of health effects of ionising
radiation on populations, including the base for our current radiation
protection philosophy, the linear non-threshold hypothesis, is supported by a
number of human epidemiological studies. The most important is still the
follow up of the atomic bomb survivors at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Great
efforts have also been made to recognise excess leukaemia and solid cancers
among groups of patients and nuclear workers. For the latter groups, the doses
to the individuals have normally been too low and/or the groups too small to
provide significantly improved risk estimates. These studies have only
demonstrated that radiation risks can not greatly exceed current ICRP-
estimates. Apart from the new information on thyroid cancers in children due
to radioiodine, this statement also seems to be valid for the Chernobyl accident.
There is now another major source of information on the health effects of
human exposure emerging in the Southern Urals, from the follow up of the
nuclear workers at the plutonium production facility Mayak and of the people
who were exposed to fission products from Mayak that contaminated the Techa
river (Kellerer, 2002). Also other former Soviet facilities might give us new
independent risk data.
Radiation physics and dosimetry will continue to be critical as will
the detection methods: For the development of criteria for other species than
man, the development of a reliable dosimetry is as important as that for man
and an important cornerstone in the future course of progress in the field. It is
straight forward to extend the current MIRD dosimetry concept and other
types of Monte Carlo calculations to volumes of interest for other species than
man. For man, improved voxel phantoms useful for patients as well as for
occupationally exposed persons and for members of the general public need to
be developed. Much research related to diagnostic and therapeutic nuclear
medicine (e.g. biokinetic and metabolic studies) are also of interest for
occupational exposure and exposure of the general public and vice versa.
Development of new detectors and dosemeters will simplify experimental
research (amorphous silicon, new material for thermoluminescence and
optically stimulated luminescence dosimetry).
Effective dose, risk estimates and comparisons: The effective dose
concept was derived for occupationally exposed workers and was from the
beginning also intended for the general public. The concept has also been found
to be very practical for patients as medical exposures often are limited to
specific body parts or are very inhomogeneous in distribution. The concept of
effective dose has been an important instrument to get a dialogue about
radiation exposure and risks in medicine and between various areas of
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radiation protection. Especially in medicine, there is a need to develop a
weighted risk factor or a new way to calculate collective dose contributions, as
the typical patient is old and often also sick, and therefore has less life
expectancy during which late effects may occur than the average member of
the public.
The base and reference value for all our comparisons is the natural
background. The inclusion of the radon daughter component has introduced
confusion and continuos alterations of this basic reference value. I propose that
we again leave the radon daughter contribution to lungs and airways out and
use 1 mSv per year from cosmic radiation, natural potassium in the body and
external gamma radiation as a basis for our judgements on risk increments
from exposure from man-made sources.
Collective dose: The use of the concept collective dose has been debated
heavily during recent years. It is a logical consequence of the LNT-model (Lin-
dell, 2001) and is a sound instrument for planning and making priorities for
patients as well as for personnel.
Overall policy for radiation and other risk factors: It is of course
important that the criteria for ionising radiation are based on the same overall
policy as the criteria for other potentially harmful agents (non-ionising radiation,
chemicals, CO2, etc) which may affect man and nature. It is well-known that
radiation protection for long has been an important forerunner in formulating
safety criteria. Within medicine we need to widen our risk discussion, not just to
concentrate on radiation risks. We have for instance to include risks from X-ray
contrast agents and the risk to die in an MR-investigation due to flying metal
objects. We should also quantify the risk not to do an investigation. A problem lies
in the fact that the assessment of benefit seems to be even more difficult than
estimating radiation risks.
Use of existing information: Research in environmental radiation
protection has contributed to the understanding of global transport processes in
stratosphere, troposphere and atmosphere as well as in the marine environment.
This is information which also can be used to tell us much about the transport of
chlorinated hydrocarbons, heavy metal, other toxic substances and nutrients.
Much of the existing radiobiology is based on animal experiments - information
which could be of direct use for the protection of other species than man. It is also
important that we today take advantage of the old studies related to
environmental effects of radiation. One example is the investigations of effects of
radiation on an ecosystem level carried out during the cold war (Lidén, 1972) to
study the radiation effects of nuclear weapons. The research related to radiation
doses and effects on man has often also included the transfer of radionuclides in
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the environment and sometimes also doses to other species than man. It is
therefore likely that significant harm to population of other species would already
have been detected (Salo, 1999). Bioindicators are now again of interest because
they have high activity concentrations and therefore can be expected to be the first
species to show any effects. Attempts were done from time to time to calculate the
absorbed dose to these indicator organisms and to animals which were eating
them. New studies of bioindicators could hopefully be combined with studies of
markers for radiation effects developed in molecular biology so that dose/effect
information can be obtained. A “problem” is however that in most situations the
contamination is so low that the absorbed doses from the naturally occurring
radionuclides as 40K and 210Po totally dominate over the contributions from the
artificial radionuclides (such as 137Cs, 60Co, 99Tc and 239,240Pu). So again we perhaps
need large scale experimental studies.
High-level waste and other radioactive sources: The safe disposal of
our spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste will be a matter of continued
interest and importance for the future and acceptable disposal sites have to be
selected. This is a question which also has an ethical and a social dimension and is
much connected to the question of information and acceptance. There are also
other radioactive sources which need to be discussed. There have been 400
significant accidents involving sources of radiation: 3 000 people have been
exposed, of whom 100 have died from acute effects. Half of these fatalities have
been a result of accidents in medicine. Over 500 000 sources have been produced.
Of these about 100 000 are still in use (Renata Czarwinski of the German
Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz cited by Kendall, 2001). We have to keep track of
these sources and simplify their safe disposal.
Education and training: When discussing radiation protection in
medicine, we see a need for education of radiologists and referring physicians.
It is obvious that a specialist in diagnostic radiology should be familiar with
basic radiation protection and that is also the view of their own professional
organisations. However, this is not the case in all our Nordic countries.
Information and acceptance: We have to communicate the scientific
and technical facts to the public in an understandable way. We must never have
an attitude that this is so complicated that people can not understand it.
Information and participation is requested by individuals and local groups
including representatives for the communities which are candidates for
disposal of nuclear waste. Also patients expect to be adequately informed about
the radiation exposure connected to a proposed investigation or treatment,
about the benefits and risks, about the alternatives and about the duties of the
medical staff.
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ICRP and the Progress Towards New
Recommendations
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Abstract
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is currently
revising its recommen-dations and is considering a simpler individual-oriented
approach. The major changes will be an emphasis on the protection of individuals;
broadening of the concept of dose limits by adding a range of protective actions and
levels above which action should be taken; a distinction between protective actions
that can be applied to the source and those that can be applied to the pathways
from the source to the individuals; clarification of the dosimetric quantities; and a
framework for protection of non-human organisms. For the revision, ICRP has set
up a Task Group, consisting of the chairman, vice-chairman, and the chairman of
each of the Committees. This article presents some of the proposed changes in the
Commission’s recommendations for the start of the 21st century.
Introduction
ICRP’s advice is aimed principally at the regulators and managements that have
direct responsibility for establishing protection standards. The present
recommendations of ICRP were developed over some 30 years and published in
1991 [1]. The system has become increasingly complex, and it has in some respects
been difficult to explain the variations between different applications. The
Commission intends to simplify its system of protection and make it more
transparent [2]. The Commission will propose the following major changes:
• an emphasis on the protection of individuals;
• broadening of the concept of dose limits by adding a range of protective
actions and levels above which action should be taken;
• a distinction between protective actions that can be applied to the source
and those that can be applied to the pathways leading from the source to the doses
in individuals;
• clarification of the dosimetric quantities; and
• a framework for protection of non-human organisms.
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Underlying policies
There are several underlying policies for the revision of ICRP’s
recommendations. Where exposures can be avoided or controlled, there is a
duty to provide appropriate mini-mum levels of protection for the exposed
individuals and for society as a whole. Because there is some risk even from
small radiation exposures, there is a further duty to take steps to provide
higher levels of pro-tection. The global average annual effective dose from
natural sources is about 2.4 mSv [3], and radiological protection concerns the
incremental doses due to additional sources, many of which cannot be avoided
or controlled. In practice, protection is concerned with the risks at levels above
a few millisieverts in a year. The system of protection is concerned mainly with
the management of stochastic effects, as the total doses from all sources for
most individuals are well below the level that might cause determinis-tic
effects. At these dose levels, the probability of harm is presumed to be
proportional to the dose. Each source can be considered separately, and no sing-
le protective action can act on the total dose to an individual. For some
individuals, the dose from one or two sources may be high enough to cause
deterministic effects, and these sources will be dealt with outside the general
system of protection.
The recommendations can be applied only to situations in which either
the source of exposure or the pathways leading to the doses received by
individuals can be controlled. ICRP calls such sources controllable sources.
Individuals are exposed to both natural background radiation and to
controllable sources. There are also sources for which the resulting effective
dose are very low or for which the combination of dose and difficulty of applying
controls are such that the Commission will exclude them from its
recommendations.
The principle of justification: The responsi-bility for the justification
of a practice usually falls on governments or government authorities. ICRP will
apply its system of protection to practices that have been justified. Sources that
can be controlled only by environmental action may have been introduced by
previous practices. Because these sources already exist, justification is not
relevant and they are therefore within the scope of the recommendations. In
medicine, there are three levels of justification: (1) the use of radiation is
accepted as doing more good than harm, and its justification is now taken for
granted; (2) a specified procedure with a specified objective is defined and
justified; and (3) the application of the procedure to an individual patient
should be justified.
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Natural sources: ICRP has recommendations for protection against
radon-222 in dwellings and workplaces [4], and the Commission will propose
that the existing recommendations continue because they have wide
acceptance. The regulatory authorities are expected to set Action Levels below
which exposures are excluded from the system of protection. The Exposures to
cosmic rays at ground level are not controllable, and they will be excluded from
the scope of the recommendations. ICRP has previously recommended that the
exposures of aircrew should be treated as occupational exposure in its system
of protection, and there is no justification for including doses to members of the
public.
Medical sources: Medical uses of radiation for patients require
separate guidance, because limitation of the dose to the individual patient is
not recommended as it may reduce the effectiveness of the patient’s diagnosis
or treatment. Instead the emphasis is on the justification of the medical
procedures, and the optimisation concentrates on the requirement to keep the
doses to patients as low as is consistent with the medical objectives. Diagnostic
Reference Levels are used to indicate that, in routine conditions, the dose to the
patient from a specified diagnostic procedure should not normally exceed the
reference level for that procedure.
Dosimetric quantities: Effective dose will be the principal quantity for
use in radiological protection. For the purpose of managing a radiation injury
in an individual, estimates of absorbed dose, possibly weighted by the
radiation-weighting factor, will be needed. Radiation-weighting factors are
deter-mined by the characteristics of the type and energy of the radiation. The
existing tissue-weighting factors are based on complex reasoning, and not
solely on the fatality risk. The two types of weighting factors need some
simplification and values have yet to be selected.
The revised system of protection
The revised system of protection will contain a structure of practical
recommendations for protective actions associated with each relevant source.
These actions will be aimed at providing a necessary basic level of protection for
individuals, and the standard is set by a structure of conditions, Protective
Action Levels, requiring specified protective actions. Optimisation of
protection is needed to provide the best level of protection of individuals. In
addition to the protection of individuals, the application of the optimisation of
protection should be applied to groups. This system of protecting individuals
and groups will be similar to the previous system, and will allow the protection
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to be applied with emphasis on the areas where protection is most needed. The
Protective Action Levels will replace the old dose limits, intervention levels,
action levels, constraints and exemption levels, and each protective action level
will be associated with the action to be taken. Where available, protective
actions applied at the source are to be preferred. ICRP will provide guidance
about the protective action levels and the associated types of protective action
and about the optimisation of protection. The guidance will be broadly
consistent with the 1990 recommendations [1] but with a different emphasis.
The new Protective Action Levels can provide the basis for international
agreements on restriction of dose or exposure. This is not sufficient and
additional requirements are needed to achieve a sufficient standard of
protection for individuals. ICRP will specify the combination of protective
action and Protective Action Level for a single source and a representative
individual. In most situations, there is more than one source and more than one
type of individual. If doses are high enough to call for protective action, one
source is usually found to be predominant. Each of the combinations can then
be applied separately.
The dose used in the Protective Action Levels applies to an individual.
There are at least three types of exposed individuals, namely patients; specially
trained workers; and general workers and the public. The exposure of patients
is usually voluntary and medical exposure of patients will be therefore dealt
with separately. Workers in ‘controlled workplaces’ are specially trained. The
general workers and of members of the public have little influence over their
exposures and they should be treated as a separate group.
There are several factors that influence the choice of Protective Action
Levels. The global average effective dose from natural sources excluding radon
is about 1 mSv per year, and this dose can be a starting point for selecting
protective action levels. The natural background provides no justification for
additional exposures, but it can be used as a basis of judgement about the
importance of other exposures. Additional doses of about 100 times this dose
are likely to be a matter of high concern. Additional doses from justified
practices far below the natural annual dose should not be of concern to the
individual or to society. In the intermediate region, the doses are sometimes a
legitimate matter for significant concern, calling for protective action. A
general scheme for the degree of concern and the level of exposure as a fraction
or multiple of the average natural background, excluding radon, is shown in
Table 1.
ICRP will propose a general Protective Action Level of 100 mSv. At
higher individual doses, the risk from a source cannot be justified, except in
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extraordinary situations, such as space flights or life-saving measures in
accidents. No protective action will be called for if the effective dose is less than
0.01 mSv in a year. It is not possible to receive a dose of 0.01 mSv in isolation,
and, therefore, the associated risk is for increments above background and to
associate a risk with 0.01 mSv is meaningless. At higher levels of exposure,
some tens of mSv, the total dose may be associated with a risk using the
nominal risk coefficients. ICRP will give more advice on this issue. The
recommended Protective Action Levels and the associated actions are shown in
Table 2.
The optimisation of protection
Because of the presumption that there is some adverse health effect from
exposures to ionising radiation even at small doses, ICRP’s recommendations
include a requirement to optimise protection for a given source. This requires
the achievement of the best level of protection that is reasonable. Doses below
about 0.01 mSv in a year, or less than one percent of the background dose
excluding radon, from a source need not be regarded as significant for this
purpose. The optimisation of protection applies to the protection of single
individuals and also to the protection of groups. This optimisation procedure is
essentially one of judge-ment and this process may best be carried out by
involving all those most directly concerned, including operators, regulators,
and representatives of those exposed, in determining or in negotiating the best
level of protection. ICRP’s recommendations need not deal with this degree of
societal process.
In addition to the protection of individuals, there is an additional
requirement to protect groups, taking account of the changes in both the level
of dose and the number of individuals affected. No single property of this
distribution is adequate for making these comparisons, and for most purposes
Table 1. Levels of concern and individual effective dose in a year in relation to the
average natural background, excluding radon.
Level of Concern Effective Dose (mSv) 
High > 100 x 
Raised > 10 x 
‘Normal’ Natural Background (1-10) 
Low < 0.1 x 
None < 0.01 x 
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several indicators will have to be used. For the protection of groups, the
minimum combination of parameters would be the arithmetic mean dose and
the number of individuals in the group. The product of these two parameters,
the collective dose, is of limited utility because it aggregates the information
excessively. This concept was introduced originally to facilitate cost-benefit
analysis, and as a means of restricting the uncontrolled build-up of exposure to
long-lived radionuclides in the environment from what was, at the time,
imagined to be a global expansion of nuclear facilities. A large dose to a few
people is not equivalent to a small dose to many people, and the collective dose
should not be used in making decisions. To avoid excessive aggregation, it will
often be helpful to present the necessary information in the form of a matrix.
Protection of the environment
ICRP has, up till now, not dealt with environmental protection, and there are
therefore no ICRP recommendations as to how radiological protection of the
environment should be carried out. The human habitat has probably been afforded
a fairly high level of protection through the application of the current system for
protecting humans. There is, however, no internationally endorsed system or
criteria to demonstrate how, and to what extent, the environment is protected.
Given the lack of a systematic and structured approach that has wide support,
there are strong expectations from many quarters on the ICRP to act. ICRP has
Table 2. Recommended protective action levels and the associated actions.
Exposed Group Protective Action Level1 Associated Action 
All situations 
All  < 0.01 mSv Exclude from the system of protection 
Prolonged situations 
Members of the public 
and general workers  
Radiation workers 
0.1 mSv 
20 mSv 
Reduce doses  
Reduce doses  
Single events and accidents 
Members of the public, 
general workers 
Radiation workers 
5 mSv 
50 mSv 
1000 mSv (long-term) 
1000 mSv 
Advise sheltering in buildings 
Arrange short-term evacuation 
Arrange long-term relocation 
Upper level for planned emergency work 
 1 The values are taken from ICRP Publications 60, 63, 64, 77 and 82. 
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therefore set up a Task Group with the aim of developing a protection policy for,
and suggesting a frame-work of, protection of non-human organisms.
The ICRP Task Group does not intend to define dose limits for biota. It will
recommend a framework that can be used to provide high-level advice and
guidance and help regulators and operators demonstrate compliance with existing
environmental legislation. It is also necessary to develop an international system
that is practical and that acknowledges the present level of knowledge concerning
radiation effects on biota.
Although the Task Group has not yet finally decided on the objectives for the
environment, these might be to safeguard the environment by preventing or
reducing the frequency of effects likely to cause early mortality, reduced
reproductive success, or the occurrence of observable cytogenetic effects in
individual fauna and flora to a level where they would have a negligible impact on
conservation of species, maintenance of biodiversity, or the health and status of
natural habitats or communities. To achieve these objectives, a set of reference
dose models, reference dose per unit intake and external exposure values will
required, plus reference data sets of doses and effects for both man and the
environment.
At its meeting in May, 2002, the Main Commission gave strong support to
the work of the Task Group and emphasized the need to develop a system along the
lines described above. The Task Group’s report will be put on ICRP’s website for
consultation this year and will also be discussed at international meetings over the
next two years.
Discussion
ICRP’s system of protection has evolved over time as our understanding of
underlying mechanisms has increased, and substantial revisions are made at
intervals of about 10-15 years. The ideas of the ongoing revision have already
been published in international journals and promulgated through the
International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA). It is therefore likely
that any system designed for the radiological protection of the environment
would also take time to develop, and similarly be subject to revision as new
information is obtained and experience gained in putting it into practice.
The Commission wishes to see an on-going debate over the next few
years, and in 2004 the proposal for new recommendations on radiological
protection will be discussed at the 11th IRPA conference in Madrid. The new set
of Recommendations will be adopted by the Commission in 2005. This will be 15
years after the current recommendations were adopted.
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Epidemiological evidence of cancer risk -
implication for low dose risk assessment and LNT
concept
Per Hall
The major strength of epidemiological studies is that human beings are under
study; risk is thus not extrapolated from animal data or derived from molecular
studies. When interpreting the results it has to be kept in mind, however, that
there are several weaknesses in epidemiological studies, especially studying
low doses and their effects.
Epidemiological studies are observational rather than experimental in
their design. This is particularly true for what is called etiological
epidemiological studies. It would, for instance, probably be very hard
convincing any ethical committee of a study where individuals are exposed to
different levels of a compound if the compound is considered harmful, e.g.
ionising radiation or smoking. On the other hand, people often, willingly or not,
expose themselves to harmful factors and we thus have to rely on populations
that have been exposed due to reasons beyond our control.
A specific feature of etiological epidemiological studies is that there is no
possibility to tell if a specific carcinogen caused a cancer. Although molecular
geneticists are trying to identify alterations that imply that a specific
etiological agent caused a malignancy, however, no reliable tool is available
today. We thus still have to depend on statistical differences between exposed
and non-exposed populations. Models extrapolating risks for intermediate and
high doses to low dose situations are necessary because of the inability of
epidemiological studies to evaluate small effects of the exposure variables.
During the past decades extensive research on the long-term effects of
ionising radiation has been conducted and epidemiological studies have
contributed to our present knowledge. There are a number of populations
under study and the most important source is the Japanese atomic bomb
survivors. The data derived form this cohort has been used for determining
exposure standards to protect the public and the workforce from harmful
effects of ionising radiation.
The major exposure to low dose and low dose-rate radiation derives from
medical tests, occupational, and environmental situations. The established
model for determining carcinogenic effects at low doses in radiation protection
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is based on the hypothesis that the cancer incidence increases with radiation
dose. Most national and international bodies have adopted a so-called linear
no-threshold model. The major implication of the no-threshold model for
stochastic effects is that all doses, regardless of how low they are, must be
considered potential carcinogenic.
Important examples from major studies, strengths and weaknesses, will
be presented and discussed.
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The latest news from radiobiology  – implications
for risk assessment
Sisko Salomaa
STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Research and Environmental
Surveillance, P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881 Helsinki, Finland
A change in radiobiological paradigm
A basic paradigm in radiobiology is that, after exposure to ionising radiation,
the deposition of energy in the cell nucleus and the resulting damage to DNA,
the primary target, are responsible for the harmful biological effects of
radiation.  The radiation-induced changes are thought to be fixed already in the
first cell division following the radiation exposure and health effects are
considered to result as a consequence of clonal proliferation of cells carrying
mutations in specific genes.
These basic assumptions have recently been challenged by new research
findings on radiation-induced genomic instability and bystander effects.
Genomic instability
It has been observed that the progeny of irradiated cells show occurrence of
new mutations and/or new chromosomal aberrations or other genomic damage
for many generations.  Affected progeny also demonstrate high levels of lethal
mutation, which may be measured as delayed reproductive cell death and/or
delayed apoptosis.  These delayed effects occur in cells that were not exposed to
radiation.
 Genomic instability occurs in the progeny of irradiated cells at a
frequency that is several orders of magnitude higher than would be expected
for a mutation of a specific gene.   Therefore a mutation in a repair gene is not
a likely explanation for the induction of genomic instability.
Induction of genomic instability has been demonstrated after very low
doses of radiation. Using a microbeam exposure system, it has been shown that
a single alpha particle is able to induce chromosomal instability in the progeny
of cultured human cells. This is indeed the lowest possible dose of densely
ionising alpha particles to cells.
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Genomic instability is induced both by high-LET and low-LET radiation,
but not all cell lines show this effect.  Animal studies indicate that some mouse
strains are genetically more susceptible to genomic instability induction than
others.  These strains also show a higher susceptibility to radiation-induced
malignancy.
Existing data of radiation-induced genomic instability suggests that
perpetuation involves non-traditional inheritance (stable non-mutational
changes or epigenetic mechanisms).  Increased oxidative stress seems to be a
long term characteristic of the progeny of irradiated cells.  The increased oxy-
radical generation is maintained by a signal produced by the irradiated cells in
the culture medium.
Bystander effect
Nontargeted or bystander effects are harmful changes in cells that were not
directly hit by radiation but were nearby.   The signal can be transferred via the
culture medium (‘clastogenic factors’) or cell-to-cell communication (inhibition
of cell communication prevents bystander effects).
Bystander effects are not new.  Starting from the 1960’s, there is
extensive literature on clastogenic factors and other ‘compounds’ that
stimulate or modify responses in cells that were not damaged.  More recently, it
has been shown that the changes in neighbouring cells include changes in gene
expression and mutation induction.  Moreover, it has been shown that the me-
dium from irradiated human epithelial cells reduces the clonogenic survival of
nonirradiated cells.  This observation implicates a secreted factor that can kill
undamaged cells and that appears to involve reactive oxygen species.
Modern microbeam exposure systems capable of exposing single cells or
even defined cellular organelles to charged particles or ultra soft X-rays have
also facilitated research on bystander effects.  Irradiation of cellular cytoplasm
with either a single or an exact number of alpha particles has been shown to
result in gene mutation in the nucleus.
It has been proposed that the bystander response is the initiating event
in  radiation-induced genomic instability.
Implications for risk assessment
The main source of information on radiation-induced human cancer risk
comes from epidemiological data on exposed populations.  However, direct
information is available only at relatively large doses, and mostly from low-LET
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radiations (X- and gamma rays).  A linear extrapolation from this data is
applied at lower doses, which are more relevant in terms of exposure to the
general population and radiation workers.  Additional extrapolation is applied
to other radiation types.  The shape of the dose response curve for cancer at low
doses is a matter of constant debate. Arguments range from a threshold or even
beneficial effect of small radiation doses (hormesis) to non-threshold
supralinear responses (implying that small doses are more hazardous than
previously assumed).
Radiation-induced genomic instability and bystander effects both
indicate that deleterious effects can be observed in cells that were not
irradiated.  These effects are similar to those occurring in irradiated cells.
Genomic instability and bystander effects are observed already after very low
doses.  In fact, some dose response data indicate that the relative contribution
of these indirect effects as compared to damage caused by direct hits may well
be more pronounced in the low dose region.
Indirect radiation effects such as genomic instability and bystander
effects may be important early steps in the development of radiation-induced
cancer.  Understanding of underlying mechanisms may have profound
consequences on the cancer risk assessment, and these events could potentially
be incorporated into biological modelling of tumorigenic responses in the
future.
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SESSION 2. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
INFORMATION AND ETHICS
Protection of the Environment: Current ICRP Work
and EC-Funded Research
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Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SE-171 16 Stockholm, Sweden
Introduction
The requirement for assessments of the environmental effects of radiation, i.e.
effects on non-human biota, is increasing due to growing public concern for
environmental protection issues and integration of environmental impact
assessments into the regulatory process. Thus, there is a strong need to establish a
framework for the assessment of environmental impact of ionising radiation, as
well as a system for protection of the environment from ionising radiation. These
ambitions are reflected in a number of international efforts and various ‘systems’
have been proposed or are under development [1-7]. This paper considers the
current discussions on environmental protection within the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), as part of the Commission’s
ongoing revision of its recommendations as laid out in Publication 60 [8].
Furthermore, the paper reviews work within the EC-funded FASSET (Framework
for ASSessment of Environmental impacT) project [9]. The concepts developed
both by ICRP and FASSET are similar, and the FASSET approach and results may
illustrate how forthcoming ICRP recommendations could be turned into practical
application.
The ICRP Task Group on Protection of the Environment
Previously, the ICRP has not explicitly dealt with protection of the environment, except
in those situations where radionuclide levels in non-human organisms were of
relevance for the protection of man [8]. Hence, there is little ICRP guidance as to
how radiological protection of the environment directly should be carried out, or
why. There are several reasons why ICRP now has considered it necessary to revise
its position and future role with regard to protection of the environment, including:
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• the need to demonstrate that radiological protection principles are
consistent with existing international conventions and recognise the inter-
dependence of man and other components of the environment;
• the necessity for operators and regulators to demonstrate compliance
with existing international and national environmental requirements;
• the need to provide advice with respect to intervention situations; and
• the necessity to demonstrate explicitly how knowledge of the potential
extent of effects of ionising radiation on the environment can be used to inform
stakeholders.
To this effect, the Commission set up a Task Group in the year 2000 with
the aim of developing a protection policy framework for environmental
protection. The conceptual framework of this area of work would then feed into
the Commission’s recommendations for the beginning of the 21st century.
The Task Group has limited its scope to effects of radiation on non-
human biota; effects on abiotic components of the environment have been
excluded. Although it may be completely legitimate and justified for various
reasons to consider also the abiotic components, it is highly unlikely that there
will be radiation effects in those components under ambient radiation levels;
hence, the limitation of scope.
A common approach for protection of man and the environment
For biotic components of the environment, it is knowledge of the dose to, and
effects on, individuals that forms the initial basis for drawing conclusions on
what actions that need to be taken in different exposure situations. For human
beings, the Reference Man [10] is the primary reference for dose assessments,
supported by a secondary set of data for a foetus, a child etc. Such data enable
dose estimates to be made for ‘hypothetical’ or representative individuals
under different circumstances of exposure. For environmental protection, a
similar set of primary reference fauna and flora, or reference organisms, has
been proposed as representatives of the biotic component of the environment
[5], and this approach is also used in FASSET.
The selection criteria for reference organisms will include many
scientific considerations, and will depend on to what extent they are considered
to be typical representative fauna or flora of particular ecosystems. A reference
organism does not represent an average or a sentinel organism, but would
serve as a point of reference for making comparisons with other sets of
information on other organisms.  The ICRP Task Group intends to propose a
stylised system for radiological protection of the environment, harmonised
with the principles for the radiological protection of man along the lines
described above. This system will be designed so that it can be integrated with
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methods that are already in use in some countries. The objectives of a common
approach to protect man and the environment might be to safeguard human
health by
• preventing the occurrence of deterministic effects;
• limiting stochastic effects in individuals and minimising them in
populations;
• and to safeguard the environment by
• preventing or reducing the frequency of effects likely to cause early
mortality, reduced reproductive success, or scorable DNA damage in individual
organisms to a level where they would have a negligible impact on
• conservation of species, maintenance of biodiversity, or the health and status
of natural habitats or communities.
A common approach to the achievement of these objectives could be centred
on a set of reference dose models, reference dose per unit intake and external
exposure values, plus reference data sets of doses and effects for both man and the
environment. Such models have already been used and are being further
developed with FASSET.
FASSET
FASSET is an EC 5th Framework Programme project, comprising 15 partners in
Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK. FASSET aims at
providing a formal framework for the assessment of radiation effects on biota and
ecosystems, to assist decisionmakers and stakeholders when judging the
environmental impact of radioactive contaminants. The project started in the year
2000 and will end in 2003. The project has the following practical objectives, also
largely shared with a similar project oriented to the Arctic environment, EPIC
(Environmental Protection from Ionising Contaminants in the Arctic):
• to provide a set of reference organisms relevant to different exposure
situations.
• to provide a set of exposure models for the reference organisms;
• to examine data on biological effects on individual, population and
ecosystem levels; and
• to review existing frameworks for environmental assessment.
3.1   Reference organisms
FASSET’s working definition of the reference organism is: “a series of entities
that provide a basis for the estimation of radiation dose rate to a range of
organisms which are typical, or representative, of a contaminated environment.
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These estimates, in turn, would provide a basis for assessing the likelihood and
degree of radiation effects”. The project has initially defined a number of
candidate reference organisms on the basis of characterization of ecological
characteristics, important pathways and radionuclide transfer processes in
major European ecosystems (semi-natural ecosystems including pastures,
agricultural ecosystems, wetlands, forests, fresh-water ecosystems, marine
ecosystems and brackish ecosystems (Table 1).
Table 1. Candidate reference organisms identified from an exposure pathways analysis.
The approach taken towards their selection should ensure that suitable
reference organisms are available for a range of scenarios (chronic and acute
exposure) and for different European ecosystems. The complete list of
candidate reference organisms and the reasoning behind their selection is
found in project Deliverable 1 [11], available on www.fasset.org.
Exposure analysis for various reference organisms
A number of radionuclide transfer models developed for different ecosystems
will be used for tabulation of external and internal radionuclide
concentrations. Furthermore, tabulations will be made to allow conversion of
concentrations in the environmental media, and internally, to absorbed dose
(rates); this will include consideration of the relative biological effectiveness
(RBE) of different radiation types in the development of appropriate radiation
weighting factors (wr) for the organisms, endpoints and dose rates of concern.
The estimation of external exposure has initially focused on organisms in
the terrestrial environment, and Monte-Carlo calculations have been used to
Terrestrial ecosystems Aquatic ecosystems 
Soil Herbaceous 
layer 
Canopy Sediment Water column 
Soil micro-
organisms  
Soil 
invertebrates, 
‘worms’ 
Plants and fungi 
Burrowing 
mammals
Bryophytes 
Grasses, herbs 
and crops 
Shrubs 
Above ground 
in-vertebrates 
Herbivorous 
mammals
Carnivorous 
mammals
Reptiles 
Vertebrate eggs 
Amphibians 
Birds 
Trees  
Invertebrates 
Benthic bacteria 
Benthic
invertebrates, 
‘worm’ 
Molluscs 
Crustaceans 
Vascular plants  
Amphibians
Fish 
Fish eggs 
Wading birds 
Sea mammals 
Phytoplankton 
Zooplankton 
Macroalgae 
Fish
Sea mammals 
40
STUK-A195
estimate external exposure for various reference organisms. As an example,
Figure 1 presents the dose conversion factor for a mole, which is exposed to a
planar g-source on top of the soil. The dose conversion factor (DCF) increases in
proportion to the g-energy, and decreases with increasing depth of the target
due to the increasing shielding effect of the overlying soil layer. The differences
in shielding are more pronounced for low energies.
Figure 1.  Comparison of the DCF for a mole as function of the g-energy and the depth of
the target for a homogeneous planar source at the top of the soil.
For estimating internal exposures to biota, a set of organisms, sizes and
energies have been defined that allow the assessment of exposures to a wide
range of possible species. The most important quantity to assess internal
exposures is the fraction of energy absorbed in the organism; this depends on
the radiation type, the energy and the size and geometry of the reference
organism. As a first step, a homogeneous distribution in the reference
organisms will be considered. Additionally, radionuclide accumulations in
specific organs, e.g., the thyroid and the gonads, will be simulated. Then, the
dose for this specified organ will be calculated.
For the reference plants defined as herbaceous vegetation, shrub and
tree, the exposure will be calculated for the meristem and the buds. These
organs are characterized by very intensive cell division, which may cause
high radiosensitivity. For the distribution of the radionuclides in the canopy,
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a distinction is made between a-, b-, and  g-radiation due to their different
ranges. For g-radiation the whole canopy is considered to be a homogeneously
contaminated source of radiation. For high energy b-radiation, the irradiation
of the target is also assumed to occur from a homogeneously contaminated
canopy. However, due to the much shorter range of a- and low energy b-
radiation, the irradiation from the external or internal contamination of the
target organ has to be considered explicitly.
Biological effects of ionizing radiation
FASSET concentrates on four ‘umbrella effects’ that when expressed in the
individual may not only affect the fitness of the individiual per se, but that may
also be of significance at the population level:
• morbidity (including growth rate, effects on the immune system, and the
behavioural consequences of damage to the central nervous system from
radiation exposure in the developing embryo);
• mortality (including stochastic effect of somatic mutation and
deterministic effects in particular tissues or organs that would change the age-
dependent death rate);
• reduced reproductive success (including fertility and fecundity);
• cytogenetic effects (i.e. indicator of mutation induction in germ and
somatic cells).
These four categories are not mutually exclusive, e.g., effects leading to
changes in morbidity may result in a change in the age-dependent death rate,
and an increase in mutation rate may lead to changes in reproductive success.
They simply provide a convenient means of summarizing the available
information in a structured way that is meaningful within the objectives of
FASSET. In order to organize the available information on biological effects in a
useful way for the framework, a database is being built; it is aimed at relating
dose or dose rate to effects for the specific purpose of FASSET [12]. The
collection of data for the database is currently ongoing.
Framework
The general structure of existing frameworks for environmental risk
assessment has been considered to be appropriate also for FASSET; i.e., a
division of the assessment into three stages: problem formulation, risk
assessment, and risk management [13]. The risk management stage lies
outside the scope of the project. The emphasis is on the development of tools
42
STUK-A195
and data for the risk assessment phase of this ecological risk assessment and
management process. However, the construction of the framework must be
flexible in order to take into account the various risk management options, as
well as societal concern defined in the formulation stage, as these influence
(and ultimately must make use of) the way in which a risk assessment is
carried out. The way in which problem formulation is carried out in the
different assessment systems studied differ, depending mainly on the different
aims and philosophies of the assessments. The framework must be appropriate
for problems of varying formulation, e.g., FASSET must:
• be able to take into account ongoing, past and future releases;
• be able to take into account chronic and acute effects;
• be appropriate for assessments carried out for various purposes, e.g.,
licensing, demonstration of compliance, assessment of accidents, and decisions
concerning remediation.
Some of the elements of other frameworks will be included and
appropriately adapted within FASSET, together with a justification for the
approach taken. This information will be presented in Deliverable 2 of the
project, due by the end of 2002, and will be publicly available at the project
website.
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Abstract
The paper summarizes the results of two studies and aim at presenting new
developments in the area of risk communication research. The first study was
conducted within a Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS/SOS-1) project in
2000 where nuclear power personnel as well as politicians and administrators
of a Swedish nuclear community participated in focus group discussions and
questionnaire studies. The project aimed at pinpointing areas of perceived
difficulty regarding the understanding and communication of nuclear safety
issues. Central themes of the discussions included e.g. presentation of PSA-
results, mutual expectations, roles, criteria for selecting and prioritizing
abundant information, use of information channels, use of persons’ knowledge
and experiences, and use of terminology. Three main areas were outlined in the
subsequent questionnaires, i.e. problems in information transmission,
handling specific situations, and ways to improve the communication situation.
Comparisons could be made between nuclear experts and politicians/
administrators on the basis of the resulting indices of the questionnaire, and
the similarities of and differences between the groups are discussed in the
paper. The study may have an impact on the local safety council of elected
representatives in terms of agenda setting and internal communication
procedures. The second study was ordered by the Swedish Nuclear
Inspectorate (SKI) and asked for an evaluation of a number of public hearings
conducted in six Swedish municipalities in 2001. The municipalities had
previously been involved in feasibility studies for investigating their qualities
for a possible future repository for high level nuclear waste. The hearings were
planned and carried through in accordance with the ideas of a transparent
communication and decision making process previously outlined within the
RISCOM and RISCOM II-projects in Sweden and EU (see e.g. Andersson,
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Espejo & Wene, 1998. Building channels for transparent risk assessment. SKI
Report 98:6.Stockholm:SKI). Presentations by the implementer, The Swedish
Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co ( SKB), were followed by group
discussions, and questions to SKB as well as to the nuclear authorities.
Questionnaires asking for evaluations of the procedures showed satisfaction
among all groups involved and pointed to a number of lessons learned. It was
concluded e.g.  that transparency in decision making can be enhanced by public
hearings although a transparent process in not sufficient for public acceptance
of a repository.
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Existing foodstuff regulations promote risk
miscommunication
Christer Samuelsson
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SE 221 85 Lund
Abstract
The respect for, not to say the fear of, radioactive materials, in lay community is
ubiquitous. The lay concern in a low-dose accident scenario, such as the Chernobyl
accident fallout in the Nordic countries, makes radiation risk information in clear
and understandable terms more important than intervention. The reason is that
otherwise the negative non-radiological effects may easily outweigh the radiation
carcinogenic and genetic effects. Evidently the radiation expert must in the low-
dose accident scenario abandon ALARA and widen the focus to include also all
conceivable non-radiological consequences, immediate or delayed, positive or
negative.
In this contribution only a minor part related to this huge and complex risk
optimising area is treated, namely food stuff regulations. It is concluded that the
easy-to-control trading limits expressed in Bq/kg must be secondary to a radiation
limit expressed in intake of activity per year (or a similar long period of time). Only
the latter limit is risk significant enough to be launched and advocated by an
authority responsible for radiation protection.
The Chernobyl accident came as a shock to all groups of people including
media. The surprise combined with the unfamiliar technical terminology led to a
unique mass-media feature reporting the accident, at least in the dominating news
medium, the television. Compared to conventional accidents, much less of the news
material was filtered through journalists, instead the radiation expertise were
given plenty of live time on television to describe and comment the Chernobyl
consequences. It is essential to have this feature in mind. It indicates that a pursuit
of self-criticism is more relevant than trying to blame the mass media coverage,
when summarizing the less than successful Chernobyl risk information. Blaming
public ignorance is no good either, as any risk information must be on the level of
the receiver. Radiation experts and authorities were not able to ease the public’s
anxiety, instead regulations and advice launched, added to it, and worse,  messages
and behaviour seemed confusing and contradictory. It is also important to note
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that non-expert (in radiation that is) authorities, literate and well-educated people
were confused. A comic strip by Stroyer in the leading morning newspaper Dagens
Nyheter illustrates the ambiguity. In this single strip, published less than a week
after the accident, a character with a gas-mask says “No danger”. Another grade
comes from the Swedish Gallup Institute interviewing a representative group of
Swedes on two occasions in May 1986. On May 1, a few days after the accident, 22
% of Swedes suspected that authorities were hiding the dangers of radioactivity.
On May 25, despite the frequent appearance of radiation experts on prime time
television, the corresponding figure was 35 %.
    This loss of trust is serious. In any emergency situation in which people
are, or believe they are, in danger, it is of prime importance from an information
point of view, to build up a trustful relation. People take advice only from informers
that they trust and believe have relevant knowledge. For most other information
they close their ears. Considering the fact that radiation experts and authorities in
1986 presented their views honestly and with the best of intentions, indicates that
there must have been something wrong with their message. A major cause for the
loss of credibility lies with the foodstuff regulation, which rightly caused a lot of
indignation among people. Instead of emphasising that the yearly-consumed
activity is the primary concern, the intervention level expressed in Bq/kg was the
frontier quantity, misleading the public to believe that this level was the borderline
between safety and harm. And worse, no distinction was made between basic food
and e.g. spices, the same intervention level of 300 Bq/kg was enforced. Today we
have differentiated trading limits and they are essential and necessary in order to
create confidence when buying and selling food. But differentiated trading limits
do not resolve the problem at stake, the credibility between the radiation expert
and the public. In the absence of a risk relevant radiation limit expressed as an
annual limit of activity, any trading limit will in the public eye be the difference
between safe and danger.
    In order to minimise future lay/expert distrust concerning radioactivity, it
is essential that the focus be on yearly intake of activity instead of trading limits.
All listings of trading limits, including Codex Alimentarius, must firmly state
limits (or recommendations) of yearly intakes of activity and stress that these
limits are primary. Besides being risk relevant, primary food levels in Bq/y open up
for people’s own decisions concerning consumption. It is of great psychological
value that the individual himself can decide what to eat, especially for farmers,
hunters etc living partly on non-commercial food. The risk information quality
from the public point of view, will improve significantly if it is made clear that the
primary limits enforced contain a margin of safety and give a dose comparable
to a typical medical X-ray investigation.
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Optimering av strålskyddet efter ett
Tjernobylliknande nedfall
Karl J. Johanson
Institutionen för skoglig mykologi och patologi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
Box 7026, 750 07 Uppsala
Under våren 2002 har det i Sverige diskuterats om de svenska gränsvärdet för
Cs-137 som SSI beslöt om våren 1986 (300 Bq av Cs-137 per kg) var för lågt
satta. I debatten får man intrycket att gränsvärdet var mycket för lågt men den
vetenskapliga bevisföringen för att så är fallet är minst sagt undermålig.
Optimering av strålskyddet är en viktig strålskyddsåtgärd och skall
egentligen ske även om gränsvärdet medger högre halter. Jag skall försöka
beskriva hur jag skulle vilja se en optimering av de åtgärder som bör vidtagas
i händelse av en ny deponering av radiocesium. Detta gör jag med en
erfarenhet från hur Tjernobylnedfallet har påverkat bl. a. jordbruk och
renskötsel och hur frågan har hanterats av olika myndigheter i Sverige från
1986 och framåt. Jag anser att jag dessutom kan göra detta helt oberoende av
olika myndigheter som var inblandade i hanteringen av Tjernobylnedfallet –
det är inte något försvarstal för myndigheter. Mitt resonemang baseras på
dagens kunskap om riskerna med inducering av cancer orsakat av joniserande
strålning d.v.s. ICRPs riskbedömningar från 1990 som måste anses vara den
bästa riskuppskattningen som vi har med dagens kunskap. I första hand
kommer jag att diskutera kostnader för några motåtgärder som kan vara
aktuella och komma fram till vilka gränsvärden som kan anses vara
vetenskapligt och ekonomiskt motiverade. Eftersom mjölken är den absolut
viktigaste transportören av radiocesium till människan diskuterar jag
radiocesium i mjölk.
Det första man måste bestämma sig för är vilken risknivå som kan anses
vara acceptabel när det gäller kontaminering av vår föda. I livsmedelsfallet
anser man att för mutagena och cancerogena kemikalier är en risknivå på 1 på
100.000 till 1 på miljonen acceptabel. När det gäller joniserande strålning – i
detta specifika fall strålning orsakat av intag av radionuklider från Tjernobyl -
anges ofta 1 på 20.000 som en acceptabel risknivå. Ett ofta förekommande
påstående är att man accepterar en större risk när det gäller kemikalier i vår
föda jämfört med strålning från radioaktiva ämnen – är det någon skillnad är
det snarare så att vi tolererar en större risk när det gäller strålning. Trots allt
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utgår jag från ambitionen att hålla risknivån på 1 på 20.000 som varande en
acceptabel risk. Det motsvarar i stort sett risken att under ett år omkomma i en
trafikolycka. Skillnaden är att Tjernobylnedfallet var en påtvingad risk medan
trafikolyckor åtminstone delvis innebär ett frivilligt riskåtagande. En effektiv
stråldos av 1 mSv ger just risken 1 på 20.000 – alltså skulle 1 mSv per år kunna
anses vara en acceptabel extra stråldos. Det finns dock många olika åsikter om
detta. Det motsvarar ett intag av Cs-137 på omkring 75.000 Bq under ett år.
Om vi skulle få ett nytt Tjernobylliknanade nedfall har vi dessutom Cs-134
med och detta innebär att intag av omkring 40.000 Bq av Cs-137 under det
första året skulle ge 1 mSv. Vi kan alltså acceptera intag av 40.000 Bq av Cs-137
under första året efter ett Tjernobylnedfall. Jag förenklar resonemanget genom
att inte ta med jodisotoper i diskussionen. Nästa steg är att fastställa ett
gränsvärde för Cs-137 i mjölk alternativt att optimera insatserna för att
reducera överföring av Cs-137 till människa via födan. Detta bör ske genom att
balansera kostnaden för en viss motåtgärd med den nytta, d.v.s. den stråldos
man kan ta bort genom att sätta in en viss motåtgärd. Ur beräkningssynpunkt
är det enklast att gå ut från att vi helt enkelt häller bort mjölken. Det är som
regel den dyraste åtgärden man kan vidtaga – det finns billigare alternativ
t.ex. installning av mjölkkorna med utfodring med icke kontaminerat foder.
Om vi nu utgår ifrån en riskbild enligt ovan och sätter ett pris av 10 miljoner
per människoliv skulle det vara relevant att betala 500 kronor för varje mSv
man kan ta bort med lämpliga motåtgärder. För att få 500 kronor måste
mjölkproducenten leverera 167 liter mjölk eftersom producentpriset på mjölk
är omkring 3 kronor. Alltså, 167 liter mjölk får innehålla 40.000 Bq av Cs-137
d.v.s. 240 Bq per liter mjölk. Observera att vi inte tagit hänsyn till att mjölken
kan innehålla I-131 och vi endast har diskuterat den dyraste motåtgärden –
gränsvärdet borde egentligen vara något lägre.
Min slutsats är att om man utnyttjar det bästa kunskap vi har just nu
kommer man fram till att gränsvärdet för Cs-137 skulle vara 240 Bq per liter
mjölk. Det man kan diskutera i mitt resonemang är vad som kan anses vara en
acceptabel risk. Min åsikt är att vi inte kan acceptera en större risk än 1 på
20.000 om vi vill att strålskyddet skall arbeta med ungefär likvärdiga risker
som används i kemikaliefallet. Det är alltså en myt som tyvärr är mycket
spridd att strålskyddet nu skulle ligga i första ledet när det gäller att
undanröja risker i vårt samhälle. Strålskyddet har historiskt sett legat i
frontlinjen men detta tycks inte gälla numera åtminstone när vi diskuterar vår
föda.
Ett problem som uppkommer något senare efter ett nedfall av Cs-137 är
hur man skall göra med gränsvärdet för kött. Priset på kött är betydligt högre
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än priset för mjölk. Beräkningarna blir något mer komplicerade därför att man
kan sätta in kraftfulla motåtgärder som reducerar Cs-137 halterna i köttet.
När det gäller slaktdjur finns alltid möjligheten att sätta in lämpliga
motåtgärder före slakt och det är kostnaden för dessa som skall jämföras med
den reduktion av stråldos man kan uppnå. Det är troligt att man kommer fram
till att gränsvärdet borde vara högre än vad vi kan acceptera för mjölk. B.
Åhman har dock visat att balansen mellan kostnad och nytta var relativt god
under 1986/87. Om ingen motåtgärd skulle ha gjorts när det gäller renar hade
den potentiella kollektivdosen orsakad av renköttets innehåll av Cs-137 i Sve-
rige uppgått till 193 manSv. Den verkliga dosen blev 3 manSv d.v.s. man tog
bort 190 manSv genom att kassera ett stort antal renkroppar. Det
överraskande är att om man jämför kostnaden för alla åtgärder - ca 95 miljoner
kronor med nyttan d.v.s. antal sparade manSv gånger 500.000 kronor per
manSv får man 85 miljoner - alltså. en överraskande god balans. Statistiskt
sett motsvarar borttagande av 190 manSvmellan 9 och 10 fall av dödlig cancer
och för att förhindra detta kanske det är värt att satsa 100 miljoner kronor.
Personligen anser jag att SSI inte behöver gå ut och be om ursäkt för att
gränsvärdet hamnade fel. Om det skulle ske en ny Tjernobylhändelse skulle
jag dock gärna se olika gränsvärden för mjölk och kött men på en betydligt
lägre nivå än vad EU föreslagit. Om man utnyttjar det kunnande som trots allt
har byggts upp efter Tjernobyl skulle det finnas stora möjligheter att göra
mera selektiva ingrepp - och därmed billigare - än vad som gjordes 1986.
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Considerations on ethics and decision making in
radiation protection
Riitta Hänninen
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Radiation protection is not only science
The system of radiation protection is under discussion due to the plans of the
ICRP to change their general recommendations from 1990. To replace the
present generally used system, the new system should be widely acceptable in
terms of underlying ethical views and the level of protection provided.
Radiation protection aims to prevent harmful effects from exposure to
radiation. To be useful and accepted as a basis for risk management the
radiation protection system should address risk assessment methods and
reasoning and justification of the desired level of protection. Risk assessment is
based on science. Assessments are made through dose calculations and the use
of dose-effect relationship. However, the magnitude of risk is only one factor in
decision making. Other aspects which affect the acceptability of risks and
decision making on protective measures include such values and targets as
equity, individual autonomy, protection of future generations and environment,
practicability of actions and proper use of available resources.
Individual and collective doses describe different aspects of the risk
Providing protection to each individual is generally seen as an ethically
correct way of action.  Individual dose limits serve this target. At the same
time, ethical views of many people require that the total harm caused by the
activity taken should be small and the balance of risks and benefits should
be pursued. Accordingly, they think that both individual and societal
aspects of the risk matter should be taken into account when forming risk
management policy. This view implies also that risks are only acceptable if
reduced to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
It is desirable to have all relevant characteristics of the risk available
for decision making. Therefore, it is important to look at the activity and the
risk caused by it from various perspectives. The use of the linear no-threshold
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dose-effect relationship (LNT) is widely accepted as a risk assessment tool in
radiation protection. This method is often thought to provide cautious
assumptions for risk evaluations. Most people think that using LNT is in line
with precautionary principle and therefore it is ethically correct. Accepting
LNT implies that the overall risk of an activity is described through the
collective dose.
Collective dose is a proper tool for evaluation of the ALARA target. Using
collective dose estimates allows different aspects of the risk management to be
taken into account:
The public. The public is exposed to many different sources. Radioactive
releases from a source can cause in distant places and times exposures which
are in most cases small. Due to the stochastic nature of the risk from small
doses the number of exposed people is a crucial factor in evaluating the harm.
It may be that for a large number of exposed people the overall risk is not
considered to be negligible although individual doses might be small. Therefore
collective dose is a useful tool when looking for optimum solutions for
controlling radiation sources.
Workers. The collective dose suits particularly well to measure the
effectiveness of ALARA-programmes designed to reduce the exposure of the
workers. It serves as an indicator of the quality of radiation protection.
Medical. It is obvious that collective dose is useful for the evaluation of
mass screening programmes. Medical use of radiation causes a significant part of
the exposure to population. Again, collective dose can be used to evaluate the
situation and its´ changes.
Decision making in complex situations
There are many varying views on the acceptable level of risk and the aspects to be
taken into account in development of risk management policies. Therefore, clear
reasoning concerning these aspects should be given in the radiation protection
system recommended for the bases of radiation protection management.
Decision making in radiation protection should be based on information on
the harm caused in order to address the actual problem clearly. To understand the
relevant importance of risks, comparisons with other risks, e.g. background
radiation and its variations, are useful. However, only comparison with
background doses with no description of the associated harm distorts the focus of
the decision making. Also, additional doses caused by human activities are
different from background radiation exposure because activities are planned and
therefore the doses can be controlled.
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Uncertainties add to the complexity of the situation to be evaluated and
make decisions more difficult. For example, information on long-term effects of
an activity and resulting collective doses from it is more and more uncertain
the longer the relevant periods to be covered are. Uncertainties should be
described and included in the factors addressed but this does not mean that
uncertain information should be ignored.
Targets for risk management change with time. On a broad scale, risks of
people have been reduced when comparing the present and past. Changes in
risk levels and other developments of society may have an influence on the
perception of acceptable risks in the future. We should also consider the
possibility that risks that are tolerated today will not be tolerated in the future.
Also, risks that persist for long periods because of contamination of large areas,
or even worldwide, may limit activities in the future due to combined
additional risks. The radiation protection system does not aim to limit the long
term contamination of the environment if radioactive releases of long-lived
radionuclides that cause very small individual doses are not counted at all.
The ethical goal of equity can be seen to include several aspects that need
to be recognised when considering risks from a radiation source. One factor is
obviously the dose received by an individual or a group of individuals. An
example of another factor is the share of benefits and burdens. In many cases,
those who are affected through radiation exposure or through economic
consequences caused by a radiation source do not receive any benefit from it. A
further aspect affecting the equity of individuals is that some people have a
possibility to influence the decision making while others have not. In many
cases those who have no benefit from the actions causing radiation exposure to
them or cannot influence the decision making are future generations or live in
distant areas. This reasoning reminds us of the complexity of situations to be
managed and suggests that it is not fair to reduce the equal treatment of
individuals to a requirement of equal radiation exposure limit from a source.
Consequently, ethical requirement to safeguard each individual’s rights
implies particularly careful reasoning for protection of those who cannot take
part in the process of decision making.
Acceptable for whom?
One of the three main requirements of the present radiation protection system
is optimisation. In relation to exposures from any particular source protection
should be optimised in order to keep the magnitude of individual doses, the
number of people exposed and the likelihood of incurring doses all as low as
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reasonably achievable. The economic and social factors should be taken into
account, within the restriction that the doses to individuals delivered by the
source be subject to dose constraints. Requirement to optimise doses is a wise
principle in radiation protection. It provides flexibility in decision making
while promoting careful thinking in implementation of radiation protection
due to the requirement of finding out what is reasonable. Optimisation urges
also for improvements in practice as it implies that development of methods
and changes in availability of resources should be taken into account.
Problems may arise when implementing the optimisation because it is
not always clear which levels of exposures are reasonable and for whom
exposures should be reasonable.  Evaluations of risks include identification of
relevant issues and definition of acceptable levels of risks. For acceptable
management of risks this process should be a matter of all interested parties,
particularly those affected by subsequent decisions.  However, it is impossible
to get consent of each individual who has an interest in the matter.
Involvement of representatives of stakeholders is the way to incorporate
various views in the process in practice.
Different and even conflicting opinions are presented on radiation
protection. Democratic processes are designed to come to a solution in such a
case. Open participation, equal availability of understandable and full
information to all those taking part in the process is a prerequisite for fairness
of the process.
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Posters
2a Radioprotection from environment to man -
ENVIRHOM
Francois Paquet1 and Jacqueline Garnier-Laplace2
1IRSN/DPHD/SDOS/LEAR/Laboratory of Applied Radiotoxicology studies
2IRSN/DPRE/SERLAB/Laboratory of Experimental Radioecology
Presented at the XIIIth ordinary meeting of NSFS, Turku, Finland 25.-29.2002,
by Tua Rahola, STUK/Laboratory of Radiation Hygiene and member of the
ENVIRHOM scientific international evaluation committee.
ENVIRHOM is a research programme towards the improvement of risk
assessment for situations of chronic exposure to radionuclides. The aim is to
study the bioaccumulation of radionuclides in situations of chronic exposure of
ecosystems and members of the public.
The project was initiated by IPSN, now IRSN, in France. The programme
is designed for a duration of 10 years. International collaboration is planned
and a proposal for an integrated project (BIOME) will be submitted to the EC
within the 6th FP.
Scientific basis of the system of radioprotection
The system of radioprotection is based on knowledge of the effects of ionising
radiation on population groups exposed to relatively high doses and dose rates
(Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The effects corresponding to lower levels,
characteristic of the exposure of the public and most nuclear industry workers
are extrapolated on the basis of a linear no threshold dose/response model.
Research carried out in the field of radioprotection for low doses have
focused mainly on the exposure of workers in the nuclear fuel industry. The
concepts and the models available for this category of the population are judged
adequate for the degree of accuracy required in that the rules applied are very
conservative. However, these models correspond to particular situations of
exposure (acute respiratory contamination) that are not at all representative of
those encountered by members of the public (chronic exposure by ingestion).
The public are above all exposed to discharges from nuclear fuel cycle plants
during normal operation and those from waste storage sites. The models
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applicable for members of the public should therefore be distinct from those of
nuclear industry workers and take into account several specific parameters:
• contamination levels
• contamination pathways; (workers: acute inhalation, members of the
public chronic ingestion)
• the physical and chemical forms of the radionuclide and the
complexity of the source term; (workers : known physical and chemical
form for the radionuclide, members of the public:  physical and chemical forms
occurring in the different physical compartments of the environment vary
widely and transfers of between and within physical and biological
compartments of ecosystems modify these forms; this context is totally ignored
in the dosimetric impact assessment models for the general public
• the multipollution context; human activities generate the dispersal of
a range of pollutants as trace elements in the environment; the possible
synergy or inhibition of the effects of radionuclides in conjunction with other
pollutants are totally ignored
• the physiological condition of the individual; this may vary widely
from one person to another and may be very different from that of the ICRP’s
“standard man”.
The project is organised in four themes, characterisation of biokinetics and
bioaccumulation after chronic exposure, biological effects (excluding cancers),
dosimetric consequences for both the environment and man and the mechanisms
of bioaccumulation as illustrated in Figure 1. The radionuclides listed to be studied
are uranium, three transuranic elements, 129I, 210Po, 232Th, 99Tc, 135Cs and 137Cs. The
biological models will be plants (wheat), invertebrates (mussels, crustacea),
freshwater fish (salmonoid), marine fish (sea bass and plaice), rodents (mouse and
rat) and -conditionally- an aquatic angiosperm (Potamogeton) and prey fish (carp)
and also other organisms. The multipollutant environment will be investigated in
experiments involving heavy metals (Cd and Zn), organic pollutants
(polychlorinated biphenyl, PCB), euthrophication (carbonenriched sediments,
fertilisers) and acidification (lowering the pH in an extreme case to a value of 3).
Validation is planned in “cage experiments” within natural ecosystems. The
acquired knowledge will also be used for a systematic effort to improve the
background to radiological protection of humans, to improve the methodology for
environmental impact assessments, and to improve comparative assessment of
environmental risks associated with radioactive and non-radioactive
environmental contaminants with emphasis on chronic low dose rate exposure.
The project was started in 2001 and the programme is still to be more closely
defined taking into account also the suggestions for improvement by the
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evaluators. Starting with the extensive expertise and resources of IRSN it will
after some time be necessary to involve outside collaborators. There is growing
activity in the field of radiation protection of the environment. There is an ICRP
Task Group on Environmental Protection and an EU 5th Framework Programme
project “Framework for Assessment of Environmental Impact” (FASSET). The
FASSET project is presented at this meeting.
ENVIRHOM is the first and very extensive project including also man as
part of the environment. The results obtained will be of great value to the ICRP for
the revision of the recommendations planned to be finalised by 2005.
Figure 1. Interlinking the four research themes constituting the backbone of the
proposed research programme.
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2b  On de minimis, collective dose and the new
ICRP recommendations
Per Wikman
Philosophy Unit, Royal Insitute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
perwi@infra.kth.se
Introduction
The main news in ICRP’s proposal to a new radiation protection philosophy is the
change of focus from minimising the collective dose, to a focus on individual
protection. This abstract examines some of the argumentation that has been used
in the debate.
The individual focus of protection in the new proposal is reflected by the
maximum additional dose that any individual would be exposed to. ICRP suggests
that effective doses above 100 times the average global natural background level
cannot be justified in any normal situation. Doses below 1/100 of the average global
natural background level would on the other hand be totally excluded from the
system of protection. As it is still assumed that even small doses pose a risk this is
clearly an introduction of a de minimis dose, though ICRP do not use the term
explicitly. The introduction of a de minimis dose is discussed below.
The new proposal also includes a requirement to optimise protection for a
given source. This is necessary to achieve the best level of protection that is
reasonable, which seems to be a concept similar to the ALARA concept. Doses
below the de minimis level are excluded from the optimisation. However, the
optimisation is made for each (potentially) exposed individual and on selected
groups, and not on the total collective dose. The new proposal gives a very limited
role to the collective dose concept. The arguments for this are discussed below.
On a de minimis dose
By declaring a risk to be de minimis it is usually implied that the risk is so small
that it should be ignored. That is, a de minimis risk is so small that it is beyond
concern, or equivalent (from a decision perspective) to no risk at all. (Peterson 2002)
ICRP still presume the probability of harm to be proportional to the dose,
and without a threshold. From this follows that exposure to even a small dose
implies exposure to a risk. If this dose (risk) is small enough, it is regarded to be
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de minimis. ICRP sets the level of the de minimis dose (and corresponding risk)
to about 1/100 of the global average of the natural background radiation. This
would mean a de minimis annual effective dose of about 0.01 mSv.
The argument ICRP give for choosing this level is that the proposed dose
is trivially small compared to the natural background;  “It is not possible to
receive a dose of 0.01 mSv in isolation, and, therefore, the associated risk is for
increments above background and to associate a risk with 0.01 mSv is
meaningless.” (Holm 2002)
ICRP also seem to motivate the level of the de minimis risk by public
opinion; “This level of imposed or involuntary risk is about the most that has
been judged as being tolerated by members of the public.” (Clarke 1999)
A general criticism to de minimis risks is that though people may find
some risks negligible, it is not certain that they are willing to subject
themselves to other risks, no matter how small, especially if they have nothing
to gain from it. It is also hard to see how naturally occurring risk levels are
relevant for establishing a de minimis risk level. We may have a high, naturally
occurring, risk level, which causes large detriments, but would we not choose a
lower risk level, and corresponding detriment, if we had the choice? Another
objection is that comparisons of natural with anthropogenic risks are
inappropriate as we cannot do anything about the natural risks, but that alone
is not a reason for introducing additional risks.
Even after establishing an individual de minimis risk level, the question
remains if the corresponding societal risk is also de minimis? The proposition
that this is the case is fundamental in the new ICRP recommendations: “If the
risk of harm to the health of the most exposed individual is trivial, then the
total risk is trivial – irrespective of how many people are exposed.” (Clarke
1999)
A problem with this argument is that a risk, which is trivial for
everybody, need not necessarily be trivial to the society. This is articulated by
Lindell (2000);  “... the fact that each individual is satisfied with his own
protection does not necessarily mean that he or she is satisfied with the
situation; they may dislike the idea that the odds are that, after all, someone
might, unnecessarily be harmed.”
There seems to be something missing in the argumentation for a societal
de minimis risk. If we could reduce or avoid a societal risk very cheaply and
easily, would we not do it, even if the individual risk were de minimis? It is hard
to see how practices like unnecessary radioactive food additives could ever be
de minimis. What is missing is the discussion of justification. A notion of this
also seems to be held by ICRP; “Additional doses from justified practices far
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below the natural annual dose should not be a matter of concern to the
individual or the society.” (Holm 2002, my italics)
This suggests that a de minimis dose should not be discussed without its
context.
On collective dose
The new proposal from ICRP gives less importance to the collective dose
concept. This has made commentators point out that the collective dose, as a
measure of the expected detriment, is a direct consequence of the linear, no-
threshold assumption. However, there can still be good reasons not to use
collective dose as a measurement of the total detriment. Some of these are
discussed below.
The main argument for not using collective dose seems to be the claim
that collective dose calculation gives exaggerated estimations of the detriment.
The argument that the collective dose is exaggerated merely because the
integration is carried out including very small doses to a very large number of
people is either yet a variation of the de minimis argument, which is discussed
above, or a non-expressed disbelief in the linear, no-threshold assumption.
An egalitarian objection is that the collective dose conceals information
about the distribution of individual doses in both magnitude and time; “a large
dose to a few people is not equivalent to a small dose to many people”. It is true
that collective dose should not be used exclusively as a measure of the
detriment, as this could result in unjust consequences for extremely exposed
people, but this does not prove that the collective dose cannot be a relevant,
albeit insufficient, measure of the total detriment.
That the use of collective doses encourages that too much money is being
spent to achieve low dose levels is not a good argument as optimisation, by
definition, does not go beyond the point where the detriment can be reduced
with “reasonable cost”. Dunster (2000) argues that the collective dose also
encourages the use of automatic, rather than well considered, procedures for
taking protection decisions. Whether or not this is true is an empirical
question.
Another argument is that global contamination or geological timescales give
absurd values of the collective detriment. But the mere fact that the exposure of
many people also makes the detriment large is not a good argument to discard the
collective dose. It is true that calculations of the collective detriment should be used
with care because of the uncertainties involved, especially when integrating over
large time spans, but this is already recognised in the existing recommendations.
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Large inherent uncertainties in the calculations of collective detriment
do not necessarily render the collective dose useless in all applications. Instead
these uncertainties could be expressed and discussed explicitly. Consideration
should also be taken to the precautionary principle, which calls upon us to
calculate with unlikely or uncertain scenarios.
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SESSION 3A
New Euratom research programme 2002-2006
Raimo Mustonen
STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881
Helsinki, Finland
Introduction
The European Union funded research is carried out under two distinct
programmes: the European Community Framework Programme (EC
Programme) covering research, technological development and demonstration
activities; and the Euratom Framework Programme covering research and
training activities in the nuclear sector. At the moment, the fifth framework
programmes are going on.
The fifth Euratom Research and Training Framework Programme (FP5)
is approaching to its end. FP5 formally started in 1998 and will cease at the end
of 2002, although several projects started during these years will continue in a
couple of the coming years. FP5 covers research, training and technological
development in the areas of thermonuclear fusion, nuclear fission and
radiological sciences. For many years, nuclear fusion research has been fully
integrated at the European level and it has been carried out as a co-operation
with Japan, the Russian Federation and Canada. There are no open calls for
proposals in the field of nuclear fusion.
The sixth Framework Programmes (EC and Euratom) 1, 2, 3 for 2002 –
2006 will start in the beginning of 2003. EU’s funding for the EC Programme
during the next four years will be 16 270 M •, which is more than ten times
bigger than that of the Euratom Programme (1 230 M•). Thematic priorities
and structure of the EC Programme is shown in Table 1. This paper addresses
to the sixth Euratom Programme (FP6) and to the instruments used in
implementation of the FP6. The both framework programmes use the same
instruments and are tools of the new concept of the European Research Area
(ERA).
63
STUK-A195
The 6th Euratom Framework Programme (FP6)
Content and structure of the new Euratom Programme is shown in Table
2. Controlled thermonuclear fusion and direct funding of the Joint Research
Centre take the major part of the funding of EU. The rest of FP6 can be called as
a Fission Programme, which has only two thematic priorities: Management of
radioactive waste and Radiation protection. Other parts of the Fission
Programme deal with New innovative ways of producing nuclear energy,
Education and training, and Safety of existing nuclear installation.
Table 1. Content and structure of the 6th Framework Programme of the European
Community for 2002 – 2006.
Geological disposal of spent fuel and other long-lived wastes on one hand
and Partitioning and transmutation on the other hand will be the main topics
in the waste management research. The high priority of waste management
research is understandable because final decisions on how to handle and
dispose of spent nuclear fuel and other long-lived wastes are getting more and
more topical in the Member States. Public information and communication in
connection of waste disposal will also play an important in future research
activities.
Focusing and integrating Community research: 
• Thematic priorities: 
- Life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health 
- Information society technology 
- Nanotechnologies and nanosciences 
- Aeronautics and space 
- Food quality and safety 
- Sustainable development, global change and ecosystems 
- Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society 
• Specific activities covering a wider field of research:
- Policy support and anticipating scientific and technological 
needs 
- Horizontal research activities involving SMEs 
- Specific measures in support of international co-operation 
- Non-nuclear activities of the Joint Research Centre 
13 345 M€
  11 285
Structuring the European Research Area: 
• Research and innovation 
• Human resources 
• Research infrastructure 
• Science and society 
2 605 M€
Strengthening for foundation of the European Research Area: 
• Support for co-ordination of activities 
• Support for the coherent development of policies 
320 M€
TOTAL 16 270 M€
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Table 2. Content and structure of the 6th Framework Programme of Euratom for
2002 – 2006.
Quantification of risks at low and protracted doses will be the keynote
in radiation protection research. This topic is of special importance since a
lot of basic knowledge on radiation effects at low doses at the cellular level
is still missing. Molecular biology and epidemiological studies will play the
major role in this issue.  Protection of the environment is another important
topic in radiation protection research and it is presumable that it will have
a high priority in the forthcoming work programme. Other topics which are
expected to be included in radiation protection research are Emergency
management, exposure to Medical use of radiation and natural sources of
radiation, and Occupational exposure to radiation.
What is new in the 6th Framework Programme?
The content and especially implementation of FP6 will deviate considerably
from the previous FPs. The main focus of FP6 is the creation of a European
Research Area (ERA) 4 as a vision for the future of research in Europe. At
their summit in Lisbon in March 2000, heads of state and governments
called for better leveraging of European research efforts through the
creation of ERA. The FP6 is the financial instrument that will help make
the ERA as a reality.
In practice, implementation of ERA means simplified management
procedures of research, reduced number of projects and hence bigger
projects, increased flexibility and management autonomy within the
projects, changes in Commission’s monitoring procedures (from detailed
monitoring of inputs to more strategic monitoring of outputs), and new
instruments to implement FP6.
Integrated projects (IP) 5 and Networks of excellence (NoE) 6 will be the
most important instruments in implementation of FP6. IP’s are designed to
Priority thematic areas of research: 
• Controlled thermonuclear fusion 
• Management of radioactive waste
• Radiation protection
890 M€
          750 
            90 
            50 
Other activities in the field of nuclear technologies and safety: 
• Innovative ways of producing nuclear energy 
• Education and training 
• Safety of existing installations 
50 M€
Nuclear activities of the Joint Research Centre 290 M€
TOTAL 1 230 M€
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generate the knowledge required to implement the priority themes by
integrating the critical mass of activities and resources to meet the clearly
defined scientific and technological objectives. In the Fission Programme
this means that the number of projects will be reduced from the present
about 200 to some 10-20 in FP6. NoE’s are designed to network (integrate)
existing and emerging research activities to provide European leadership
and to be a world force in a particular topic. The basic concept for NoE is
thus to bring together research actors, which are already funded at a
national or regional level.
Also traditional instruments will be maintained. Stairway of
excellence is designed to smooth the transition from the “old” to the “new”
instruments (present concerted actions) and is especially directed to
smaller research actors (including SME’s) and to participants from the
candidate countries. Specific support actions are planned to complement
FP6 and to prepare future R&D activities (means conferences, meetings,
studies, awards, etc.).
Participation rights will also be extended. The candidate countries
associated the FP6 can participate the Programme under same conditions
as EU Member States. Also European research organisations (e.g. CERN,
ESA, EMBO etc.) will be treated as any entity from the Member States.
Changes in partnerships within established IP’s and NoE’s can quite freely
be decided by the partners.
Time table for implementation of Euratom FP6
Approval of FP6 (both the EC and the Euratom Programmes) was given 3
June 2002 by a co-decision of the Council and the European Parliament.
Council Decision adopting the Euratom FP6 was given 7 August 2002.
On 20 March 2002 the Commission launched an Invitation to submit
Expression of Interest (EoI) 7 as “an opportunity for Europe’s research
community to help prepare for the first calls of FP6". To the deadline 7 June
2002 about 200 EoI’s have been received for the two thematic priority areas
of the Fission Programme (Management of radioactive waste and Radiation
protection), and about 50 EoI’s for other activities. The EoI’s were assessed
in July and the results of assessment will be published in September 2002.
All received EoI’s will also be published on the CORDIS web-site. Purpose of
the EoI’s was to gain information on areas where the research community is
prepared to make proposals for IP’s and NoE’s. The Commission will use the
results of the assessment in the preparation of the Work Programme and
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the first call for proposals, which is expected to be published by the end of
2002.
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SESSION 3. NATURAL RADIATION
Natural Radiation  - Exposures and Controls
Kaare Ulbak
National Institute of Radiation Hygiene, Knapholm 7, DK-2730 Herlev,
Denmark
Exposures to natural radiation world wide and in the Nordic countries:
Table I. UNSCEAR 2000. Average radiation dose from natural sources.
Table II. Nordic Flagbook 2000. Average radiation dose from natural sources, mSv/y.
Source Worldwide average 
(mSv/y) 
Typical range 
(mSv/y) 
External exposure 
- Cosmic 
- Terrestrial gamma 
0,4
0,5
0,3-1,0 
0,3-0,6 
Internal exposure 
- Inhalation (radon) 
- Ingestion 
1,2
0,3
0,2-10 
0,2-0,8 
Total 2,4 1-10
Source Finland Sweden Denmark Norway Iceland 
External exposure 
- Cosmic 
- Terrestrial gamma 
0,3 
0,5 
0,3
0,5
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,5
0,3
0,2
Internal exposure 
- Inhalation (radon) 
- Ingestion 
2,0 
0,3 
1,9
0,3
1,0
0,3
1,7
0,4
0,2
0,3
Total 3,1 3,0 1,9 2,9 1,0
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Occupational exposures world wide to natural radiation sources:
Table III. UNSCEAR 2000. Occupational radiation exposure.
ICRP recommendations 1959-1990 regarding control of exposures from natural
radiation sources:
IRCP Publication No. 2 (1959).
- Natural background radiation varies considerably from locality to
locality and the doses it contributes to the various organs are not well known.
- If maximum permissible limits recommended by the Commission
included background radiation, the allowable contribution from man-made
sources – which are the only ones that can be controlled – would be uncertain
and would have to be different for different localities.
ICRP Publication No. 26 (1977)
- …the Commission’s recommended dose limits have not been regarded as
applying to, or including, the “normal” levels of natural radiation…
- …man’s activities can increase the “normal” exposure to natural
radiation…
Source/practice Workers 
(thousands) 
Average dose 
(mSv/y) 
Man-made sources 
- Nuclear 
- Industrial 
- Defence 
- Medical
- Education 
800
700
420
2320 
360
1,8
0,5
0,2
0,3
0,1
Total, man-made 4600 0,6 
Enhance natural 
- Air crew 
- Mining (- coal) 
- Coal mining 
- Mineral processing 
- Above ground (radon) 
250
760
3910 
300
1250 
3,0
2,7
0,7
1,0
4,8
Total, natural 6500 1,8 
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o Mining
o Flight at high altitudes
o Building materials
o Houses
ICRP Publication No. 60 (1990)
- Occupational exposure: include exposures to natural sources only in the
following cases:
o Workplaces identified by regulatory agencies
o Operation and storage of materials with significant traces of natural
radionuclides
o Operation of jet aircraft
o Space flight
- Public exposure: +/- practices, use of intervention
- Radon in dwellings: Action levels
Requirements to Members States of the European Community in the Basic
Standards Directive 1996 (EU-BSS):
EU-BSS (1996)
- Do not apply to:
o Radon in dwellings (Recommendation, 1990)
o Natural levels of radiation
o Radionuclides in the human body
o Cosmic radiation at ground level
o Radiation from the undisturbed earth’s crust
- Applies to:
o Practices and intervention
o Work Activities with Natural Radiation Sources (Title VII)
EU-BSS Requirements for Work Activities
- Work Activities declared to be of concern
o Monitoring of exposure
o Implementation of all or part of the requirements for practices
o Implementation of all or part of the requirements for intervention
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Nordic recommendations regarding control of exposures to natural radiation
sources:
Flagbook – Hierarchy of recommended levels
EU recommendations regarding control of exposures to natural radiation
sources:
- Radon in dwellings (Official Journal, 1990)
- Radon in workplaces (RP 88, 1977)
- Exposure of air crew (RP 88, 1997)
- Workplaces – Materials and Residues (RP 88, 95, 1997, 1999)
- Building Materials (RP 112, 1999)
- Exemptions and Clearance (RP 122 part II, 2001)
- Radon in water supplies (Official Journal, 2001)
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Abstract
Slab-on-ground is the prevalent substructure in Finnish low-rise residential
buildings. The gap between the foundation wall and floor slab is the main entry
route of radon-bearing air from soil into living spaces. Performing the sealing
work and installation of radon piping are the key measures of radon-safe
building in houses with slab-on-ground. Sealing measures have been carried
out in a minor part of houses due to the difficulties in the sealing practice
presented in the current guidance. A new construction for an airtight joint
between the foundation wall and floor slab has been studied in several test
houses.  Based on the results, a new guidance for a wide use in Finland is under
preparation. In the new sealing practice bitumen felt will be installed
underneath the floor slab in direct contact with concrete slab. The municipal
authorities require increasingly radon-safe construction.
Introduction
High radon concentrations of indoor air in low-rise residential buildings form an
important national health problem in Finland. Radon-bearing soil air is the main
reason to elevated indoor radon concentrations of dwellings in Finland. According
to the resolution of the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health in 1992, the indoor
radon concentration should not exceed 400 Bq/m3 in existing houses, the target for
new construction being less than 200 Bq/m3.  The average indoor radon
concentration in single family houses is close to 150 Bq/m3, hence the target
concentration of 200 Bq/m3 is very demanding. In wide areas of the Southern
Finland 200 Bq/m3 is exceeded in more than 30 % of houses.
Decrease in the use of crawl space in house foundations has increased the
indoor radon concentration of Finnish housing stock during last decades. The
prevailing type of foundation is slab-on-ground (Fig 1). In this type of foundation
the flow of radon-bearing air from soil into living spaces through gaps between the
foundation wall and floor slab should be prevented through special measures.
During the last ten years radon-resistant new construction has become more and
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more common in areas with high indoor radon concentrations and also all over the
country. However, the practices have been variable and defective. Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has performed questionnaire studies in order to
explore the prevention techniques and municipal practices (Ravea and Arvela
1997, Voutilainen et al. 1998, 2000).   This study presents results of these
questionnaire studies and of a new development project “Radon-safe foundation,
moisture prevention and air exchange in a healthy building” (RAFO), funded by
Finnish Technology Agency. The aim of the project was to develop simple
construction practices which can be utilised for prevention of these leakage flows
and which form simultaneously quality moisture prevention for the foundation
structures (Arvela et al. 2002). Several building companies participated in the
project. The project aimed also at development of radon technical practices of the
companies.
Materials and methods
The questionnaire studies aimed at exploring how the builders had followed the
guidance given on radon-safe building (Ministry of Environment 1994).  This
guidance has been studied and developed also in the RAFO-project. The guidance
aims at radon-safe construction of slab-on-ground, cellar and hill-side foundations.
The guidance can be applied to more than 80 % of new single family houses
because of the prevalence of these substructure types.  The radon-safe construction
comprises two measures. First air-tightness should be achieved using bitumen felt
and elastic sealants. Second preparatory perforated piping should be installed.
The data regarding the preventive measures taken in 300 dwellings was
ob-tained from a questionnaire study carried out in 1995-1996 (Ravea and Arvela
1997).  The subject group was 300 house-owners having taken preventive
measures in order to achieve a low indoor radon concentration. The second
questionnaire study (Voutilainen et al. 1998, 2000) aimed at exploring the radon
prevention practices in municipalities with high indoor radon concentrations.  The
questioning was made by phone to 95 municipal building authorities and to 55
health authorities in municipalities.
In the RAFO-project the construction of foundations of 20 houses was
followed up. All measures related to the air-tightness of the foundation as well as
difficulties and drawbacks were documented. When the houses were ready and in
normal use indoor radon concentration, air exchange rate and depressure were
measured. The effect of activated sub-slab radon piping on the drying process of
the floor slab was tested in two houses.
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Results and discussion
Questionnaire studies
The questionnaire study addressed house-owners showed that the most common
measure was installation of the sub-slab piping, with no sealing work. However,
although the target level of 200 Bq/m3 was exceeded, no fans had been normally
installed at the time of the study.  The target level of 200 Bq/m3 was still exceeded
in 40 % of the houses.
Sub-slab piping with an operating fan provides an efficient preventive
measure. In 80 % of houses with sub-slab piping conne-ted to an operating fan,
radon concentration was below the action level of 200 Bq/m3. In houses with piping
but no fan, the corresponding fraction was only 45 %.  The corresponding median
values of radon concentration in these houses were 55 and 220 Bq/m3, respectively.
Sub-slab piping without a fan had no remarkable effect on radon concentration. In
houses with crawlspace and edge-thickened slab, radon concentrations were low.
The choice of foundation system thus significantly affects the indoor radon
concentration.
Sealing was performed in a low number of houses although it is an essential part of
radon-safe building. Sealing measures were carried out in about 30 % of the houses
and in many of these houses the sealing was not carried out along the quideline.
However, through performing careful sealing work, good results were achieved
without the acti-vation of the sub-slab piping.
The questionnaire study addressed to municipal authorities revealed that
only in 30 % of the municipalities studied the authorities demanded or
recommended to react to radon in the whole area of the municipality. In 70 % of the
cases they demanded radon-safe measures at least in a certain restricted area.
The most important prevention measure for houses with slab-on-ground, radon
tight foundation construction was recommended only in a few municipalities.
Installation of the preparatory sub-slab piping was the normal measure taken by
the builders.
RAFO-project
The radon-tight construction practices published in the guidance of the
Ministry of Environment (1994) were studied in the project. In addition a new
more easy-to-do construction was studied. The construction given in the guidance
requires a high level carefulness. Along the results of this study the sealing of the
joint between the foundation wall and floor slab fails often in real building site
conditions. A new construction for a radon-tight joint between the foundation wall
and floor slab was developed for houses with slab-on-ground or houses with
basement. The results were very promising. In the new construction a wide (0.5-1.0
m) strip of bitumen felt will be installed above the foundation wall. The other edge
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of the strip will be installed underneath the concrete slab in direct contact with the
casting. The key advantage is the exclusion of the need for elastic sealant.   The
tests made in laboratory ascertained that the adhesion of the felt to concrete was
good.
Indoor radon concentrations in 7 test houses varied in the range of 20-60 Bq/
m3. Five of the seven houses located in an area were 50 % houses exceed 200 Bq/m3.
In the 8th house where the new method was tested radon concentration was 220 Bq/
m3. However, this was a low value in an area where 90 % of houses exceed 200 Bq/
m3 (median 590 Bq/m3). Lack in installation of bitumen felt and sealing of lead-
throughs was considered as the main reason to remaining radon leakage.
In the sealing of lead-through the methods presented in the guidance of the
Ministry of Environment showed to be working. The practical experiences showed
that special attention should be paid to the development of the guidance of sealing
the water pipes and the electric wiring which are installed in protective piping
beneath the floor slab. Above-slab installation would be preferable.
The results showed that airtight construction is needed in the whole
building area. Omitting the sealing work for example in storerooms or in rooms for
Figure 1.  Installation of bitumen felt to the joint of foundation wall and floor slab.
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house technology may lead to increase in radon concentrations in living spaces. In
these auxiliary spaces radon concentration was in some cases 5000-10000 Bq/m3,
when the sealing was omitted.
Summary
• The municipal authorities have required radon-safe construction often  only
in restricted areas with high indoor radon concentrations
• Since 2000 in many municipalities new local building regulations require
radon-safe construction in the whole municipality.
• STUK has recommended radon-safe building practices in the whole country
• A new construction for an airtight joint between the foundation wall and
floor slab was developed for houses with slab-on-ground and houses with
basement. The construction prevents the flow of radon-bearing air from soil into
the house. The results will be utilised when improving the present guidance
material.
• The bitumen felt used in the construction works also as a qualified moisture
insulator.
• A new guide to be published in the Finnish RT-Building Information File is
under preparation.
Refernces
[1] Arvela H, Bergman J, Yrjölä R, Kurnitski J, K. Jokiranta, Matilainen M. and
Järvinen P. Radon-safe foundation, moisture prevention and air exchange in a
healthy building. Publications of The Finnish Research Programme on
Environmental Health - SYTTY 1/2000. Kuopio 2002.
[2] Ministry of the Environment. Radon-safe building, foundation construction.
Guide 2/1993.  Ministry of Environment. 1994 (in Finnish).
[3] Ravea, K, and Arvela H.  Radon-safe building in Finland. Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority. STUK-A137,  Helsinki 1997,  45 p.  +  15 app.
(abstract in English).
[4] Voutilainen, A, Vesterbacka K, Arvela H. Radon-safe building- questioning to
municipal authorities. STUK-A160, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority,  Hel-
sinki 1998. (abstract in English)
[5] Voutilainen A, Vesterbacka K, Arvela H. Finnish practice in building radon-
safe houses- questioning to municipal authorities. Proceedings of the
Workshop: Radon in the Living Environment. Athens 19-23 April 1999. The
National Technical University of Athens , 2000.
78
STUK-A195
Mitigation of radon in drinking water of Finnish
drilled wells -
Present state and Cost-benefit analysis
Ilona Mäkeläinen and Tuukka Turtiainen
STUK, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O. Box 14, FIN-008810
Helsinki, Finland
Email: ilona.makelainen@stuk.fi
Introduction
The annual collective dose from natural radioactivity of ingested drinking
water in Finland is estimated at 260 manSv. The users of drilled wells receive
about half of the collective dose, although their proportion of the population is
only about 5%. Radon causes approximately 70% of the ingestion dose. Apart
from ingested water, consumers are exposed to radon and its decay products
when radon is released into indoor air in situations like showering and washing
cloths and dishes. The lung cancer risk from inhaled decay products of radon
depends strongly on the smoking prevalence in the exposed population. To
combine the both exposure paths, ingestion and breathing, it is more feasible to
calculate the number of cancer deaths rather than doses. In addition to the
number of annual cases, the cost per averted cancer case is influenced by the
total costs of the chosen removal method, frequency distribution of radon
concentration in the wells and the action level applied.
When the action level for radon in drinking water in a private well is
exceeded, STUK recommends joining the municipal water system or a water
co-operative as a primary alternative. These options assure both the quality of
drinking water and a proper wastewater disposal. However, neither of these
alternatives is commonly available in sparsely populated areas. Another viable
choice is to dig a well into the soil. If none of these alternatives is possible, two
methods can be used for removing radon from drinking water: aeration and
activated carbon filtration. If the filtration method is used without adequate
shielding, an additional dose may incur due to external gamma radiation
emitted by the short-lived decay products of radon that are retained in the
carbon. STUK recommends that an activated carbon filter unit not be installed
inside a dwelling, but be placed in a separate building or in the subsurface
service space beside the drilled well.
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Until now, about one thousand drilled wells are equipped with radon
removal units. This is about ten per cent of the total need for mitigation. This
necessitates further use of effective radon removal methods or alternative
water sources in reducing potential cancers.
Materials and methods
In Finland the distribution of radon concentration in drilled wells is nearly
lognormal with an excess number of very high concentrations. According to our
data, the mean and the median are 570 Bq/L and 140 Bq/L, respectively (1, 2).
In order to calculate the number of wells and well water consumers with
exceeding action levels, as well as the mean concentration of radon before and
after mitigation, the data were weighted as described in previous papers (1,2).
The number of permanent users of approximately 80,000 drilled wells is
estimated at 300,000, the number of consumers per well being 3.6 on average.
The number of consumers was assumed larger in this study than that in the
previous papers.
The averted dose from ingested water was calculated using the dose
conversion factor of 3.5x10-9 Sv/Bq (3). For the assessment of the number of
annual cancer deaths, we applied the ICRP estimate of a 5% increment of fatal
cancer incidences caused by 1 manSv. Concerning inhaled, waterborne radon,
the dose approach does not take into account the strengthening effect of
smoking on the lung cancers. Therefore, in STUK, a national estimate of 200
annual fatal lung cancer cases caused by the Finnish mean indoor radon
concentration of 120 Bqm-3 has been made using the results of both
epidemiological studies among miners and the nation-wide epidemiological
study (4). We used this estimate and the transfer coefficient of 10-4 (the ratio of
indoor radon concentration due to water use to the radon concentration in
water) to calculate the cancer cases due to inhaled waterborne radon (3).
The effectiveness of radon mitigation depends on the type of the removal
unit, the professional skill of the seller and the plumber, and the quality of the
water. With proper equipment and installation, an efficiency of 98–99% can be
achieved by using either aeration or activated carbon filtration methods. In
practice, this is not always the case. Therefore lower values (95 and 90%) are
considered in this paper, too.
The expenses of radon removal are comprised of acquisition and
installation costs, and the annual costs of operation and water quality
monitoring. We calculated repayment periods of 10, 20 and 30 years to obtain
estimates for the total annual costs. Plausible service lives are 20 years for the
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aeration device and 30 years for the activated carbon filtration unit as well as
for a new well dug into the soil. Total annual costs were calculated by dividing
the investment costs by the service life and discounting the annual operation
and monitoring costs during the repayment period into the present value using
a discount rate of 3%. As to public water supply, the annual operation costs
were calculated by using a reference value provided by the Finnish water and
waste water works association (FIWA) and by discounting it into the present
value. The connection fee was added to the total costs by assuming a real
interest of 3 % (5).
The action level applied in Finland for radon concentration in water for
private wells is 1,000 Bq/L. This is set as a quality recommendation in a decree
of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health that is based on the 2001/928/
Euratom recommendation of the European Commission.
Results
Average acquisition and installation costs of an aeration device are about twice
of that of an activated carbon unit. This difference will be partly compensated
by the higher operating costs due to changing the carbon batch every other
year (Table 1). The longer service life of the activated carbon filtration device,
Table 1. Typical costs of removal methods and alternative water sources (ranges in
parenthesis).
Cost factor Costs (euro) 
 Activated  
carbon 
filtration 
Aeration New well 
dug into the 
soil 
Joining into  
public water 
supply 
Installation (or digging 
the well, connection fee 
to join public water 
supply) 
400  
(200–600) 
800  
(500–1,000) 
1,500  
(1,000–2,000) 
900 (0–17,000) 
Acquisition of 
equipment 
1,000  
(500–2,000) 
2,500  
(1,500–4,000) 
800
(500–1,000) 
Operation and water 
quality monitoring  
(per year) 
160 130 60 (20–100) 190
Total costs per year,  
10-year repayment 
period  
300 (200–400) 400 (300–600) 200 (100–300)  
Total costs per year,  
20-year repayment 
period  
200 (150–250) 300 (200–350) 120 (70–200) 
Total costs per year,  
30-year repayment 
period  
150 (130–200) 200 (150–250) 100 (50–150) 150 (70–600) 
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Figure 1. The dependence of the removal efficiency on the number of annual averted
cancer cases when applying four different action levels
however, limits the annual cost of the filtration method to only half of that of
the aeration method. The costs of a new well dug into the soil are even 50%
lower than the costs of filtration. The repayment period of the founding
expenses of a well was assumed as 30 years.
Annual costs from drinking water distributed by waterworks to a
reference house with annual consumption of 180 m3 of water are about 200
euro. When the fees on the 30-year period are discounted as previous, and 3 %
of the connection fee is added, the mean value of annual costs is 150 euro.
With a fixed distribution of radon concentration in water, the number of
cancer cases averted depends on the action level applied. When mitigating all
wells exceeding the action level of 300 Bq/L most of the cancers caused by radon
could be averted (Table 2). The effect of the mitigation effectiveness is not
noteworthy, as can be seen in the Figure 1.
Table 2. The effect of action level applied on the cancer cases averted.
Action 
level of 
radon 
Bq/L 
Number of wells 
exceeding the 
action level 
Number of 
Consumers 
using water 
exceeding the 
action level 
Mean radon 
concentration  
after radon 
removal 
Bq/L
Number of cancer 
cases averted by 
the mitigation of 
95% effectiveness 
0 80,000 300,000 0 10
100 50,000 200,000 50 10 
300 30,000 100,000 90 9
1000 10,000 40,000 200 7 
3000 3,000 10,000 300 4
A c tio n  le ve ls  a p p lie d  B q /L
0
2
4
6
8
1 0
1 2
0 .8 8 0 .9 0 .9 2 0 .9 4 0 .9 6 0 .9 8 1
Effic ie n c y
Av
er
te
d 
an
nu
al
 c
an
ce
r c
as
es
0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
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Figure 2. Costs of an averted cancer case as a function of applied action level when the
annual mitigation costs vary from 100 to 400 euro.
When the action level of 1,000 Bq/L for radon is used, the costs of an
averted cancer case are about 300,000 euro (100,000–600,000) (Figure 2).
Decreasing the action level to 300 Bq/L would double the costs of a saved life,
while increasing the number of the averted annual cancer cases from 7 to 9. On
the other hand, the action level of 3000 Bq/L would halve the costs when the
number of averted cancer cases would decrease from 9 to 4.
Discussion
The 1000 radon removal systems installed by summer 2002 will save 0.7 cancer
cases annually. However, the number of averted cases and, furthermore,
calculated costs per averted cancer case are sensitive to the risk model. If the
risk model from inhaled radon introduced by BEIR 6 were used, the number of
averted cancer cases would be more than twofold and thereby, the costs per
averted cancer case would be less than half of those calculated in this study (6).
According to this study, when applying the current action level of 1,000
Bq/L the costs per an averted cancer case by mitigation of radon in water are
rather high, typically 300,000 euro. Nevertheless, considering the number of
lives saved and the costs, the present action level is well justified. The
corresponding costs for an averted cancer case saved by mitigating indoor
radon are about 100,000 and 20,000 euro for action levels of 200 and 800 Bq/m3,
C o st p e r  m i ti g a te d  w e l l
0
5 0 0 , 0 0 0
1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0
2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 5 0 0
A c ti o n  l e v e l  a p p l i e d  B q / L
C
os
t o
f a
nn
ua
l a
ve
rt
ed
 c
an
ce
r 
c
a
s
e
 E
ur
o
1 0 0  E u ro 2 0 0  E u ro 4 0 0  E u ro
83
STUK-A195
respectively (7). The current action level for indoor radon is 400 Bq/m3. The
mitigation of indoor air in dwellings is thus more cost-effective than the
mitigation of radon in drinking water.
However, the consumers in Finland are more motivated for mitigation of
radon in drinking water than in indoor air. This may be due to the tradition of
monitoring of drinking water rather than indoor air, and the available
commercial radon removal methods for private wells. The methods for
mitigation of indoor radon are more complicated and few competent companies
are working in the field. Therefore, the authority should make more effort to
provide people with more information about cancer risks of indoor radon. The
companies should also find motivation to further develop radon mitigation
products for indoor air and market them widely.
Digging a new well into the soil may be the most economic solution for
the mitigation of radon in drinking water. However, there is a risk that the
water from the dug well contains contaminants (e.g. iron and humus) that
require appropriate removal units, too. The second cheapest options are
activated carbon filtration and joining into the public water supply, and the
most expensive is the aeration method. However, a consumer making a choice
may not see the options in this order, and all of them are not necessarily
available. In sparsely populated areas a public water supply may not be
available at any price. A well dug into the soil requires suitable soil with
adequate aquifers. The radon removal equipment requires special space and
accessory, which may not be easily available and may cause extra costs
depending on the house and the well. The activated carbon filtration system
has to be installed outside the dwelling so that the residents are not exposed to
external radiation. The aeration equipment has to be installed into a room with
a floor drain, electric wall socket and heating.
Water quality and proper wastewater treatment are guaranteed best by
joining the public water supply. Monitoring of private well water is often more
or less at the responsibility of the resident. The convenience and high quality of
water offered by public water supplies make them a competitive choice even
when compared to temporarily cheaper options.
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Abstract
Assessments of the levels of radioactivity in sludge from the Brent Spar storage
tanks have been performed. Based on field and laboratory measurements, only
44 drums (of a total of 2268 drums) were identified as drums with 226Ra-
concentrations above the exemption level of 10 Bq/g given by the Authorities.
Field measurements showed satisfactorily agreement with laboratory
measurements. The drums containing radioactivity concentrations below the
exemption level were classified as non-radioactive and shipped to Sløvåg
Industriservice AS for incineration. Only small amounts of radioactivity were
found in the ashes after incineration. The concentrations in the offgas and the
outlet water were below or close to the detection limit for gamma spectrometry.
Incineration of sludge with activity concentrations below the exemption level
was found to be a well-suited method for disposal.
Introduction
On request from Wood-GMC AS in 1999, Institute for Energy Technology (IFE)
assessed the levels of radioactivity in sludge from the oil storage tanks on
Brent Spar. The sludge was contained in 2268 standard-size steel drums at
Raunes Quay at Vats, Rogaland, Norway.
The assessment was carried out in two stages:
I) Survey of the distribution and levels of radioactivity throughout the
storage facility, including estimation of the within-drum variation in activity
concentration (homogeneity test) [1,2].
II) Final assessment including identification of the drums containing sludge
with radioactivity concentrations above the exemption level given by the
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority [2,3].
IFE was also asked to carry out verification measurements during
incineration of the sludge that had been classified as non-radioactive [2,4].
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Legislation
A preliminary exemption level of 10 Bq/g for 226Ra, 228Ra or 210Pb was given by
the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) in 1995 [5]. Waste from
the petroleum industry with activity concentrations exceeding this level for
one of the radionuclides mentioned shall be regarded as radioactive waste and
handled as such. This exemption level is in accordance with international
recommendations [6,7].
Stage I
Sampling and measurements
The sludge was contained in numbered standard-size steel drums stored in
containers. Based on knowledge of the origin of the sludge, it was assumed that
the activity concentration in drum number x would be similar to the activity
concentration in drum number x+1. For the purpose of establishing regions of
drum numbers with expected high, intermediate or low activity concentrations,
one sample was collected in one drum in each storage container. All samples
were taken below the “water table” inside the drums to avoid sampling of
oxidised and semi-dry material. Four additional samples were collected in
selected drums for test of the variation in activity concentration with the
drums.
A total of 127 samples were collected from 107 of the drums. All samples
were packed in plastic containers and analysed with high-resolution gamma
spectrometry. Based on earlier measurements of the Brent Spar sludge, 210Pb
could be excluded from the assessment, as its presence was only as a daughter
of 226Ra. 226Ra was analysed directly by its 186 keV gamma line and the results
were corrected for self-absorption, which was 12% for the counting conditions
in question. 228Ra was analysed through its daughter 228Ac.
Results and recommendations for Stage II
The results from Stage I revealed no drums with an activity concentration
exceeding the exemption level of 10 Bq/g. The mean activity was found to be 5.9
± 1.5 Bq/g and 1.6 ± 0.5 Bq/g for 226Ra and 228Ra respectively. The 226Ra:228Ra
ratio was found to be 3.8 ± 0.5 with three outliers all high in 226Ra. The mean
within drum variation in activity concentration for 226Ra was found to be 6.7%
with the highest variation being 13.0%. It was therefore concluded that the
homogeneity of the material was sufficient for conclusive determinations with
respect to the exemption level based on one sample per drum for measured
activity levels below 8 Bq/g. Additional sampling might be necessary for
activity levels exceeding 8 Bq/g.
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Figure 1. Specific activity of 226Ra and 228Ra vs.   drum number. Results from Stage I.
Viewing the results as a function of drum number (Fig.1), there appeared
to be three drum number intervals with activity concentrations that might
exceed the exemption level. All drums in this region should therefore be
sampled during Stage II. In all other regions it was not deemed necessary to
sample and measure the activity concentration in each and every drum.
An action level of 8 Bq/g were proposed for the field measurements in
Stage II. All samples exceeding this limit should be brought back to IFE for
further measurements using high-resolution gamma spectrometry.
Measurements above this action level from drums in expected low activity
regions should lead to sampling of ten drums above and below.
Stage II
Sampling and measurements
The work in Stage II was performed according to recommendations given in
Stage I. Samples were collected after the same procedure as in Stage I and
packed in standard size plastic containers. Screening measurements of the
sludge were carried out at site using a hand held monitor (NE Electra with a
beta sensitive BP4-probe, Fig. 2). The measurements were made with a fixed
geometry between the probe and the samples to ensure proper analytical
quality. The instrumental set-up was calibrated using the results and the ratio
between the two radium isotopes obtained in Stage I.
Each sample was measured for one minute and the background count
rate automatically subtracted. The background count rate was measured
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Figure 2. Experimental set-up at Vats.
regularly, and if it had changed significantly, a new background count rate was
determined. All samples measured to have activity concentrations above 8 Bq/
g were sent to IFE for possible re-measurement using high-resolution gamma
spectrometry.
Assuming a reasonable correlation between the field measurements and
the “true” values it was decided to analyse the samples brought back to IFE in
batches with decreasing order of activity until no more samples within one
batch were found to have activity concentrations exceeding the exemption
level. The rest of the samples were then assumed to contain less than 10 Bq/g of
226Ra. 226Ra was analysed directly by its 186 keV gamma line and the results
were corrected for self-absorption.
Results and conclusions
A total of 1266 measurements were made at Vats (the results are shown in Fig.
3). Based on the screening measurements samples from 203 drums were found
to have a 226Ra concentration above 8 Bq/g and consequently brought back to
IFE. At IFE 164 samples, divided into six batches, were measured with high-
resolution gamma spectrometry.
The criterion for selection of the drums with concentrations above the
exemption level was defined to be: “Analytical value + total analytical
uncertainty ≥ 10 Bq/g”.
Based on this criterion, a total of 44 drums were identified and classified
as “above exemption level”-drums. These drums were shipped back to the UK.
The mean 226Ra-activity concentration of all the sludge material was found to
be 6.0 ± 0.6 Bq/g.
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Figure 3. Specific activity of 226Ra vs. drum number. Results based on fieldwork and
measurements at Vats – Stage II
On average, each drum contained 230 kg of sludge (data from Wood-GMC
AS). Total activity of 226Ra was then estimated as:
• Total 226Ra activity in all Brent Spar sludge: 3.1 ± 0.3 GBq in 2268 drums
• 226Ra activity in “above exemption level”-drums: 0.10 ± 0.01 GBq in 44 drums
• 226Ra activity in “below exemption level”-drums: 3.0 ± 0.3 GBq in 2224 drums
There was good agreement between the results obtained in Stage I and
the results from the screening measurements in Stage II. All “above exemption
level”-drums identified in Stage II were found in the high activity regions
identified in Stage I. Also the correlation between the field measurements and
the “true” values were fairly good. The average discrepancy was about 8 %, with
a maximum of 27.9%. Considering the simplicity of the method used in field,
this must be regarded as a satisfactory result.
Incineration process
The remaining 2224 drums were shipped to Sløvåg Industriservice AS for
incineration. To obtain optimal conditions for combustion, the sludge was
mixed with drill cuttings at a ratio of 1:9. An evaluation of the expected activity
levels in exhaust gases, water and ashes had been made before the verification
work began [8]. The radioactivity in the sludge was assumed to follow the solid
fraction, and mixed with the drill cuttings the activity concentration in the
ashes was expected to be in the range 2-6 Bq/g. The activity concentration in
discharges to water and air were expected to be insignificant.
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IFE was requested to carry out verification measurements during the
incineration to ensure that the radioactivity levels were well within current
regulations and within calculated levels for exhaust gases and water [8].
A sampling programme was set up covering the following sampling
points: Coarse ash under incinerator, ash below the cooler outlet, ash from
skimmer (auger), ash from main filter (auger), water from scrubber and offgas
from stack. The external dose rate in the vicinity of the sampling points were
measured using a Geiger counter of the type Automess AD5. In addition,
contamination control, using an Electra contamination monitor, was performed
along the transport route for the sludge. Two sampling rounds were performed
the day before the incineration process began. The first day of incineration four
sampling rounds were performed. A total of five visits were made during the
incineration period, and two sampling rounds were performed at each visit. A
final visit was made three weeks after the incineration period.
All samples were analysed using the same experimental set-up as
described earlier. A selection of samples were analysed with high-resolution
gamma spectrometry to establish a calibration factor for the measurements. At
very low count rates, the uncertainty in the measurements would be
substantial and a discrepancy between field and laboratory measurements was
expected.
Analyses of the ash from the incineration showed activity concentrations
well below the estimates given in [8], the highest concentration of 226Ra being
approximately 2.5 Bq/g. Samples of water and offgas showed activity
concentrations below or close to the detection limit for gamma spectrometry.
Dose rate measurements in working areas in the vicinity of the sampling points
did not reveal any increase from the background level measured before the
incineration began.
It was concluded that incineration of sludge with activity concentrations
below the exemption level is a well-suited method for disposal. The dose to
personnel at the incineration facility will under normal circumstances be very
low. Risk for intake, especially inhalation of dust having elevated activity
levels, should however be observed.
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Survey of Radioactivity in Scale from Demolition of
an Oilrig
Azadeh Badiee, Jan Heggdal, Anfinn Mehus
Dept. of Radiation Physics, Haukeland University Hospital, N-5021 Bergen,
Norway
An oilrig was decommissioned and brought to shore from the North Sea for
demolition in June 2001. The Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency (NRPA)
has published directions1 on how deposits in pipes and tanks in oil and gas
production (scale) should be controlled with respect to radioactivity.
Scale is formed by precipitation of sulphates and carbonates from the
water in the production line in oil production. The naturally existing nuclides
226Ra and 228Ra are precipitated together with barium, calcium and strontium
due to similar chemical properties. It is possible for the concentration of radium
in scale to exceed the level in sedimentary rock.
Scale in the production of natural gas consists of thin layers of solid
elements inside the production line. 210Pb will concentrate in scale as it is a
daughter of the inert gas 222Rn, and has a longer half-life than the intervening
nuclides.
The task
Aker Maritime is responsible for the demolition, and wants to send samples of
scale to a laboratory for measurements. They contacted the Hospital and asked
if we could do the measurements in our “low-activity” laboratory. At that time
the laboratory needed an upgrade with new equipment and training of new
personnel. We therefore started a co-operation with Laborel AS, who has
supplied us with new measuring equipment and software. The laboratory now
has NaI(Tl)- and HPGe-detectors with MCA and software for measurement
control and spectral analysis.
Aker Maritime requires quick answers and prefers the laboratory to be
located close to the demolition site. The Hospital fulfils these requirements. We
1 StrålevernHefte 12, Avleiring av naturlig radioaktive stoffer i olje- og gassproduksjon, Statens
strålevern 1997.
Also: StrålevernRapport 1999:2, Håndtering av radioaktive avleiringer i olje- og gassproduksjon i
Norge, Storbritannia og Nederland, Statens strålevern og Oljedirektoratet 1999.
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can analyse samples with short measurement times partly because the “low-
activity” laboratory has a good signal-to-noise ratio.
The directions given by the NRPA define requirements to the analysis of
the samples. If the activity is more than 10 Bq/g for any of the isotopes 226Ra,
228Ra or 210Pb, the deposits shall be handled specially.
Our results are given with an uncertainty of ±2 Bq/g. Low activity
measurements are given the result <1 Bq/g.
“Low-activity” laboratory and methods
The entire laboratory (Lavaktivitetsrommet) is built from concrete and it is
placed at the very bottom of the largest building at the Hospital (Figure 1).
Inside the laboratory is another layer of shielding made of steel
(Helkroppsteller). The inner compartment is large enough to contain a couch
and the necessary equipment to perform whole-body measurements. All the
building materials are specially selected to contain as little radioactivity as
possible.
The laboratory is surveyed regularly to ensure that the rooms haven’t
been contaminated. The survey measurements are performed with a NaI-
detector at various locations. From these measurements we have found that
the counting rate inside the laboratory is approximately 20 times less than
outside. The inner compartment reduces the measured count rate another 40
times. The scale measurements are performed in the outer laboratory, as the
Figure 1.
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signal-to-noise ratio is sufficient low there. We are also very careful to avoid
bringing possible sources of contamination inside the inner compartment.
The samples that we receive are packed in sample boxes and they are
measured with a Geiger-Müller counter. We have compared these measurements
with the measured activity of 226Ra, and we have found fairly good agreement
between counts per second and activity. While these results should be used with
care, Geiger-Müller measurements give an opportunity to estimate the activity;
and thus which sampling times will be necessary to achieve good statistics on the
spectral analyses.
Figure 2.
The spectrum above (Figure 2) is measured with a HPGe semiconductor
detector on a calibrated scale standard sample. These standards are used to
calibrate the detector with respect to energy and efficiency. The software (Genie
2000) contains a system of calibration and certificate files that tells us when and
how the detectors were last calibrated. We have found this useful in a multi-user
environment.
The software handles the spectral analysis when the user has specified
which nuclide library to use. The scale library contains the most prominent lines of
the natural radioactive series as well as some nuclides that we may find in the
samples (e.g. 40K and 137Cs).
226Ra is measured by its 187 keV line. 235U has several lines, one of which is
190 keV, and it could be difficult to separate the two. The activity of 235U can be
estimated from its other lines and subtracted. So far we haven’t detected 235U in the
samples. 228Ra will be in equilibrium with 228Ac; which can readily be detected.210Pb
can be measured directly by its 47 keV line.
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Results
The initial samples were taken from storage tanks for oil and the
measurements confirmed the expected results; <1 Bq/g. We have later received
samples from the production line, and some of these have had radium activities
above 10 Bq/g. So far we haven’t measured activities of 210Pb above the 10 Bq/g
limit.
Three samples have been sent to STUK. The activities measured in two
of the samples were in very good agreement, while the third deviated by 22%.
This deviation is (according to STUK) probably due to density corrections and
use of non-airtight sample boxes, which would let radon escape the box and
upset equilibrium conditions.
Conclusion
This project has given us an opportunity to expand our activity into new areas
in co-operation with commercial partners. The laboratory has been upgraded
with new equipment and we have got valuable experience in measuring
techniques. We now have better opportunities to offer new services in low-level
radiation measurements. We consider offering surveys of personnel or patients
who have been exposed to radioactivity.
The project also shows that the activity of the scale samples can readily
be measured without using the inner compartment. We find that promising
with respect to which activity levels it will be possible to detect inside the inner
compartment.
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Natural radionuclides in fuel and waste from
Danish power plants
Carsten Israelson and Tina Andersen
National Institute of Radiation Hygiene, Knapholm 7, DK-2730 Herlev,
Denmark; email: ci@sis.dk, tan@sis.dk.
Abstract
We have examined the content of natural occurring radionuclides in three
types of fuel and waste from power plants in Eastern Denmark (coal,
orimulsion and biomass). While coal previously was the main fuel used for
power production, the majority of fuel used today is biomass, natural gas and
orimulsion. Coal was in 2000 less than 50 %. It was found that the Ra-226
content of coal ash was on an average 104 Bq/kg, which is similar to what was
found in previous studies. The Ra-226 content of orimulsion ash is only 8 Bq/kg,
which exclude radiological problems with this fuel and the associated ash. Bio
fly ash from combustion of straw contains about 40 % potassium and from a
radiological point the K-40 content of up to 13000 Bq/kg is the most interesting.
However, even handling of large amounts of bio fly ash will probably not give
external doses to workers beyond the radiological protection goals of the
European Basic Safety Standards.
Background and introduction
All types of coal, oil and other fossil fuel types contain small amounts of natural
occurring radionuclides, principally K-40 and radionuclides from the U-238
and Th-232 decay series. Combustion of the fuel leads to an increased
concentration of the nuclides in the ash.  Several studies of the radiological
impact on the population and on workers from coal-fired electricity generation
have therefore been made [1,2,3].
A previous Danish investigation of coal and coal fly ashes from 1984,
Ulbak [3] showed that the use of fly ash from coal-fired power plants in
concrete increased the radiological impact of a habitant in a concrete
apartment by 30 µSv/y.
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For two reasons we have decided to reinvestigate the radiological impact
from Danish power plants. Firstly, until 1995 the principle fuel in power plants in
Denmark was coal (above 90 %). The majority of fuel used today is biomass (mainly
straws), natural gas and orimulsion. Orimulsion is composed of 30% water and
70% natural bitumen. It is produced in Venezuela and is in Denmark only used at
Asnæs Power Plant [4]. In 2000, coal amounted to less than 50 % of the fuel used for
electricity generation. Secondly, in the case of natural occurring radioactive
material (NORM), the European BSS [5] requires that the member states
regulators identify which work activities and associated wastes or discharges
require control or prior authorisation.
This study includes some of the power plants in Eastern Denmark
organized in the company ENERGI E2, which produced both electricity and
district heating on Sjælland, Eastern Denmark. Some of the studied power
plants use several fuel types while other are dedicated to one fuel type
(Table 1).
Material and analytical techniques
All samples were collected between January and July 2002. They were kept for
one month in air-tight Marinelli beakers before they were analysed with a
high-purity germanium detector. Ra-226 was determined by the gamma lines
of its progenies Pb-214 at 353 keV and Bi-214 at 609 keV, 1120 keV and 1764
keV assuming secular isotopic equilibrium with Ra-226. Th-232 was
determined from the gamma lines of it progenies Tl-208 and Ac-228 at 583 keV
and 911 keV respectively, also assuming equilibrium with Th-232. K-40 was
determined directly via the 1461 keV gamma line. All samples were analysed
for a minimum of 60000 s. Errors for the Ra ,Th and K activity concentrations
are ± 20% or less and include counting statistics, determination of the detector
efficiency, and correction for photon mass attenuation.
Results
The results of the analyses are shown in Tabel 1. Biomass is in Denmark mostly
straw, which comes from farming in Eastern Denmark. For all fuel types, both
the unburned fuel and the remains (ash) have been analysed. A portion of the
ash remains in the boilers after combustion and is termed bottom ash. The
smaller and lighter ash particles, which escape the boiler and are captured in a
filter are termed fly ash. The ash content of the various fuel types depends both
on the quality of the coal or biomass and on the type of boiler. The fly ash
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Table 1. Activity ratios of natural radionuclides of samples from Danish power plants.
Bio mass is straw if nothing else is given. Errors for activity concentrations are ± 20% or
less.
Sample 
no. Sample type Power plant 
K-40
(Bq/kg)
Ra-226
(Bq/kg)
Th-232 
(Bq/kg)
      
1 Coal Avedøre 71 15 14
8  Asnæs 77 9 6
9 78 10 6
14   57 11 8
15 65 11 10
2 Coal fly ash Avedøre 669 158 103
4 693 146 111
6  Asnæs 292 88 79
7 393 87 78
12   562 105 84
13 554 102 83
37 Coal bottom ash Amagerværket 581 102 83
3 Avedøre 396 83 63
5   453 85 70
10 Asnæs 371 59 49
11     361 62 54
18 Orimulsion Asnæs 0 0 0
19   0 0 1
16 Orimulsion ash 25 8 28
17     26 8 27
30 Bio fly ash Avedøre 12804 9 3
32   12070 10 5
33 12389 11 5
20  Slagelse 11902 13 7
21 11839 12 6
28  Masnedø * 11531 16 10
29 11703 18 8
31 Bio bottom ash Avedøre 1940 42 14
22 Ringsted** 1196 10 4
23   654 6 3
24 Haslev** 3631 34 16
25   3535 35 17
26 7231 24 11
27     8130 25 12
* Ash from fuel consisting of about 20 % wood and 80 % straw. 
** The samples are a mix of fly ash and bottom ash. 
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content of coal is typical between 10 and 20 % while it is only between 0,5 and 1 %
for biomass.
Discussion
The coal and coal ash samples analysed in this study have activity concentrations
similar to what is found in previous studies [2, 3]. Coal fly ash is used in the same
way as for many years in the production of concrete, cement and asphalt. As
previously mentioned Ulbak [3] has calculated the radiological impact of use of
coal fly ash in concrete and these calculations are still valid today.
Orimulsion is a relatively new fuel in Denmark but the very low content of
naturally occurring radionuclides in this fuel and in the ash excludes any
radiological impact for workers handling orimulsion. The Ra-226 content of
approximately 8 Bq/kg is much lower than in almost any type of soil or rock in
Denmark [6]. The orimulsion ash is exported to companies in the UK, Germany
and Austria, which exploit its content of metals.
The analyses of the bio fly ash samples reflect the large amount of potassium
in these samples (about 40 %). Bio fly ash therefore also has a relatively high
content of K-40 (up to 13000 Bq/kg).  While fly ash from coal combustion in readily
used in building material, most bio fly ash cannot be reused due to its high content
of cadmium. This means that the power plants at the present store the ash in ‘big
bags’ containing about 1 m3 of ash each.
In order to meet the Danish parliament’s targets for use of biomass,
ENERGI E2 has initiated a comprehensive plan for the expansion of biomass-fired
production, initially based on straw [4]. Over the coming years, E2 expects to use 4
times as much biomass fuel as they do today, which means that they will burn
about 350 000 tons of straw a year. The newly build boiler at Avedøre alone has a
capacity of 150 000 tons of straw each year making this the larges biomass-fired
boiler in the world. Since the fly ash content of straw is only about 0,5 to 1 % of the
original mass, they will produce a minimum of 750 tons of bio fly ash each year
with a total activity of about 9,6 GBq K-40. Since the density of bio fly ash is about
200 kg/m3 the total volume of ash will be on approximately 3750 m3. This amount of
ash will require some handling and possible disposal at a landfill site, which could
potentially lead to doses to workers.
In compliance with the European BSS a dose criterion of 0.3 mSv/y (after
background subtraction) have been used to calculate exemption/clearance levels
for K-40 for various working scenarios [7]. A scenario where this dose rate could
be reached describes exposure situations for workers at a NORM landfill site.
For external gamma radiation, an exposure geometry of a point situated one
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metre above a semi-infinite volume is used and the worker is shielded by a steel
vehicle. It is assumed that a worker spends 1800 h/a working with handling
NORM, that the activity of K-40 on an average is 10 Bq/g, and that the disposal
rate is at a minimum 20 tons/h or 36,000 tons a year.  It is clear that compared
to a future work scenario at Avedøre, or even the combined straw-fired power
production at E2, it will be many years before handling of NORM will amount
to a volume that requires dose control.
Conclusions
The development in power production in Denmark means that the potential
radiological impact from natural radionuclides in fuel and fuel waste is
currently undergoing changes. The most important change is the wide use of
biomass (straw or wood), which is replacing coal as the major fuel. The
potential radiological hazard from bio ash is external radiation from K-40. This
ash type cannot at the present be reused and is therefore stored in large
quantities. Preliminary calculations indicate that external radiation to
workers is not likely to exceed 0,3 mSv/y even with a much larger production
than today. However, since much more biomass will be used in the near future,
it is relevant for regulators to monitor this development and to make actual
monitoring of doses to workers and the public.
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210Pb in Air and Soil: Ra -Rich Areas in NE Estonia
K.Realo, E.Realo and R.Koch
Institute of Physics, University of Tartu, 51014, Tartu, Estonia
The present report presents the results of a detailed study of the 210Pb and 226Ra
in undisturbed soil profiles collected from Lääne-Virumaa and Ida-Virumaa
County in NE Estonia. In a few areas of this region, an enhanced natural U/Ra
content characterizes surface soils. In general, maximum U/Ra activity
concentrations found in these distinct areas increase from west to east. These
Ra-rich areas are neighboring with areas characterized by a significantly lower
Ra con-tent. From place to place the range from 25 Bq kg-1 to 350 Bq kg-1 has
been determined [1]. At present, data on the detailed geographical distribution
of these areas are rather scarce.
Depth-distributions and inventories of the 210Pb activity have been
determined from the HPGe gamma spectrometric analysis of the 2-3 cm thick
slices of soil profiles. In  spectrum analysis [2], a self-attenuation correction
method basing on a direct 46.5 keV transmission measurement for each sample
was applied. In addition, for the same samples placed into sealed beakers 226Ra
content and 222Rn emanation coefficients have also been determined by using
gamma spectrometry.
Along a typical soil profile, the 226Ra concentration showed a negligible
variation, while the  activity concentration of 210Pb demonstrates a
considerably more complex behavior with depth. In upper soil layers two 210Pb
fractions exist: the atmospherically deposited unsupported fraction and the in-
situ produced supported fraction fixed to the soil particles. An attempt has been
made to separate the fractions as a function of depth.
From the determined unsupported fraction inventories in low-Ra soils,
210Pb deposition fluxes and concentrations in precipitation have been
evaluated. In these cases, a depth-dependent activity concentration of the
unsupported fraction has been reasonably well approximated by an
expo-nential (and for a few cases, by a lognormal) distribution.
In Ra-rich soils, which serve as efficient sources of radon, the
unsupported Pb fraction is comparable to or even smaller than the supported
fraction and an appropriate modeling is required for separation of the fractions.
A simple one-dimensional diffusion model has been satisfactorily applied.
While mean deposition flux value, F, equals to 116 Bq m-2 a-1, the maximum of 177
Bq m-2 a-1 has been determined. The concentration in precipitation reaches values
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Figure 1. 210Pb deposition flux, F, vs 226Ra activity concentration, CRa, in soil, 19 sites in NE
Estonia, 1999-2001. Solid line is a linear fit, F=97+0.15 CRa
up to 260 Bq m-3, using a local long-term annual mean precipitation value of 0.68 m
a-1. The deposition flux shows a tendency for finding higher deposition fluxes at the
locations characterized by higher 226Ra concentration, CRa, in soil. The relevant
dependence F vs CRa with a linear fit is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a slight
increase in flux, while the Ra concentration increases. The correlation coefficient is
0.39.
The found correlation may be explained assuming locally enhanced 210Pb
(and 222Rn) concentrations in outdoor air of the Ra-rich NE regions in comparison
to the worldwide reference value of 0.5 mBq m3 [3].
Preliminary results on the low-energy gamma spectrometric analysis of
210Pb in filter samples collected by high-volume air samplers in three different
locations, Harku, Tõravere and Narva-Jõesuu, are obtained. The average and
extreme 210Pb concentrations in air (mBq m-3) of these locations are presented in
Table 1.
The presented air concentration data seem to confirm the above
assumption about locally enhanced 210Pb air concentrations in this region. The
mean concentration value for the seaside station in Narva-Jõesuu (NE
Estonia), neighboring the high radium areas, is almost equal to that for the
inland station in Tõravere (South Estonia). Additional evidence follows also
from the results of a transport modelling study for the airborne 210Pb [4], where
Eastern Estonia is identified among the 210Pb source regions of a relatively high
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Table 1. 210Pb concentrations in air for three locations in Estonia, 2001.
intensity.
The authors acknowledge the Estonian Radiation Protection Centre for
presenting air filter samples and the ESF for a partial financial support.
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Concentration in air (mBq m-3)
HARKU N-JÕESUU TÕRAVERE 
Arithm. Mean 0.47 0.57 0.55 
Geom. Mean 0.37 0.44 0.46 
Standard Error 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Min - max 0.08 – 1.30 0.12 – 1.60 0.16 – 1.51 
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Posters
3a Continuous Monitoring of Indoor Radon
A. Uljas, L. Pahapill and E. Realo
Institute of Physics, University of Tartu, 51014, Tartu, Estonia
A recent radon survey performed by one of the authors (L.P.) using passive
plastic track detectors has confirmed that the time-integral air concentrations
in living apartments are as an average about 100 Bq m-3 in Tartu and Tartumaa
County. The average value for this region almost coincides with the
corresponding country mean of 101 Bq m-3 [1]. In the region, the maximum
average long-term radon concentrations up to 220 Bq m-3 have been found in a
multi-storey mansion. It is well known that short-term radon concentration
values may vary significantly from a long-term average.
The present report presents data on continuous radon monitoring
carried out using an active alpha-spectrometric monitor ALNOR RM-3B in a
work place during 2 years. The monitor was installed in a laboratory room of
the Institute of Physics, University of Tartu, in the third floor of the five-storey
building (58°21' N, 26°41' E). The building  constructed in the 1970’s has no air-
conditioning and its ventilation is rather poor. The room accommodates two low
background HPGe gamma spectrometers.
Radon was let to diffuse freely into the measuring chamber of the
monitor, where both 218Po and 214Po radon daughters were counted, integrating
over 4 hr (slow mode). In parallel, for characterization of the environmental
conditions in the analysis room, gamma dose rate, room temperature, relative
humidity and atmospheric pressure were also continuously recorded.
During the measurement period, daily radon concentration varied in the
range from 8 Bq m-3 to 71 Bqm-3 with a long-term average value of 29 Bq m-3 and
a standard deviation of 9.6 Bq m-3 (Fig. 1). At the same time minimum and
maximum values of 4 h measurements vary in the range from 5 to 80 Bq m-3.
Distinct day-night, weekly and yearly oscillations in air concentration of radon
have been found (Fig. 2).
The measured data are analyzed for correlation between radon
concentration and the environmental parameters (temperature, humidity,
etc.). The analysis is in progress and only the most apparent correlations are
available. E.g., in addition to the above-mentioned time-dependent features, a
significant inverse correlation with air pressure is observed.
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Fig. 1. Radon concentration in laboratory air averaged over: 24 h, 1 month and 1 year.
Fig. 2. Average (a) daily and (b) weekly dependence of radon concentration in room air.
Overall mean and mean calculated for working hours are also shown.
The results are discussed in relation to the exposure of persons and to the
low-level counting. The present results are also a part of monitoring carried out
in the framework of the local quality assurance program for low-background
gamma spectrometric analysis.
The authors acknowledge a partial support from the ESF grants.
[1] L.Pahapill and R.Rajamäe. Radon in houses. http://www.envir.ee/ekk/
radoon.html (in Estonian)
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3b NORM Exposure to Workers at a Zircon Sand
Processing Factory
Tina Andersen and Carsten Israelson
National Institute of Radiation Hygiene, Knapholm 7, DK-2730 Herlev,
Denmark; email: ci@sis.dk, tan@sis.dk
Abstract
The National Institute of Radiation Hygiene (NIRH) has estimated doses to
workers at a Danish zircon-processing industry. Calculations of internal doses
were made after measuring dust concentrations in the working area and
content of radium-226 and thorium-232 in the zircon sand. The total effective
dose from internal and external irradiation was calculated to approximately
0,75 mSv/y.
Introduction
Zircon (ZrSiO4) is a natural occurring mineral with a relatively high content of
radionuclides from the uranium and thorium decay series. Activity
concentrations for zircon sand are reported to be in the range from 0,4 Bq/g to
40 Bq/g of thorium-232 and from 0,2 Bq/g to 74 Bq/g of uranium-238 [1].
Because of its high melting point, zircon is used in the manufacturing of
refractory materials. It is used in the industry as a fine powder, and workers
can be exposed to NORM internally by ingestion, by inhalation of dust, by skin
contamination and from inhalation of radon. External NORM exposure can
occur in the proximity of large quantities of material such as in a storehouse.
Historically, mining and processing of zircon sand have lead to high
exposures from contaminated dust, although in the last ten years much has
been done by the industry to reduce such exposures. Typical dust concentration
levels in refractory fabrication plants are between 0,7 and 3,1 mg/m3 [1].
NIRH has calculated the annual effective dose to workers at a Danish
zircon sand processing factory. Calculations of internal doses were made after
measuring dust concentrations in the working area and content of radium-226
and thorium-232 in the zircon sand.
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Table 1. Activity concentrations in zircon sand, ACSAND.
Materials and Methods
Samples of three different types of zircon sand have been analysed for the
concentration of radionuclides. The samples were analysed in the Dosimetry
Laboratory at NIRH using a gamma spectrometer with a Canberra High Purity
Germanium detector, Model GC 2318-7500. The samples were kept for one
month in airtight Marinelli beakers before they were analysed for a minimum
of 60000 s. Radionuclides were determined following the procedure described
in [2].
Dust particles in the air were collected and separated in size fractions by
means of an impactor.  The impactor collects particles in 5 size fractions
between 0,36 µm and 6 µm. The dust particles are deposited on a glass plate
coated with apiezon. A pump is used to force the air through the impactor with
a flow rate on 15 L/minute [3].
Dose rate from external irradiation was measured with a Bicron
microsievert instrument.
Results
Concentrations of radium-226 and thorium-232 in three different types of
zircon sand are shown in table 1. The uncertainty is approximately + 20 %.
Dust concentrations were measured at the working area under the most
dusty conditions, where zircon sand in big bags are poured into the production
equipment. In this experiment 437 L of air was pumped through the impactor.
The concentration of dust in the place of production was higher than normal,
because the ventilation in the production equipment was wrongly adjusted.
The measurements reported in table 2 therefore describe an unlikely scenario
with dust concentrations higher than normal.
Sample ACSAND (Ra-226)  ACSAND (Th-232) 
1 3,1 (Bq/g) 0,57 (Bq/g) 
2 4,3 (Bq/g) 0,78 (Bq/g) 
3 3,0 (Bq/g) 0,67 (Bq/g) 
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Figure 1. Impactor.
Table 2. Mass of dust from each impactor step.
Dust particles from impactor step 1 were excluded, because these
particles are larger than 5 µm and cannot be inhaled into the alveolar of the
lungs [4]. The concentration of dust in the air that can be inhaled, CDUST, was
calculated to 25 mg per m3.
The dose rate from external irradiation in the place of production was
measured to approximately 0,15 µSv/h.
Discussion
Because the activity concentrations of the zircon sand were higher than the
exemption levels for naturally occurring radionuclides [5,6], it was decided to
estimate the annual effective doses to the workers.
The effective dose from each radionuclide was calculated separately for
the five exposure pathways. Doses from all radionuclides were summed to give
the total dose for each pathway. Finally, the doses from the pathways were
Impactor step 1 2 3 4 5 
Filter
paper 
Particle Size [3] > 6 µm 6-2,5 µm 
2,5-1,7
µm
1,7-0,70 
µm
0,70-0,36 
µm < 0,36 µm
Mass 7,4 mg 5,9 mg 2,1 mg 1,5 mg 0,70 mg 0,95 mg 
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summed to give the total effective dose. It was assumed that uranium-238,
uranium-235 and thorium-232 were present in secular isotopic equilibrium
with all their daughter products. The calculation of doses from each pathway is
described in [1].
Dose from inhalation of dust from each radionuclide is given by the
following equation [1].
Inhalation of dust:
• UDINH = DCINH * RINH * CDUST * TINH
• Where UDINH = The annual effective dose per unit activity from inhaling
contaminated dust, in Sv y-1 per Bq g-1
• DCINH = Dose coefficient for inhalation, in Sv Bq-1
• RINH = The rate at which air containing contaminated dust is breathed by
the individual, in m3 h-1
• CDUST = The concentration of contaminated dust in the air, in g m-3
• TINH = The time that an individual is exposed to these conditions, in h y-1
Table 3 shows the parameters used to calculate the annual effective dose
for the unlikely working situation. It is assumed, that the activity
concentrations in the size fractions are the same as in the bulk material. No
respiratory protection was used.
Table 3. Parameters for inhalation of dust. ACSAND is the activity concentrations in Bq/g
from table 1. EINH   is the effective dose from inhalation in mSv/y.
The total effective dose, EINH, from inhalation of dust using the parameter
values in table 3 is 0,12 mSv/y.
Under normal conditions the concentration of inhaled dust CDUST was
estimated to 1 mg per m3, and the time an individual is exposed TINH was estimated
to 1000 hours/y. The total internal effective dose is then calculated to 0,47 mSv/y.
The external dose at the working area is 0,15 mSv/y, whereas doses from ingestion
Decay series DCINH RINH CDUST TINH UDINH ACSAND EINH 
U-238 + 
daughters  6,8E-05 1,18 2,5E-02 10 1,9E-02 3,5 0,068 
U-235 + 
daughters 7,0E-04 1,18 2,5E-02 10 2,1E-01 0,16 0,033 
Th-232 + 
daughters 7,6E-05 1,18 2,5E-02 10 2,2E-02 0,67 0,016 
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and skin contamination are negligible. Because the factory does not store large
amounts of zircon sand, doses from inhalation of radon were not calculated. The
total effective dose from internal and external irradiation was thus estimated to
approximately 0,75 mSv/y.
Conclusion
According to Danish legislation [6], industries that process material with
enhanced levels of naturally occurring radionuclides require an appropriate form
of regulatory control, if the annual effective dose to workers or members of the
public exceeds 0,3 mSv/y.
The calculated annual effective dose of 0,75 mSv/y for this factory indicates,
that the zircon processing industry should be further investigated for the
radiological impact from natural radionuclides. The factory will also require a
license from the authorities, because the activity concentrations of uranium-238 in
the zircon sand were higher than the exemption levels for this nuclide [6].
For further investigation it could be interesting to locate refractory
producing factories, because refractory products are finished by grinding and
polishing. One of the most radiological hazardous areas of a typical refractory
producing factory is the sprue elimination area, where the castings are cleaned up
[1]. In this area the concentration of dust is high, and the ventilation and dust
control have to be adequate.
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3c Assessment of human exposure to natural
radionuclides by using in vivo measurements
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T. Haninger* and D. Kucheida*
STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881 Hel-
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*GSF-National Research Center for Environment and Health, Institute of
Radiation Protection, Ingolstädter Landsstr. 1, D-85764 Neuherberg, Germany
Introduction
Geologically, Finland is part of the Fennoscandian shield and the bedrock
consists mainly of granitoids. The average concentrations of natural
radionuclides in granitoids, especially in granites, are high. Consequently,
exceptionally high concentrations of natural uranium (234,235,238U) and the
daughter nuclides of uranium and thorium series ( 222Rn, 226,228Ra, 210Po,
210Pb) have been found in wells drilled in bedrock. The concentrations of
natural radionuclides both in drinking water and indoor air have been
observed to vary markedly in Finland depending on the location. The
highest concentrations have been measured in the granite areas of Sout-
hern Finland [1-3].
Exposure to natural radionuclides in drinking water is usually
chronic and may persist for many years before it is recognised. It is
normally difficult to assess individual cumulative exposures of afflicted
persons with biokinetic models because of several problems: activity
concentrations in water may show great temporal variations, assumptions
on individual water consumption rates have to be made and many biokinetic
parameters are uncertain. Due to these difficulties with biokinetic models it
would be useful to have a biological indicator in the human body itself. This
would provide more direct information on the cumulative exposure. The
objective of this study is to demonstrate the feasibility of estimating
individuals’ cumulative exposure to uranium and 210Pb by measuring the
amounts of these nuclides in their skeletons.
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Experimental methods
The short-lived decay products of inhaled 222Rn deposited in the respiratory
track decay inside the body into 210Pb. Lead accumulates mainly (55%) in the
skeleton and is retained there with long effective half-life. Several researchers
have shown [4-6] that the human skull is suitable for in vivo measurements of
210Pb in the human skeleton, whereas studies on the individual exposure via
waterborne natural radionuclides are very scarce [7]. In this paper we have
studied persons whose main source of long-lived radon progeny 210Pb (22.3-year
physical half-life) and natural uranium is drinking water.
Both lead and uranium accumulate mainly in the skeleton. Fractions of
0.6, 0.2 and 0.2 of the lead translocated to the skeleton are retained with
biological half-lives of 12, 180 and 10000 d, respectively [8]. From uranium,
fractions of 0.2 and 0.023 are transferred to mineral bone and retained there
with half-lives of 20 and 5000 d, respectively [9]. The skull represents a fraction
of 13-15% of fresh skeletal weight and anatomical structures of individuals’
skulls do not differ much from each other. Additionally, a relatively thin layer of
tissue around the skull makes it very suitable for uranium and 210Pb
measurements.
 210Pb is a beta emitter but 4.25% of its decay is followed by the emission
of a 46.5 keV γ-ray. Of natural uranium isotopes (234,235,238U) only the decay of
235U is accompanied by the emission of γ-rays (186, 144, 163 and 205 keV) with
intensities high enough (57, 11, 5 and 5%) to be detected in vivo using HPGe
detectors. As no fluctuations in the isotopic abundance ratio of 238U and 235U in
naturally occurring materials have been found, the concentration of 238U can be
calculated from the 235U concentration [10]. Furthermore, it is possible to
determine the 238U content using the 63 keV and 93 keV peaks originating from
the decay of its daughter nuclide, 234Th.
The instrumentation constructed at STUK for the in vivo measurements
consists of four high purity broad energy Ge-detectors: three detectors with
crystal thickness of 20 mm and diameter of 70 mm and one detector with
thickness of 20 mm and diameter of 80 mm. In part of the measurements one of
the smaller detectors was replaced with a LOAX detector with a crystal
diameter of 70 mm and thickness of 30 mm. Detectors are placed near the top
and the back of the head, and lateral surfaces (see Figure 1). The average
distance between the detector and head surface is approximately 10 mm. To
reduce the amount of background radiation from the surroundings the
instrumentation has been installed into a room with 15-mm thick iron walls
covered with 3-mm lead and 2-mm copper. A measuring time of 7200 seconds
was used.
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Figure 1. Array of four broad energy Ge-detectors installed for in vivo measurements of
natural radionuclides accumulated in the skull.
The study persons were selected from the drinking water database of
STUK, which covers the results of radionuclide measurements from more than
7 000 drilled wells. Those individuals who had used water with highest 210Pb
and uranium concentrations were mainly contacted. By the end of June 2002
the levels of  210Pb and uranium in the skull of thirteen Finns had been
determined. A questionnaire was made to collect information on residential
history, usage of drilled well water, daily beverage consumption (well water and
other beverages) as well as smoking history and dietary habits. The study
persons were also asked to collect a 24-h urine samples for the determination of
210Pb and natU concentrations. Uranium in urine (mg/l) was analysed with
inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) in the laboratory of
Consulting Engineers Paavo Ristola Laboratory, Hollola, Finland. The analysis
method for 210Pb in urine is under development.
Results
Each study person was measured for 7 200 seconds in periods of 1 800 seconds.
Figure 2 shows a few examples of collected γ-ray energy spectra.  Spectra a) and
b) were recorded from subjects who use water rich in uranium and 210Pb,
whereas spectrum c) represents a control person exposed to normal 210Pb and
natU concentrations in the environment. Examples a) and b) are members of the
same family (a daughter and father) who have been using the same water
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source for almost 20 years. Enhanced 210Pb and 235U activities were observed in
both. However, much smaller amounts of uranium and 210Pb have accumulated
in the father. According to the questionnaire the father reduced his water
consumption from the family’s drilled well about 15 years ago. In addition, he
has consumed the water only as an adult whereas the daughter consumed the
same water during her growth period. The results of the measurements (water,
urine and skull) are shown in Table 1. The radionuclide concentrations of the
well water have been measured several times in different years. Some of the
families bought water treatment equipment for removing uranium or radon
from water as soon as the enhanced radionuclide concentrations were noticed.
In the table, the higher concentrations represent the situation when no water
treatment equipment has been used. The seasonal variations in radionuclide
concentrations have been large in some of the drilled wells used by the study
individuals. The results related to the Figure 1 are represented in the Table 1.
The background (the lowest row) has been subtracted from the results of the
skull measurements.
Figure 2. a,b) Gamma-ray energy spectra recorded from subjects who use water rich in
natural uranium and 210Pb. Spectrum c) was recorded from a control person exposed to
normal 210Pb and natU concentrations in the environment.  The background in the spectra
may vary due to different measurement dates. Spectrum a) was recorded in June 2002
while the others were collected in March 2002.
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Discussion
Although the number of studied individuals is too small to be statistically
significant, a positive correlation can be observed between the U concentration
in urine (µg/d) and the number of counts (cpm) in the 186 keV and 63 keV peaks
originating from the decay of 235U and 234Th, respectively. Likewise a correlation
can also be seen between the estimated intakes of uranium (mg) from drinking
water and the counts in the 186 keV and 63 keV peaks. The estimation of the
total intake of uranium in the course of years was based on the uranium
concentration in drilled well water and on the information of the water
consumption obtained by the questionnaire. A rough estimation of the uranium
intakes was possible after the time of the installation of water treatment
equipment and the variation in activity concentrations in water (see Table 1)
were known. At the moment, the absolute efficiency of the detection system is
not known due to lack of a realistic anthropomorphic skull phantom. After the
calibration it will be possible to compare the results of the in vivo
measurements to those obtained from the activity concentrations in water and
in urine using biokinetic models.
Drinking water is the predominant source of uranium and 210Pb in our
study, but the contribution of each pathway for uptake into the human body
have to be considered. Unfortunately, there is no data on uranium and lead
contents in normal Finnish diet. The recent studies performed elsewhere show
that the average daily uptake of 210Pb in a ‘normal’ indoor atmosphere (CRn=50
Bq/m3, F=0.4, CPb=0.5 mBq/m
3 [11]) is 23 mBq [6] and references therein. The
contribution of atmospheric 210Pb, domestic radon and diet to 210Pb uptake is
12%, 2% and 86%, respectively. Tap water with low or normal concentration of
210Pb has been estimated to be a negligible source of 210Pb [12], while smoking a
pack of 20 cigarettes would result in an additional 210Pb uptake of about 10
mBq/d. The average daily intake of uranium from foodstuff has been reported
to be 1-2 µg/d [11]. Small amounts of uranium and 210Pb may also accumulate in
the hair. To estimate the effect of this source of background, hair samples from
study persons will be collected and analysed.
This study indicates that the measurement of the 210Pb and natU contents
in the skull could be applied to estimate the individual cumulative exposures to
the waterborne activities. The calibration of the measurement set-up and the
determination of background sources are in progress.
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Table 1. The results of the measurements.
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study
person 
Radionuclides in 
water 
natU                      222Rn
µg/l                      
kBq/l 
Years 
of 
water
usage 
Years of 
water
treatment 
in opera-
tion 
Urine
U µg/d
         Radionuclides in skull 
                               c p m 
234Th           235U             210Pb 
 63 keV      186 keV        46 keV 
male 50-12500 1-9 6 - 8.11 6.3±0.2 5.0 ±0.2 2.4 ± 0.1 
female 50-12500 1-9 6 - 12.17 18.4±0.4 12.2±
0.3 
5.2 ± 0.2 
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0.1 
1.6 ± 0.1 
male 1-30 0.1-27 19 6 (Rn) - 0.2±0.1 0.7 ±
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a)
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3 (Rn) 
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back
ground 
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a,b) See Figure 2. 
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3d Natural radionuclides and 90Sr in sludge at
waterworks and wastewater treatment plants
Marketta Puhakainen and Tarja Heikkinen
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HELSINKI, Finland
Introduction
Many radionuclides in water are concentrated into sludge during water
treatment process. Sewage sludge is a sensitive indicator of radionuclides
entering the environment.  In previous studies artificial gamma-emitting
radionuclides from the Chernobyl accident were found in activity
measurements of sludge from waterworks and wastewater treatment plants.
There were also found radionuclides from nuclear weapon tests, nuclear power
plants and medical use in sewage sludge. These results have been reported in
STUK report series(1-4). To obtain more comprehensive information on
radionuclides in sludge, the amounts of natural radionuclides and 90Sr were
determined in sludge samples taken earlier from waterworks and wastewater
treatment plants. Natural radionuclides were principally analysed from the
samples taken in 1991 and 2001, and 90Sr from the samples taken in 1986, 1994
and 2001.
The investigation determining the activity concentrations of natural
radionuclides in sludge gives more information on their contribution to
radiation doses of workers at the wastewater treatment plants. The
investigation also gives knowledge about the transfer of radionuclides in
environment and possible radioecological consequences when using sewage
sludge as fertiliser or as a soil-improvement agent in the fields. In addition, the
study provides information for incineration of sludge.
Waterworks
Data on plants and treatment methods are given in Table 1. Sludge samples
formed in the surface water treatment plants during water purification process
were obtained from the treatment plants Pitkäkoski in Helsinki and Dämman
in Espoo. Pitkäkoski receives raw water via a 120-km long rock tunnel from
Lake Päijänne. The transportation of water in the tunnel takes about ten days.
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Water in waterworks includes about 10% of groundwater, which infiltrates into
the tunnel from the bedrock. In the city of Espoo about 70% of water comes
from Lake Päijänne via Pitkäkoski waterworks and 30% from Lake Dämman.
Pitkäkoski plant treated water using aluminium sulphate until 2000. New
methods using iron compounds have been adapted since 2000. The tunnel from
Lake Päijänne was closed from September 1,2001 to December 22, 2001 and the
Pitkäkoski plant received water from the Vantaanjoki river. In Dämman plant
aluminium sulphate was changed to polyaluminium chloride at the beginning
of 1990’s and again to iron chloride in 2000. The older sludge sample taken from
Dämman in 2001 could contain Al-sludge.
The sludge from the Pitkäkoski water treatment plant in Helsinki is
pumped into the sewer system leading to Viikinmäki wastewater treatment
plant (until 1994 to Kyläsaari plant) and the sludge from Dämman to Suomen-
oja wastewater treatment plant.
Wastewater treatment plants
The sludge samples were taken in municipal wastewater treatment plants from
the output sludge of the plant and also in Kyläsaari (to 1994) and Viikinmäki
Table 1. Treatment methods of waterworks and wastewater treatment plants and mean
values for dry matter and estimated amounts of sewage sludge during sampling.
Waterworks Treatment 
 method 
Year Raw water from 
lake/river 
Sludge to wastewater 
treatment plant 
Helsinki, Pitkäkoski Al-sulph 1991 Päijänne Kyläsaari 
Helsinki, Pitkäkoski Fe-sulph 2001 Päijänne Viikinmäki 
Helsinki, Pitkäkoski Fe-sulph 2001 Vantaanjoki Viikinmäki 
Espoo, Dämman Al-sulph 1991 Dämman Suomenoja 
Espoo, Dämman Al, Fe 2001 Dämman Suomenoja 
Wastewater treatment 
plant 
Treatment method Dry matter 
%
Estimated amount of 
sludge m3 d-1
Helsinki, Kyläsaari Biological-chemical 
simultaneous  
precipitation (RS) 
16 - 22 130 
Helsinki, Viikinmäki RS 30 - 33 200 
Espoo, Suomenoja RS c.30 55 - 70 
Rauma, Maanpääniemi RS 12 - 14 25 - 30 
Pori ,Luotsinmäki Chemical treatment 15 - 18 50 - 60 
Kotka, Mussalo RS 16 - 18 c. 23 
Kotka, Sunila RS 15 - 20 20 - 30 
Loviisa, Vårdö Direct precipitation 18 - 20 3 - 4 
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(since 1994) in Helsinki from the raw sludge before digestion and dewatering.
Data on the wastewater treatment plants are given in Table 1. In the
communities studied, groundwater was used for tap water in the cities of Lovii-
sa and Pori, and surface water in other places.
Methods
In our laboratory the digested, dewatered sewage sludges have been
gammaspectrometrically measured in Marinelli beakers, without any
pretreatment. Other sludge samples have been dried at a temperature of 105
°C, homogenised and measured using a plastic beaker. The measurement time
was about 1000 min.
Separation and measurement of 90Sr
The method of analysis was based on the radiochemical separation of 90Sr
through oxalate, nitrate, chromate and carbonate precipitation (Bryant et al
1959, modified by STUK). 90Sr and 90Y were determined together after ingrowth
of 90Y using Lumagel liquid scintillation cocktail and the Quantulus Liquid
Scintillation counter. The measuring time was 300 min and efficiency of 90Sr
was 199.6%
Gammaspectrometric measurements
Artificial gamma-emitting radionuclides were earlier measured
gammaspectrometrically from samples taken from waterworks and
wastewater treatment plants. The same gammaspectra were now used for
evaluating the amounts of natural radionuclides in these samples.
228Ra was determined from the short-lived daughter 228Ac. 226Ra was
determined from the 186.1 keV line taking into account the interference of the
185.7 keV line of 235U.  235U was determined from the 143.8 keV, 163.3 keV and
205.1 keV lines. 238U was determined from its daughter nuclides 234Th (63.3
keV) and 234Pa (1001.3 keV). 228Th was determined from its short-lived daughter
212Pb, 212Bi and 208Tl.
Results and discussion
The results of activities in sludge from waterworks are given in Table 2. The
ratio of 137Cs to 90Sr in sludge in Pitkäkoski was compared to the ratio of 137Cs to
90Sr in surface water in Lake Päijänne. The ratio in the water of Päijänne
varied from 180 in 1986 to 5 in 1994. The much higher ratio of 137Cs to 90Sr in
sludge at the Pitkäkoski waterwork shows also the much higher accumulation
of 137Cs than that of 90Sr into sludge. The results also show the higher mobility
of 90Sr than 137Cs in the environment.
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In the Dämman sludge , the slight differences were noticed in the
concentrations of natural radionuclides in samples taken in 1991 and 2001. In
Pitkäkoski sludge the activities were about three times lower in 2001 than in
1991 but about ten times higher than those in Dämman. Perhaps the raw water
flowing via a rock tunnel causes a special source of natural activity in the
precipitation produced in Pitkäkoski. When water was taken directly from
Vantaanjoki river without transportation via a rock tunnel, the concentrations
of thorium, protactinium and uranium were slightly decreased. Gäfvert et al.(5)
noticed that a general trend for uranium and thorium is that Fe(OH)3
precipitation has a slightly lower removal efficiency than Al(OH)3
precipitation, but this explains only partially the differences in Pitkäkoski in
various years. Because the interest was earlier only in artificial radionuclides,
the measuring time and the volume of sample was not always enough for the
determination of natural radionuclides.
Table 2. Concentration of natural radionuclides and 90Sr and 137Cs in sludge at the
waterworks.
Bq kg-1 dry matter 
Waterworks 
Treat-
ment
method
Sample Date 228Ra 228Th 226Ra 234Th 234mPa 235U 90Sr 137Cs 137Cs/90Sr
Helsinki, 
Pitkäkoski 
Al-sulph accumulating 
sludge 13.8.1986       81,1 20300 250 
(water from 
Päijänne) 
Al-sulph removed 
sludge 28.8.1986 0 0  2340 3100 152 95,5 56800 595 
 Al-sulph removed 
sludge 25.9.1986 0 0  2710 3160 151 61,9 27700 447 
 Al-sulph removed 
sludge 19.11.1996       40,3 11400 283 
 Al-sulph accumulating 
sludge 20.11.1991 20 25   2340 146    
 Fe-sulph sludge after 
sand filtrati-
on 
29.5.2001  10  680 1150 59    
 Fe-sulph removed 
sludge 
29.5.2001  10  510 1000 53 0,91 94,1 103 
(water from 
Vantaanjoki) 
Fe-sulph removed 
sludge 4.12.2001 27 40  470 780 45 0,71 72,8 103 
Espoo, däm-
man 
Al-sulph  11.11.1991 24 34 140  190     
 Al, Fe older sludge 30.5.2001 20 26     1,63 63 39 
 Fe sludge 30.5.2001 13 23  48 90 7 0,9 41,8 46 
 Fe sludge 22.10.2001 9 21  39  4    
Tampere, 
Rusko 
 removed 
sludge 21.8.1986       17,7 8700 492 
(water from 
Roine) 
 accumulating 
sludge 21.8.1986       42,1 12300 292 
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Table 3. Average concentrations of natural radionuclides in sewage sludge in 1991 and
2001.
Table 4. Concentration of  90Sr and 137Cs  in dewatered sewage sludge.
Figure 1. 137Cs/90Sr in dewatered sewage sludge.
Bq kg-1 dry matter Wastewater 
treatment plant 
Year  228Ra 228Th 226Ra 234Th 234mPa 235U 40K
Helsinki, Kyläsaari 1991 46 20  430 450 40 210 
Helsinki, Viikinmäki 2001 35 17 120 370 460 24 130 
Espoo, Suomenoja 1991  20    8  
Espoo, Suomenoja 2001 42 17 84 92 140 7 80 
Rauma, Maan-
päänniemi 
1991 46 26  39  4 140 
Pori, Luotsinmäki 1991 51 32  48  6 110 
Kotka, Mussalo 1991 78 29  52   150 
Kotka, Sunila 1991 87 45  89   110 
Loviisa, Vårdö 1991 120 57  99  10  
Loviisa, Vårdö 2001 81 51 82    75 
Bq kg-1 dry 
matter 
Bq kg-1 dry 
matter Wastewater  
treatment plant 
Data 
90Sr 137Cs
Wastewater 
 treatment plant
Date 
90Sr 137Cs
Helsinki Kyläsaari 22.5.1986 56,7 4940 Kotka Sunila 8.8.1994 2,63 61 
Helsinki Viikinmäki 22.4.1996 16,0 50 Kotka Sunila 29.8.1994 3,84 41 
Espoo Suomenoja 22.10.2001 6,48 11,4 Kotka Mussalo 29.8.1994 1,45 35 
Rauma Maanpään-
niemi 
2.6.1986 53,6 4460 Loviisa Vårdö 2.6.1986 15,9 3460 
Rauma Maanpään-
niemi 
6.6.1986 52,1 3420 Loviisa Vårdö 14.8.1986 31,1 3390 
Rauma Maanpään-
niemi 
24.10.1994 9,62 27 Loviisa Vårdö 12.10.1994 3,75 52,6 
Pori Luotsinmäki 26.5.1986 79,1 5400  
Pori Luotsinmäki 26.10.1994 7,49 51  
1
10
100
1000
1984 1987 1990 1993 1995 1998 2001 2004
13
7 C
s/
90
Sr
Helsinki Espoo Rauma Pori Kotka Loviisa
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Figure 2. Concentrations of 90Sr and 137Cs in raw sewage sludge at Helsinki Kyläsaari and
Viikinmäki.
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The activity concentrations of 90Sr in output sewage sludge and 137Cs in
the same samples are given in table 4 and figure 1. The concentration of 137Cs
and 90Sr in raw sewage sludge in Kyläsaari, Helsinki, (until 1994) and Viikin-
mäki (since 1994) are shown in Figure 2. 90Sr was analysed only in few samples.
Table 3 summarises the average values of natural radionuclides in
sewage sludge taken at various treatment plants in 1991 and 2001.
The activity of tap water and foodstuffs influence the activity
concentration of natural radionuclides in sewage sludge as do the precipitation
produced in waterworks and transported to wastewater treatment plants and
the sludge from industrial processes.
The concentrations of 234Th and 234mPa, belonging to 238U series, and 235U
were higher in the Kyläsaari and Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plants
than in Suomenoja, Espoo. Al and Fe precipitation taken from the Pitkäkoski
waterworks has increased the amounts of natural radionuclides in sewage
sludge at the Kyläsaari and Viikinmäki treatment plants. A considerable part
of the new trunk sewers in Helsinki have been constructed as rock tunnels and
hence rock water can also infiltrate into sewage water from there.
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Introduction
Naturally occurring radioactive elements are present in all ground waters.
Groundwater from rock aquifers can contain relatively high concentrations of
natural radionuclides, especially in areas with uranium-rich granites and
pegmatite. Sweden has relatively high levels of natural radioactive elements in
the groundwater. In this investigation we have carried out measurements in
order to estimate alpha- and beta-emitting natural radionuclides. The alpha-
emitting nuclides are primarily 238U, 234U, 226Ra and 210Po. The most important
beta-emitting nuclides are 210Pb and 228Ra.
In the European Drinking Water Directive, 98/83/ EC, a reference value
of 0.1 millisievert, mSv, per year for Total Indicative Dose, TID, from
consumption of drinking water is given. TID includes all radionuclides in
drinking water, both artificial and natural, with the exception of radon, radon
progeny, 40K and tritium. A first indication of that TID might exceed 0.1 mSv is
that the gross alpha activity concentration exceeds 0.1 Bq/l or that the gross
beta activity concentration exceeds 1 Bq/l.
A new Swedish Drinking Water Ordinance implementing the new
directive has come into force but will not be put into practice until December
2003 (SLV FS 2001:30). Sweden has had action levels for radon in drinking
water since 1997 (SLV FS 1997:32). The action level for radon in water from
public water supplies is 100 Bq/l. For private wells the recommended maximum
level is 1,000 Bq/l.
Sweden has about 2,100 public water supplies and 200,000 private
drilled wells used permanently and another 100,000 used in summerhouses.
Altogether about 1.2 million of the Swedish population rely on private water
supplies.
126
STUK-A195
Objectives and scope
The objective of the investigation has primarily been to test the measurement
methods needed to verify compliance with the TID reference value of 0.1 mSv
per year, and secondly to get an indication of what kind of levels of TID that
consumption of water from waterworks using groundwater could cause in Swe-
den. Measurements have also been performed of water samples from private
wells. Formally, the Drinking Water Ordinance is in most cases not applicable
to water from private wells, but it is inevitable that owners of private wells will
judge the quality of their water according to the standards of the Drinking
Water Ordinance.
Thirty waterworks, chosen at random, were asked whether they were
willing to participate in the investigation. 24 of them accepted and delivered a
total of 41 water samples. Some of the waterworks took samples from several
water catchments and in some cases both from raw water and production
water. About 30 water samples from private wells have been analysed, most of
them collected in the Stockholm area. Radon was also analysed in these
samples.
Sampling and measurement methods
The water samples were collected in clean glass bottles and immediately sent
to SSI with information about the waterworks and the samples.
The measurements were performed in a low-background liquid
scintillation spectrometer (Wallac 1220 Quantulus) using “Pulse Shape
Analysis” to separate the alpha and beta pulses into separate energy spectra,
see fig. 1.
Radon measurements:
10 ml of water was slowly poured using a pipette into a low-potassium
borosilicate glass vial that was filled with 12 ml of cocktail Ultima Gold XR. The
sample was measured after a few hours and the measurement was repeated
later to check for leakage of 222Rn from the vials. All alpha pulses are used for
the determination of the radon concentration. The results from this method
agree well with other methods.
Alpha and beta measurements:
2x19 ml of the water sample was evaporated with a freeze-dryer in a
Teflon-coated polyethylene vial and the residue was dissolved in 1 ml of 0,1 M
HCL, after which 21 ml of the cocktail Optiphase HiSafe 2 was added. The
sample was measured after one month. During that time 222Rn and the short-
lived daughters establish equilibrium with 226Ra. Besides the long-lived alpha
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nuclides 238U, 234U, 226Ra and 210Po, the alpha energy spectrum also contains
structure from 222Rn, 218Po and 214Po. As the alpha energy of 214Po is different
from all other natural alpha emitters expected in water samples, the 214Po peak
(see fig 2) is used to calculate the 226Ra activity and also for calculating the
gross alpha activity concentration.
The gross beta activity concentration is calculated using the total beta
counts in an energy interval excluding 3H, reduced by the contribution from
short-lived radon progeny.
The presence of 210Pb, in significant amounts, can be detected as a peak in
the beta spectrum, but the activity determination is associated with large
uncertainties.
Assuming that no 210Po is present, the activity of both 238U and 234U can be
estimated as the gross alpha activity minus 226Ra activity, but the results can
have significant uncertainties due to this assumption. Chemical analyses are
performed on a few samples to determine gross alpha, 226Ra, U and 210Pb, and
the correlation with these two methods is good.
Results
Discussion
The results from this study indicate that a number of Swedish waterworks will
have difficulties complying with the reference value for TID. The reference
value will also be exceeded in a large number of private drilled wells. The
results from this study also show that the measurement method used works
well. The investigation will continue during 2002 in co-operation with SGU.
Waterworks       
  Rn 
Bq/l 
Gross
alpha 
Bq/l
Gross 
beta Bq/l 
Ra-226 
Bq/l
U mg/l 
Median  0,055 0,094 0,009 0,002 Groundwater without artificial 
infiltration. 15 samples Max  0,94 0,92 0,04 0,037 
       
Median  0,047 0,14 0,019 0,001 Groundwater with artificial 
infiltration.12 samples Max  2,25 1,24 0,34 0,078 
       
Median  0,004 0,034 u.d 0,0002 Surface water. 5 samples 
Max  0,03 0,3 0,006 0,001 
       
Median 181 0,71 0,98 0,057 0,023 Private Drilled wells
21 samples Max 3746 8,48 5,99 2,53 0,244 
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Figure 1.
Figure 2.
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Abstract
In this project we have collected high-volume aerosol samples at Mt. Zeppelin
Global Atmosphere Watch station, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard and measured their
lead-210 contents in the laboratory. The measurement is based on the alpha
counting of the in-grown polonium-210 using an automatic alpha/beta
analyser. The gathered data of atmospheric lead-210 concentrations can be
used as a tracer in the analysis of air pollutant concentrations in the area. In
the long run the data on atmospheric 210Pb can help to identify natural, e.g. due
to the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), and anthropogenic variations in the
transport behaviour of air masses and thus also air pollutants in the Arctic
region.
Introduction
During the past three decades, there has been increasing interest in the
presence of airborne pollutants in the Arctic region. However, the
interpretation of the results has suffered from the lack of data concerning the
atmospheric and coupled oceanic/atmospheric transport processes in the area.
In this project we have measured concentration of lead-210 (210Pb) in the air at
Svalbard. The gathered data can be used as a tracer in the analysis of air
pollutant concentrations in the area. In the long run the data on atmospheric
210Pb can help to identify natural, e.g. due to the North Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO), and anthropogenic variations in the transport behaviour of air masses
and thus also air pollutants in the Arctic region.
Lead-210 is formed in the atmosphere from the radioactive noble gas
radon-222 (222Rn) emanating from the Earth’s crust. 99 % of the airborne 222Rn
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originates from land and only 1 % from the sea (Baskaran et al., 1993). Owing
to the long half-life (22 years) of 210Pb, its removal from the atmosphere is
governed by the different scavenging processes affecting the aerosol particles
carrying it rather than radioactive decay. Based on the activity ratio of 210Pb
and its progeny, mean aerosol residence times of one to two weeks have been
obtained (Mattsson, 1975; Samuelsson et al., 1986; Papastefanou and Bondietti,
1991).
Preiss et al. (1996) have reviewed the publications of 210Pb activity
concentrations in the air. High 210Pb concentrations are found in continental air
masses. Lead-210 has been used as a tracer for particle-bound sulphate
because they are both secondary aerosols, i.e. produced in the atmosphere from
their gaseous precursors 222Rn and SO2, respectively (Turekian et al., 1983;
Mattsson et al., 1993).
 Recently it was discovered that the several-year oscillation of the 210Pb
activity concentrations in the air in Southern Finland is connected to the state
of the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean. Low 210Pb activity
concentrations are associated with the more frequent arrival of maritime air
masses in Finland. On the other hand, high 210Pb concentrations are associated
with the more frequent presence of continental air masses. Higher amounts of
warm and saline water in the North Atlantic Ocean are closely connected to
enhanced cyclonic activity and low 210Pb air concentrations in Finland
(Mattsson et al., 1996a; Paatero et al., 1998; Paatero et al., 2000).
Materials and methods
The sampling site was at Mt. Zeppelin Global Atmosphere Watch (GAW)
station, Ny-Ålesund, (78°58´ N, 11°53´ E), on the west coast of Spitsbergen, the
largest island in the Svalbard archipelago (NILU, 2002; WMO, 2002). The
station is located 474 m above sea level. It is owned and operated by the
Norwegian Polar Institute. The Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU) is
responsible for the scientific programmes at the station. Meteorological Insti-
tute of the Stockholm University co-operates closely with NILU in developing
the scientific activities and programmes at the station.
Results and discussion
The observed 210Pb activity concentrations at Mt. Zeppelin, Ny-Ålesund,
Svalbard vary between 11 and 620 µBq/m³ (Fig. 1). A Japanese research group
observed 210Pb activity concentrations ranging from 83 to 1204 µBq/m³ at Ny-
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Ålesund in February-March 1995 (Suzuki et al., 1996). They also reported
aerosol residence times ranging from 26 to 78 days based on the 210Po/210Pb
activity ratio. These values are much higher compared to studies made in USA
and Finland, where the residence times have usually been one to two weeks
(Mattsson, 1975; Papastefanou and Bondietti, 1991; Balkanski et al., 1993).
Samuelsson et al. (1986) reported an average concentration of 75 µBq/m³ in
July-September 1980 between the 75th and 83rd latitude north and between
Greenland and Frans Josef Land.
The lowest 210Pb concentrations are found in summer and the highest
ones in spring. This differs from the seasonal behaviour of 210Pb in Finland,
where the maximum concentrations occur usually in winter. The lag between
the winter maxima at Mt. Zeppelin and Sodankylä, northern Finland is about a
month. Earlier it has been shown that in winter the air masses coming from
Arctic regions to northern Finland contain relatively high amounts of  210Pb
(Paatero and Hatakka, 2000). This was attributed to the small amount of
precipitation, reduced air chemistry and stagnant mixing conditions in the
troposphere during the Arctic night. These factors increase the aerosol
residence time and thus the accumulation of 210Pb into the air. The one month
phase shift between Svalbard and northern Finland may  be related to the
strength of solar radiation and its capability to cause vertical mixing of the air.
Figure 1. 210Pb activity concentration (µBq/m³) in the air at Mt. Zeppelin GAW station,
Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard in 2001.
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The 25, 50, and 75 % percentiles of the 210Pb activity concentrations at
Mt. Zeppelin are 42, 83, and 220 µBq/m³ (Fig. 2). The values are clearly lower
than at Sodankylä with corresponding values of 100, 170, and 270 µBq/m³. The
arithmetic mean concentrations in 2001 were 144 and 245 µBq/m³ at Mt. Zep-
pelin and Sodankylä, respectively.
The future work will include the comparison of the 210Pb observations to
e.g. sulphate and aerosol particle concentrations and the studies on the relation
between 210Pb and various meteorological parameters.
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SESSION 4. REACTOR SAFETY AND WASTE
MANAGEMENT
Radiation protection experience from a fuel failure
at Halden reactor
Tord P. Walderhaug
OECD Halden Reactor Project
Institute for Energy Technology, P.O.Box 173, N-1751 Halden, Norway
Abstract
On January 28 2001 lack of cooling resulted in failure of several fuel rods in a
test assembly in the Halden reactor. The resulting contamination of the primary
circuit lead to very high radiation levels in the containment of the reactor. There
were no releases of radionuclides to the containment or to the environment around
the reactor plant. In the subsequent handling of the failed fuel and bringing the
reactor back to a normal state, the primary aim was to keep radiation doses to the
workers and releases to the environment as low as possible. Every operation was
analysed and carried out according to these criteria. Consequently the collective
dose from the whole operation was 0.052 manSv, which is 10% of the average
annual collective dose at the Halden reactor, and there were no additional releases
of radionuclides to the environment.
Introduction
In the evening Sunday January 28th 2001 lack of cooling resulted in a
simultaneous failure of several fuel rods of a test assembly in the Halden reactor.
This activated one of the reactor’s safety systems with subsequent control rod
injection and closing down of the reactor. At the same time a substantial increase
the gamma dose rate was seen on the monitors in the reactor containment, with
several going off scale. The released activity from the failed fuel rods was
contained in the closed primary circuit of the reactor, and no activity was released
to the containment or to the reactor surroundings. The increased dose rate level in
the containment was due to external radiation from primary circuit components.
The following cleaning up and preparing the reactor for further operation
took more than three months. It was very important that this process could be
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accomplished with as low personnel radiation doses as possible, otherwise it
could influence future possibilities of maintenance and replacement of
experiments. On the other hand was the contradictory goal of getting the
reactor operational again as quickly as possible. The first objective was
therefore to reduce the dose rate from external radiation in the containment. In
addition a meticulous control of the personnel radiation doses through out the
whole operation was introduced.
External dose rate development
Figure 1 shows the reactor containment with reactor tank and steam
transformers. Most of the work in cleaning up after the incident and unloading
the damaged assembly would be performed from the rotating lid above the
reactor tank.
Figure 1. Reactor containment.
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Figure 2. Dose rates at different locations in the containment
The gamma monitors showed an initial very rapid decrease, which
levelled off after two days, as can be seen on Figure 2. Two days after the
incident measurement of dose rate in the working area was carried out. The
dose rates were then 30 mSv/h between the steam transformers and about 3
mSv/h on the rotating lid. The main source of the radiation in the working area
was the steam transformers. The decrease of the radiation from the steam
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transformers showed that the dominant nuclides had an effective half-life of 4
to 5 days. Measurement of the lead half value layer of the radiation indicated
an effective energy of approximately 350 keV. A combination of 90% 133Xe and
5% each of 132Te with daughter 132I, and 131I would give this half-life and
effective energy.
The dose rate in the working area was far too high to initiate any work, and
it was decided to shield the rotating lid from the steam transformers. Two rows of
2 meter high and 5 cm thick steel plates were positioned between the rotating lid
and the steam transformers, giving a dose rate reduction on the rotating lid of
about 40%.
Fourteen days after the incident, shielding and disintegration had brought
the dose rate in the working area down to 0.05 to 0.1 mSv/h. The primary circuit
purification system had been fully operational throughout the period, and the
activity concentration in the primary circuit water was brought down to values
comparable to values experienced in shut down periods before the incident. It was
therefore considered justifiable to start the clean up operation.
The clean up operation and unloading of the damaged assembly
Visual inspection with a periscope in the reactor tank showed that fuel fragments
were scattered out on the reactor tank bottom plate, both in the form of particles,
but also as a thin covering. There was some uncertainty as to whether the covering
was actually fuel, but gamma spectral analysis of a sample of the covering clearly
showed a radionuclide content as would be expected from the fuel from the failed
rods. The covering was later identified as UO2CO3, and it was expected that it
would be dissolved at temperatures above 150 ºC. The clean up process therefore
consisted of a mechanical removal of the fuel particles followed by electrical, and
later nuclear, heating of the primary circuit water for dissolving the covering. The
dissolved UO2CO3 would then be removed from the water in the reactor’s
purification circuit.
Removal of fuel particles from the reactor tank bottom plate and unloading
of the damaged assembly was carried out over the next two months. Thereafter the
heating process described above was performed for fourteen days.
The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) had been
continuously informed of the situation and the clean up process. Based on a
comprehensive analysis of all possible consequences regarding nuclear safety and
expected releases of radionuclides to the environment with further reactor
operation, NRPA gave consent to further operation three months after the
incident.
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The collective radiation dose to the personnel involved in the clean up
operation amounted to 0.052 manSv. This is approximately 10% of the average
annual collective dose at the Halden reactor. The operation did not cause any
additional releases of radionuclides to the environment.
Further development of radionuclide concentration in the primary circuit
water
Figure 3 shows the concentration of 239Np in the primary circuit water from
start of operation until shut down in January 2002. The concentrations of
fission products were very high in the first periods of reactor operation, but
decreased rapidly to about 15% of the initial concentrations. The high initial
concentrations were due to the dissolving process of the remaining UO2CO3,
which during the process was brought into the high neutron flux in the reactor
core. Further decrease in radionuclide concentrations is slow, and the
concentrations are still about four times higher than before the incident. The
source of the present activity is a general uranium contamination of the reactor
core, which will be reduced with further reactor operation and future unloading
of contaminated fuel assemblies. The latter can be seen in Figure 4, where the
Figure  3. Activity concentration of 239Np (markers) and reactor power (curve) from May
2001 until February 2002.
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Figure  4. Activity concentration of 239Np (markers) and reactor power (curve) from May
2001 until February 2002.
effect of unloading several contaminated fuel assemblies in the June 2002
shutdown can be seen as a general reduction of the activity concentration in the
following reactor operation.
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Dekontaminering av eksperimentalkrets ved
Haldenreaktoren
Kristin Fure, J. Arvesen*, B. Beverskog, S. E. Christiansen, T.
Elisenberg, K-J. Krohg, J. S. Mjølnerød, G. Mjønes,
N. S. Norman, K. L. Moum
IFE Haldenprosjektet, P.B. 173, N-1751 Halden
*Arvesen konsulting, Tlf: +46-155219361, Ny Köping.
Sammendrag
Ved Haldenreaktoren er en lukket krets for testkjøring av brensel og materialprøver
blitt dekontaminert. Kretsen ble dekontaminert ved vekselvis behandling med
KMnO4 og oksalsyre etterfulgt av skylling, i flere omganger. Eksperimentet var
meget vellykket. Under forsøket oppstod det ingen lekkasjer eller andre problemer
og i ettertid er det ikke registrert svakheter ved noen av kretsens komponenter som
følge av kjemikaliene som ble benyttet. Det gjennomsnittlige strålingsnivået fra
kretsen sank med 89 %, og rørbiter som ble tatt ut hadde rene blanke
metalloverflater. Fra start til slutt krevde forsøket 16 person milli Sv. Utslipp som
følge av forsøket utgjorde kun 1/2000 del av utslippstillatelsen på 1 mikro Sv til
vann og 7 ‰ av totalt utsluppet radioaktivitet til vann fra april til desember i 20001.
Innledning
Haldenreaktoren er en forskningsreaktor for testing av brensel og materialer. En
del av eksperimentene utføres i egne lukkede kretser, som gjør det mulig å utføre
forsøkene ved andre reaktorforhold enn reaktorens eget. De lukkede kretsene er
bygget opp av en eller flere såkalte flasker, og en ytre del bestående av rørsystemer
og komponenter som pumper, heatere/kjølere, ventiler, filtre, ionebyttere etc.. I
motsetning til flaskene som befinner seg i selve reaktorkjelen, er den ytre delen
plassert i reaktorhallen. Under kjøring av reaktoren sirkulerer det vann gjennom
hele kretsen. Vannet tar med seg radioaktive spesier, som i sin tur fester seg til
oksidbelegget inne i kretsene. Spesielt komponenter med temperaturgradienter,
som heatere/kjølere, men også pumper og ventiler er utsatt for slik kontaminering.
Resultatet over tid er høy ekstern stråling i de områdene hvor slike lukkede
1 IFE fikk ny utsippstillatelse i 2000 som trådte i kraft fra 1. april. Grensen var fortsatt 1 ìSv/år,
men modellen som ligger til grunn beregningene var endret.
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kretser er plassert. For Haldenreaktoren er ekstern stråling fra slike lukkede
kretser en av hovedkildene for doser til arbeiderne. Målet med
dekontamineringsforsøket var å komme frem til en metode for generell
dekontaminering av eksperimentalkretser slik at doser til personell ville
reduseres i fremtiden: Metoden måtte ikke skade komponentene i kretsene.
Forsøket
Kretsen som ble dekontaminert, er en eksperimentalkrets som har vært i drift i
seks år. I løpet av denne tiden er det utført forsøk ved flere forskjellige
reaktorforhold, inkludert forsøk som har gått ut på å få fysisk kontakt mellom
brensel og kjølevann. Kretsens rørsystem bestod av syrefast stål.
Dekontamineringen ble utført ved å vekselvis behandle kretsen med et sterkt
oksidasjonsmiddel (KMnO4) og en svak organisk syre (oksalsyre), etterfulgt av
skylling med vann. Disse stegene ble repetert flere ganger (sykluser) inntil ønsket
resultat var oppnådd: Å fjerne mest mulig oksidbelegg uten å tære på selve
metallet i rørene, da dette ville forringe materialets integritet.
Forsøket forløp uten komplikasjoner. Det oppstod ingen lekkasjer eller
andre problemer som følge av slitasje på pumpe eller andre komponenter, og
inspeksjon i ettertid har òg vist at alle kretsens komponenter har tålt
påkjenningen fra kjemikaliene.
Reduksjonen i strålingsnivå var stor allerede etter første syklus. I snitt
gikk det midlere strålingsnivået ned med 56 % (Figur 1). Reduksjonen flatet
imidlertid noe ut utover i forsøket, og etter fire sykluser endte det med en
senkning i midlere strålingsnivå på 89 %.
Figur 1. Reduksjon i midlere strålingsnivå fra kretsen som følge av dekontaminering.
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Rørbiter ble skåret ut av kretsen både før, under og etter
dekontaminering. Visuell in-speksjon viste at rør med mindre dimensjoner (18
mm diameter) raskt fikk blanke og rene overflater, mens i mer grove rør (48
mm diameter) var opprensingen dårligere. Dette var imidlertid eldre rør hvor
en òg ville forvente tykkere oksidlag. I tillegg til den visuelle inspeksjonen ble
det tatt bilder med scanning elektron mikroskop (SEM) og lysmikroskop
(LOM) (Figur 2).
Forsøket krevde arbeid på kretsen både før, under og etter
dekontamineringen. Spesielt ombyggingen for å sette kretsen i stand for
dekontaminering var arbeids- og dose-krevende. I alt gikk det med 218
persontimer, og 15 person m Sv til denne jobben. Dosene under
dekontaminering kom fra drift av kretsen. Dette var lave doser, 0,4 m person
Sv, da kretsen i hovedsak opereres utenfra. Arbeidet med å sette kretsen
tilbake til opprinnelig stand var for så vidt også tidkrevende, men
strålingsnivået i arbeidsområdet var nå betydelig redusert. Arbeid etter
dekontaminering ga derfor kun 0,5 person mSv. Totalt gikk det med 16 person
mSv på hele forsøket, hvilket utgjorde mindre enn 4 % av kollektiv dosen ved
reaktoren i 2000.
Rundt 250 liter vann gikk med i hvert steg. I tillegg til kjemikalier og
oppløst oksid, innholdt vannet aktivitet, og måtte renses før det kunne slippes
ut. Til dette var det bygget et eget rensesystem bestående av en
oppsamlingstank, pumpe, filtre og en kationbytter. Vannet ble sirkulert i dette
systemet inntil aktivitet og kjemikalieinnhold var så lavt at det kunne slippes
til omgivelsene. Erfaringene her var at opprensingen var god, men den fysiske
ut-formingen førte til at det tok lang tid. Utslippene som følge av
dekontaminering av kretsen, ble lave i forhold til det som slippes ut på
årsbasis. Den teoretiske stråledosen til individer i utsatt gruppe ble 5·10-4 µSv,
hvilket kun utgjorde 1/2000 del av utslippstillatelsen til vann på 1 µSv til
Figur 2. Bildet lengst til venstre viser rørprøver tatt fra samme sted i kretsen, før og en
etter dekontaminering. I midten er et LOM-bilde av tverrsnittet av innvendig overflate av
det dekontaminerte røret, og bildet lengst til høyre er et SEM-bilde av innvendig
overflate på det samme røret.
143
STUK-A195
utsatt gruppe og 7 ‰ av utsluppet aktivitet fra april til desember i 2000. For
nuklidene 106Ru og 125Sb, stod derimot dekontamineringen for store deler av
utslippet av disse nuklidene det året (Tabell 1). Nuklidene var først mulig å se
i det rensede vannet da mengden 60Co i kretsen overskygget tilnærmet all
annen aktivitet. Opprensingen av Ru og Sb gjennom ione-bytteren må derfor
ha vært vesentlig dårligere enn for Co. En erfaring som ved nye
dekontamineringer har ført til endringer i rensesystemet.
Diskusjon og konklusjon
Selve dekontamineringen av kretsen var meget vellykket. Strålingsnivået ble
betydelig redusert, og kom ned på nivå med resten av reaktorhallen. Kretsens
komponenter tok ikke skade og det oppstod ingen komplikasjoner underveis. I
tillegg til de gode resultatene for reduksjon i stråling, viste forsøket at det er
mulig å gjennomføre en dekontaminering av en eksperimentalkrets uten
økning i utslipp av betydning. Forsøket krevde en del dose, men totalt sett ble
kollektivdosen lavere enn forventet. Dessuten er 80 % av denne dosen påbeløpt
under arbeid med å bygge rensesystemet, et system som skal benyttes i alle
dekontamineringer fremover, og derfor en engangs investert dose. Beregninger
viser også at antallet person Sv påbeløpt vil være spart inn i løpet av 264 timers
arbeid i det samme området av reaktorhallen som konsekvens av
strålingsreduksjonen dekontamineringen gav. Til sammenligning er en
langstopp gjerne på 2000 til 3000 persontimer.
Alt i alt er derfor inntrykket positivt. Det som gjenstår å se, er hvor fort
ny aktivitet fester seg til de dekontaminerte rørveggene. I ettertid er imidlertid
eksperimentalkretsen revet, men nok en eksperimentalkrets er siden
dekontaminert. Denne kretsen skal inn med nye eksperimenter ved slutten av
2002, og det ses frem til de erfaringer som dette vil gi.
Tabell 1. Teoretisk dose til individer i utsatt gruppe som følge av dekontaminering [µSv]
Nuklide 
fra
dekontaminering 
totalt 1/4-31/12 
2000
134Cs 4,0·10-6 2,2·10-4
137Cs 2,4·10-5 2,9·10-3
60Co 2,6·10-4 5,9·10-2
51Cr 6,8·10-7 1,7·10-4
106Ru 4,6·10-6 8,1·10-6
125Sb 1,8·10-4 6,3·10-4
144Ce 3,0·10-6 3,0·10-4
95Zr 1,1·10-5 2,6·10-3
95Nb 1,2·10-5 1,8·10-3
Totalt 5·10-4 7·10-2
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Abstract
Every third year the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company
(SKB) summarises achieved results and updates the research program for
proper handling of radioactive waste in Sweden. In this paper a short summary
of the biosphere program is made. Especially a new systems ecological
modelling approach to describe dispersal and uptake of radionuclides is
described. Moreover an outline of the siting programme is presented.
Introduction
Every third year the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company
(SKB) summarises achieved results and updates the research program for
proper handling of radioactive waste in Sweden (SKB, 2001b). In this paper a
short summary of the biosphere program is made. For a more detailed program
see further SKB (2001b) as well as cited reports. Most of them are available on
internet (www.skb.se).
Currently SKB is in an intensive phase to perform field studies at two
proposed sites for a potential deep repository of spent fuel. This program
includes an environmental impact assessment as well as performance analysis
of suggested repository and an encapsulation plant. It will be handed over to
the authorities around 2008 according to current time-plans.
Thus in the coming years the biosphere program will handle issues from
data collection, data generalisation to modelling and dose estimation.
Moreover, the authorities’ regulations require that future safety assessments
provide a more realistic description of the biosphere and an estimation of the
consequences for surrounding fauna and flora (SSI, 1998). Finally the site
investigations make the biosphere concrete, which entails that simplifications
in how the biosphere is conceptualised must be valid for the site in question.
The following gives an overview how this will be achieved through
modelling and some examples of special studies that needs to be performed.
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Model development
SKB’s modelling of radionuclide transport in the biosphere in the safety
assessment have been carried out with the tools BIOPATH and PRISM.
Studsvik EcoSafe has developed these with support from SKB since the 1970s.
The tools have been utilised for various safety assessments, such as the KBS
studies, SFR, SKB 91, SR 97 and SAFE, and have been progressively refined by
SKB’s efforts, summarised in a review by Edlund et al. (1999) and in the most
recent safety assessments (Bergström et al., 1999; Karlsson et al., 2001).
In the safety assessment of a deep repository for spent fuel, SR97, models
for typical ecosystems (lake, running water, archipelago, coast, mire,
agricultural land and well) were analysed (Bergström et al., 1999). The
biosphere for three hypothetical repository sites was divided into squares sized
250 x 250 metres which were associated with one of the typical ecosystems
based on available map information (Nordlinder et al., 1999).
The advantage of this approach is that the causes of the variation in
estimated dose can be separated. The uncertainty in the data used for the
models accounted for a variation of roughly one order of magnitude in dose,
while the choice of the typical ecosystem accounted for variations of up to seven
orders of magnitude. Uncertainty analyses and sensitivity analyses also
showed that the biological processes need to be described better and that the
physical parameters need to be measured better (Karlsson et al., 2000).
In the SAFE project, the safety assessment for SFR, the models were
further refined for different types of ecosystems and a time-dependent
evolution was introduced (Karlsson et al., 2001). In addition, site-specific
biosphere data were gathered and investigations were conducted to obtain a
better body of data (Kautsky, 2001).
The concepts used in the models above are to a large extent based on the
use of generic transfer factors to different compartments, which presumes that
the system being modelled is in equilibrium. Furthermore, the transfer factors
are based in many cases on empirical data without a mechanical explanation.
The models describe the pathways that affect man and human food, while other
parts of the biosphere are seldom dealt with.
These simplifications may be warranted for safety assessments where
doses to man are overestimated. But they are insufficient for a proper
understanding and an explanation of the simplifications. Alternative models
are needed to validate the assumptions that are made. Other models are also
needed to be able to make use of site-specific information on processes and
states in the ecosystems. To estimate the consequences for surrounding fauna
and flora in accordance with the regulations, models are needed that are based
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on the flow of radionuclides in the entire ecosystem and not just for specific
pathways that are critical for man, such as well or cow’s milk.
The use of process-based models is an appropriate way to solve some of
these problems. The transfer between compartments is in these models is based
on natural processes such as photosynthesis, degradation, food ingestion,
metabolism, nutrient needs, etc. These processes are coupled and the flows are
driven for the most part by the mass balance between the fixation and
degradation of organic material, which is sustained by other flows of organic
and inorganic materials (e.g. oxygen, carbon dioxide, water, and nutrients).
Proportional flows of radioactive substances are associated with these flows.
The models are general and can be used for all radionuclides. Even if data are
lacking for transfer factors, good estimates can be made of the concentration in
different compartments and organisms. Another advantage is that the models
are scalable to different site and climatic conditions. Many of the conditions are
measurable in the field and non-nuclide-specific, e.g. geometry of the drainage
basin, water balance, and ecosystem.
For SAFE, new models for the coastal area based on these principles
were developed (Kumblad, 1999; 2001). These models are mechanistic and
dynamic mass-flux models and were developed for the ecosystem on the
hierarchical level of population and uses site data. One of the models is a
carbon and nutrient flow model (CNP-model) for the area above the SFR-
repository (Kumblad, 2001, Kumblad and Kautsky, in press, Kumblad et al., in
press). This model was developed to describe and get an overview of the
ecosystem at the site and to identify the most important processes for mass-
fluxes of matter. The CNP-model describes the flow of carbon and nutrients
between both abiotic and biotic components of the ecosystem. In the model,
carbon enters the food web via primary producing organisms and the trophic
interactions of the components in the system determine how the matter is
channelled through the ecosystem. The processes involved in the CNP model
are primary production, respiration, consumption and water exchange.
Because C-14 is one of the most important radionuclides in SFR as a
potential dose contributor to the local environment, the CNP-model was extended
to describe the fate of a hypothetical leakage of C-14 to the area (Kumblad, 2001,
Kumblad et al., in press). The major uptake pathway was through primary
producing organisms in proportion to the rate of primary production and the
amount of C-14 compared to DIC (dissolved inorganic carbon) in the water. The
trophic transfer of the radionuclide was modelled to be equivalent to the rate of
consumption for the various organism groups and the C-14 concentrations in
their food items. Thus a model without using transfer factors.
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Since a multitude of isotopes often need to be considered in safety
assessments and sufficient data seldom exists to run transfer factor models, the
developed C-14 model was further extended to a generic radionuclide model for
the aquatic ecosystem. Systematic analysis of the importance of radionuclide
specific mechanisms showed that the adsorption process was of subordinate
importance compared to uptake of radionuclide via consumption. Analysis of
the excretion efficiency of radionuclides indicates that the magnitude of
biomagnification of radionuclides in fish not exceed a factor 3. Calculated
bioconcentration factors (BCF) showed fairly good agreement with empirically
obtained BCFs for about 40 radionuclides (Næslund et al. in manus).
The process based modelling studies shows that it is possible to apply
mechanistic ecosystem models for the fate of radionuclides in the environment
and to estimate concentrations in components of the whole ecosystem with only
a few radionuclide specific parameters such as plant uptake and adsorption
efficiency. The developed model is a first step towards a new type of
methodology to be used in assessments of radionuclides in the environment.
Other areas of special concern
In most safety assessments of radioactive waste for the planned repositories
the releases of radionuclides (if any) are at low concentrations. That means that
only mechanisms accumulating radionuclides for a long time period can create
concentrations that could be hazardous for humans and the environment. Such
potential high accumulating environments are the forests with its soil profile,
mires and sediments in lakes and the sea.
The forest is the dominant ecosystem for the hypothetical sitings
(Lindborg and Schüldt, 1998). It is likely that at least the wet forest will be a
recipient. The forest has been the focus of several projects that have studied the
fallout from Chernobyl (Avila et al., 1998; SSI, 1999). But most studies have
mainly been concerned with the short-term consequences of radionuclide
transport. Few calculations have been done of the migration and accumulation
of radionuclides from a deep repository in forest. The most important long-term
processes are accumulation of nuclides in the soil profile and biological
leaching processes that move nuclides to biota. The upward transport of
radionuclides from the groundwater table into the roots and vegetation is also
essential. This needs further studies.
Mires and wetlands are important and probably the most likely
recipients for radionuclides, especially in the future. These ecosystems are a
probable discharge point from the geosphere and a result of the natural future
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evolution of the biosphere after post-glacial land uplift in a coastal area.  The
ontogeny (evolution) of a marine area to a lake and then a mire has been
described in connection with the SAFE project (Brunberg and Blomqvist,
2000). Currently a review of important processes in mires is performed, which
will lead to a further development of understanding and modelling (Kellner,
2002 in manus).
The sediments in seas, rivers and lakes comprise important areas that
influence radio-nuclide transport to biota. In many potential discharge areas,
the radionuclides will pass a sediment layer. The permeability and adsorption
of the sediment affect the pattern of dispersal and dilution. A marked change in
redox conditions, salinity and biological activity takes place in the boundary
layer between sediment and water, which can greatly influence the
radionuclide flow. In the short term, these processes will probably reduce
radionuclide efflux and result in lower doses. In the long term, however, large
quantities of radionuclides can accumulate, only to be released later due to land
uplift and resuspension, resulting in higher doses. Furthermore, the organisms
that live in sediments are exposed to elevated levels, which can then be passed
on in the food chains, for example via fish to man.
In connection with the SAFE project, the sedimentation environment in
northern Uppland has been modelled from approximately 10,000 years ago to
5,000 years in the future (Brydsten, 1999). The controlling parameters were
wave fetch, which has determined the force of wave erosion, and the process of
land uplift, which has determined the depth and creation of protective islands
and archipelagos.
Also efforts have been made to compile current radioecological
knowledge. A literature study reviews how different iodine isotopes occur and
how they move in soil (Johansson, 2000). The biosphere parameters for the
radio-nuclides in the most recent safety assessments is compiled in a
radionuclide catalogue (Karlsson and Bergström, 2002).
Site investigation programme
Inadequate availability and quality of data cause some of the uncertainties in
the biosphere. To support the development of models and furnish site-specific
data for the safety assessments, data need to be gathered during site
investigations.
The site investigation programme for siting of a spent fuel repository
started in 2002 will be one of the most extensive data collections ever
conducted in Sweden. An overview of the scope of the programme is provided in
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the background material for SKB, 2000, 2001a. In order to satisfy the need for
data and understanding for the safety assessments and the biosphere models,
data must be collected from the surface ecosystems. Variables and parameters
judged to be important are given in (Lindborg and Kautsky, 2000). Efforts have
been co-ordinated with the geosphere programme to find common needs of data
for boundary conditions, input data for the environmental impact assessment
and background material for future monitoring programmes. Moreover,
variables have been identified which are of value for the planning of the site
investigation programme in order, for example, to reduce environment
disturbances. Various compilations have since been made of existing data and
methods within various fields, e.g. meteorology, oceanography, hydrology (Lin-
dell et al., 1999), existing information on agriculture, forestry, population etc.
(Haldorson, 2000), methods for studying lakes and rivers (Blomqvist et al.,
2000, 2001) and other biological methods (Kyläkorpi et al., 2000). Thus siting
programme in combination with other research effort will provide new data,
new understanding and new model in the biosphere, but they will create new
questions that need to be answered.
Conclusions
SKB is in an intensive phase to improve the understanding of the biosphere
during the coming 6 to 10 years. Parallel efforts will be made in developing
models, modelling tools, understanding of important processes as well as
collecting a vast amount of field data. SKB invites to a participation in
reviewing, commenting and discussing the results obtained.
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Abstract
In 1970 a total of 997 drums and 19 other units containing radioactive waste were
buried in clay at IFE-Kjeller. When the Norwegian Parliament in 1994 decided to
build a combined storage and repository facility for low- and intermediate level
radioactive waste in Himdalen (KLDRA), it was also stated that this waste should
be retrieved and transferred to this new repository.
Retrieval of the buried waste was carried out during the autumn of 2001. A
short description of the work is given below.
Introduction
In 1970 IFE got permission from the National Institute for Radiation Hygiene
(now Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority) to bury approximately 1000
drums of radioactive waste and 19 other waste items in a near surface repository at
IFEs premises at Kjeller. When the Norwegian government in 1994 decided to
build a new combined storage and repository in Himdalen approximately 30 km
from IFE (KLDRA-Himdalen) it was also decided that the waste in the old near
surface repository should be retrieved, that the waste drums containing plutonium
should be placed in the storage part and that the rest of the waste should be
deposited in the new facility.
The work of retrieving radioactive waste from the old near surface
repository at IFE started 14 August 2001. The last drum was removed 22 October
2001. Free classification of the area was finished in early November 2002.
Description of the old near surface repository at IFE, Kjeller
A total of 997 drums of radioactive waste and 19 other waste items were buried in
1970. The drums were standard 210 l steel drums with variable shielding and
inner drums dependent on the type and activity of the waste.
Complete information of the radioactivity of various radionuclides in the
repository was difficult to obtain because of a rather poor documentation of the
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content in the separate drums. A summary of the total activity of the most
important radionuclides is given in Table 1. The total activity of nuclides with half-
life  > 1 year buried in 1970 was approximately 9300 GBq. In August 2001 prior to
the retrieval the total activity had decreased to approximately 2600 GBq.
The waste drums were embedded in clay and stacked in two layers lying
sideways [1]. The area covered 11.5 m x 23 m. The upper layer of drums was
covered by 1.5 –2 m of clay and soil. In the area where the repository was
established it had previously been a small brook and the area had a slightly
inclined surface. A drainage sump was established at the lowest level at one end of
the repository.
Retrieval of waste drums
The area around the repository was fenced off and classified as a controlled area
where work required use of special clothes and boots and special radiation
protection measures were required. The fence had two openings, one for
transportation of drums out of the area and one personnel entrance. The personnel
entrance was through a tent with a barrier in the middle. The barrier marked the
border to the controlled area. The tent was used for changing clothes on entrance to
and exit from the restricted area and was also used to store radiation protection
instruments and other radiation protection equipment for use during work and
stay in the area.
The repository was uncovered in smaller sections and an excavator was used
to lift the drums up and out of the repository. The process is shown in Figure 1.
Bigger lumps of clay were removed from the surface of the drums before they were
lifted out of the repository. A rough removal of clay from the drum surfaces was
performed before the drums were repacked. This clay was measured and
Table 1. Radioactivity in the repository by 31 December 1970 and 1 August 2001.
                   Radioactivity (GBq)_____________  
Nuclide Half-life (a)  31 December 1970 1 August 2001 
Co-60   5.3 1870      30 
Sr-90 28 2580            1180  
Cs-137 30 2530  1220 
Pu-239   2.41⋅104     79.1      79.1 
Pu-240 6569       5.2        5.2 
U (nat.)         4.47⋅109           1.3        1.3 
Other nuclides  2240  < 100 
Total  ~ 9300  ~ 2 600 
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contaminated clay was treated as radioactive waste and collected in two waste
drums. Many of the drums were rather heavily stuck in the clay bed and the lifting
process put a heavy strain on these drums.  One drum cracked and fell apart and
the content fell out before it could be removed from the repository. The dose rate
from the content (plastic pipes etc.) was however low, and it could be recovered and
secured without any problems.
The condition of the drums varied from almost complete intact to heavily
corroded with cracks and openings. Figure 2 shows some examples of the condition
of drums. It was not necessary to clean the surfaces completely because all the
drums should be repacked in new drums.
A major part of the drums were difficult to identify because the marks and
signs were either difficult to read or destroyed by corrosion. However, the drums
containing plutonium which according to the governmental decision in 1994
should be placed in the storage part of the new KLDRA-Himdalen facility, could be
identified by two bungholes compared to the other drums having only one
bunghole. A total number of 166 drums containing plutonium were recovered and
given new identification numbers. These 166 drums were repacked in new   330 l
stainless steel drums. The 831 drums without plutonium and with one bunghole
were also given new identification and were designated for depositing in the
KLDRA-Himdalen facility. These drums were repacked in new 300 l steel drums.
In order to give the old drums a protective layer and fix the contamination
on the surfaces concrete was pumped into the space between the old drum and the
Figure 1. An excavator was used to lift the drums out of the repository.
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new outer drum. The drums were then cleared for transportation and brought to a
nearby storage building awaiting transportation to KLDRA-Himdalen. Twenty
drums, 10 with plutonium and 10 without, have been selected for further research
activities and are stored separately at IFE
Since many drums were impossible to identify the old documentation could
not be used to identify the content. The knowledge of nuclides and the total
radioactivity level of  nuclides in the  repository was, however, available and the
mean radioactivity per drum could therefore be calculated and was used for drums
where identification was impossible.
Figure 2.  Drums from the repository
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Radiation protection measures and radiation doses
 Monitoring of contamination in air and doses inhalation of
radioactivity
People working inside the controlled area were classified as occupationally
exposed. Individual doses to occupational exposed personnel were monitored by
personal dosimeters based on TL-dosimetry from IFE’s radiation protection
service. In addition to the personal dosimeters work inside the controlled area
required use of electronic personal dosimeters (EPD). Doses on the EPD’s were
recorded every day after work inside the controlled area. During the period
starting at 14 August and ending at 22 October doses to 21 persons were recorded
on EPD’s during work in the controlled area. The maximum total dose recorded on
the EPD’s was 2.06 mSv. The dose recorded on the personal dosimeter for the same
person for the period July/August – October was 1,8 mSv. The collective dose
recorded by the EPD’s for the 21 persons was 5.2 man-mSv.
During the excavation work the contamination of the air by radioactive dust
particles was monitored by use of a transportable air monitor. The activity on the
filter was measured every day with a contamination monitor in order to calculate
the level of air contamination. The filter was changed once a week. A similar
instrument located at the other end of IFE’s premises approximately 400 meters
away monitored the background level of air contamination.
Workers that frequently were in contact with drums and clay were equipped
with personal air samplers (PAS). Filters in these instruments were changed once
a week and the activity on the filters were measured.
Based on the daily and weekly measurements of filters from the air monitor
and the PAS’ it was decided that use of breathing masks were not required during
the work.
Based on g-measurements and radiochemical analysis of the radioactivity
on the filters from the air monitor located inside the controlled area and from the
air monitor for background measurements the maximum committed dose from
inhalation of contaminated dust was calculated. It was assumed that a person
worked 5 days and 8 hours a day for a period of 10 weeks. A breathing volume of 20
l/minute was used. The results of the calculations were:
• Maximum committed dose from 137Cs: < 5×10-4  µSv
• Maximum committed dose from 238Pu: < 5×10-3  µSv
• Maximum committed dose from 239, 240Pu: < 0.2  µSv
Dose rates in the environment outside the controlled area
Once a week the dose rate was measured at the gate to the controlled area, at
the fence around the nearby kindergarten, along the walls and at a door to the
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nearby building and at the tent for personnel entrance and exit. The results are
shown in Table 2. A TL-dosimeter was placed at the gate for transportation of
drums out of the controlled area in the period 2001.09.09 – 2001.11.07. The
mean dose rate at the gate in this period was 0.19 µSv/h. The dose rate in the
environment depended on the number of drums stored above the ground in the
controlled area.
Measurements and free classification of the clay bed
Clearance levels for contaminated clay was specified by the Norwegian
Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) to be:
• For 137Cs : 100 Bq/g dry weight
• For 239Pu + 240Pu + 241Am : 10 Bq/g dry weight
After a section of drums in the repository had been removed samples of
clay from the clay bed in 2 x 2 meter grid and from the sides were taken and
analysed by γ-spectroscopy. A total of 99 samples were taken from the empty
repository. A calibrated MiniSPEC Survying Gamma Ray Spectrometer form
Exploranium was used to measure 137Cs in wet clay samples. The detection
limit was 10 Bq/g. Calculation of Pu + Am was made by using a relation of 0.08
between Pu + Am and Cs. This relation includes a factor of 2 between wet
weight and dry weight. From earlier measurements in 1993 and 1994 it could
be concluded that the relation between Pu+Am and Cs content in the clay was
below 0.04 with 95 % confidence.
Based on measurements and calculations it could be concluded that all
99 samples taken form the empty repository were below the clearance levels
given by NRPA and the repository could therefore be closed without removal of
contaminated clay.
Table 2.  Dose rates in the environment outside the controlled area.
Location Range of dose rate measurements 
    
  (µSv/h) 
At the gate to the controller area   0.1 – 1.0  
At the fence to the kindergarten   0.1 – 0.15 
At the wall and door to the nearby building  0.25 – 7.0  
At the tent for entrance/exit  0.2 – 1.5 
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Closing of the empty repository
Since 996 drums had been removed from the repository additional masses had
to be filled in the empty hole. As a result of the removal of contaminated
sediments from the river Nitelva at the end of IFEs old pipeline for release of
low-level liquid radioactive waste, 37 containers with approximately 160 - 170
m3 of sediments were stored at IFEs premises at Kjeller. By measurements it
could be established that the radioactivity content in these containers were
below the clearance levels given by NRPA. IFE was therefore allowed to fill
these sediments into the empty hole together with the layer of soil from the top
of the drums that had been removed.
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Abstract
A new sequential procedure for the analysis of Pu, Am, Cm and Sr in low-level
liquid radioactive effluents is presented. The proposed method utilises an
actinide specific extraction chromatographic resin (TRU-Resin) for the
isolation and separation of the actinides. 90Sr determination is accomplished
via analysis of its progeny 90Y, which is purified with TBP extraction. The
proposed method is simpler and faster than traditional ion exchange,
extraction and precipitation methods used in routine analysis of actinides and
90Sr. The chemical yield of all analytes, when analysing 200 ml low-level
effluent, is between 80-95%.
Introduction
The operation of nuclear power plants undesirably leads to the formation of
liquid and solid radioactive waste containing activation and fission products.
While the solid waste is suitably stored in repositories, the low-level liquid
waste is normally discharged to appropriate surroundings, after decay of the
shortest living radionuclides. Before such an operation can be undertaken the
radionuclide content of the liquid must be examined. The Environmental
Monitoring Section (EMS) of The Institute for Energy Technology (IFE),
performs surveillance of discharges originating from IFE’s nuclear activities to
ensure that the discharge limits given by the Norwegian Radiation Protection
Authority (NRPA) are not exceeded. The liquid effluents are analysed for gam-
ma emitters (including 241Am), 3H, 35S, 90Sr, 238Pu and 239,240Pu. The gamma
analysis is performed directly on the liquid samples using HPGe detectors with
low-energy windows. Analysis of 90Sr, 238Pu and 239,240Pu is performed using
standard separation procedures.
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The low-level liquid waste at IFE originates from the operation of a small
(thermal output 2 MW) research reactor and the production of
radiopharmaceuticals. The waste from different locations at IFE is collected in
large drums to allow the decay of the shortest living radionuclides before an
evaluation on the discharge of the liquid is undertaken. Representative
samples from the drums are then analysed for α-, β- and γ-emitters. The
composition of the liquid and the radionuclide content varies with the activities
at the specific time.
In our lab 90Sr is analysed using the traditional “fumic nitric acid
method” [1,2]. 239,240Pu analysis is done on a separate sample using traditional
anion exchange procedure before the activity on electroplated discs is
determined using PIPS detectors.
In an effort to optimise these analyses the use of extraction
chromatography coupled with liquid-liquid extraction to develop a sequential
procedure for the analysis of 90Sr and α-emitters was studied. Since the gamma
detection limit of 241Am is quite high, an alpha analysis of 241Am was also
desired. The wastewater is normally stored for at least a month before
radiochemical separations are undertaken. 90Sr activity in the water therefore
equals the activity of its progeny 90Y. In the proposed procedure the more
favourable separation chemistry of Y(III) is utilized to determine the
activity of 90Sr via 90Y. An additional advantage in analysing 90Y is its short
half-life (t1/2 = 64.1 hours), which enables a simple check of chemical purity of
the final source by just following its decay.
Experimental
Reagents and apparatus
Seven different low-level liquid waste solutions were analysed for Sr, Pu,
Am and Cm. The 242Pu (0.163 Bq/ml) and 243Am (0,086 Bq/ml) standards
were supplied by Risø National Laboratory, Denmark. Y-carrier (10 mg/ml)
was prepared from pa grade Y2(NO3)3×6 H2O purified by TBP-extraction [1].
The extraction chromatographic resin used for the separation of Pu, Am and
Cm was TRU-Resin SPS (50-100 µm) (Eichrom Ind.). All chemicals were of
analytical reagent grade.
An i.d. 5 mm glass column with a glass wool fitting at bottom and top
was used to make an extraction chromatographic column of 0.50 gram TRU-
Resin. 0.1 µm polypropylene membran filters (25 mm) fitted in a 50 ml
polysulfone filter funnel (Gelman Sciences) were used to collect the
fluorides when preparing the α-sources.
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90Y-beta activity was determined using a low level beta GM multicounter
(Risø GM-25-5). The alpha-activities were measured with 450 mm2 PIPS
detectors placed in multichamber racks (Canberra). The vacuum in the
chambers was kept under 10 torr and the distance between the source and the
detector at 1 cm, giving a counting efficiency of 17±1 %. Data treatment was
done with the Canberra Alpha Analyst software.
Procedures
200 ml effluent water was acidified with 10 ml 65% HNO3 and 0.2 ml
each of 243Am- and 242Pu-tracer and 1ml of Y-carrier solution added before the
sample was evaporated to dryness. The salts were then treated twice with 10
ml 65% HNO3.
The salts were dissolved with 15 ml 3 M HNO3 and Na2SO3 added to 0,2
M. The solution was left for 20 minutes for the complete reduction of Pu to
Pu(III). NaNO2 was added to 0,2 M and the solution left for 20 min for the
oxidation of Pu(III) to Pu(IV). The solution was then loaded on a TRU-Resin
column pre-treated with 3 M HNO3 and the column washed with 10 ml 2 M
HNO3 and 10 ml 2 M HNO3-0,1 M NaNO2 (Flow: 1-2 ml/min). All effluents were
kept for Y-analysis. After washing the column with 2 ml 9 M HCl, Am was
eluted with 10 ml 4 M HCl and Pu with 10 ml 4 M HCl-0,02 M TiCl3 directly into
two different 20 ml scintillation vials. The Am and Pu-fractions were added 50
µg Ce and 1 ml 40% HF and the fluorides allowed to develop for at least 30 min.
The fluorides were then collected by filtration through 0,1 µm membrane filter
pre-treated with 80% ethanol and the vials and filter washed with 5 ml H2O
followed by 5 ml 96% ethanol. The filters were then attached to planchets with
double sided tape, dried at 60 oC, and the alpha-activity determined using PIPS
detectors.
The Y-fraction from TRU-Resin was evaporated to dryness, treated once
with 5 ml 65% HNO3 and the salts picked up with 30 ml 14 M HNO3. Y was then
extracted twice with 30 ml TBP preconditioned with 14 M HNO3 and the
separation time between Sr and Y noted. The TBP phases were combined,
washed with 30 ml 14 M HNO3, and Y stripped twice with 30 ml H2O. NH3 was
then added to pH 2-3 and Y-oxalate precipitated with the addition of saturated
oxalic acid solution. The solution was heated for approximately 1 hour at 90 oC,
cooled, and the oxalate collected on a 25 mm Whatman 42 ash less filter paper.
90Y-activity was then determined using a GM-counter. After β-counting the Y-
oxalate was ashed at 900 oC for 90 minutes and the Y2O3 picked up with 3 ml
65% HNO3. The solution was evaporated to dryness and the salts dissolved with
20 ml acetate buffer at pH 4,4. 1 drop of 0.5% xylene orange indicator was then
added and Y titrated with 0.01 M EDTA until a color change from red to yellow
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was observed. Y-recovery was then determined by comparing the EDTA
consumption of the analyte solution versus that of a reference solution
containing 10 mg Y [4].
Results and discussion
In normal routine operations where the analysis of Sr and actinides is desired
for a sample the analyses are performed on different sample aliquots. One
aliquot is analysed for Sr and another for Pu and Am. This requires the pre-
treatment of two different sub samples. Since the pre-treatment step for many
matrixes is the most time consuming step a considerable gain in throughput
can be achieved by using the same sample for both Sr and actinide analysis. In
a two-step sequential procedure the time used for the analysis of the second
analyte can additionally be reduced as many interfering elements are
eliminated in the first step.
In the proposed procedure tri-, tetra- and hexa-valent actinides are
extracted by TRU-Resin while most other elements pass right through. Some
Y(III) is also extracted, but this is washed out of the column with 2 M HNO3 [3].
When the column is washed with HNO3 containing NaNO2 any remaining
traces of Pu(III) are oxidised to Pu(IV). Since trivalent actinides are not
extracted by CMPO (the active extractant in TRU-Resin) from HCl soluitons, 4
M HCl is used to elute Am and Cm. As Cm(III) resembles Am(III) the recovery
of 243Am equals the recovery of Cm and the activity of other Cm isotopes can
also be calculated. After the removal of trivalent actinides plutonium can be
reductively eluted with 4 M HCl – 0,02 M TiCl3. The α-sources are then made by
micro co-precipitation with CeF3. The alpha spectra of the Am and Pu fraction
can be seen in Figure 1. As seen both fractions are very clean and do not contain
any interfering α-emitters.
Figure 1. Alpha-spectra of the americium (a) and plutonium (b) fraction.
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TBP extraction is here used to extract Y and separate it from Sr and other
mono and divalent cations. Only those elements that are not extracted by CMPO
from 2-3 M HNO3 but extracted by TBP from 14 M HNO3 and form sparingly
soluble oxalates at pH 2-3 can interfere in the determination of 90Y. The possible co-
precipitation of radionuclides interfering in the determination of 90Y can easily be
checked by following the deacy of the Y-source. In none of the seven samples
analysed did the decay deviate from that of 90Y. The chemical yield of Y is
traditionally checked by gravimetric methods. This however can give a too high
yield estimate as other elements also can precipitate together with Y-oxalate. In
our lab we have found pH-controlled EDTA titration to be more reliable than
gravimetric methods for the determination of Y-recovery [4]. The chemical yield of
Pu, Am, Y and Sr for the proposed and traditional methods is shown in Table 1.
While the recoveries of both Sr and Y are high using the tradition method,
the recovery of Pu is very low. Using the proposed method the recoveries of all
analytes are very high. In addition the new method allows a simple α-analysis
of Am and Cm. The traditional method requires the use of about one week for
Pu analysis and 3 weeks for Sr-analysis. The proposed method offers significant
time reduction as separation and source preparation of Pu, Am and Y can be
achieved in one day.
Conclusion
A simple, rapid and reliable method for the analysis of Pu, Am, Cm and Sr in low-
level liquid effluents is proposed which offers higher chemical yields, is less time
consuming and more environmentally friendly than traditional methods.
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Yield (Traditional methods) 24 ± 12% n.d. 80 ± 12% 67 ± 27%   
165
STUK-A195
[3] E. P. Horwitz, R. Chiarizia, M. L. Dietz, H. Diamond and D. M. Nelson, Anal.
Chim. Acta, 281 (1993) 361-372.
[4] P. Varskog, T. O. Bjerk and A. B. Ruud, pH-controlled EDTA titration as an
alternative method for determination of the chemical yield of yttrium in 90Sr-
analysis, Proc. Rapid Radioactivity Measurements in Emergency and Routine
Situations, The National Physical Laboratory, Teddington, UK, 1997, p. 237.
166
STUK-A195
Measurements and calculations for determination
of discharge of 41Ar from IFEs research reactor
JEEP II at Kjeller, Norway
Aud Raaum and Elisabeth Strålberg
Institute for Energy Technology, P.O.box 40, N-2027 Kjeller, Norway
Abstract
 41Ar is formed by neutron irradiation of 40Ar, which occurs naturally in air with
a concentration of 9300 ppm. The discharge of 41Ar from IFEs research reactor
Jeep II is yearly reported to the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority
(NRPA). Until year 2000 the reported values were based on theoretical
calculations of produced 41Ar per operating hour of 6.8 GBq/h. During 2000 and
2001 the reactor was upgraded to increase the irradiation capacity and to meet
the markets demand for irradiation of 5"Si-crystalls. After the upgrading,
measurements and calculations were initiated to determine the new discharge
rate for 41Ar. During reactor operation an approximately constant discharge of
41Ar is expected, mainly due to irradiation of air in open beam channels. In
addition 41Ar is released from irradiation pockets when they are opened to
transfer samples in and out during reactor stop. The new value for discharge
rate was determined from measurements of air samples from the discharge
channel during operation and theoretical calculations of the release from the
irradiation pockets. The new discharge rate was determined to 5.9 ± 0.5 GBq/h,
which is a small reduction compared to the former value of 6.8 GBq/h. A small
reduction in discharge rate was expected because the number of air-filled
irradiation pockets was reduced after the upgrading. In a normal year the
discharge of 41Ar will be about 2 % of the Institutes discharge permission.
Introduction
During 2000 and 2001 IFEs research reactor Jeep II was upgraded to increase
the irradiation capacity and to meet the markets demand for irradiation of 5"
Si-crystalls. Larger and water-filled irradiation pockets were installed, and the
top lid and various help systems were changed. Until year 2000 the reported
discharge was based on theoretical calculations of produced 41Ar per operating
hour. The calculated discharge rate was 6.8 GBq per working hour at a reactor
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effect of 2 MW [1]. Two non-calibrated gamma monitors control the discharge
rate, and give alarm on high activity levels [2]. After the upgrading,
measurements and calculations were initiated to determine the new discharge
rate for 41Ar. A small reduction in discharge rate was expected after the
upgrading because the number of air-filled irradiation pockets had been
reduced.
Sources of 41Ar discharge
41Ar is formed by neutron irradiation of 40Ar, which occurs naturally in air with
a concentration of 9300 ppm. During reactor operation an approximately
constant discharge of 41Ar is expected, mainly due to irradiation of air in open
beam channels. In addition 41Ar is released from irradiation pockets when they
are opened to transfer samples in and out during reactor stop.
The reactor is equipped with 9 irradiation pockets, 2 which are filled with
air and 7 which are circulated with heavy water. In the water-filled pockets 41Ar
is produced by irradiation of 40Ar that is dissolved in the water. The irradiation
pockets are closed during reactor operation by a plug on the top. The plug is
removed when transferring samples in and out of the pockets during reactor
stop, and the 41Ar that has been created during operation is released. In
addition to the radiation pockets described above, a tenth pocket contains a
pipe system called the “Rabbit” in which samples are transported to and from
the reactor core for neutron activation. 41Ar created in the “Rabbit” is released
when transferring samples in and out of the “Rabbit”, which is usually done
during reactor operation.
Measurements of 41Ar from the beam channels
The discharge rate from 41Ar produced in the beam channels was determined
by measurement of air sampled from the discharge channel. Measurements
were assumed to be easier and more accurate than calculations, mainly
because accurate stipulations of the parameters needed for calculations are
difficult. Measurements also make it possible to control whether the discharge
rate is constant with time.
Air was sampled from the discharge channel on 1-litre evacuated glass
flasks. The samples were measured on a Canberra 3x3” NaI-detector. Efficiency
calibration of the detector was performed using a standard 60Co-solution.
Corrections were made for differences in self-attenuation in air and water.
The reactor is usually started and stopped several times during a day to
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Figure 1. Samples collected during and after starting of reactor.
Table I. 41Ar concentration in samples taken at arbitrary times during reactor operation.
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Date  Concentration [kBq/m3]
Sample 1 Sample 2 
05.09.01  771 771 
10.09.01  840 848 
11.09.01  776 763 
12.09.01  900 777 
14.09.01  674 670 
19.09.01  900 906 
All samples:  800 ± 80 
transfer samples in and out of the irradiation pockets. After the reactor is
started, some time will elapse before the 41Ar concentration at the sampling
place is stabilized at a maximum level. This was examined by taking a series of
samples during and after start of the reactor. The results are shown in figure 1.
After about one hour the 41Ar concentration was stabilized on a maximum level
of 850 kBq/hour.
In order to determine the mean discharge rate during reactor operation,
several samples were collected at arbitrary hours during reactor operation. The
sampling was done after the reactor had been operating on maximum effect (2
MW) for at least one hour. Two parallel samples were collected. The results are
given in Table I.
Except for the samples collected September 12th it was good agree-ment
between the concentrations measured in the two parallel samples. Possible
reasons for the day-to-day differences in concentrations may be uneven air
stream and air density.
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The discharge rate during reactor operation is:
cuU luft ⋅= Formula 1
where
U = Discharge rate in Bq/h
uluft = Average discharge rate for air in m
3/h
c = Average activity concentration in Bq/m3
The average discharge rate for air was measured by the Building and
Maintenance department to 6100 ± 100 m3/h. The resulting discharge rate
based on the samples collected is
4.9 ± 0.5 GBq/h.
Calculations of contribution from irradiation pockets
The determination of the discharge rate from the irradiation pockets was based
on calculation of the amount of 41Ar produced in the pockets during reactor
operation, and knowledge of how often the pockets are opened. For the air-filled
pockets it was assumed that all the produced 41Ar is released when opening the
pocket. The water-filled pockets are circulated with heavy water, and 41Ar is
produced by activation of 40Ar dissolved in the water. It was assumed that all
the 41Ar dissolved in the water that passes the opening of the pockets when the
pockets are open is released.
The activity of the 41Ar produced by neutron activation of 40Ar after an
irradiation time t is given by:
 where 
Q = activity in Bq 
ϕ = thermal flux in cm-2 s-1 
q = concentration of Ar in g/m3 (= 16.8 g/mol in air) 
f = relative amount of 40Ar =  0.996 
NA = avogadros number = 6.023?1023 mol-1 
σ = cross section  for 40Ar(nt, ?)
41Ar = 0.64 barn = 0.64?10-24 cm2 
Am = molar weight for Ar = 39.948 g/mol 
V = irradiated volume (m3) 
t = irradiation time  
T1/2 = half life for 
41Ar = 1.83 h 
)2/1
2ln
1(
T
t
eV
mA
ANfqQ
⋅−
−⋅
⋅⋅⋅⋅
=
σϕ
Formula 2
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Air-filled irradiation pockets
The reactor has two air-filled irradiation pockets, I6 and E2. Table II shows the
parameters for irradiated volume, thermal flux and the calculated activity of
41Ar. It is assumed that the irradi-ation time is long enough so that equilibrium
is reached. Thermal flux measured in the height of the active part of the fuel
elements varies from 4.0×1012 – 9.0×1012 cm-2s-1 in E2, and from 8.5×1012 –
1.5×1013 cm-2s-1 in I6 [4]. It is assumed in the calculation that all the air in the
pocket is irradiated with the maximum thermal flux, which is a very
conservative assumption taking into account that the active part of the fuel
elements only covers about one third of the total height of the pockets. It is also
assumed that the pockets are empty. Most of the time the pockets will be filled
with samples, which displaces about 10 % of the total volume. The resulting
activities are therefore considered to be conservative. The pockets are on
average emptied three times a week  [4]. Average discharge rate from the air-
filled pockets is then:
Discharge rate = Qtotal ×3/(24 h × 7) = 0.81 GBq/h
Table II. Argon in air-filled irradiation pockets.
Water-filled irradiation pockets
The reactor has seven water-filled (heavy water) pockets, five of type I, and 2 of
type E. During operation 41Ar is produced by irradiation of 40Ar dissolved in the
water. The solubility of Ar in the water was calculated using Henrys law:
PkSolv ⋅=          Formula 3
This gives a solubility of 1.3×10-5 mol Ar per litre water.
Because the water is circulated through the pockets, not all of the water
is irradiated at the same time. Due to the short half-life of 41Ar, the produced
41Ar in a water volume will disintegrate when circulating outside the pocket
until the same volume is irradiated once more. Total volume, volume irradiated
at one time, and neutron flux is given in table III.
Pocket  V [m3] [5] ϕ [cm-2s-1] Q [Bq] 
E2  0.0117 9.0?1012 1.7?1010
I6  0.0117 1.5?1013 2.8?1010
   Total: 4.5?1010
where 
Solv = Solubility of gas in mol/litre 
k = Constant = 1.4?10-3 M atm-1 at 25 °C for Ar  
P = Partial pressure of the gas above the liquid = 0.00934 atm for Ar in air 
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Table III. Parameters used for calculation of 41Ar activity.
The irradiation time was calculated to be 0.6 h, and the disintegration
time to 1.4 h based on a water flow of 0.03 m3/h. In table IV the same finite
water volume is followed through 6 irradiation and disintegration periods in an
E-pocket. The 41Ar concentration at the end of each period was calculated from
Formula 2. After 4 periods the concentrations has stabilized at 1.02×1010 Bq/m3
at the end of an irradiation period and 6.16×109 Bq/m3 at the end of a
disintegration period. Equivalent calculations were done for the I-pockets.
Table IV. 41Ar concentration in an infinite water volume in an E-pocket at the end of each
irradiation and disintegration period.
The pockets are opened twice a day in average, i.e. every 12th hour. It
may therefore be assumed that the 41Ar concentration is at a maximum level
(table IV) when the pockets are opened. It is assumed that the pockets stay
open for 10-15 minutes when opened to transfer samples in and out. After 15
minutes 0.0075 m3 water has passed the opening of the pocket (15 cm
diameter). It is assumed that the water passes the opening after being
irradiated, and then has a maximum 41Ar concentration (1.02×1010 Bq/m3 for E-
pockets and 1.71×1010 Bq/m3 for I-pockets). Assuming that all the 41Ar in the
0.0075 m3 that passes the opening of the pocket is released, 7.7×107 Bq is
released from each E-pocket every time it is opened. The corresponding value
for an I-pocket is 1.3×108 Bq. The average discharge rate is then:
Discharge rate = (2×7.7×107 Bq + 5×1.3×108 Bq)×2/24 h = 0.07 GBq/h.
A considerable part (up to 45 %) of the water available for irradiation is
usually displaced by crystals. The calculated discharge rate is therefore
assumed to be conservative.
Pocket Irradiated volume 
per pocket [m3]
Total volume per 
pocket [m3]
ϕ [cm-2s-1]
Type E (2)  0.0177 0.0583 9.0?1012
Type I (5)  0.0177 0.0583 1.5?1013
Time 
[h] 
Activity 
concentration 
[Bq/m3]
 Time 
[h]
Activity 
concentration 
[Bq/m3]
0.59  9.04?109  1. irradiation 6.42  1.02?1010  4. irradiation 
1.94  5.42?108  1. disintegration 7.78  6.16?109  4. disintegration 
2.53  1.01?1010  2. irradiation 8.36  1.02?1010  5. irradiation 
3.89  6.05?109  2. disintegration 9.72  6.16?109  5. disintegration 
4.48  1.02?1010  3. irradiation 10.3  1.02?1010  6. irradiation 
5.83  6.10?109  3. disintegration 11.7  6.16?109  6. disintegration 
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“Rabbit”
41Ar created in the “Rabbit” is released through the discharge channel when
samples are transferred in or out of the “Rabbit”. The amount of 41Ar created in
the “Rabbit” is calculated by Formula 2. It is assumed that the irradiation time
is long enough so that equilibrium is reached. Volume of irradiated air, neutron
flux and calculated 41Ar activity is given in table V. The “Rabbit” is in average
used 4 times a week [3], and 41Ar is released both when taking samples in and
out of the “Rabbit”. Average discharge rate is then:
Discharge rate = Qtotal × 4/(24 h × 7) = 0.15 GBq/h
Some of the air available for irradiation is usually displaced by samples.
The calculated discharge rate is therefore assumed to be conservative.
Total discharge rate
The average discharge rate for 41Ar from JEEP II is given in table VI. The total
yearly dis-charge is found by multiplying the discharge rate by the number of
operational hours for the reactor.
Because the calculated contributions from the irradiation pockets are
regarded as being con-ser-vative, no uncertainty is given for these values.
Discussion and conclusion
Before upgrading of the reactor there were 6 air-filled irradiation pockets. A
reduction in dis-charge rate was expected after the upgrading because the
numbers of air-filled pockets were reduced to 2. However the “Rabbit” was not
included in the former calculations. In addition some release is taken place
Table V. Argon in the “Rabbit”.
Table VI. Total discharge rate from JEEP II.
”Rabbitt”  V [m3] ϕ [cm-2s-1] Q [Bq] 
  0.0038 [6] 1.0?1013 6.4?109
Contribution from  U [GBq/h] 
Beam channels  4.9 ± 0.5 
Air-filled pockets  0.81 
Water-filled pockets  0.07 
”Rabbit”  0.15 
Total:  5.9 ± 0.5 
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from the water-filled pockets. The resulting discharge rate of 5.9 GBq/h
compared to the former value of 6.8 GBq/h therefore seems reasonable. In 2000
the reported discharge of 41Ar from JEEP II was 22.8 TBq, based on a discharge
rate of 6.8 GBq/h, and 3361 ope-ratio-nal hours [8]. This amounts to only 2 % of
the discharge permission. With discharge levels far below the discharge
permission the precision of the perfor-med measurements and calculations is
considered to be good enough, and the reporting of discharge should be based
on the discharge rate of 5.9 GBq/h.
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4a Long Term Behaviour of Waste Drums Retrieved
from the IFE-Kjeller Near-Surface Repository
T. Ramsøy, S. Backe, P. Varskog (1), T. Bøe and G.C. Christensen
Institute for Energy Technology, P.O.Box 40, N-2027 Kjeller, Norway
(1) Present affiliation: Norse Decom AS, P.O. Box 112, N-2027 Kjeller Norway
Abstract
In 1970 a near surface repository containing about 9300 GBq radioactive waste
was established at IFE-Kjeller. The buried waste units were retrieved during the
autumn of 2001.
15 waste drums had been retrieved from the repository earlier. A pilot study
was carried out on one of these drums. The aim of the investigation was to
determine if leakage of radionuclides through the barriers had taken place. The
conclusion was that the investigated drum was in good condition and no leakage of
radioactive material had taken place.
From the drums retrieved in 2001, 20 drums have been selected for further
studies. Proposed studies include core sampling and the measurement of activity
profiles through the barriers surrounding the waste.
Introduction
In 1970 a total of nearly 1000 drums and 19 other units containing radioactive
waste were buried in clay at IFE-Kjeller. After a safety assessment the drums were
disposed with approval from the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority. The
drums were stacked in two layers. The field, depicted in Figure 1, had an area of
276 m2.
The drums were buried in clay. The reason for choosing clay was that it
provides a good barrier against leakage of radioactivity from the field.
Water running through the field was collected in a drain sump. The water
was controlled before it was released. The annual release of radionuclides from the
repository is estimated to less than 0.1% of the permitted release limit.
When the drums were buried in 1970, this method was recommended by the
IAEA and in accordance with current international practise. Radiation protection
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policy has however changed since then. When the Norwegian parliament in 1994
decided to build a combined storage and repository for low- and intermediate level
radioactive waste in Himdalen (KLDRA), it was also stated that the drums should
be retrieved and transferred to this new repository.
It should also be mentioned that in 1993, representatives from the
environmental foundation “Bellona” committed a forced entry to the premises and
uncovered some drums, one of which were damaged by the mechanical digger. IFE
took advantage of the incident and dug up 5 drums for inspection. In addition, 10
drums were retrieved in 1994.
Inventory
The radioactive waste consisted of laboratory waste, organic liquid absorbed in
vermiculite and dried ion exchange mass. Metallic waste was embedded in
concrete. For high dose rate waste, the drum was equipped with a lead inner
container. The total activity in the repository is calculated to be 2900 GBq
(1.7.1997). The activities for the most important nuclides are shown in Table 1.
The repository contains 80 GBq plutonium (35 g) in 166 drums and 1.3
GBq uranium (100 kg) from the former reprocessing pilot plant.
Figure 1. Artistic view of the near surface repository at IFE-Kjeller.
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Table 1. Inventory of the near surface repository at IFE-Kjeller
Contamination in the surroundings of the repository
With two exceptions, no contamination has been detected in the surroundings
of the buried drums. One borehole close to the drain sump showed activity
concentrations of 137Cs of 10-600 Bq/kg. A trace of 137Cs was also found in
another borehole.
Contamination of clay and water in the repository
The activity levels in rust and clay from the drums range from 1.5 MBq/kg and
down. Samples of water taken after retrieval of the drums had a content of 137Cs
in the range
1-50 Bq/l and for 90Sr from 1-10 Bq/l. Clay and sludge profiles from the
bottom of the repository had activity levels of 137Cs up to 100 kBq/kg in the first
2 cm.  The concentration of 239Pu in clay was 500 Bq/kg or below with one
exception of a sample of 7 kBq/kg. Samples from profiles showed that the
activity was concentrated in the 2 cm of clay closest to the drum surface.
Study of the waste drums
Identification and documentation
All drums were initially marked by drum numbers painted on the surface. For
each drum number, there exists a drum journal with information on the waste
and the type of container. The information content of the journal is, however, of
variable value. Some of the drum journals do not contain information on
radionuclides present or activity of the waste. After 21 years in the ground, the
numbers on many drums were impossible to read. In conclusion, little is known
about the activity and isotope contents of each drum. Drums containing
plutonium were however easy to identify as the have two bungs.
All drums were given new identification numbers and were
photographed before reconditioning.
Nuclide Half-life [years] Activity 1) [GBq] 
60Co 5.3 60 
90Sr 28 1340 
137Cs 30 1360 
239Pu 24 000 85 
U(nat) 4.5 ·109 1.3 
Other 2) - <100 
1) Activity as per 1. July 1997 
2) Other nuclides includes 3H, 14C, 55Fe and 204Tl 
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Pilot study
One of the drums retrieved in 1973/1974 was selected for a pilot investigation.
The drum was selected on the criteria that the outer surface was among the
most heavily corroded and that information of the composition of the waste was
available. The aim of the investigation was to:
• Determine if leakage of radionuclides through the barriers had taken
place.
• Inspect the barriers, especially the concrete shielding, for visible
degradation.
• Check the information in the journals on drum construction (shielding,
inner container).
The method used was to drill out cores from the concrete shielding using
a commercially available core-drilling device that generated cores with a
diameter of 7 cm (Figure 2). The length of the cores corresponded to the
thickness of the concrete shielding, typically 10-15 cm. Three cores were taken
from the drum.
The cores have been analysed using high-resolution g-spectrometry. In
order to make a measurement of the inner and the outer core end and compare
the spectra from the two sides. If there is a difference in activity, the cores were
sliced into appropriate samples for a quantitative analysis.
Figure 2. Drilling cores from drum no. 6.
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The measurements showed that the samples contained 137Cs. It was,
however, no difference in the activity on the two sides. It should also be noted
that loose corrosion sampled from the outer surface of the drum had a much
higher 137Cs activity.
Measures have been taken to ensure that radiation protection is
attended to during the investigation. All treatment of waste drums was
performed in an “active area”, that is an area that only can be entered using
protective clothing and wearing a personal dosimeter. Effort was made to find a
suitable area with acceptable working conditions and where possible
contamination from core drilling can be handled safely.
The external dose rate from the selected drum was rather low, typically
20 µSv/h. The main risk was thus connected to contamination. The core drill is
cooled using running water, so the risk for generating airborne contamination
was low. The spill water may however be contaminated. Care was taken to
collect the water in a drip-tray. The amount of water used was kept as low as
possible to reduce the amount of liquid waste generated. The idea was to let the
water evaporate naturally from the drip-tray.
Protective clothing as rubber gloves and a disposable suit were used
during core drilling. A full-protection breathing mask was required, as some
cooling water tends to spurt from the drill.
Preliminary conclusion
Visual inspection of the cores revealed that the concrete shielding was in
remarkably good condition. No visible degradation or cracks were observed.
The inner steel container was also found to be in good condition with no visible
corrosion.
The investigated drum was in good condition and leakage of radioactive
material had not taken place. It is necessary to investigate more drums to
establish if this drum is representative for the majority of drums from the
repository. The presence of 137Cs on the outer surface does indeed indicate that
some of the drums must have been leaking.
Further studies
Most of the nearly 1000 drums retrieved have already been reconditioned and
are being transferred to the KLDRA repository and storage site.
From the drums retrieved in 2001, 20 drums have been selected for
further studies. Ten of the drums, easily identified having double bungs,
contain plutonium.  Proposed studies include core sampling and the
measurement of activity profiles through the barriers surrounding the waste.
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4b Sorting of waste from the decommissioning of
the nuclear facilites at Risø
Lisbeth Warming, Per Hedemann Jensen, Jens Søgaard-Hansen
and Bente Lauridsen
Risø National Laboratory, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark
Abstract
It has been decided to close down and decommission all nuclear facilities at
Risø National Laboratory. The radioactive parts are to be stored in a suitable
repository, and the non-radioactive (or very low-radioactive) parts should be
carefully checked, before they can be cleared and disposed as ordinary waste.
Sorting materials into radioactive and non-radioactive waste is important, as it
has both ethical and economical aspects, because the amount of waste to be
stored as radioactive waste can be significantly reduced.
Every piece of material removed from the nuclear facilities will be
marked and registered, so its movements in the decommissioning system can
be followed through the documentation. Due to its original position in the
facility, it might have been activated by neutrons, contaminated or both. The
flow of material through the sorting system is described in detail, from the first
check to the final determination of activity content and the subsequent
separation into radioactive and non-radioactive waste.
There are two reasons for determining the radioactivity. One is to have
documentation for the activity content in the radioactive waste to be stored and
the other is to verify that the activity content is so low that the piece can be
disposed off as ordinary waste. The plan is to have two separate laboratories for
these measurements.
International organisations have given recommendations on
radionuclide specific clearance levels based on a dose rate of 0.01 mSv/y to the
most exposed individual. The levels that will be used at Risø will be in
accordance with notices given by the Danish authorities. The whole process of
clearance, including the measurements of activity content will be described in
detailed procedures. The system will be written up as a QA-system, and the
plan is to seek certification.
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Introduction
The decommissioning includes three research reactors, a hotcell facility and a
fuel fabrication plant. The waste treatment plant is also supposed to be
decommissioned, but not until a final storage facility is established.
Waste from the decommissioning has to be treated according to
strategies laid out by the authorities.  Most important in the handling and
storing of the radioactive waste is to minimise the impact on people and the
environment. Sorting and decontamination will be used to reduce the amount
of medium and low-level radioactive waste. The waste will be thoroughly
described to fulfil the requirements to the waste storage, the temporary as well
as the final.
Sorting of waste
When a part in a nuclear facility is removed from the position is has
occupied during operation, it will be marked with an identification. This
identification shall contain information on what function the part had, and
where it was positioned giving information about possible irradiation with
neutrons and possible contamination. The identification shall follow the
part through the checking and measuring procedures till it is either
disposed off as non-radioactive materials or it is stored in the temporary
storage facility. The identification label shall have comments and measuring
results added to the basic information. If a part is cut into sub-parts, each
sub-part shall have a “daughter”-label. Parallel to the identification label a
record with a unique identification number will be created in an electronic
database. This database shall contain and link all available information
about the different parts.
The purpose of the sorting is to separate the radioactive waste from
the non-radioactive waste. The radioactive waste will be placed in standard
waste containers to be stored in a temporary  storage hall at Risø for later to
be transferred to a permanent waste repository. The nuclide specific activity
content of the radioactive waste will be documented from the results of the
activity measurements and from the chemical analysis of the content of
other toxic materials, e.g. heavy metals. The basic principle in the waste
sorting is that all waste is radioactive till proven otherwise.
The non-radioactive waste will be recycled or disposed of as ordinary
building and metal waste. The activity concentration in this waste will be
measured by different methods to demonstrate and document that the
concentration is below the clearance level given by the authorities.
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Figure 1.  Flow diagram for the sorting of  waste from the decommissioning of Risø’s
nuclear facilities. If the concentration of a radionuclide in the material is above the
clearance level, the waste will if possible be decontaminated and measured again -
otherwise it will be stored in a temporary storage hall at Risø. If the activity
concentration is below the clearance level, the material will be transported from Risø
for recycling or for ordinary disposal.
Figure 1 shows the different steps in the sorting procedure for waste
from the decommissioning. Materials waiting for measurements will be kept in
ISO containers with labels showing which measurements the materials are
still needed for the materials. In total 15,000 - 20,000 m3 of waste is to be
handled, about 5,000 m3 of these are expected to be radioactive and should
therefore be stored in the temporary waste storage.
Low-level laboratory for clearance measurements
Control and documentation of the content of g-emitting radionuclides of
potentially non-radioactive waste from the decommissioning of the nuclear
facilities will primarily be based on gamma-spectrometric analyses. For these
measurements a new laboratory will be build. Since is has to be a low-level
laboratory, it must be placed at a suitable distance from the nuclear facilities -
Start Is the wastevery
radioactive?
Clearance measurements
by -spectrometerγ
Activity above
clearance level?
Possibility for 
decontamination?
Decontamination or
cutting into active/
non-active parts
Possibility for 
decontamination?
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
to scrapyard
active partsnon-active parts
to
temporary
storage
to
temporary
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particularly DR3 - where highly radioactive materials are handled during the
decommissioning. It will also be necessary to classify the laboratory as a clean
laboratory; consequently the staff should change to clean and non-active
clothes when entering the laboratory.
The laboratory will be supplied with two sets of identical measuring
equipment in order to have a reasonable capacity. The object to be checked will
be placed on a table. Either the table or the detector must be able to rotate, so
that the detector can see all external surfaces. The measuring equipment will
be high efficiency germanium detectors. They will be calibrated from a
sophisticated point source/volume source technique, which will take into
account a possible  inhomogeneous activity distribution in bulky items.
Furthermore there will be detectors for analysing the content of pure a- and
pure b-emitters in samples taken from the items.
All procedures for the measurements shall be approved by the
authorities and the laboratory shall be certified according to ISO standards.
Clearance levels
A large part of the waste from the decommissioning will be candidate for
release as non-active waste. Non-active waste can without restrictions be
disposed outside the Risø area as normal building and metal waste. It is,
however, necessary to ensure that its content of activity is sufficiently low,
so that no form of post-release regulatory involvement is required in order
to verify that the public is being sufficiently protected. The clearance levels
is defined by international organisations as values, established by the
regulatory authority and expressed in terms of activity concentrations, at or
below which sources of radiation may be released from regulatory control.
The EU Article 31 Group of experts has made recommendations on
the clearance levels for radionuclides in waste from the dismantling of
nuclear installations (EU Radiation Protection No. 113 (2000)). These
clearance levels have been calculated from public exposure scenarios and a
dose criterion of 10 µSv/y, corresponding to what has been defined as a
trivial risk.  Clearance levels for the radionuclides that are expected during
the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities at Risø are shown in table 1.
The content of radionuclides in the candidate waste for release shall
be documented to the regulary authorities.
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Table 1.  Recommended clearance levels from EU.
Conclusions
All the nuclear facilities at Risø National Laboratory, except the Waste
Management Plant, have been closed and the plan is to decommission these
facilities, including the Waste Management Plant, to green field within the next
10 - 20 years. About 15,000 - 20,000 m3 of waste have to be sorted into non-
radioactive waste for release as ordinary waste and into radioactive waste. The
latter is estimated to be 5 000 m3, and it will be stored in standard containers at
a temporary storage facility at the Risø area. The activity content in all waste
will be determined by different measurements, so that both the released and
the stored waste will be well documented.
Clearance levels (Bq/kg) 
3H 105
60Co 102
63Ni 106
90Sr 103
137Cs 103
238U 103
239Pu 102
241Am 102
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SESSION 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
ICRP publication 82 on protection against
prolonged exposure - application in accident
situations
Per Hedemann Jensen
Risø National Laboratory, Dk-4000 Roskilde, Denmark
Introduction
In the past 15 years, two events have occurred that cover a conceivable range of
emergencies involving extensive post-emergency phase response, namely the
Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents. Large amounts of 137Cs were released to the
environment during these accidents, leading to a prolonged or quasi-prolonged
exposure of the affected populations. The experience gained from these
accidents and others have revealed that there is a need for an updated and fully
integrated system of guidance on implementation of countermeasures. A
revised system must have a sound technical basis but must also be
understandable, explainable and acceptable to the public and the decision-
makers. Once all protective actions have been undertaken, the situation should
be considered ‘normal’ again with no further restriction being imposed.
Therefore a common language explanation should be developed for the public
and public officials that clearly state the risks of radiation exposure and what
actions are appropriate and inappropriate, and what is “safe”. The concepts of
“safe” and “return to normality” should be developed together with
intervention criteria, disengaged from the linear non-threshold risk
hypothesis. Within this context, the application of the recommendations in
ICRP Publication 82 for application in post-accident situations is briefly
summarized with reference to observations and lessons learned from the
Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents.
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Radiation protection in prolonged exposure situations
ICRP has recently published guidance on protection of the public against
prolonged radiation exposure1. Prolonged exposures are adventitiously and
persistently incurred by the public over long periods of time. They are
incidental to situations in which members of the public may find themselves.
The annual doses associated with prolonged exposures are more or less
constant or decreases slowly over the years. Generic reference levels for
intervention in prolonged exposure situations, expressed in terms of existing
annual dose, are recommended by the ICRP; these levels should be viewed as a
consequential derivation from the basic ICRP principles of radiological
protection for intervention and as complementary, rather than alternative, to
those principles. Their use should not preclude the application of these basic
principles to any dose component of the existing annual dose that is
controllable, particularly if it is a dominant component.
Sources of prolonged exposure
Situations of prolonged exposure of the public include the prolonged
background exposure and the exposure from human-made radiation sources.
The prolonged background exposure varies with the geographical and
geological characteristics but also with features associated with human
development. The human-made radiation sources causing prolonged exposure
would arise from a number of human activities associated with the
development of society.
The natural sources, which are responsible for the prolonged
exposure, are the external cosmic radiation, the radionuclides produced by
cosmic rays in the atmosphere (e.g. 14C and 3H), and the radionuclides of
uranium and thorium in the earth’s crust. The exposure pathways include
external exposure and inhalation and ingestion of radionuclides in air, food and
water.
Prolonged exposures of the public from human activities usually
result from releases of long-lived radionuclides into the environment. Residues
containing long-lived radionuclides from past human activities that were not
adequately controlled are one example. Others are current practices, some past
industrial applications, especially mineral extraction, military operations and
nuclear or radiological accidents. Figure 1 presents a schematic illustration of
various sources of prolonged exposure.
1 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection of the
Public in Situations of Prolonged Radiation Exposure. Publication No. 82, Pergamon Press,
Oxford, New York (2000).
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Figure 1. Schematic presentation of various sources of prolonged exposure. They
include a number of natural and artificial sources. The sum of exposures to the sources
present in a human habitat results in an existing annual exposure to the individuals
living there.
The operation of practices may leave long-lived radioactive residues
in the environment, resulting in situations of prolonged exposure. Practices
may also generate prolonged exposure situations due to the disposal of
radioactive wastes. Radioactive residues from practices can either result
from normal discharges to the environment or remain on and around the
site of a practice after the cessation of the practice and decommissioning of
its installations.
Intervention situations involving prolonged exposure are of various
types. In all cases, decisions have to be taken on whether and how to
intervene in order to reduce these exposures and, eventually, on whether
and when to discontinue protective actions. The classical intervention
situation is where people are already incurring exposures attributable to an
identifiable event relatively close in time, e.g., a nuclear or radiological
accident. Another type is, for example, exposures to natural sources and to
radioactive residues that cannot be linked to any particular originating
cause or where the link to the cause has weakened over time.
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Reference levels for intervention in prolonged exposure situations
In the ICRP 82 the relevant dosimetric quantity for controlling prolonged
exposures is the annual effective dose. This is the sum of the time integral, over
a year, of the effective dose rate due to external irradiation caused by the
prolonged exposure situation and the committed effective dose due to internal
contamination caused by all intakes, during that year, of the long-lived
radionuclides (and their short-lived progeny) involved in the situation. A
subsidiary quantity used within the context of prolonged exposure is the
existing annual dose caused by all persisting sources of prolonged exposure in a
given situation. Other subsidiary quantities are the additional annual dose
caused by practices and the averted annual dose precluded by an intervention.
The existing annual dose can conceptually be used to establish generic
reference levels for intervention. However, such quantity should be used with
caution. It is made up of all the existing and persisting annual doses incurred
by individuals and, therefore, it is constituted by many different components of
prolonged exposure. These include external exposure to long-lived
radionuclides (and their progeny) in soils, strata, and building materials
(including exposure to radon and other radionuclides in the ambient), internal
exposure due to the incorporation of those radionuclides into the body as a
result of inhalation of resuspended materials, and ingestion of contaminated
foodstuffs.
There is not a single measure that can be used to determine the value of
the existing annual dose, as any of its components may require different
assessment methodologies. Thus, there may be practical problems in
implementing regulatory standards expressed in terms of the existing annual
dose. Because of these difficulties, the ICRP 82 has given preference to specific
reference levels based on avertable annual doses of given components, rather
than to generic reference levels based on existing annual doses. The ICRP 82
recommends that:
(a) An existing annual dose approaching about 10 mSv may be used as a
generic reference level below which intervention is not likely to be justifiable for
some prolonged exposure situations.
(b) Below the level of existing annual dose for which intervention is not likely
to be justifiable, protective actions to reduce a dominant component of the
existing annual dose are still optional and might be justifiable. In such cases,
action levels specific to particular components can be established on the basis of
appropriate fractions of the recommended generic reference level.
(c) Moreover, above the level of existing annual dose for which intervention is
not likely to be justifiable, intervention may possibly be necessary and its
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justification should be considered on a case-by-case basis as appropriate.
(d) Situations in which the annual (equivalent) dose thresholds for
deterministic effects in relevant organs could be exceeded should require
intervention.
(e) An existing annual dose rising towards 100 mSv will almost always
justify intervention and may be used as a generic reference level for establishing
protective actions under nearly any conceivable circumstance.
In general, ICRP concludes that the use of generic reference levels
should not encourage a ‘trade-off ’ of protective actions among the various
components of the existing annual dose. In this regard the ICRP considers that
a low level of existing annual dose does not necessarily imply that protective
actions should not be applied to any of its components; and, conversely, a high
level of existing annual dose does not necessarily require intervention. Should
intervention be considered justifiable, the form, scale and duration of the
protective actions should be optimised.
ICRP 82 generic reference levels in perspective
The identification of existing annual doses low enough to make intervention
usually not to be expected, and not likely to be justifiable, is not simple and
certainly not straightforward. For perspective purposes, it is helpful to use the
‘natural’ existing annual doses experienced in many parts of the world. The
global average ‘natural’ dose is 2.4 mSv/a, but many large populations have
lived for years in areas of the world experiencing typically elevated doses of up
to around 10 mSv/a, with some populations even incurring doses above 100
mSv/a. In many of the places experiencing high levels of background radiation,
the dominant component of exposure is that to the gas radon in dwellings; in
other situations, the exposure is mainly caused by other gamma-emitting
radionuclides, such as radium in soil and water.
With some exception, intervention has rarely, if ever, been undertaken to
reduce the typically elevated ‘natural’ background doses of about 10 mSv/a.
Moreover, only occasionally have protective actions been implemented to
reduce higher ‘natural’ background doses, even when these doses were
controllable. This might suggest that competent authorities have considered
these levels as being unlikely to trigger any intervention in those situations.
Moreover, the ICRP considers that a high level of existing annual dose -
e.g., due to high natural background levels - should not justify per se a
particular component of annual dose - e.g., a high level of annual dose
attributable to long-lived radioactive residues. This should always be restricted
following the principles of the System of Radiological Protection for
intervention. However, as the expected radiation health effects depend on the
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dose received and not on the source origin, the ICRP also considers that the
typically elevated levels of existing annual doses from ‘natural’ sources, which
have not triggered any protective action, may provide a useful insight into
decisions related to intervention.
Further insight on sufficiently low levels of existing annual doses can be
obtained from earlier recommendations given in ICRP Publication 632 and in
ICRP Publication 653. In these publications a number of intervention situations
including some involving prolonged exposure were addressed. Specific
reference levels below which any intervention or action is unlikely to be taken
in various situations were here recommended, suggesting levels ranging from a
few to a few tens of mSv for a dominant single component of the existing annual
dose. Such intervention and action levels have been generally incorporated into
international standards4 and some national regulations. Again, this suggests
that governmental authorities have considered the recommended levels (of
around 10 mSv/a) as being unlikely to trigger intervention.
Response to nuclear or radiological emergencies - principles and
experience
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has indicated
that its basic framework for radiological protection is intended to prevent the
occurrence of deterministic effects, by keeping doses below the relevant
thresholds, and to ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to reduce the
induction of stochastic effects. Although the ICRP policy for radiation
protection has evolved over the years, its main objective has remained basically
unchanged. It was formulated in the latest recommendations from ICRP
(Publication 60) as: The primary aim of radiological protection is to provide an
appropriate standard of protection for man without unduly limiting the
beneficial practices giving rise to radiation exposure. The ICRP policy is also to
supplement the available scientific knowledge by value judgements about the
relative importance of different kinds of risk and about the balancing of risks
and benefits.
2 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Principles for
Intervention for Protection of the Public in a Radiological Emergency. Publication 63, Pergamon
Press, Oxford, New York, Seoul, Tokyo (1993).
3 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection Against
Radon-222 at Home and at Work. Publication 65, Pergamon Press, Oxford, (1993).
4 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection Against Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Safety Series No. 115,
Vienna (1996).
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Protection principles in a nuclear or radiological emergency
The System of Radiological Protection makes a distinction between source-
related protection - which is concerned with the exposures of individuals
resulting from a single source - and individual-related protection - which is
concerned with the exposure of a single individual from many sources.
Provided that the individual doses are well below the threshold for
deterministic effects, the contribution to an individual dose from a single
source has an effect that is independent of the doses from other sources. For
many purposes, each source, or group of sources, can then be treated on its
own.
Source-related assessments make it possible to judge whether a
practice or intervention is likely to bring benefits sufficient to outweigh any
disadvantages and whether all reasonable steps have been taken to reduce
the radiation exposures that a source will cause. They thus facilitate the
justification of practices and interventions and the optimisation of
protection at the source level. Source-related assessments take account of
the magnitude (increase or decrease) of the doses attributable to the
assessed source, and of the number of individuals exposed, but not of the
influence on individuals of other exposure sources.
The system of radiological protection for intervention situations
is based on the following general principles of justification and
optimisation:
(a) All possible efforts should be made to prevent deterministic effects.
(b) The intervention should be justified, in the sense that introduction of
the protective measure should achieve more good than harm.
(c) The levels at which the intervention is introduced and at which it is
later withdrawn should be optimised, so that the protective measure will
produce a maximum net benefit.
Dose limits used in the radiation protection system for practices do
not apply in the case of intervention, for which intervention levels in terms
of avertable dose should be applied.
Some reflections and lessons from past emergencies
Radiation emergencies in the past have demonstrated that immediately
after the emergency phase of the response, there will be immense pressure
from the public, public officials and the media to act to correct the problem
and return the situation to normal. Without prior arrangements, public
officials, when under intense pressure to restore the situation to normal,
may take highly visible actions even if these are only minimally effective or
even counterproductive. During the response to Chernobyl many
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unjustified efforts were carried out because of this pressure, such as
decontamination of areas (e.g. Pripyat) that were evacuated and never
resettled.
The Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents demonstrated that public
officials make decisions concerning implementation of countermeasures
affecting the public during the post-emergency phase of a radiation
emergency. These officials were not radiation specialists and they made
their decisions on the basis of their understanding of both the radiological
risk and of societal and political concerns. This was recognized by the ICRP1
when it recommended that guidance for taking post-emergency
countermeasures based on scientific consideration of radiation protection
should serve as an input into the wider decision-making process. It is
important that the decision-maker understands the guidance for dealing
with the radiological risk and be able to explain it to the public and the
stakeholders for it to be useful as a decision-aiding tool. Assurance that the
actions being taken will guarantee the “safety” of the affected populations
should therefore be elaborated by the radiation protection community,
disengaged from the linear non-threshold (LNT) risk hypothesis.
Following radiation emergencies the public took inappropriate
and in some cases harmful action due to fear and misunderstanding
concerning radiation risks and how to reduce them (e.g. refusing to buy
products from the area, refusing to sell airline tickets to people from the
area, having abortions due to a fear of radiation induced effects, and
refusing to provide medical treatment to victims). These fears were in part
due to the use of the LNT hypothesis by unofficial sources, the use of cryptic
technical terms and the reluctance of technical experts to provide the
definitive guidance needed and wanted by the pubic. Therefore, the LNT
hypothesis should be reconsidered as basis for decisions on
countermeasures.
Experience shows that international guidance does not address
many post-emergency countermeasures that should be implemented, in
part, based on radiation protection principles and insights. These include
personal monitoring and decontamination, decontamination of property,
release of contaminated property for use, initial medical screening, long-
term medical follow-up, contaminated non-food products, and termination
of countermeasures (‘return to normality’).
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The ICRP1 and others5 have pointed out that it is impossible to
anticipate or address factors not directly related to radiation protection
principles when developing radiation protection guidance. Attempting to
consider other factors or anticipate what would be acceptable to the public
would only undermine the technical foundation of the recommendations,
making them difficult to apply consistently, adjust or explain. It is the role
of the radiation protection expert to give the best professional advice, even
if the decision-maker, bowing to the pressure of political or public opinion,
subsequently ignores it. Therefore, international guidance on interventions
after an accident should be based solely on radiation protection
considerations.
Applying ICRP 82 in an integrated framework of emergency response
A fully integrated system for implementation of countermeasures must have a
sound technical basis but must also be understandable, explainable and
acceptable to the public and to decision-makers. The essence of the guidance is
that it must do more good than harm (be justified) and assure the public that
they are safe. The ICRP 82 recommendations were developed for prolonged
exposure situations, and they can be used as basis for an integrated system of
radiological protection in emergency situations with special emphasis on the
radiation protection of populations affected by nuclear accidents (e.g.
Kyshtyhm, Chernobyl) or radiological accidents (e.g. Goiânia) in the post-
emergency phase.
The radiation protection strategy for a population affected by a
nuclear or radiological accident should first of all do everything possible to
avoid serious deterministic effects and should thereafter implement protective
actions with the aim of averting doses to the population to a safe level. Once all
required protective actions have been undertaken, the situation should be
considered ‘normal’ again with no further restriction being imposed.
Figure 2 illustrates the protection strategy after a nuclear or
radiological accident: all effort should be done to avoid deterministic effects,
and the reduction in expected stochastic effects should be based on optimized
intervention and action levels to achieve a safe level, which can be defined as:
(1) From a radiation protection point of view “safe” means that population or
critical subgroups will not receive a total annual dose leading to identifiable
5 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Restoration of Environments with
Radioactive Residues. Proceedings of an International Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, USA, 29
November - 3 December 1999. IAEA, Vienna (2000).
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Figure 2. Protection strategy following a nuclear or radiological accident. At very high
levels of individual dose preventive and urgent protective actions should be
implemented to prevent deterministic effects and high probabilities of stochastic
effects. At lower individual dose levels countermeasures should be implemented to
avert doses to the affected population to reduce the stochastic effects and to restrict the
residual individual dose level to a safe level. This level can be regarded as level for safe
living conditions after a protective measure has been lifted (or considered but not
implemented).
adverse health effects; “safe” does, however, not mean zero risk.
(2) Normal living conditions means that members of the public can live
without any significant disrupting restrictions. Safe conditions are when
people are living in normal living conditions or are following restrictions
associated with radiation exposure.
(3) A total annual effective dose of about 10 mSv can be used as a reference
level for safe living conditions. However, if a process of justification and
optimization results in different (higher or lower) dose levels, these should be
applied in that given situation.
The system of radiological protection for interventions can be rephrased
based on the following principles:
(a) Actions to avoid serious deterministic effects should almost always be
undertaken
(b) Protective and remedial actions should be based on justified and
optimised specific intervention levels and action levels
POSSIBLE HEALTH EFFECTS
Deterministic effects possible
Known to be safe - many areas
around the world at this level - 
no effects
Detectable increase in cancer
incidence rate if large
populations are exposed 
If received in short period
maybe increase in thyroid
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May be safe - a few areas
around the world at this
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No identifiable health effects
below this dose level
EFFECTIVE DOSE
1000 mSv/a
100 mSv/a
10 mSv/a
“Safe levels of dose”
(safe living)
[mSv per unit time]
100 mSv in days
1000 mGy in days
ORGAN DOSE
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100 mGy in days
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Figure 3. Schematic representation of the system of protection in emergency situations
with an upper bound of the generic intervention levels of existing dose vis a vis the
specific intervention levels of avertable dose. The specific intervention and action levels
have been set to give an optimum reduction in individual doses. The exposure level to
be compared with the intervention/action levels is the average individual dose in the
critical group.
(c) The population affected by a nuclear or radiological accident should be
safe after protective and remedial actions have been implemented (individual
effective doses < 10 mSv/a)
The rephrased system of radiological protection for interventions in
emergency situations is illustrated in Figure 3.
An annual effective dose of about 10 mSv (3 - 5 % additional
average lifetime risk of fatal cancer if lifetime is taken to be 60 - 100 years)
represents an upper bound on residual annual dose dividing exposure
situations into two “classes”. Situations with annual effective doses to the
critical group above this level would normally not be considered as normal. In
cases where the residual dose is characterized as “normal” it would henceforth
be considered “background”. In addition, a high level of existing annual dose
should not preclude the introduction of a new practice, as a practice is
controlled through the additional annual dose attributable to the practice
rather than through the existing annual dose.
Typically elevated
‘NATURAL’ BACKGROUND
Very high
Global average
GENERIC REFERENCE
LEVELS
Intervention almost
always justifiable
Intervention may
be necessary
Intervention unlikely
to be justifiable
AVERTABLE 
EFFECTIVE DOSE
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cleanup, etc. if justified)
EXISTING ANNUAL
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Conclusions
The Chernobyl and Goiânia accidents clearly demonstrated the need for
recommendations on ‘normal’ or ‘safe’ living conditions in post-accident
management. The USSR lacked criteria for implementation of countermeasures
and return to normality (ending countermeasures) at the time of the Chernobyl
emergency. In the years after the Chernobyl accident, the former Soviet Union -
due to public pressure - adopted criteria for resettlement and other
countermeasures that were not founded on established radiation protection
principles. In the opinion of many radiation protection professionals, the criteria
were not justified and probably have done more harm that good. During the
response at Goiânia, it was very difficult to set operational levels for post-
emergency intervention that were consistent with internationally accepted
scientific principles because of time constraints and political pressure. This
resulted in the use of the dose limit for practices as a basis for intervention and
consequently in protective actions, generation of contaminated waste and
decontamination and disposal costs that did not appear to be justified on radiation
protection grounds.
The recommendations in ICRP Publication 82 were developed to fill a long
experienced gap with regards to radiation protection against exposure from long-
lived radionuclides in the environment, including those originating from
radiological or nuclear accident. The recommendations are based on objective
assessments of the health risks associated with prolonged exposure levels and on
radiological protection attributes of various exposure situations. Typically elevated
prolonged exposures due to natural radiation sources are usually ignored by
society, while relatively minor prolonged exposures to artificial long-lived
radioactive residues are a cause of concern and sometimes prompt actions that are
unnecessary in a radiological protection sense. This reality of social and political
attributes, unrelated to radiological protection, usually influences the final
decision on the level of protection against prolonged exposure. Therefore, while
ICRP 82 should be seen as a provider of decision-aiding recommendations mainly
based on scientific considerations on radiological protection, the outcome of its
advice will be expected to serve as input to a usually wider decision-making
process.
Based on the radiation protection recommendations in ICRP 82 a dose level
of 10 mSv per annum can be used as a reference level for ‘safe living conditions’ or
‘return to normality’ after protective measures have been lifted (or considered but
not implemented). The definition of ‘safe’ in the context of residual radiation
exposure of population groups is that no radiation induced adverse health effects
can be observed, and, equally important, that the residual risk for developing such
health effects is low for the affected individuals.
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Strålskyddsåtgärder när strålrisk föreligger
Anne Weltner
STUK
I direktiv VAL 1.1 beskrivs grunderna för beredskapsplanering med tanke på
strålrisklägen, åtgärdsnivåer för igångsättande av centrala skyddsåtgärder,
samt grunderna för strålskydd av dem som deltar i räddningsarbetet.
 Denna anvisning är avsedd att användas av räddningsmyndigheter som
ansvarar för beredskapsplanering, ledning av räddningsverksamhet och
varningar till befolkningen samt av andra myndigheter som deltar i
handhavandet av ett läge med strålrisker.
Direktiv VAL 1.1 finns på internet publicerat av STUK och Finlex:
på svenska:
i html-format http://www.stuk.fi/saannosto/VAL1-1r.html
i pdf-format http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/normit/6430-VAL1-1r.pdf
på finska:
i html-format http://www.stuk.fi/saannosto/VAL1-1.html
i pdf-format http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/normit/6429-VAL1-1.pdf
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Development of a prototype radiation surveillance
equipment for a mid-sized unmanned aerial vehicle
P.Smolander1, K.Kurvinen1, R.Pöllänen1, M.Kettunen2, J.Lyytinen3
1 Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881 HELSINKI,
Finland. petri smolander@stuk.fi
2 Defence Forces Research Institute of Technology, P.O.Box 5, FIN-34111 LAKI-
ALA,  Finland
3 Helsinki University of Technology, Laboratory of Lightweight Structures,
P.O.Box 4100, FIN-02015 HUT, Finland
Abstract
A prototype radiation surveillance equipment has been developed to be used in
a mid-sized Ranger unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) acquired by the Finnish
Defence Forces. A multi-detector assembly was designed for the acquisition of
dose rate and radionuclide concentration in the release plume. Detector
assembly includes a GM-tube based dose rate meter, an inorganic scintillator
detector and a  semiconductor detector operating at room temperature. A
sampling unit was designed for the collection of an aerosol sample of the plume
for a detailed analysis in a ground based laboratory. The measurement data
from all three detectors and several environmental parameters are collected by
the onboard data acquisition computer. Real-time data dissemination is
implemented with a TETRA based radio network.
Test flights have been carried out with target drones and a small manned
airplane. The Northrop KD2R-5 target drones have been used to simulate the
high-G launch and vibration environment of the Ranger aerial vehicle. Target
drones have been used because their air vehicle classification allows small test
packages to be installed without tedious air safety protocols. Stability and
survivability of the detectors, GPS navigation and radio frequency
communication have been studied with the target drone test flights. Ground
station software was developed to visualise the measurement data and to track
the position of the air vehicle on a digital map. Test flights with the small
manned airplane have been used to study the operational aspects of the
detectors with greater detail.
The housing for the instruments has been designed and constructed
based on the experiences gained with the test flights and the laboratory
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measurements. The housing satisfies the aviation authority standards. Spe-
cial attention has been paid to the high modularity, quick installation and
ease of use.
Introduction
Finnish Defence Forces decided to acquire the Ranger unmanned aerial
surveillance system at the beginning of the year 1999. Soon after a feasibility
study for the use of the Ranger system in radiation surveillance missions was
started at STUK. The main motivation was to reduce the radiation risks
imposed on the crew of conventional manned surveillance flights. Unmanned
aerial vehicles provide a new platform for in situ measurements inside a
nuclear accident release plume. Ranger system was found to be suitable for
such missions and the development of a radiation surveillance equipment for
the Ranger system was initiated.
Unmanned aerial vehicle platform
The Ranger unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is mainly designed for electro-
optical surveillance in military missions, but the modularity of the payload
enables it to carry out a wide range of missions. Ranger UAV has endurance of
five hours and it can carry 40 kg of payload. The range of the command and
data link is approximately 150 km, but the air vehicle is capable of performing
autonomous operations without the command and data link. This property
gives the maximum range of 500 km if the cruise speed of 200 km / h is used.
With these characteristics, Ranger UAV can be used for radiation surveillance
missions as well.
Range and duration of the flight of the Ranger enables it to cover large
enough area needed for locating and mapping of a radioactive plume. The
payload capacity of the Ranger enables it to carry reasonably large detectors,
but rules out the use of HPGe detectors due the volume and weight
requirements of the cooling system.
Prototype radiation surveillance equipment
The limitations of the platform led to the selection of a 6" x 4" thallium
activated sodium iodine scintillator detector as the main detector. This kind of
detector provides fairly good sensitivity and enables the detection of the plume
from a distance. The poor energy resolution of the NaI(Tl) detectors hinders the
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use of the main detector for nuclide identification.
A cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detector was chosen as a secondary detector
to compensate the low energy resolution of the main detector. CZT is a
semiconductor and the detector has a fairly good energy resolution. Secondary
detector increases the usability of the system for nuclide identification. The CZT
detector is not cooled and is operated in ambient temperatures. This limits the
thickness of the detector to the millimeter scale. The small size and poor efficiency
above 100 keV limits the use of the detector to in situ measurements in a high
radiation field. A filter sampler equipped with an air flow meter has been installed
to further improve the measurements. Filter samples can be analysed post flight in
a ground based laboratory for nuclide concentration estimates in the plume.
A Geiger – Müller tube based dose rate meter completes the detector
assembly. A commercial dose rate meter has been modified to provide single pulse
counting for short integration times. The short  integration time improves the
spatial resolution of the dose rate measurement on a fast moving platform.
The onboard data acquisition computer provides data storage and detector
electronics control capabilities for the system. The computer is based on PC/104
standard modules and has a Pentium class processor that runs with Windows
Embedded operating system. Data is stored on a silicon chip based Disk-on-Chip
drive. The computer also provides A/D converters for environmental sensors,
counters for GM tube pulse counting and GPS receiver for the spatial positioning
of the measurements.
Real time data transfer with TETRA radio network
Real time data transfer is needed for the best possible usability of the system.
Some radiation surveillance missions require the UAV to fly autonomously
outside the data link coverage.
A secondary data link is needed for the real time data transfer.
A nation wide TETRA based radio network called VIRVE is currently
being built in Finland.
The VIRVE network is limited to official use and can provide adequate
resources in emergency  situations. All measurement data (spectra, pulse
counts, environmental parameters etc) will be transmitted directly to the
STUK headquarters for further analysis using TCP/IP network provided by the
VIRVE radio network.
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Flight tests with target drones
System components have been tested in Finnish Defence Forces Northrop
KD2R-5 target drones. Target drones have been used to simulate the high-G
launch and vibration environment of a UAV. Various components have been
tested and found to be durable enough to withstand the demanding conditions.
Detector  stability has been studied as well. Scintillator detector has been
proven to be stable in  the vibrational environment of a target drone and
consequently will be stable also in the Ranger UAV. Variation in the
temperature of the detector has been shown to be the main cause of instability.
Variations can be attenuated with adequate insulation and heating of the
detector housing.
Test flights have been used to study the reliability of GPS tracking and
radio frequency data communications. Various data acquisition schemes have
been programmed and studied together with data visualisation and geocoded
information concepts. Commercial ‘off the shelve’ GPS receiver was found to be
reliable in fast moving airborne platforms. Radio frequency data transfer with
commercial transmitters at UAV speeds has been proved to be reliable enough
to provide the bandwidth needed.
Figure 1. The CAD design of the instrument housing
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Equipment housing design
Equipment housing has been designed to meet the aviation authority
standards. Composite materials have been used to construct light weight and
durable housing that can withstand the foreseeable situations. The payload
space of the Ranger air vehicle provides multiple equipment bays, but compact
design which places all equipment at a single equipment bay was selected to
emphasise the fast and easy installation. The new housing constructed will
replace the standard camera payload of the Ranger.
Conclusion
A multiple detectors system has been constructed for the RANGER unmanned
aerial vehicle. The system and the real time data transfer has been tested in
the laboratory and with the help of several test flights in target drones and in
conventional aircrafts. Performance of the complete system in the Ranger will
be tested in the near future.
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Radiological emergency preparedness training at
Loviisa NPP
Klaus Sjöblom
Fortum Power and Heat Oy, Loviisa Power Plant, POB 23, FIN-07901 LOVII-
SA, Finland
Introduction
The consequences of nuclear power events or accidents can be effectively
mitigated by countermeasures conducted by emergency organization. The
protective actions recommended to the public and radiation protection of the
personnel working at the plant have a high priority. The protective actions are
based on radiological assessment. By real-time monitoring and theoretical
calculations the emergency organization aims to assess and predict the
accident sequence: plant process, core damage, transportation of radioactivity
from the fuel to the reactor coolant, containment, plant buildings, stack and to
the environment.
The competence of the emergency organization is based on each
individual’s capability for the normal time job position. The specific emergency
training consists of topical training for each branch and real-time co-operation
exercises in which management and various sections participate together. This
presentation concentrates on the radiological part of emergency preparedness
training at Loviisa power plant.
Emergency preparedness organizations
Licensee emergency management organization
The shift personnel 24 h/d at the plant consists of 15 men operating the two units
and three men at fire brigade and the security personnel. The safety engineer on
duty can stay outside the plant but must always to be  able reach the plant within
40 minutes after a call.  If the shift supervisor declares site emergency or general
emergency  Fortum activates its emergency organization. As a lower alternative he
can declare alert which means that 10-15 persons from the emergency
organization are called to enter the power plant.
The plant manager, or his substitute, shall direct the emergency
organization. The plant emergency management team settle themselves at the
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), which is located in a civil defense
shelter below the plant administrative building. The emergency
organization consists in addition to the plant personnel also engineering
support provided by Fortum Nuclear Services (FNS) and Fortum communication
personnel which are located in Helsinki.
FNS engineering support has a broad technical expertise concerning
nuclear accidents - consequences and counteractions. It has also radiological
experts with experience on radiological accident analysis, PSA study, release
estimates, radioactivity / dose rate –calculations and transportation of
radioactivity & doses in the environment.
Off site emergency organizations
Numerous authorities at local, provincial and national level contribute to off site
protection activities. The fire chief of town Loviisa has the responsibility of  rescue
service management. When the accident has larger dimensions, the provincial
board or the ministry of interior can appoint a higher level rescue service manager
and then the local fire chief concentrates on the rescue service management on the
county level. He supervises a rescue service management group that gathers in the
County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) at the town of Loviisa, 15 km from
the power plant.
Radiation related topical training
Radiation engineers
Radiological assessment and radiation monitoring are key areas in the emergency
organization of a nuclear power plant. The aims are to make assessment of the
situation and predict the accident sequence: plant process, core damage and
transportation of radioactivity from the fuel to the reactor coolant, the
containment, plant buildings, stack and to the environment. Based on these
predictions the emergency management can direct plant personnel and people in
the vicinity.
Trained areas are radiological assessment, emergency organization
management, information, radiological surveys, taking and analyzing samples
from the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. Emergency preparedness
training of radiation engineers consists of training  on these topics and real-time
exercises together with the rest of emergency organization.
Most of radiation engineers have during normal plant operation radiation
related responsibilities and therefore they have a fair good base for emergency
preparedness training. Special issues included in emergency preparedness
training are emergency plan and implementing procedures, use of plant process
computer displays and radiological calculations.
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Environmental calculations are calculated by LENA (LENA is an acronym
from “Liten, Enkel, Numera Användbar”). It has been developed by the Swedish
authority SSI and used also by Swedish nuclear power plants. A new area is a
support system for radiation specialists SaTu (SäteilyAsiantuntijan Tuki-
järjestelmä – support system for radiological experts). It is an excel-based
computer code that predicts the radiological consequences based on plant process
data. Because nuclear power plant accidents are complicated so also the use of
SaTu is a demanding task.
In larger co-operation exercises the radiation engineers also practice
supervising health physics personnel, communication with other emergency
organization and contributing to information to mass media.
Health Physics
Health physics personnel has long experience in radiation protection at Loviisa
nuclear power plant. During annual maintenance outages they monitor and
potential / actual contamination radiation within the plant and supervise the
appropriate radiation protection actions. In case of an accident the radiation levels
may be many orders of magnitude higher.
Radiation chemistry
The regular training includes taking and analyzing samples from the reactor
coolant and containment atmosphere make use of accident sampling points and
methods.
Rescue service authorities
STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland represents the Finnish
safety authority that sets the regulations for the use of radiation and nuclear
energy and supervises that they are followed. STUK also co-operates in rescue
service actions. STUK observes the annual emergency exercises at Loviisa power
plant and participates with its own emergency organization in this exercise. The
fire brigade of town Loviisa drills regularly with the plant fire brigade.
At least every 3rd year there will be a larger rescue service exercise with
national and regional authorities. These exercises require thorough advance
planning and training. According to YVL 7 .4 the licensee also contributes to the
topical training of rescue service authorities for nuclear accidents.
Co-operation exercises with real-time simulated exercises
Licensee level emergency exercises
The activities in licensee level emergency exercises are:
• management of and co-operation between various organizational units,
• alerting and activating the emergency organization,
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• investigating the plant situation and assessing the progress of the accident,
• control room operations,
• working procedures in emergency operations facility (EOF)
• extinguishing a fire,
• gathering and evacuating the personnel,
• radiological surveys,
• taking and analyzing samples from reactor coolant and containment
atmosphere
• estimating and forecasting fuel damage, radioactive releases and radiation
doses,
• preparing recommendations concerning protective actions.
In real time exercises the emergency organization comprises of the
power plant management, health physics, radiochemical laboratory and control
room operators. The emergency exercises encompass also task groups,
information personnel, the plant fire brigade and the engineering support at
Helsinki.
STUK and the management of the local rescue service authorities (fire
brigade, police, health center, information bodies etc.) have also participated in
these emergency exercises.
Accident simulation in emergency exercises
In emergency exercises, in which the “backbone” of the emergency organization
participates, the accident descriptions comprise of three semi-independent
entities: the plant process sequence, the radiological situation at the plant and
the consequences of the radioactive release to the environment.
The on site radiological description defines the quantity and timing of
the radioactive releases to the reactor coolant, to the containment and other
plant areas and into the environment. It presents also the postulated radiation
levels at the plant.
The environmental description includes radioactive release to the
environment, weather data, the atmospheric dispersion and deposition and the
external dose rates and dose commitments.
Conclusion
Among the public there are different point of views towards nuclear power.
However, people seem to be rather unanimous in one sense: exercising for
nuclear accidents is needed.
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Emergency response planning around Norwegian
research reactors
Eldri Naadland Holo and Yngvar Bratvedt
 Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority
Introduction
The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) has for some time
focused on emergency response planning in connection with Norway’s two
research reactors. This refers to emergency response planning off site, where
the local police, health authority, municipal authority, county governor and
central authorities headed by the Crisis Committee for Nuclear Accidents are
key players in dealing with an accident. The NRPA is concerned not because
planning at the facilities, by the police or by the central authorities is
inadequate, but because planning is insufficiently coordinated.
In order to make all parties involved in handling an accident situation
aware of their own and others’ responsibilities, the NRPA, in keeping with
international recommendations, has worked to achieve a basis for harmonising
planning among the various players. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has published a document in its Safety Standards Series entitled
“Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency”. This
standard underlies our effort to achieve coordination of emergency response
planning around Norway’s two research reactors. Both are run by the Institute
for Energy Technology (IFE) and are located at Halden (25 MW) and Kjeller (2
MW) respectively.
Background
As a background to the issues we have discussed in this process, some
important points in the IAEA standard are reviewed:
- The standard calls for emergency planning and response to be based on a
safety analysis, and for a broad range of postulated events to be included in the
threat assessment. Scenarios involving a combination of a radiological
emergency and a conventional emergency (e.g. earthquake) should be included.
- Various threat categories are defined. Nuclear power stations are
classified in threat category I, whereas most research reactors are classified in
209
STUK-A195
threat category II. Further facilities and sources are listed, ending with
activities which do not usually involve radiation sources but which can become
contaminated as a result of events in category I and II.
- A system for classifying types of emergencies is defined. For research
reactors these are defined as follows:
• “General emergency” (actual release or risk of release warranting taking
of urgent protective actions off  the site)
• “Site area emergency”  (major decrease in the level of protection for those
on the site and off the site which requires planning for action to be taken off the
site)
• “Facility emergency”  (major reduction in level of protection for personnel
on the site, but no threat off site)
• “Alert” (uncertain or significant reduction in level of protection for the
public or personnel on the site)
• “Uncontrolled source emergency” (loss or theft of a radiation source).
ENATOM, the IAEA’s Emergency Notification Manual compiled in
conformity with the Early Notification Convention, also refers to
transboundary emergency.
- Various planning zones are defined for the various threat categories.
“Urgent protective action planning zone” is relevant for research reactors. In
this zone arrangements should be made for urgent protective action to be taken
promptly to avert dose off the site in compliance with international standards.
Organisation and legal basis
The role of the radiation protection authorities in the Nordic countries differs
both as regards emergency response planning and accident management. In
Norway the NRPA is the competent authority in this field. The Crisis
Committee for Nuclear Accidents, headed by the Director General of the NRPA,
is for responsible for action taken at an early stage of an accident occurring in
Norway or elsewhere. Minor accidents are handled by the NRPA. The police at
the accident site will be responsible for saving lives and protecting health in
cooperation with the fire service and the health service/ambulance service. In
the event of major accidents the local police will be a resource available to the
Crisis Committee and will be responsible for implementing a number of dose-
reducing measures as soon the Crisis Committee becomes operational.
The Act on Radiation Protection and Use of Radiation (of 12 May 2000)
and Royal Decree of 26 June 1998, require the IFE and the participants in the
emergency response organisation at the central, regional and local level to
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adhere to a coordinated body of plans. The Radiation Protection Act, the
Nuclear Energy Act and the Health Preparedness Act require the various
accident management players, and anyone likely to be affected by an accident,
to maintain emergency response programmes. The legislation also imposes
information and notification duties on the IFE and the nuclear emergency
response organisation.
Issues
Our work on developing a basis for coordinated emergency response plans for
crisis management in connection with accidents at Norwegian research
reactors has greatly benefited from IAEA standards and other documents.
However, various issues needed clarification. Some of these are presented
below.
What scenarios should planning be based on?
According to the IAEA standard, a broad range of scenarios should be included.
The IFE’s safety report, which includes a “reference accident”, is a natural
starting point. Since 11 September last year a variety of terror scenarios have
been in focus, but such scenarios are not covered in the safety report. Despite
this, we have chosen to use the report as a basis. A flexible body of plans is
called for which gives greatest emphasis to the most probable scenarios but
which is also suited to other scenarios and other types of accidents. This
justifies exercises involving scenarios of greater severity than the reference
accident described in the safety report. In the aftermath of 11 September we
have also discussed physical protection and the establishment of a “design
basis threat”, i.e. the attributes and characteristics of a person or organisation
who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage
which may have safety or health consequences for employees, population or
environment. We aim to integrate thinking on physical protection and
preparedness more closely into the overall approach, and are working on ways
of achieving this.
Classification of accidents at national facilities
In the standard IAEA proposes 5 degrees of accident severity, both for nuclear
reactors and for research reactors, in addition to “transboundary emergency” in
ENATOM. In other words, there are many classes to keep in mind and plan for, at
the same time as the classes described do not in our view necessarily describe the
degree of severity faced. We note, for example, that an “alert” can be just as serious
as a “facility emergency”. For the time being we aim to employ just three of the
classes mentioned: “general emergency”, “site emergency” and “alert”.
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The Crisis Committee is assigned a role both in connection with
accidents in Norway and with accidents and events elsewhere. The nuclear
emergency response organisation has two levels of preparedness:
• Information preparedness, which is declared in situations requiring the
nuclear emergency response organisation to be informed, and
• Heightened nuclear emergency preparedness, which is declared in
situations which may have consequences for Norway or Norwegian interests.
These levels of preparedness are thoroughly incorporated into the
nuclear emergency response organisation and are also described in the media
when appropriate (e.g. the Kursk accident, where a state of information
preparedness was declared). It is important to be able to employ these levels in
the event of a national accident too. We therefore see a need to develop a
“translation” between accident classification and preparedness levels. We also
consider the merits of coordinating preparedness levels, accident classification
and INES classification, or whether to make less use of the INES scale when
informing the population in an accident situation.
Having preparedness levels as well as a system for classifying national
events could lead to confusion. The preparedness levels will be used both
internally and externally, but, especially in the local arena, publicising the
classification of an accident will be significantly more informative.
Changes in and /or introduction of new planning zones at existing
facilities
A 300 metre building prohibition zone is currently enforced around the Kjeller
reactor. This zone serves no purpose in relation to preparedness planning, and
the police have established their own evacuation zones. We see benefits of
harmonising these zones as far as possible, not least with a view to
communication.
Appropriate information to the population
Neighbours of the IFE facility ask for information on preparedness plans and
on what they themselves can do in an accident situation. In the event of an
accident the police, in line with their emergency plan, will distribute an
information card to the public explaining what action to take. We see a need for
more information to the population in the event of an accident. This needs to be
developed separately.
Those likely to be affected should be involved at an early stage in this
ongoing process.
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Conclusion and further work
Through our work on establishing a basis for harmonisation of emergency
preparedness plans in relation to potential accidents at the IFE’s research reactor,
our aim is to contribute to a clear-cut division of responsibilities, professionally
well-founded measures at the acute stage of an emergency, predictable emergency
management, simplified information flows and intuitive awareness among the
parties and, not least, coordinated information to the population and others who
may be affected. The NRPA is accordingly preparing a guide in conjunction with
the IFE, and in due course with the other actors, with a view to clarifying
responsibilities and planning assumptions. This guide will be binding on many
actors by virtue of the Radiation Protection Act or other legislation. What remains
to be done at the national level is to involve the police, municipal authorities,
county governors, the health service, the Crisis Committee and the population and
industry in the area surrounding the reactors.
As a small country with limited nuclear activity, we are concerned to ensure
that the thinking on various aspects of safety, physical protection, information and
emergency preparedness forms a coherent whole. We see inconsistencies in the
basis established for systems for physical protection, safety at facilities and
emergency preparedness planning. Perhaps “design basis accident” (safety) and
“design basis threat” (physical protection) need to be accompanied by better
guidance when it comes to establishing a “design basis for emergency planning and
response”.
Here in Norway we would like to see the IAEA’s standards form the basis for
a review of emergency planning in connection with port calls by nuclear powered
vessels, along with an extension of the methodology to embrace radiation sources.
This would promote uniform management of various events, geared to the degree
of severity of the event in question.
However, we see that this work has an international dimension. There are
clear-cut advantages to achieving the maximum possible international
harmonisation of emergency response planning for various facilities. This will
simplify information flows and other countries’ chances of intuitively
comprehending the situation and the measures implemented. We have therefore
opted to follow the IAEA’s recommendations as far as possible in our effort to
achieve a basis for harmonising emergency planning and a coordinated response.
Even so national adjustments and simplifications have proved necessary, and for
that reason we diverge somewhat from the IAEA standard. In an international
perspective this is detrimental, and we see advantages to international
cooperation to reduce disparities in planning. We would also like to see greater
harmonisation of emergency planning among the Nordic countries.
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Posters
5a Finnish early warning system  for nuclear
emergencies: Experiences during 2000–2001
K. Vesterbacka,  J. Lahtinen, T. Ilander
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Research and Environmental
Surveillance, P.O. Box 14, FIN-00881 Helsinki, Finland
Introduction
The Finnish early warning system for nuclear emergencies consists of the
nation-wide automatic external dose-rate monitoring network and the control
system, which is known as USVA. The monitoring network comprises of approx.
300 AAM95 central stations and substations equipped with RD-02 or RD-02L
GM tubes. Stations are thoroughly inspected on a routine basis every 4–5
years. During the inspection the GM tube, battery and power adapters of the
station are replaced with new ones, as is also the modem if necessary, and the
alarm connections to USVA are tested.
The USVA system utilizes advanced www technology (including a
browser-based, easy-to-use user interface) and a network of PCs with dedicated
tasks. USVA’s central hardware is located at STUK. USVA began its operation
in the beginning of the year 2000, replacing the older y2k incompatible system.
In a routine situation, USVA collects the monitoring data once a day. The USVA
is capable of connecting (via telephone lines) to eight AAM stations
concurrently, and the results from the whole country are obtained in about 15
minutes. When the system receives an alarm message from the network, it
sends a text message to the mobile phones defined in a separate list and starts
an automatic data collection procedure at all the stations situated within a
certain distance (100 km) from the alarm-causing station.
Experiences
In 1999 efforts were to a large extent concentrated on building the new control
system, USVA. Consequently, the operational state of the monitoring network
degraded. Therefore, in the spring 2000 resources were channelled to the
maintenance of the network. The effect of this resource input can be clearly
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seen in Fig. 1: the number of the stations contacted successfully during daily
routine data collection began to increase remarkably during the summer 2000
and has now reached an average value of 275 stations (corresponding to the
percentage of 96 %).
In the year 2000 the monitoring network generated 26 automatic
messages (see Table 1), most of those being system-identified hardware failures
caused by problems with the backup battery (16) or with some other piece of
equipment (3). The number of alarm messages was seven; four of these were
false alarms caused by broken GM-tubes while three were real dose rate
alarms. During the last year the total number of messages was 18. Backup
battery failures caused three messages, as did also other system-identified
equipment errors. One of the alarm messages (12) was a real one but the rest
were generated by miscellaneous hardware errors.
Two of the four above-mentioned real dose rate alarms were due to
careless use of portable dose-rate-meter calibration sources close to the GM
tube of the automatic monitoring station.  One alarm was caused by an
industrial X-ray device, which was used to inspect welding seams of direct
heating pipeworks near the monitoring station. The fourth alarm was caused
by a fire fighter who, after having had radiological treatment in the hospital,
returned to the fire station and walked too close to a monitoring probe.
As regards the USVA system, it has been functioning very well. A few
errors have been encountered in the www server system but they have not
affected the capability of USVA to retrieve data from the monitoring stations or
Figure 1. Number of stations contacted successfully during daily routine data collection
in the years 2000–2001.
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Table 1. Messages from automatic monitoring network during 2000–2001.
to handle alarms. Because USVA has been designed and realized mainly by
STUK’s experts, all necessary modifications and error repairs can be carried
out in a fast, flexible and reliable way.
Summary
As compared to the late 90’s, the reliability and operational quality of the Fin-
nish early warning system has improved considerably during the last two
years. This is due to the proper and well-planned maintenance of the dose rate
measuring network and the introduction of  the new control system, USVA, in
the end of 1999.  It can be said without hesitation that USVA has exceeded all
expectations set on it.
Year Total number of 
messages 
Hardware failures  
automatically identified  
as such by the system 
Alarm messagesa
False          Real 
2000 26 19 4  3  
2001 18 6 11  1 
a Lowest alarm limit is 0.4 µSv h-1
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5b Nuclear threats in the vicinity of the Nordic
countries – a database, Nordic Nuclear Safety
Research
Inger Margrethe H. Eikelmann
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 9925 Svanvik, Norway
Introduction
The acute phase of an accident and the possibility of high exposure of the
populations are always the most important threats in the emergency
preparedness work. Radioactive contamination from an accident can however
also cause long time effects for land use and enhanced doses to special
population groups and economic problems for agriculture, grazing animals,
reindeer industry, hunting, freshwater fishing, tourism and recreation. For
planning purposes it is always valuable to be aware of potential radiation
hazard and other potential threats in the vicinity of the Nordic countries. Thus,
mapping such threats in a Nordic context is an important factor in emergency
preparedness in the Nordic countries.
The project has dealt with threats from the north west of Russia and the
Baltic states. The results from the different activities in the project is
generated in a web based database called the “the base of knowledge”.
The “base of knowledge” on nuclear threats
This project was one of the new cross-disciplinary studies in the NKS research
program 1998-2001. The main task for the project was to aggregate already
conducted knowledge of nuclear threats in the vicinity of the Nordic countries,
into a “base of knowledge”, present by modern information technology. This web
based “base of knowledge” will be available for the Nordic authorities as a
supplement for the national emergency preparedness work. This base of
knowledge will, by information technology, be made available to authorities,
media and the population. The users of the websites can easily get information
on different types of nuclear installations and threats.
The first stage of the project was to prepare a list of relevant papers and
reports that have been produced concerning nuclear threats in the vicinity of
the Nordic countries, a literature database. The literature database was
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created as a part of the “base of knowledge” and is a database with the most
relevant publications, papers and reports that have been produced regarding
possible nuclear threats in the vicinity of the Nordic countries. The literature
database is presented on a website and as a report with 500 references. As a
summary of the literature in the database there are made two status reports on
the most important issues of the project, threats from the nuclear power plants
and the nuclear vessels. The reports give an overview of the work done in this
matter. The reports are published as NKS reports.
At the Workshop 2000 experts from the different Nordic countries
presented each countries evaluation of the threats against their country. There
were presentations from the different Nordic countries concerning the threats
from nuclear installations and there were discussions about source terms,
models and consequences of nuclear threats.
The results of the discussions at the workshop and the presenting
literature reports on the threats from nuclear power plants, nuclear powers
ships and storage and handling of used fuel and radioactive waste are
presented in the “base of knowledge”.
218
STUK-A195
SESSION 6. NON-IONIZING RADIATION
Non-Ionizing Radiation - sources, exposure and
health effects
Maila Hietanen
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Helsinki, Finland
Introduction
Non-ionizing radiation contains the electromagnetic wavelengths from
ultraviolet (UV) radiation to static electric and magnetic fields. Optical
radiation consists of UV, visible and infrared (IR) radiation while EM fields
include static, extremely low (ELF), low frequency (LF) and radiofrequency
(RF) fields. The principal scientific organization on non-ionizing radiation is
the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP).
The main activity of ICNIRP is to provide guidance on safe exposure and
protection of workers and members of the public by issuing statements and
recommendations.
Ultraviolet radiation
The sun is the most significant source of natural UV exposure, whereas welding
arcs are the most important artificial sources of UV and bright light in terms of
health hazards. Usually welding is performed manually at construction sites,
shipyards and in small workshops, so that in addition to welders, other workers
close to the welding site are also exposed.
Erythema (sunburn) is an acute injury following excessive exposure to UV
radiation. Erythemal threshold doses vary with skin type and colour (Table 1).
Though painful erythema will fade after a few days, there may still be
serious late effects, e.g. skin cancer. The three common forms of skin cancer are
basal cell carcinoma (BCC), squamous cell carcinoma (SCC) and malignant
melanoma (MM).  Around 90% of skin cancer cases are of the non-melanoma
cancers, BCCs being approximately four times as common as SCCs.  Exposure to
UVR is considered to be a major etiological factor for all three forms of cancer.
Exposure to UV also causes a variety of eye disorders to the cornea, lens and
retina. Cataracts are the most frequent effect, while photokeratitis
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Table 1.  Classification of skin types: susceptibility to sunburn and ability to tan.
(snowblindness), keratopathy and pterygium (growth on the conjunctiva) also
result from UV exposures.
 Since not all wavelengths of UV radiation equally effective in producing a
biological effect, an action spectrum defines the relative effectiveness of different
wavelengths.  This relative response curve is normalised to a maximal value of 1.0
at the wavelength of maximal tissue sensitivity.
Visible radiation
 As for the adverse effects of visible radiation on the eye, chronic over-exposure
to short-wave light, so called blue-light, is a contributing factor to degeneration
of the retina. Though the eyelids close at exposure to bright light, this response
is too slow in special situations. Especially hazardous are laser beams focused
to a small spot at the retina. Also exposure to bright light from welding arcs or
metal halide lamps may cause acute or chronic ocular damage.
Electromagnetic fields
People in technically developed countries are surrounded by low and high
frequency EMFs. Exposure to EMFs fields induces body currents and energy
absorption in tissues. Thermal effects caused by temperature rise are obvious,
whereas the mechanisms for suspected non-thermal effects are still unclear.
The main sources of occupational exposure to EMFs are induction heaters,
RF welding equipment, electronic article surveillance devices, and medical and
therapeutical devices. For the general public, the primary sources are high voltage
powerlines, radio and television transmitters, and electrical appliances at home.
Recently, as a result of the expansion of the use of hand-held cellular phones,
Skin
phototype   
Sun sensitivity Sunburn  
susceptibility  
Tanning 
ability
Classes  
of individuals 
I Very sensitive Always sunburn No tan Melano-
compromized 
II Moderately 
sensitive
High Light tan Melano-
compromized 
III Moderately 
insensitive 
Moderate Medium tan Melano-competent 
IV Insensitive Low Dark tan Melano-competent 
V Insensitive Very low Natural 
brown skin 
Melano-protected  
VI Insensitive Extremely low Natural 
black skin 
Melano-protected 
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health concerns of people have focused to mobile phones and base station
antennas. Table 2 indicates some technical properties of commonly used mobile
and cordless telephones.
New varieties of cellular phones are under construction all the time, such
as the Universal Mobile Telecommunication Systems (UMTS). The spectra of
UMTS and some existing networks are shown in Fig. 1.
Base stations for mobile phone networks transmit and receive signals to
and from a mobile phone. The power density generated by a base station
antenna depends on the distance and direction from the antenna. The antennas
are normally located so that the RF energy is directed away from the building
to cover the surrounding area. In the direction of the main beam there is a free
Table 2. Technical properties of six wireless telephones.
Figure 1. Spectra of various wireless networks.
System NMT 450 GSM 900 DCS 1800 CT1 DECT 
Type Analogue  Digital  Digital  Analogue  Digital  
Pulse repetition  
rate
- 217 Hz 217 Hz - 100 Hz 
Peak power 15 W 2 W 1 W 10 mW 250 mW 
Mean power 0.15-15 W 2-250 mW 1-125 mW 10 mW 10 mW 
Cell radius 2-50 km 0.1-35 km 0.1-35 km 500 m 300 m 
100
75 
50 
25 
GSM 900 
890-915/ 
935-960 
GSM 1800
1710-1785
1805-1880
UMTS
1885-1970 
+1970-2025 
+2110-2200
PCS 1900 
1850-1990
DECT 
1880- 
1900 
MHz
Bandwidth 
(MHz)
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space of typically several hundreds of meters to ensure the proper functioning
of the mobile network. According to the field measurements taken at 26 sites in
Sweden, most of the environmental EMF exposure was emitted by GSM 900
antennas (47 %). Television transmitters had a mean contribution of 48 % in
rural areas and 13 % in the city. Measured maximum and mean power densities
in different sites are given in Table 3. The levels of these fields are so low that
temperature rise is unlikely, but other adverse effects have been suspected,
such as EM hypersensitivity and development of cancer.
Relevant literature
[1] Sliney D. and Wolbarsht M. Safety with lasers and other optical sources. A
comprehensive handbook. Plenum Press, New York, 1980.
[2] WHO. Ultraviolet Radiation.  Environmental Health Criteria 160, UNEP,
ICNIRP, WHO. Geneva, 1994.
[3] ICNIRP. Guidelines for limiting exposure to time varying electric, magnetic
and electromagnetic fields (up to 300 GHz). Health Physics, 74(4)492-522, 1998.
[4] ILO. Safety in the use of radiofrequency dielectric heaters and sealers.
Occupational Safety and Health Series No 71. Geneva, 1998.
[5] European Commission. Council recommendation on the limitation of
exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 3000 GHz).
Doc.1999/519/EC, 1999.
[6] NRPB (2001).ELF Electromagnetic fields and the risk of cancer. Oxon, 2001.
[7] WHO/IARC. Non-ionizing radiation, Part 1: Static and extremely low
frequency (EL) electric and magnetic fields. IARC Monographs on the
evaluation of carcinogenic risks to humans. Vol 80. Lyon, 2002.
Table 3. Maximum and average power densities measured at 26 sites in Sweden.
Location Max 
(mW/ m2)
Mean 
(mW/ m2)
City 3.01 0.8 
Town 0.049 0.034 
Rural 0.006 0.0016 
Indoors 0.0115 0.0055 
Office (1.6 m to DECT base station) 3.7 0.154 
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Perspective on electromagnetic fields as a
potential genotoxic risk – where are we today?
Björn Cedervall
1. Medical Radiation Physics, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden
2. SwedPower AB, Sweden
email: bjorn.cedervall@cck.ki.se
Introduction
Several thousand scientific articles published over the past twenty years relate
to the question of whether electromagnetic fields, EMF, somehow can be
involved in the induction or promotion of genotoxic effects including cancer. In
a smaller number of these articles it has been stated that EMF may be the
cause of such dangers. It is therefore important to review the present
knowledge and also to clarify certain scientific aspects.
To the general public, the word “radiation” in many cases is wrongly
perceived as threatening. It is there-fore important to note that ionizing
radiation such as X-rays and gamma radiation gives rise to completely
different physical and biological effects and carry a much higher energy per
“photon” than EMF.
What follows is thus a summary of an analysis according to the so-called
Hill’s criteria, a review of some of the previous research that has been made for
low frequency EMF (50/60 Hz)  including some theoretical and experimental
aspects of EMF. Finally a remark is made regarding “possible risks”.
Reviews and Hill’s criteria for cause-effect relationships
At least fifteen national or international committees composed of distinguished
and competent persons and set up by responsible public bodies and
professional associations have arrived at the conclusion that low frequency
EMF does not constitute a cancer risk.
The criteria for the establishment of a solid cause-effect situation, as
specified by A. Hill1 are:
1 A.B. Hill, The Environment and Diseases: Association and Causation, Proc. Royal Soc. Med.,
Sec. Occup. Med. Vol. 58, 1965:295-300.
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1. Strength  2. Consistency  3. Specificity (mechanism: the same kind
of tumor should be expected to appear in similar studies) 4. Temporality  5.
Biological gradient (exposure or dose response – “the more the worse”) 6.
Plausibility (known phenomena and laws in physics, chemistry and biology)
7. Coherence  8. Animal experiments  9. Analogy
These criteria were applied to the issue of whether electric power
lines could cause cancer or not. The analysis was made by thirteen
American professors, including six Nobel laureates, in physics, chemistry
and medicine2. The conclusion was that none of Hill’s criteria was fullfilled.
Two reviews conclude as follows:
“The hypothesis that the epidemiological associations observed
between 50/60 Hz EMFs and disease reflect a causal relationship is not
supported by what is known about mechanisms.”3
“Overall, the existing evidence for a causal relationship between RF
radiation from cell phones and cancer is found to be weak to nonexistant.”4
A recent publication regarding brain tumors and the use of NMT
phones5 is inconsistent with other publications including a retrospective
cohort study of the incidence of cancer in all 420,095 users of cellular
telephones during the period of 1982 to 19956.
Some previous key findings that have not been possible to replicate
A number of suggested molecular mechanisms for the induction or
promotion of cancer as a result of EMF exposure have been tested. These
mechanisms include the induction of oncogenes, signal transduction
according to a calcium membrane leakage – protein signal pathway and
DNA damage. Several studies along these lines originally reported positive
associations with EMF exposure.
Looking into the rear view mirror, we now see that none of these
initial findings can be replicated by independent investigators. The early
2 Brief of amici curiae, Adair, Bloembergen, Bodansky, Cormack, Gilbert, Glashow …, in M.
Covalt et al. Vs San Diego Gas and Light before Supreme Court of California, 1995.
3 P.A. Valberg et al., Can Low-Level 50/60 Hz Electric and Magnetic Fields Cause Biological
Effects? Radiat. Res., Vol. 148, 1997:2-21.
4J.E. Moulder et al., Cell Phones and Cancer: What is the Evidence for a Connection? Radiat.
Res., Vol. 151, 1998:513-531.
5 Hardell et al., Cellular and cordless telephones … risk for brain tumors. Eur. J. Cancer Prev.,
Vol. 11, 2002:377-386.
6Johansen et al., Use of cellular telephones and risk of cancer…, Ugeskr Laeger., Vol. 164,
2002:1668-1673.
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reported EMF induction of the c-myc oncogene could not be replicated7,8. For
example, earlier calcium membrane and signal transduction findings cannot be
repeated at levels as high as 150 microtesla (50 Hz)9,10. The calcium leakage
hypotehesis originally created headlines in newspapers such as Swedish
Svenska Dagbladet (Dec. 4, 1995) and has also been covered by Swedish TV
media. For the calcium membrane issue, it may in addition be mentioned that
there has been a legal settlement regarding scientific misconduct (the so called
“Liburdy affair” – a couple of key publications have partly been retracted but
few formal details are available due to an agreement between those most
involved and concerned).
For genotoxic findings (carcinogeneisis, mutations etc) it may be
mentioned that some researchers are studying indirect endpoints such as DNA
mass (as a surrogate for DNA breaks) which may lead to serious
misinterpretations with methods such as the comet assay. For the genotoxic
studies in general the criticism has been related to weakness concerning three
basic conditions: independent reproducibility, consistency with the scientific
knowledge base, and completeness according to basic data quality criteria11.
An important replication study (which failed) regarding exposure of mice
to 898.4 MHz and tumors  was published as this text was being prepared12.
Previous criticism included the exposure conditions, lack of exposure-response,
statistics, the use of cancer prone animals, and that the animals that were still
alive at the planned end of the study were assumed to be lymphoma-free, but
were not proven to be so.
What is meant by possible risks?
An argument often used in the EMF controversy is that EMF is a possible
cancer risk. While this is true, it also represents an unfortunate wording.
Nothing can be excluded as a possible cancer risk – not even raspberry juice.
7 J.D. Saffer and S.J. Thurston, Cancer risk and electromagnetic fields, Nature, Vol. 375,
1995:22.
8 G. Taubes, Another Blow Weakens EMF-Cancer Link, Science, Vol. 269, 1995:1816-1817.
9  S.C. Miller and M.J. Furniss, Bruton’s tyrosine kinase activity and inositol 1,4,5-
trisphosphate production are not altered in DT40 lymphoma B cells exposed to power line
frequency magnetic fields. J. Biol. Chem., 273, 1998:32618-26.
10 H.E. Wey et al., 50-Hertz magnetic field and calcium transients in Jurkat cells: results of a
research and public information dissemination (RAPID) program study. Environ Health
Perspect., Vol. 108, 2000:135-140.
11 McCann et al.,Genotoxic potential of electric and magnetic fields: an update. Mutat. Res., Vol.
411, 1998:45-86.
12 Utteridge et al., Long-term exposure … mice to 898.4 MHz Microwaves … Radiat. Res., Vol.
158, 2002:357-364.
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Nevertheless, some careless scientists repeatedly exploit this fact and thereby
indirectly create an unfounded public hysteria. It is therefore important to
clarify this aspect to a larger fraction of the public (including some scientists!).
Conclusion
1. Inconsistencies in scientific findings. For epidemiological data: Many studies
show no association. Weak associations may be due to statistical variations or
other factors. 2. No exposure (“dose”) responses 3. Experiments cannot be
repeated by independent groups (many hypothesis have been tested)  4. No
convincing “positive” genotoxic data 5. For low frequency fields (“50/60 Hz”) and
probably also for high frequency fields no physical mechanisms seem plausible.
The overall impression is that EMF does not constitute a genotoxic risk.
If such a risk exists it is probably so low that it cannot even be detected and the
distinction between these two alternative interpretations will therefore never
be made.
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Supervision of sunbeds in Finland
Reijo Visuri
STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Non-ionizing Radiation
Laboratory
Introduction
Sunbeds emitting ultraviolet radiation (UV radiation) are used for cosmetic
tanning. UV radiation incontrovertibly causes skin diseases such as skin
cancer and eye diseases. UV exposure from natural sun should be moderate
and from sunbeds it should be avoided.
The aim of the supervision of sunbeds and tanning facilities is to ensure
that they comply with valid safety requirements. The basis for the
requirements is that acute effects such as sunburns will not occur and the
yearly UV dose would not increase excessively.
Former regulations
Since 1989 the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has
published guidelines for radiation safety of sunbeds. They have been mostly
based on the European standard EN 60335-2-27 “Safety of household and
similar electrical appliances - Part 2: Particular requirements for appliances
for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiation”. Only UV type 3
sunbeds have been accepted for cosmetic purposes in Finland. STUK made pre-
marketing type inspections of sunbeds until the end of 1993. After Finland
joined the EEA and EU, the supervision of sunbeds by STUK has consisted of
market control and inspections at tanning facilities.
Present regulations
Since 1.5.2002 the Decree of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on the
Limitation of Public Exposure to Non-ionising Radiation (294/2002) has been in
force. This new Decree sets more detailed, binding public exposure limits of
non-therapeutic/cosmetic ultraviolet radiation use. According to the Radiation
Act (592/1991) the Decree is enforced and supervised by STUK. The
requirements of the Decree are adopted in STUK’s new guidelines “Radiation
safety requirements and supervision of sunbeds”.
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In the Decree the main exposure limits of ultraviolet radiation for
sunbed use are the following:
• the effective radiant exposure of ultraviolet radiation to the skin should
not exceed 5 kJ/m2 in one year
• the effective irradiance of ultraviolet radiation to the skin should not
exceed 0,15 W/m2 determined separately in the wavelength ranges less than
320 nm, and 320 - 400 nm, respectively, and the combined effective irradiance of
both wavelength ranges should not exceed 0,3 W/m2
• a person under the age of 18 should not be exposed to ultraviolet
radiation of a sunbed except during an operation controlled by the medical
doctor.
Earlier the maximum yearly dose was 15 kJ/m2 (erythemally weighted)
as it is in the European standard. However, the dose 15 kJ/m2 would allow
regular sunbed use. The average dose of one tanning session can be calculated
to be about 230 J/m2 (1). The dose 5 kJ/m2 thus means about 20 tanning sessions
per year with a typical UV type 3 sunbed. To reduce the risks of sunbed use,
STUK’s recommendation for yearly use of sunbed (maximum 10 sessions) is
half of what the new formal decree would allow. The recommendation follows
recommendations given by the WHO and the Association of Dermatologists in
Finland.
According to the Decree also in the future only UV type 3 sunbeds are
accepted for cosmetic use in Finland. The use of sunbeds shall be arranged so
that the requirements presented in the standard EN 60335-2-27 will be
fulfilled. If other than UV type 3 sunbed is to be used for cosmetic purpose, the
operation must be done under the supervision of a professional with expertise
in UV phototherapy.
The age limit is normative and it is based on the fact that children and
young people have more sensitive skin than adults do. It should be said near
the sunbed that it´s use is not re-commended for people under age 18.
Supervision
The supervision of sunbeds by STUK consists mainly of market control and
spot checks of tanning facilities. In 1998, STUK launched a nation-wide survey
of the use of sunbeds in Finland. Inspections were carried out in co-operation
with municipal health officials. According to this survey it is estimated that
there are about 700 tanning facilities and 1000 commercial sunbeds in Finland.
Deficiencies affecting the safety of sunbed users were discovered in
nearly every tanning facility. Half of the sunbeds did not have an adequate
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timer for adjusting the length of exposure. Half of the sunbeds did not have
warning signs indicating the health hazards of UV radiation and the necessary
precautions required, and one quarter had no instructions at all. Only one third
of the sunbeds had exposure schedules taking into account individual skin
sensitivity, which is essential for correct UV dose. In most cases the UV levels
were found to be within accepted limits for UV type 3 sunbeds. However, it was
estimated that one tenth of the sunbeds have UV radiation levels which may
exceed these limits.
The current practice (market control, spot checks and information of the
public) has proven to be effective in the supervision of commercial sunbeds. In
recent years the supervision of tanning facilities has also become essentially
more effective, because municipal health officials have actively taken part in
the supervision together with STUK.
References
[1] Jalarvo, Valpuri. Use of sunbeds by Finnish population. STUK-A81, Helsin-
ki 2000 (in Finnish. Abstract in English and Swedish)
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Communication and Public Information in
Development and Maintenance of Radiation Safety
Laura Huurto
Medical Physicist
STUK, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland
Introduction
The natural source of Non-Ionizing radiation (NIR) in our environment is the
sun. Artificial NIR is widely used in medical and industrial applications and
also in households. The most important medical NIR applications are
phototherapy, surgical lasers and magnetic resonance imaging. In industry
NIR is applied in radio frequency heaters and laser printing. NIR has
applications even in entertainment and cosmetics: High power lasers are used
in light shows and sun beds emit artificial ultraviolet radiation (UVR) for
tanning.
From the safety point of view the field is indeed very wide from harmless
and common items to devices which can cause acute health hazards. The use of
non-ionizing radiation needs neither any safety licence nor other kind of
authorisation. The users of NIR devices varies from professionals in health care
or lighting technology to those who only use them as a sideline in their main
work like beauticians. Also laypersons use various NIR devices like microwave
ovens, laser pointers and mobile phones.
Many NIR devices are used in applications where the user does not have
the knowledge to understand the health risks associated with the device. Thus
the only way is to educate the users by communication and public information.
Examples
Sometimes new kinds of NIR sources are adopted quickly in wide use. Reckless
behaving or insufficient user instructions can cause hazardous exposure and
even actual health hazards. Microwave dryers intended to dry wet concrete are
examples of potentially hazardous novel applications.  Couple of years ago
problems arouse when damp damages of inhabited buildings were renovated
by using high power microwave dryers. Microwaves were transmitted through
the concrete walls to next apartments and staircases. Because those dryers are
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not objects of supervision, the safe use of them was achieved by an intensive
information campaign. The campaign was targeted to building renovating
companies and house managing companies. In the campaign safety
recommendations (1) were delivered for the user of the dryers and after short
period the use of dryers had settled to safe manner.
In the use of UVR for tanning the need of public information is most
evident. This concerns both sunbathing and the use of sun beds. We have
targeted the information to two distinct groups, to the general public and to
enterprisers offering sun beds for customers in gyms and in beauty salons.
The aim is to make people aware of the risks of tanning and remain of
sensible acting in sunshine. We also point out that tan is not a sign of health as
still commonly believed. The use of sun beds is discouraged by correcting the
two common misbelieves: 1) tanning by sun bed is safer than by solar UVR, 2)
use of sun beds provides protection against solar UVR.
 The public information is distributed by leaflets, media and Internet.
Targeting a press release to women’s magazines and other magazines of beauty
and fitness the most enthusiastic group of sun bed users and sunbathers is
attained. Nowadays we have achieved a reliable and high profile in media.
Often newspapers and broadcasting companies make the initiative for
interviews and offer visibility both in local newspaper and in national TV-
broadcasts. Thus we can achieve a wide audience. It is essential to avoid too
authoritative appearance. Instead we deliberately use a positive attitude and
common speech and encourage people to use common sense. If possible, we put
to limelight a young and preferably female researcher. Young females are
heavy users of sun beds, and they may accept information more readily from a
person with whom they can identify themselves. Women are also the target
group when we promote people to protect their children against excessive
sunbathing and sunburns.
The information targeted to gyms and in beauty salons reminds them of
their responsibilities and provides advice and instructions how to fulfil the
valid requirements. The information is distributed mainly by mail and via local
health authorities. Media is also used to arouse the awareness of the
entrepreneurs.
The Decree of Ministry of Social affairs and Health (2) gives upper limits
for the UVR dose rate of sun beds. The requirements for the instructions and
information available to users of sun beds are given in the Decree and
described in a European standard (3). These requirements apply to those who
offer sun beds for customers’ use. STUK supervises the sun bed facilities in co-
operation with municipal health authorities. Supervision and inspection can
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never reach all the facilities. The site inspections and their after-care have
demonstrated that entrepreneurs have enormous difficulties to provide all the
required instructions and safety information for the customers. The importers
of the sun beds often offers incomplete information material but they provide
often good looking glossy posters where extracts of adequate information is
mixed with misleading advertising. If the entrepreneurs tries to add all the
missing instructions the result is often a mess of photocopies and various
printouts plastered on the walls. This is only confusing and frustrating to the
sunbed users.
Confronted with the reality we decided to solve the problem by doing the
work ourselves. An elegant poster was designed to present all the required
guidance and safety information required by references 2 and 3. The lay out of
the poster was designed to make the text easy to read and make the poster
appearance so aesthetic and classy that the gyms and beauty salons would
accept to hang it on their walls. The poster is delivered free to sun bed facilities
by mail and during site inspections. The poster is also available for printing in
our WWW-site.
Hopefully, providing this free poster to every sun bed facility we can
improve the safety of the sun bed user far more effective than by supervision
and inspections.
References
[1]  Säkerhet vid mikrovågstorkning. Strål- och kärnsäkerhetsöversikter.
STUK 2001
[2]  The Decree of Ministry of Social affairs and Health on the Upper Limits of
Exposure to Non-Ionizing Radiation. (294/2002)
[3]  EN-60335-2-27. Safety of houshold and similiar electrical appliances. Part
2: Particular requirements for appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and
infrared.
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New laser classes
Anders Glansholm
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SE-171 16  Stockholm
Abstract
By an up-dated international standard (IEC 60825-1 + Amendment 2) on laser
safety some new laser classes are introduced. The new set of laser classes
consists of  1, 1M, 2, 2M, 3R, 3B, and 4. This is a result of  intense discussions in
the committee and was laid down in 2000, slightly adjusted 2001. The previous
classes 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 4, established since more than 25 years, are partly
abandoned. This paper compares the new classes to the old ones.
Introduction
The IEC committee TC76 has since many years dealt with laser safety,
exposure limits and laser classification. The exposure limits (maximum
permissible exposure, MPE) form an important part of the standard IEC 60825
which has been up-dated and amended several times since 1984. The exposure
limits are expressed as functions of, among others, wavelengths, time patterns,
and retinal image sizes. Thus their use is not too easy for persons who have not
particularly considered the matter. No higher mathematics is involved, but
there are a number of things to think about.
To make things easier for the users, a system of classification of lasers
and products containing lasers was invented. The user then easily gets an idea
about the potential risks and how the work on safety should be designed. Since
some years, also light emitting diodes (LEDs) are included within the scope of
the standard.
Discussions within the committee on new laser-classes have been going
on for several years. The main reasons have been that one did not want to be
unfair to the LEDs and also to approach the national system in USA, which
since many years has been different from the rest of the ‘IEC world’. After
meetings in Mishima (Japan) 2000 and Kista (Sweden) 2001, the new laser
classes have taken their new shapes. The philosophies behind the new classes
can be described as follows, but we will first look upon the old classes:
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Old classes
Class 1
Lasers (and LEDs) are harmless even to long term exposure. Either the lasers
are so weak that they are not capable of producing any health effects
whatsoever, or we deal with products that contain lasers, which might be of
higher classes, but are safely built-in and interlocked in such a way that no
harmful radiation can be emitted from a product at normal use. The maximum
radiation power or the maximum pulse energy in the class is directly related to
the exposure limits. The upper class-limits of these parameters are of course
strictly defined, but the complexity of the exposure limits does not permit a
simple description.
Class 2
This class only contains lasers that emit visible radiation, defined in the stan-
dard as radiation in the wavelength interval 400 - 700 nanometres. (It is
possible to see radiation of wavelengths for instance 380 nm or 750 nm as well,
but in these spectral regions the relative vision response of the human eye is
too low to guarantee a sensation of glare.) The sensation of glare is important.
If an unprotected eye should be hit by a class 2 laser beam, natural mechanisms
are provoked to avoid further exposure i.e. the eyelid closes. These mechanisms
are fast enough (< 0.25 seconds) to prevent overexposure of the retina. For CW-
lasers the upper class limit is 1 mW. CW stands for “continuous wave”, and such
lasers emit radiation with constant power from switched on to switched off.
Class 3A
The class contains lasers emitting visible radiation (400 - 700 nm) as well as
invisible radiation (< 400 nm, i.e. ultraviolet, or > 700 nm, i.e. infrared). In the
visible case the laser may totally emit 5 times the class limit of class 2, that is 5
mW for CW-lasers, but the beam must be expanded so the power density is at
most 25 W/m2. This implies that the retina of the naked eye can not receive
more than about 1 mW, which is equivalent to the exposure by a class 2-laser.
However, if the beam is viewed through binoculars or other collecting optics
more than 1 mW may enter the eye.
For invisible radiation the philosophy is analogous but here 5 times the
limit of class 1 is allowed and, simultaneously, the condition for the beam to be
expanded in such a way that the MPEs can not be exceeded, provided that no
collecting optics are used.
Class 3B
As soon as we exceed the class limits for class 1 (invisible) or class 2 (visible), we
run right into class 3B, if we are not in the lower end and the beam is expanded
according to the conditions for class 3A. Class 3B-lasers are considered to be
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hazardous for direct exposure to the eye and, at least in the upper region, to the
skin. However, it is not hazardous to view diffuse reflexes, i.e. reflexes from a
matte surface. The upper limit for CW-lasers is 0.5 W.
Class 4
This class contains lasers that can be extremely dangerous. Direct exposure is
dangerous for eye and skin and even diffuse reflexes may be hazardous at least
under some circumstances. The class has no upper limit.
New classes
Class 1
is in principle unchanged.
Class 1M (new class)
This class contains lasers, emitting visible or invisible radiation (or both), with
a total power or pulse energy that exceeds the class 1 limit, but the beam must
be expanded so the MPEs are not exceeded. The philosophy is similar to the
former class 3A but the cap (five times the class 1 limit) is removed. Thus lasers
in the class are harmless provided no collecting optics are involved. M stands
for magnifier.
Class 2
is not changed.
Class 2M (new class)
The class contains lasers emitting visible radiation (400 - 700 nm). The limit of
class 2 is exceeded, but the beam must be expanded to allow an exposure of
duration 0.25 seconds. This means for CW-lasers a maximum power density of
25 W/m2, as we recognise from the old class 3A in the visible region. Also here
the cap (five times the class 2-limit, i.e. 5 mW for CW-lasers) is removed.
Class 3R (new class)
This class contains lasers in the lower end of the old class 3B. The class limits
are defined as five times the upper limits of class 1 (invisible) or five times the
limits of class 2 (visible), regardless of the geometric shape of the beam, unless
the beam is expanded to meet the requirements of class 1M or 2M. It is possible
to exceed the MPE-values, but they have inherent safety factors, so lasting
damages on eyes or skin are extremely unlikely in reality, should a short term
human exposure occur. R stands for restricted.
Class 3B (modified class)
This class is similar to the old class 3B but the lasers in class 3R are removed.
Class 4
is not changed.
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Consequences
A crucial problem with the old system was that many LEDs were
overestimated when it comes to evaluation of hazards and classification. It was
difficult to create measurements procedures for classification taken into
account the fact that most LEDs emit radiation from an expanded surface
forming an exposed area on the retina rather than a point. The radiation fields
are also strongly divergent. Earlier many LEDs were classified as class 3B. The
new classes 1M and 2M give possibilities to more adequate classifications in
better agreement to reality. Of course this was applauded by the
manufacturers, but it is also advantageous from a workers protection point of
view since otherwise the respect for “real” 3B-lasers would have declined.
The old class 3A is completely discarded. All such lasers are either put
into class 1M or 2M. In addition, other lasers than former class 3A fit into one of
these classes since the cap is removed.
The national system in USA differs from the IEC system. In USA there is
a class 3A consisting of lasers in the visible region with a maximum power of 5
mW (CW). The former additional 3A condition, expanded beam, was abandoned
a number of years ago. This has caused some confusion, since many products,
for instance the majority of laser pointers, are labelled according to the USA
system, i.e. 3A. The correct classification in IEC parlance is 3R.
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Posters
6a Dosimetry in Phototherapy
Laura Huurto1, Erna Snellman2
1STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O. Box 14, FIN-00881 Hel-
sinki, Finland
2Department of Dermatology, Central Hospital of Päijät-Häme  FIN 15850 Lah-
ti, Finland
Introduction
Artificial ultraviolet radiation (UVR) is used in phototherapy, the medical
treatment of various skin diseases like psoriasis and atopic eczema. Both solar and
artificial UVR exposure have also carcinogenic effects. Long term phototherapy
with high cumulative UVR doses is shown to be risk for squamous cell carcinoma
(1,2).
Various biological effects are strongly dependent of the wavelength of the
UVR. UV-B-radiation with short wavelength ( 280 - 320 nm) is more effective to
cause sunburn of the skin than UV-A -radiation with longer wavelength (320 - 400
nm). The correlation between wavelength of UVR and the tissue sensitivity is
described by action spectra. An action spectrum is a mathematical model
describing the efficiency of UVR of different wavelength for producing a certain
biological phenomena (3). Specific action spectra have been determined for the
most important health effects like erythema and skin cancers as regard squamous
cell carcinomas and basal cell carcinomas. (4,5).
Phototherapy devices
In most of phototherapy devices the UVR sources are fluorescent tubes. There is a
wide selection of lamps producing different UVR spectra.
Phototherapy devices are classified to three main categories by the UVR
spectrum (Figure 1):
• PUVA-devices are equipped with UV-A-lamps and they are used with
certain photosensizing drugs, psoralens, for PUVA-treatments (PUVA = psoralen +
UVA);
• UV-B-devices are equipped with broadband or narrow band UVB-lamps;
• SUP-devices. SUP is an abbreviation of Selective UV-phototherapy;
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SUP-spectrum lies between spectra of UV-A and UV-B-lamps and it is commonly
used for phototherapy in Nordic countries.  In Germany SUP refers to treatments
with UV-B-lamps.
Devices intended for whole body treatments are mostly cabins or cubicles
where lamps are placed in vertical panels surrounding the patient.  Sunbed
shaped devices are also used. In local treatment of hands and feet a typically
phototherapy device is a small size panel installed in an adjustable stand.
Dosimetry
The concept of the “dose” in photobiology and in photomedicine differs significantly
from the one in radiobiology.  The UVR dose is defined as the radiant exposure on
the surface (3). This concept does not take account which proportion of the UVR is
absorbed in the tissue and which is reflected or transmitted.
Traditionally phototherapy has based on assessment of the skin erythema
between exposures.  The redness of the skin has been used as an indication to
shorten or lengthen the irradiation times. There has been no other means to assess
the treatment doses.
The dose rate of phototherapy devices can be assessed by a simply hand held
UVR-meter. When the dose rate is known it is possible to determine the UVR dose
delivered in each treatment exposure as well as the cumulative dose of a patient.
Figure 1. UVR spectra of three different kind of UV-lamps intended for medical
purposes. The spectra are scaled to their maximum values.
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In these cases treatment regimens can be planned and carried out by the means of
UVR doses instead of exposure times. Nowadays some of the most advanced
phototherapy devices have an intrinsic meter to monitor the intensity of UVR and
an automatic system to adjust the length of exposure time when the dose rate
changes.
It is essential that the UVR-meter is calibrated against the spectrum of the
measured UV-lamps (6,7). An uncalibrated or inadequately calibrated meter may
cause a gross error in the measurement result.
When the treatment regimens are based on the actual UVR doses it s
possible compare the results of exposure regimens in different clinics (8).
The UVR dose rate of phototherapy device decrease when the lamps age.  To
maintain the intended treatment regimens the exposure times should be lengthen
respectively to compensate the lower dose rate. On the contrary, when aged lamps
are replaced with a fresh lamp set the dose rate is significantly higher. This may
cause overexposure and skin burns if exposure times are not shortened
appropriately.
Clinical practice in Finland
Although more than half of the phototherapy clinics in Finland have an UVR-
meter they are seldom used for dosimetric purposes. In some cases regular dose
rate measurements were carried out by service men only to monitor when it is time
to replace a lamp set but the measurement results was not utilised in the
treatments. There is also a wide variation between the clinics in making the
decision when it is time to replace the aged lamps by new ones. Only in few clinics
treatment regimens are based on UVR doses, the majority still follows time-based
regimens. Thus, the recording of each patient’s cumulative UVR doses has not
came in practice (9).
Recommendations
Dermatologist in Britain and In U.S.A have given recommendations to keep
records of the UVR dose of the patients (10,11). Similar recommendations is also
given in Finland by STUK and the National Agency of Medicine (7,12).
Measurements are mandatory in Sweden (SSI FS 1998:2). The main points of the
Finnish recommendations are following (7):
• The personnel should have sufficient training to operate phototherapy
devices.
• Phototherapy devices should have written instructions for use.
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• The dose rate should be monitored by a calibrated UVR meter.
• Records should be kept on matters affecting to the UVR doses of
phototherapy devices, i.e., the type of the lamps and dose rate.
• UVR doses of each patient should be recorded and treatment doses should
be kept as low as convenient for the treatment.
• Patients’ eyes shall be protected always and also critical skin areas should be
covered if convenient.
• A regular review of patients with high UVR doses is recommended to detect
malignant skin lesions.
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6b Dosimetry associated with mobile phone fields
Tim Toivo, L. Puranen, A.-P. Sihvonen, K. Jokela
STUK- Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland
Concern about electromagnetic fields produced by mobile phones and the
effects of the fields on human health have recently been under continuos
debate among citizens, media and scientists. This concern is justified, even
though the effects on health under the thermal threshold have not been
established, because the use of mobile phones is so widespread nowadays.
To evaluate the health risk of mobile phones, reliable and repeatable
biological studies must be conducted. Studies are conducted with various
methods (epidemiological, human, animal, cell culture). Firm conclusions about
the effects of radiation can only be made, if the results from several well-
conducted studies coincide. Results from earlier studies have some
contradictions. This is partly due to the fact that the equipment and methods,
used in exposure determination, have been insufficient. To ensure high quality
studies, the dosimetry must be as good as possible. The SAR (Specific
Absorption Rate) must be precisely known and its’ distribution as uniform as
possible. This has been the key idea of the work done in the Non-Ionising
Radiation Laboratory of STUK.
The SAR evaluation is based on Maxwell’s equations, which are
calculated numerically, because in the case of a real system the geometry is so
complicated that analytical equations cannot be solved. The numerical
calculations can be done with some computer-based algorithm (e.g. FDTD,
FEM). In finite difference time domain (FDTD) algorithm, first some impulse is
fed to the three dimensional computational space and then all the field values
(in every voxel) in space are calculated from time step to time step until a
steady state is achieved. The SAR distribution can be calculated from the E-
field distribution from following equation:
where σ is conductivity of material, E is the RMS (Root Mean Square) value of
Electric field, ρ is density of material, c is specific heat, and dT/dt is the
temperature rise. Computer based SAR evaluation should always be verified
with measurements. This can be done for example with E-field measurements
in air or tissue with miniature E-field probes (Narda or SPEAG) or with
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temperature rise measurements with small temperature sensors (Luxtron or
Vitek).
The various aspects of dosimetry for mobile phones have been studied in
our laboratory. We have developed a set of calibration waveguides for the
calibration of E-field and temperature probes used in the measurement of E-
field in air and liquids. This ensures that the fields and thus the SAR can be
measured correctly, which is basis for reliable SAR-determination. The
calibration uncertainties of waveguides (450, 900, 1800, 2000, 2450 MHz) are
one of the lowest in the world and the results have been verified with
intercomparison with other high quality laboratories. Other important factors
in SAR measurements are the correct permittivity values of liquids used (e.g.
cell culture liquid, different phantom liquids). Permittivity values can be
measured with TEM-line sensor method developed in collaboration with
Radiolaboratory of TKK (Helsinki University of Technology) and STUK. That is
the most accurate method to measure the dielectric constant and conductivity
of liquids around mobile phone frequencies (900 and 1800 MHz). With the
correct permittivity values and calibrated probes it is possible to measure the
SAR in phantoms, simulating for example human head or animal, or in cell
cultures.
The SAR distribution of a mobile phone can be studied either
numerically with computer simulations and real shaped models of a human
head or experimentally with E-field measurements in liquid phantoms,
simulating the electrical properties of average brain. An E-field scanning
system (CADSCAN) has been developed by STUK for measurements of E-fields
in various phantoms. Even though the CADSCAN can be used for mobile phone
tests, it does not satisfy the positioning requirement (< 1mm) of the European
Standard (CENELEC EN 50361). Therefore we are now installing a
commercial robot based E-field scanning system (SPEAG), where the moving
accuracy is 0.1 mm. The system should be ready in operation at the beginning
of year 2003. With the system SAR distribution, emitted by a GSM phone, can
be measured accurately and the comparisons to international (ICNIRP) or
national (STM) guidelines can be made. The new system will be used for
research and the market control of mobile phones.
In STUK two versions of a cell culture exposure chambers have been
developed for mobile phone studies at 900 MHz. Both systems are water-cooled
waveguide exposure chambers, allowing higher SAR exposure, when compared
to normal air-cooled systems, due to the efficient heat removal. The higher SAR
exposure, without the thermal effects, is essential to elucidate non-thermal
effect dose relationship. The older system was constructed five years ago and
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the newer one two years ago. Both systems are of resonator type; at the older
version the cells are located near the magnetic field maximum and E-field is
parallel to the plane of medium. At the newer version the cells are placed at the
E-field maximum, which is perpendicular to the plane of medium resulting in a
more uniform distribution. The variation of SAR in whole dish volume is under
±30%. This can be compared to older version where the SAR decreases at the
edges of cell dish to about 10% of the maximum value at centre of the dish. The
dosimetry and exposure determination in cell culture studies have been done
with FDTD simulations and they are verified with E-field and temperature rise
measurements.
We have also developed exposure systems for animal studies (mouse,
rat), which have been conducted in Kuopio University. A waveguide exposure
chamber for 24 mice was developed and in that system the animals are
restrained to plastic tubes during the exposure. For rats, nine exposure
chambers each of which has 24 rats were developed and the dosimetry was
conducted in collaboration with VTT (Technical Research Center of Finland).
The rat chamber is a parallel plate waveguide system shown in Figure 1, where
a radial TEM wave propagates from a centre feed outwards. The rats are
Figure 1. Parallel plate chambers for exposing rats to 900 MHz radiofrequency fields.
The plastic rat cages are inside the chambers under the drinking vessels. The fresh air
for rats is circulated from the tubes in the centre of each chamber. The electromagnetic
field is produced with a real GSM-phone and amplified with power amplifiers and
controlled with PC; all these in centre of figure.
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located at cages, which are located near the outer circle of the chamber. Rats
can freely move in their cages, which makes the SAR determination quite
difficult because the rat absorbs the energy differently depending on its
orientation and place. The benefits of rat system are free movement of rats, no
stress, less work for personnel. These benefits are gained at the cost of
increased uncertainty of dosimetry.
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SESSION 7. RADIATION IN MEDICAL USE
Medical use of ionising radiation – challenges for
the third millennium
Wolfram Leitz
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SE-171 16 Stockholm
Introduction
From the very beginning after its discovery ionising radiation has been in
beneficial use for health care. But even the drawbacks showed up very early: only
a few months after Röntgens discovery reports were published on patients who got
severe skin damage after fluoroscopy with x-rays. This finding of the adverse
effects was soon turned into something positive: ionising radiation could be used
for treatment of cancer. In 1928 radiologists took the initiative to the foundation of
what later became the International Commission on Radiological Protection,
ICRP.
 Medical use of ionising radiation is giving by far the largest contribution to
the radiation burden of the global population from artificial sources, on average 0,3
mSv per year and inhabitant, excluding doses from radiation treatment. In the
Nordic countries this dose is approximately 0,7 mSv. This isn’t a problem by itself.
The total benefit is exceeding the total radiation risk with large margins. But the
margins could even be larger. Methods for examinations and treatments have
often a potential for improvements, meaning that the medical effect can be
obtained with a lower dose to the patient. In certain circumstances the
examination does not contribute to the further treatment of the patient or to her/
his well-being and is then regarded as not justified. The huge challenge we are
facing depends among other things on the extreme fast technical development
which enables exposures of a magnitude that we haven’t seen before and
applications we only could dream about. There is a risk that the motto do what is
possible to do is followed instead of do what the individual patient needs. This
presentation addresses the possibilities, but also the dangers that medical use of
ionising radiation in medical care is facing in the new millennium, or at least in its
first years.
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Trends and development
X-ray diagnostics
The number of x-ray examinations has been rather constant during the last 20-
30 years. But an enormous development went on that has influenced the
radiation doses in both directions. With the introduction of the image
intensifier in the 1960s and rare earth screens in the 1970s the radiation doses
for conventional x-ray examinations could be reduced considerably. In addition
the number of high-dose examinations such as barium meal and barium enema
decreased steadily being replaced by gastroscopy and endoscopy. Ultra sound
and magnetic resonance examinations have also substituted a number of x-ray
examinations.
On the other hand computed tomography has experienced a tremendous
development since its introduction into clinical use in 1972. Computed
tomography accounts today for less than ten percent of all x-ray examinations
but for 30-50 percent of the collective dose from x-ray examinations. And the
fields of application are increasing more and more. Within a few seconds a
detailed 3-dimensional image of a multi-trauma patient can be produced, and
with virtual coloscopy we can make a journey through the intestine where
lesions and other changes can be studied in detail.
The use of digital x-ray technique has also increased outside the x-ray
departments: cardiologists, neurologists and urologists are using x-rays for
guidance in therapeutical measures, for the so-called interventional
procedures. This trend is most likely to go on in the foreseeable future.
Nuclear Medicine
Whereas x-ray diagnostics is mostly used to reproduce images of different
organs or tissues in the body, to describe anatomical conditions, the strength of
nuclear medicine is to reflect dynamic processes (how the organs are working).
Substances with radioactive isotopes are administered to the patient,
intravenous, by indigestion or inhaling. The travel of these radionuclides
through the body is monitored by measuring the radiation emitted by means of
suitable detectors. Uptake of iodine in the thyroid, mapping of the brain
activity and determination of the lung function are some examples of nuclear
medicine procedures. Tumour searching molecules are used for both diagnostic
and therapy. Although new radioisotopes and new methods have been
introduced the total number of nuclear medicine examinations and treatments
has been rather constant during the last 10 to 15 years.
Radiation therapy
Soon after the discovery of x-rays the radiation treatment of tumours started.
In the beginning this was only possible for superficial tumours because of the
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low radiation energy. In lack of reliable physical measuring methods the
quantity skin erythematic dose (HED) was introduced. HED was determined
with the physician himself as a detector. He (or she) irradiated his (or her) own
arm and determined the irradiation time necessary to induce redness.
Radium was the most frequently used radioisotope for therapeutical
purposes before the turn of the last semi-century. With the introduction of
nuclear reactors Co-60 became available, and cobalt equipments were
replacing the x-ray therapy equipments. Soon followed the first accelerators
and today they have replaced almost all cobalt equipments.
Challenges for radiation protection
X-ray diagnostics
Several aspects in the recent development of x-ray diagnostics are likely to
have great importance for radiation protection issues. There is a risk that the
development is going too fast and that radiation protection is falling short. It
happens easily that the new achievements are so overwhelming that nobody is
caring about eventual side effects or is questioning the need of this method.
Adequate education and training of the staff, in the first hand of the radiologist,
is of utter importance but unfortunately frequently neglected.
Radiation protection in x-ray diagnostics can be summarized with the
statement that all examinations shall be justified and optimised. Some aspects
in the latest development can be pointed out where special attention is needed.
X-ray equipments are becoming more and more powerful, and the natural
limitation of the exposure that is associated with the use of film (over-exposed
films cannot be used for the diagnosis) is absent with digital systems. An
increase of the radiation dose in excess of the level necessary for a safe
diagnosis is hardly visible in the images – what happens is maybe a slight
reduction of the noise, and who is complaining about that? With modern
computed tomography equipment the whole body can be scanned within a few
seconds giving a three-dimensional image with high resolution – is that always
needed for the patient’s well being?
Interventional procedures, where therapeutic procedures are performed
assisted by fluoroscopy have been developed more and more. Examples are the
reparation of injured or obstructed vessels, the ablation of nerves in the heart for
the elimination of the disturbance of the heart rhythm, implantation of
pacemakers. Frequently these procedures are combined with long fluoroscopy
times, especially when complications occur with e.g. the introduction of the
catheter. Acute radiation injuries such as slowly healing ulcerations in the skin
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have been reported for the first time again since the time when x-ray diagnostics
still was in its infancy. This could have been avoided if the equipment had been
used in a correct manner and if the staff had have better education and training in
radiation protection, radiation physics and x-ray technique.
Nuclear medicine
Within nuclear medicine two areas can be mentioned that deserve special
attention. One is the sentinel node procedure, where the purpose is, e.g. for a
breast cancer patient, to identify those lymphatic nodes that are in direct
connection with the tumour, so that the removal in the lymphatic system can be
restricted to what is necessary. A radioactive substance is injected directly into
the tumour and by measurement with an external detector those lymphatic
nodes with an uptake are identified. There might be a radiation protection
problem because the practice is carried out in a new environment outside the
nuclear medicine department (operation theatre) with personnel not educated
in radiation protection (surgeons). Education and training and establishment
of radiation protection rules are crucial for the practice to be run satisfactory.
The other area is PET (positron emission tomography). Also here a
radioactive substance is administered to the patient, a β+-emitter. The two 511
keV annihilation photons are measured in coincidence and so the distribution
of the radioactive substance is localised in the body. A three-dimensional image
is created which is used among other things to study the glucose metabolism,
the cerebral blood flow and the blood flow in the coronary arteries. For tumour
diagnostic F-18 FDG is increasing with the increased availability of this
method.
Radiation protection problems may be present for the staff during the
process of manufacturing and preparation of the radiopharmaceutical and in
connection with the administration, and also for the patient herself. Very high
activities are dealt with and the energy of the radiation is high. One special
problem is the finger dose from the preparation and administration. The
radioisotopes used have short half-lives. Standard gamma cameras can be
modified such that they can be used for PET examinations, and that will lead to
a spread of this technique to more hospitals. Longer distances between the
accelerators where the isotopes are produced and the hospitals are leading to
longer transport distances and a need for higher activities.
Radiation therapy
Radiation therapy is a balancing act: The tumour must receive a sufficient high
radiation dose in order to kill all cancer cells whilst the surrounding healthy
tissue must be spared as much as possible. The development of diagnostic
methods (computed tomography, magnetic resonance, PET), of computer power
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and of accelerators with the possibility of tailor-made adjustments of the beam
has given better and better tools to the therapist for this purpose. With the
latest technique IMRT (intensity modulation radiation therapy) it is possible,
at least in principle, to choose any incident radiation field with respect to
direction, field size and radiation intensity. A difficulty is to determine the real
dose distribution that is achieved of the thin scanning beam and to determine
the anatomical landmarks with respect to location and attenuation properties.
Some people with certain hereditary changes in the genes have higher
radiation sensitivity than the average. Research is going on with the purpose of
obtaining more knowledge about this phenomenon and to use this knowledge for
individual adaptation of the therapeutical dose: lower to those with high
sensitivity, higher for the others.
Intravascular brachytherapy is a practice where competence is needed
within x-ray diagnostics, radiation therapy, and to a certain extent also in nuclear
medicine, and both with respect to clinical and to physical-technical aspects. Of
importance is the establishment of a well-designed organisation that is ensuring
that the competences needed are present and that the co-operation is performing
well.
Conclusions
Ionising radiation has been at the healthcare’s service for more than a century
and there are no indications that this will change in the foreseeable future. In
total the benefit is outweighing by far the deleterious effects caused by
radiation. But there is a large potential for improvements. In some applications
the radiation dose can be reduced without jeopardising the medical objective,
in other cases alternative methods without the use of ionising radiation could
be a better option. In some cases the use of ionising radiation is totally
unnecessary if e.g. the result of the diagnosis is of no significance at all for the
patient. From the diversity of application areas some can be mentioned that are
entailing special requirements on radiation protection in the near future.
Generally the development is going more and more towards complex
equipment and methods. The radiation protection conditions may be difficult to
grasp when dealing with advanced technology equipped with many automatic
functions, and it may be difficult to choose the correct settings or to adapt
parameters for the actual application. Efforts are necessary concerning the
equipment with e.g. standards prescribing that the settings must be flexible for
adaptation to the various clinical situations, and user-friendly documentation
of the equipment must be provided. On the user side the major demands are
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education, education and education. This is of special relevance when advanced
equipment is located outside the traditional clinics in an environment with
lacking radiation protection competence among the users – a trend that can be
observed more and more.
Justification is another area of interest. The new examination methods
as e.g. the new applications of computed tomography must be scrutinised from
the patient’s perspective. Is really the examination from the top to the toe to
the benefit for the patient, or is it performed on flimsy grounds? This question
must be asked and answered for all examinations that are planed, but it is
especially important for new procedures with new technology in order to avoid
the introduction of a practice that is inferior from a radiation protection point
of view.
Continuous optimisation can lead to large dose reductions. A tool for that
purpose in x-ray diagnostics is the introduction of the concept diagnostic
reference levels. At the least a dose reduction of five percent can be expected. In
the Nordic countries this would imply a dose saving of 800 manSv, every year.
The discussions on actual and potential problems for the present and the
future use of ionising radiation in health care could give the impression that
these practices are full of problems and should be questioned from a radiation
protection point of view. That is completely wrong. Even if much can be
improved there is a huge benefit for millions and millions of patients. Many
lives are saved by the diagnostic and therapeutical procedures. In a global
perspective the major issue is not that too many persons are exposed to medical
exposures but too few: the availability of medical practices involving ionising
radiation is concentrated to the developed countries. An expansion of these
techniques to the developing countries would imply a large step forward for the
public health in those countries.
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Nordic working group on x-ray diagnostics  –
Practical implementation of the directive on
medical exposures in the Nordic EU countries
H. N. Waltenburg1, P. Grøn1, W. Leitz2, A. Servomaa3, G.
Einarsson4, H. Olerud5
1. National Institute of Radiation Hygiene, Knapholm 7, DK-2730 Herlev,
DENMARK
2. Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, S-17116 Stockholm, SWEDEN
3. Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK), P.O.BOX 14, SF-
00881 Helsinki, FINLAND
4. Icelandic Radiation Protection Institute, Raudararstig 10, IS-150 Reykjavik,
ICELAND
5. Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, P.O. box 55, N-1332 Østerås,
NORWAY
Introduction
The EU directive1 on medical exposure, 97/43/EURATOM (referred to in the
following as MED) imposes new requirements on hospital departments using
ionising radiation for either diagnostics or treatment of illnesses. The directive
was approved on 30 June 1997, and the member states were obliged to
implement the requirements into national legislation before 13 May 2000.
The implementation of a directive of this kind is a complicated process
requiring time as well as other resources. The Nordic EU countries (Sweden,
Finland and Denmark) must comply with the rules in MED, while this is not
the case for Norway and Iceland as EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
members, since the agreements between EFTA and EU does not cover the
EURATOM treaty.
The issues that have to be addressed in the national legislation are
justification, optimisation, responsibilities, procedures, training,
equipment, special protection during pregnancy and breast-feeding, and
potential exposure. A central aspect in MED is the requirement for quality
assurance programmes to be established in radiological departments (and
in other departments employing ionising radiation). A change of this
magnitude in legislation requires adjustments in the routines of the
individual departments. The staff in each department needs to prepare and
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follow procedures and instructions for daily work and also participate in
day-to-day quality assurance.
A considerable burden has also been laid on the radiation protection
authorities in the member states, first in the process of transposing MED into
national law or regulations, and secondly in guiding the process of practical
implementation. Here we will describe how the individual Nordic EU countries
have chosen to implement MED in national legislation and how far the process
of complying with the requirements has come so far. Although Norway and
Iceland are not required to follow MED, it is still interesting for comparison to
include the situation in these countries. We will not cover all aspects of MED,
instead we have chosen specific points that we think are the most interesting.
The scope is limited to diagnostic applications of x-rays, excluding dental,
therapy and nuclear medicine applications.
Regulations implementing the directive
MED was implemented into the legislation of all of the Nordic EU countries2,3,4
before May 2000 as required.
Furthermore, new radiation protection laws were issues in Norway5 in
May 2000 and in Iceland6 in April 2002, both implementing parts of MED.
Responsibilities
According to MED, the member states shall ensure that any medical
exposure is effected under the clinical responsibility of a practitioner
(Article 5 (2)), where a practitioner is defined as (Article 2): a medical doctor,
dentist or other health professional, who is entitled to take clinical
responsibility for an individual medical exposure in accordance with
national requirements. However, the practical aspects for the procedure
may be delegated to other professionals (Article 5 (3)) (these professionals
are referred to in the following as entitled individuals).
National requirements thus had to be established on who can serve as
responsible for an x-ray facility, and these requirements differ among the
Nordic countries. Sweden has the strictest requirements, requiring the per-
son responsible to be a radiologist, while Finland and Denmark are less
strict, allowing also physicists and chiropractors, respectively. A complete
list of the formal educational requirements is given in Table 1.
Differences also exist in the requirements to the entitled individuals.
Finland and Denmark have set up specific requirements to the education of
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Table 1. Educational requirements to the practitioner responsible for the x-ray facility.
the entitled individuals, while Sweden allows anyone to photograph under
the responsibility of the responsible radiologist. The formal educational
requirements are listed in Table 2.
Medical physics expert
A new aspect in the directive was that all facilities for medical exposure of
patients must have a medical physics expert involved. In diagnostic radiology
departments, the medical physics expert should be involved as an advisor in
optimisation including patient dosimetry, in quality assurance, and in matters
of radiation protection (Article 6 (3)). This has not been a tradition in all
countries, and where this is a new requirement, time is required for further
education, establishment of interpersonal networks and collection of expertise.
Involvement of medical physics experts in therapy was common in all of
the Nordic countries, but involvement of medical physics experts in diagnostic
radiology had only been a tradition in Sweden and they also had a formalised
education. Finland now also has a medical physics degree, while the education
as medical physics expert in Denmark is based on an individual study program
for each candidate. In Norway and Iceland the medical physics expert is not
defined as a health profession in the legislation, and no formalised educational
system exists for this group.
Table 2. Educational requirements to entitled individuals (see text).
Educational requirements to the practitioner responsible for the x-ray facility: 
Sweden: Radiologist 
Finland: Physician or physicist 
Denmark: Radiologist, physician with relevant supplementary education or 
chiropractor  
Norway: Physician or chiropractor 
Iceland: Physician or chiropractor 
Educational requirements to entitled individuals (see text):  
Sweden: None (under responsibility of the responsible radiologist) 
Finland: Physician, chiropractor or radiographer 
Denmark: Physician, chiropractor, radiographer or nurse 
Norway: None (under responsibility of the responsible doctor/chiropractor) 
Iceland: Physician, chiropractor, radiographer, nurse 
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Table 3. Estimated number of medical physics experts in diagnostic radiology per 1 mill.
inhabitants.
Equipment
MED requires an up-to-date inventory of radiological equipment at each
department to be available to the radiation protection authorities (Article
8 (2)). However, since national inventories have existed for at least 10 years in
all of the Nordic countries except Norway, this requirement was already
implemented.
To ensure that the equipment performs adequately, acceptance testing
must be carried out before first use for clinical purposes (Article 8 (2)). In a
transitional period, acceptance tests must also be carried out on all existing
equipment. This is a process requiring some time, since it is simply not possible
to test all equipment at the same time. The Nordic ambitions for acceptance
tests were outlined in a Nordic report in 19997, and the practical
implementation is referring to this report.  By now, the process is finished in
Sweden, nearly finished in Iceland, but still some remains to be done in Finland
and Denmark, as seen in Table 4. In Norway the legal basis for imposing such
tests is still not clear, that means it is up to the hospital to prioritise the
purchase of necessary measuring devises and training of local staff for such
tests.
As part of their quality assurance programmes, the Nordic countries
have introduced constancy tests, i.e. testing on a frequent basis that all the key
parameters in the picture producing process remain constant. Implementation
of constancy testing has also required some time, since the regular staff in the
Table 4. Estimated status of implementation of acceptance and constancy testing.
Estimated number of medical physics experts in diagnostic radiology per 1 mill.  
inhabitants 
Sweden Finland Denmark Norway Iceland 
10 2 4 0 0 
Acceptance test Constancy tests 
Sweden 100 % 100 % 
Finland 20 % 100 % 
Denmark 70 % 50 % 
Norway 10% 20% 
Iceland 95% 100 % 
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department mainly carries this out, and the necessary education had to be
completed first. As seen in Table 4, constancy test are by now fully implemented
in Sweden, Finland and Iceland.
Inspection
To ensure that the departments comply with the regulations, MED requires the
national authorities to set up a system of inspection (Article 13). The systems
set up divides into two groups: Sweden and Denmark have chosen an approach
with audit of the quality assurance system and then spot testing of selected
issues, while Finland inspects the practices in the department. The system in
Iceland is close to those in Sweden and Denmark, but with a more thorough
inspection of equipment. In Norway the focus is on control of equipment. The
interval between inspections lies in the range of 2 – 5 years, except in Norway
where the range is 5 – 10 years. The systems of inspection are summarised in
the table below.
Table 5. Inspection systems set up by national radiation protection authorities.
Conclusions
The Nordic EU countries, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, have progressed a
long way towards full practical implementation of the Directive on medical
exposures. Some notable and interesting differences in the national
requirements exist, but the trends are very similar. The pace of the practical
implementation also differs somewhat with Sweden seeming to be in the front
at the moment. In the aspects covered here, except for medical physics experts
Iceland seems to follow the directive quite closely.
 Type of inspection 
Interval between 
inspections 
Sweden Audit, spot tests  3-5 yrs 
Finland  Inspection of practices  2-5 yrs 
Denmark Audit, spot tests  2-3 yrs 
Norway Control of equipment, spot tests  5-10 yrs 
Iceland Audit, control of equipment  2-3 yrs 
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Introduction
Medical x-ray diagnostics is one of the few applications of ionising radiation
where people are irradiated on purpose. The strategy for radiation protection is
also different compared to that in other areas that have the zero-alternative as
its ultimate goal, meaning that no human beings at all are exposed in these
practices. The focus in x-ray diagnostics concerning radiation protection is
justification and optimisation. Optimisation implies that the examination is
performed in such a way that the radiation dose is as small as possible without
jeopardising the diagnostic security.
 X-ray diagnostics is a complex method where many technical
parameters and methodology factors together are interacting in the
determination of radiation dose and image quality. The optimisation process is
not a simple and uncomplicated procedure, this difficulty is reflected in many
international and national surveys showing a large spread of patient doses for
one and the same type of examination. The concept diagnostic reference levels
(DRL) has been introduced as a tool for reducing this wide distribution that is
obviously indicating a lack of optimisation, and for cutting the highest
radiation doses. In this presentation the concept for DRL and the experience
gained in the Nordic countries with DRL are described.
257
STUK-A195
What are DRL?
According to the European Council directive on medical exposures, 97/43/
Euratom (1), DRL are
Art. 2: dose levels in medical radiodiagnostic practices … for typical
examinations for groups of standard-sized patients or standard phantoms for
broadly defined types of equipment.  These levels are expected not to be exceeded for
standard procedures when good and normal practice regarding diagnostic and
technical performance is applied.
Further the directive requires:
Art. 4 (2a): Member States shall promote the establishment and the use of
diagnostic reference levels for radiodiagnostic examinations …and the availability
of guidance for this purpose having regard to European diagnostic reference levels
where available.
Art 6 (5): Member States shall ensure that appropriate local reviews are
undertaken whenever diagnostic reference levels are consistently exceeded and that
corrective actions are taken where appropriate.
So, the aim with DRL is in the first hand that practices having the highest
radiation doses for the examination under consideration are identified and that
measures are taken for reducing the radiation dose. Values below the DRL do not
automatically imply that the procedure is optimised, but values exceeding the
DRL are strongly indicating a non-optimised practice. A pragmatic approach for
establishing DRL is to choose the 75 percentile of the doses from a national survey.
Criteria to be applied for DRL are that the measurements are simple with
sufficient accuracy and that the quantity for DRL is correlated with the radiation
risk, i.e. the effective dose or organ dose. Quantities meeting these criteria and
which are used for conventional x-ray examinations are the skin dose (for single
projections) or the dose-area-product, suitable also for complete and complex
examinations. For mammography the average absorbed dose to glandular breast
tissue is used and for computed tomography the dose-length-product and the
average absorbed dose in the volume irradiated.
DRL in the Nordic countries
DRL is not a new concept in the Nordic countries. Already 1996 the Nordic
guidance levels for patient doses in diagnostic radiology were published in the
report series of the Nordic radiation protection authorities (2, 3) prepared by the
Nordic working group on x-ray diagnostics. DRL (then called as “guidance levels”)
were defined for six conventional x-ray examinations, based on nation wide patient
dose measurements in Norway, see Table 1. Three years later a study was
performed in all the Nordic countries with the aim to compare the dose
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situation in the various countries and to see whether the DRL, based on the
situation in Norway, are also applicable in countries outside Norway. The
results have been presented at the European congress on radiology in 2000 (4).
An example for lumbar spine examinations is shown in figure 1. For each
country the mean-, min- and max-values are shown, and the 25 and 75
percentile. The mean values for the various countries are equal with each other
within a factor of two. The example for lumbar spine examinations is shown in
figure 1. The number of x-ray stands is between 5 and 30 with 10 to 20 patients
each. Although the distribution differs between the various countries the DRL
chosen is acceptable, let be that it is somewhat high for Norway. The increased
radiation doses in Norway compared with the earlier results depends most
likely on the fact that now fluoroscopy is used for positioning before
radiographic images are taken. Also for the other types of examinations the
Nordic values for DRL are quite adequate, except for chest examinations where
a lower value of 0,6 Gy • cm2 has been shown to be more suited.
Table 1. Nordic guidance (=reference) levels for six diagnostic procedures.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the radiation doses from barium
enema examinations for all 89 units. The highest radiation dose differs from
the lowest with a factor of 20, and similar spread is seen for the other
examinations. Therefore we can draw the conclusion that there is a large
potential for dose reductions. This has been verified in Sweden (5). The Swedish
Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) has required for forty examination units,
where the radiation doses were exceeding the DRL, that investigations about
the cause for these values are performed and that dose reduction measures are
to be taken. Thirty of these have reported the results to SSI: The dose reduction
was between twenty and eighty-five percent with an average of forty-five
percent. A positive finding was that many of the measures taken were simple
and cheap and they should be possible to be realised even in hospitals with a
stretched economy. However, it must be born in mind that the assessment and
Examination type Guidance levels 
 DAP (Gy·cm2) ESD (mGy)* 
Chest, PA and Lat 1 0,2 PA 
0,5 Lat 
Pelvis 4 5 AP 
Lumbar spine 10 6 AP 
Urography 20  
Barium meal 25  
Barium enema 50  
* Entrance surface dose including backscatter 
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Figure 1. Mean, min and max values of the dose-area-product for lumbar spine
examinations in the five Nordic countries.
Figure 2. Dose-area-product for barium enema examinations (all Nordic countries).
follow-up of patient doses is entailing financial and personal resources,
particularly in the initial phase.
Within the Nordic co-operation work has started for setting DRL also for
interventional procedures (6) and computed tomography (7) but this work is
not completed yet.
Implementation of DRL into national legistlation
The three Nordic member states in the EU have transposed the requirements
in the medical exposure directive into national legislation. For five of the six
conventional examinations the values proposed in (2) have been established as
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DRL (except for chest examinations where Finland and Sweden have chosen
0,6 Gy • cm2). The sixth examination in (2), barium meal, has become a rather
uncommon examination because it has been replaced to a large extent by
endoscopy and therefore not taken into the legislation.
For conventional examinations Finland has also established DRL for
single views, with the quantity absorbed skin dose. For computed tomography
European values (8) have been applied, slightly modified in the various
countries based on own experiences. Denmark and Finland have chosen
entrance surface exposure as the quantity for DRL in mammography, whereas
in Sweden it is the average glandular dose in the breast, both for single views
and for complete examinations.
The extent of measurements required, such as interval between
measurements and number of patients, are somewhat different between the
countries. Finland and Sweden are stating three years between measurements
whereas Denmark has two years and for examinations comprising fluoroscopy
one year. Ten patients are regarded as sufficient in Denmark and Finland; in
Sweden the figure is at least twenty. Denmark is stating “patients of standard
size”, in Finland the weight of the patients shall be between 55 and 85 kg with
an average around 70 kg, in Sweden the patients preferably should weight
between 60 and 80 kg with an average of 70+3 kg, but if this cannot be achieved
the dose value for a 70 kg patient can be derived by interpolation.
Conclusion
Since more than six years work was performed in the Nordic countries with the
concept diagnostic reference levels, to start with in a more limited and
unsystematic way. The findings are good: just the fact that patient dose
measurements are performed is drawing attention and interest to patient
doses and the standardized method enables objective comparison between
different hospitals. Remedial actions were taken for highest radiation doses
found, often with little effort. Within the coming years thousands of patient
dose measurements will be performed and compared with DRL. Based on the
experiences gained up to now this will lead to considerable dose savings –
probably a larger dose reduction then any other single action. A conservative
figure would be a five percent dose reduction – in the Nordic countries this
would lead to a dose saving of 800 manSv per year, an impressive figure in the
context of radiation protection and in good balance with the inevitable costs
entailed with the assessment of doses, with the investigations and with the
remedial actions taken.
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Can the medical service afford to reduce radiation
doses for x-ray examinations?
Helene Jönsson och Wolfram Leitz
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SE-171 16  Stockholm
Introduction
X-ray examinations are giving the largest contribution to the radiation burden
of the public from artificial radiation sources. Mostly these examinations are
justified; the benefit for the patient is normally exceeding the radiation risk by
far. But they are not always optimised; there are indications that the radiation
doses and hence the radiation risk frequently can be reduced without loss of the
benefit for the patient. Shortage of resources is a frequently used argument
brought forward by the medical service as a defence not to change existing
conditions. In this presentation is accounted for which dose reducing measures
have been taken, and their costs and effects are discussed.
Background
The Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SSI, requested in 1999 that
patient dose related data for a number of x-ray examinations were reported to
SSI and these were compiled in a SSI report (1). The aim was to gain experience
for planned regulations on diagnostic reference levels (DRL) and to gain
information about the level of patient doses in Sweden.  In total, data for
around 8 000 patients have been reported, divided into 195 conventional,
148 computed tomography and 55 mammography examination stands. The
spread of the radiation doses between the various examination stands for the
same type of examination was varying with up to a factor of 15 between the
highest and lowest. At the same time a realistic test of the concept with DRL
was performed by applying those in the Nordic countries recommended levels
for the conventional examinations – barium enema, chest, lumbar spine, pelvis
and urography. When the patient dose at an examination stand was higher
than the corresponding DRL SSI required investigation of the reason and that
dose reducing measures were taken.
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Measures for dose reduction
At 42 of the 195 examination stands for conventional x-ray examinations the
radiation dose exceeded the Nordic reference levels. SSI has received reports
on which measures have been taken at these stands and which effect these
measures resulted in. Table 1 shows for how many examination stands
measures have been taken and the total dose reduction achieved by these
measures.
For 30 out of the 42 examination stands results have been reported from
dose reducing measures. For the remaining 12 it was either declared that no
possibility for dose reduction could be seen or that the equipment was to be
replaced in the near future and nothing was done in between. For the five
different x-ray examinations the average dose reduction was between 35 and
60% amongst those having taken measures. This can be seen as an indication
that the introduction of diagnostic reference levels will provide a positive effect
by reducing the patient dose. A prerequisite is that the costs for the measures
taken are in reasonable proportion to the gain in radiation dose and that the
measures do not render the diagnosis more difficult or even deteriorate it.
The majority of measures taken dealt with changes of the exposure
factors (increased tube voltage, smaller field sizes), of the methodology
(reduced number of images, reduced fluoroscopy time, use of compression). The
latter was partly achieved by increased efforts on education of the staff. In
seven cases the image receptor system has been changed and in four cases the
whole equipment. An analysis of this material cannot give a conclusive answer
to the question of how the result will be when DRL is introduced in a large
scale, but it is giving hints on what could be expected. A mixture of what has
been seen in the present study:
Table 1. Measures reported and the resulting dose reduction for the actual examination.
 Barium 
enema 
Chest Lumbar 
spine 
Pelvis Urography Total 
Number of examination 
stands (total) 
35 45 40 30 45 195 
 - request for investigation 5 5 9 3 20 42 
 - no measures taken  - 3 3 - 6 12 
 - measures taken 5 2 6 3 14 30 
Dose reduction for those that 
have taken measures  
(mean value) 
60 % 55 % 35 % 45 % 35 % 40% 
Min/Max dose reduction 20/85 % 50/65 % 20/60 % 25/55 % 15/60 % 15/85% 
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• Measures requiring small resources
Education and training, change of the chemistry-film-system, increased
developing time, increased filtration, increased tube voltage, reduced tube
loading, reduced number of images, reduced fluoroscopy time and use of
compression.
• Measures requiring large resources
New equipment, direct digital image receptor, imaging plates.
But also that no measures are taken at all with the arguments:
• The diagnostic safety would be impaired, new equipment and/or
accessories will be purchased in the near future.
At nineteen of the examination stands only low cost measures were
taken. Some of them didn’t cost anything, in certain cases there was even an
economic benefit, e.g. when the number of images was reduced. Among these
are measures such as reduced number of views, reduction of the fluoroscopy
time or of the tube loading, increase of the tube voltage, increase of the
filtration, smaller radiation fields, use of compression, change of film and
chemistry in the film processor, increase of the developing time and education.
Even the change of the imaging system is a relatively low cost measure,
taking into consideration its limited lifetime and the need for regular renewal.
Even at the category where larger resources were needed, at six examination
stands the analogue imaging system has been replaced by digital systems, the
resources needed could be called moderate, and it is most likely that the
replacement is part of a since long time ago planned development process
towards digital x-ray images.
 In less than 15 % of the cases a drastically measure such as replacement
of the equipment has been taken. Most likely also this action is something laid
down since long time ago in the investment plans for the hospital, let be
speeded up because of the high patient doses. All this shows that it is realistic
to expect large dose reductions with the introduction of diagnostic reference
levels; the bad economy of the hospitals is certainly no excuse for not
performing actions.
It cannot be concluded which influence the respective action has on the
total dose reduction because mostly several different actions have been taken
at the various examination stands. The effect is of course dependent on the
starting point and on how much the respective parameter can be stressed. It is
not possible on the basis of the present data to conclude which actions were
most effective, but it can be stated that the potential for each of the actions
mentioned is large.
 The majority of the measures taken are about exposure parameters and
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examination methodology. This is an indication for that no systematic
optimisation process has been conducted earlier at these stands. The good
thing is that a large part of the high doses most likely can be reduced by simple
and cheap actions, which increase the likelihood for them to be performed in
the stretched economy of Swedish health care. In those cases where a drastic
action such as replacement of the equipment is performed the exceeding of the
DRL is most likely playing only a minor part, but a side effect could be that
radiation protection issues will get more importance in the purchasing
procedures of new equipment.
Conclusions
In the present study the concept of diagnostic reference levels has been used for
the first time in a systematic way in Sweden. It has been shown that the patient
doses could be reduced considerably by simple and cheap measures. Although
the study had a limited scope it can be concluded that similar conditions exist
when the concept with DRL is introduced on a large scale in the entire country.
The examination stands with the highest doses will not only be identified but
also measures will be taken to reduce the high patient doses because lack of
resources is not a valid reason for refraining. It can be foreseen that patient
doses are reduced considerably without jeopardising the diagnostic outcome.
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Clinical audit and quality systems - practical
implementation in Finland
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Introduction
Clinical audit is a new concept of significant importance for the qaulity of
radiological practices, introduced by the EC Medical Exposure Directive (MED,
97/43/EURATOM). By definition, clinical audit means “a systematic
examination or review of medical radiological procedures which seeks to
improve the quality and the outcome of patient care, through structured review
whereby radiological practices, procedures, and results are examined against
agreed standards for good medical radiological procedures, with modifications
of the practices where indicated and the application of new standards if
necessary”. In its most profound meaning, being introduced in the medical
exposure directive, clinical audit can be seen as a review of the success in
implementing the justification and optimization principles, and therefore, it is
to a large extent an issue of radiation safety for the patient. According to the
directive, clinical audits shall be “carried out in accordance with national
procedures”.
For the last few years, parallel to the development of the MED in Europe,
there has been a worldwide tendency to implement appropriate quality
systems (QS) in the health care organizations, in accordance with the
international quality standards (ISO 9000 series etc). Such quality systems
have been applied for a long time and very widely by the industry. It is a strong
belief that the development of quality systems for health care would result in
equal benefits as trusted in industry, in terms of efficiency and safety of health
care services. For radiological practices, the quality systems are expected to
become a framework for improving the optimization of practices and for
maintaining good radiation safety, as well as providing a mechanism to prevent
mistakes and accidents.
In some countries, like the UK and The Netherlands, there are legal
requirements to establish and maintain quality systems at certain type of
radiological units. In some countries and some radiological units, quality
systems have been developed voluntarily without any regulatory pressures. In
267
STUK-A195
some cases, the radiological units have acquired a certification of their quality
system by a recognized certification body, or wanted to prove their competence
by an accreditation by a recognized accreditation body (e.g., in some nuclear
medicine laboratories). There has also been development to modify the general
quality standards into more practical standards for health care applications.
For example, the European Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology
(ESTRO) has published general philosophy and practical guidance on
developing quality systems, specially tailored to the needs of radiotherapy,
starting from ISO quality standards and published practice-specific quality
assurance recommendations. Such practice-tailored recommendations or
standards provide the health care organizations with an easy and
straightforward access to building-up an appropriate quality system.
In the context of quality systems, confusion sometimes appears as to the
meaning of “quality audits” versus “clinical audits”. Further, the difference of
“clinical audit” from regulatory inspection needs to be clarified. In this
presentation, these conceptual differences are discussed. The approach
adopted in Finland for practical implementation of clinical audit is presented
in detail.
Clinical audit and other quality audits
When an organization, e.g., a radiological department, builds-up a quality
system, it may want that it  conforms to a given QS standards (for example ISO
9001). To ensure this, the organization may apply for a certification of the QS,
i.e., an independent evaluation by a certification body that the QS is in
conformance with the selected quality standard. For such a certification,
initially and regularly thereafter, a quality (system) audit by a certification
body is introduced. The subsequent regular quality audits are needed to
maintain the certification. The certification body has high expertice in quality
standards and in general auditing procedures, but need not to employ health
care professio-nals, because the purpose of quality (system) audits is only to
check that the QS conforms to the requirements of the QS standard (a
document which is non-specific to the radiological practice).
At least in radiotherapy, the term “quality audit” has been applied for a
long time but with somewhat varying meanings. Generally, it can be
understood as a “process audit” where the process is the dose delivery to the
patient. In its most limited meaning, the quality audit has been no more
than an independent check of the dose at the reference point in an external
radiotherapy beam, e.g., by a mailed thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD).
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In a wider meaning, checking of a number of other dosimetric parameters of the
beam, or simple testing of the accuracy of the treatment planning system, are
also included. In its most comprehensive meaning, the quality audit in
radiotherapy has been a review of the overall Quality Control and dosimetry
programme of the treatment equipment. Even in this most comprehensive
form, the quality audit has been limited to just one part of the radiotherapy
process, the dose delivery to the patient. It has not addressed the total
radiotherapy process that also includes, for example, practices for dose
description, treatment preparation, treatment reporting and follow-up
procedures.
Clinical audit is an assessment of radiological practices against pre-
set criteria (“good practices”) and should not be mixed with the above
quality audit for QS certification. However, the quality audits such as the
above examples for radiotherapy could be seen as important parts, but
certainly not as the whole concept, of the clinical audit.
For a clinical audit, all grades of staff (all professionals) should be
involved. A term “medical audit” has sometimes been used; it is equivalent
to clinical audit, when only the medical staff (physicians, radiologists,
oncologists etc) is involved.
Clinical audit and regulatory inspections
Clinical audit is in no way a regulatory action and should not be mixed with
regulatory inspections. While regulatory inspections may sometimes
include partly similar checking procedures or measurements as clinical
audits, there are clear differences in the purpose of the procedures, in the
criteria applied for the results, and in the authority of the persons
performing the procedures. Regulatory authorities can carry out regulatory
inspections for the verification of the fulfilment of legal requirements. Then
the criteria are unambigious and always set in a law, decree or other
regulations by the authorities. For clinical audit, the criteria are more freely
set by the selected “good practice”, For this, not a single choice but a number
of good practices can be acceptable. Based on the results of the inspection,
the inspector can impose orders or requirements to the licensee concerning
the practice and the necessary actions for improvement. In case of clinical
audit, the audit report with auditors’ suggestions for improvements are
given to the audited organization, while it is fully up to the audited
organization to decide on the actions to be implemented. The auditors
cannot impose any orders or requirements to the organization.
269
STUK-A195
Practical implementation of clinical audit in Finland
Legislation
The basic requirement for the implementation of clinical audit has been set
by a Radiation Law (1142/1998). The detailed requirements are given in the
Decree on the medical use of radiation (423/2000).
According to the Decree, clinical audits shall be arranged to
supplement in an appropriate way the self-evaluation of the practices. The
goal shall be set so that all radiological practices would be audited for all
essential parts at the minimum every five years.
The Decree states the following ten points which shall, among other
things, be considered in clinical audits:
1 Definition of authority and responsibilities
2 Recommendation for referring a patient to other processes or
departments
3 Practices and the information flow in justification process
4 Instructions and practices for delivery of medical exposure
5 Diagnostic and treatment equipment
6 Doses to patients and the outcome of diagnosis or treatment
7 Quality, storage and flow of information
8 Training of staff
9 Quality assurance procedures
10 Self-evaluation of practices
Organization
Representatives of professional societies, authorities and other key organizations
have discussed the implementation of the requirements for clinical audit in Fin-
land. This resulted in 2001 in the establishment of a special company, Qualisan Oy,
to organize the practical implementation of clinical audits in Finland by
developing and offering the necessary services. Qualisan is a joint-stock company
established and supported by the major professional societies such as the Finnish
Society of Radiologists and the Society of Radiographers in Finland. The company
has organized a number of training courses for auditors, inviting volunteers from
among the major professional groups (radiologists, oncologists, medical physicists,
radiographers) to participate. About 40 auditors have been trained so far to
undertake clinical audits through Qualisan, on request of the radiological units.
The purpose is to train sufficient number of auditors for each health care district in
Finland.   The auditors are paid for their services while the audits are charged from
the audited organizations.
A special advisory group for the development and follow-up of the
clinical audit procedures, including a representative of a regulatory authority
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(STUK), was established in close connection with Qualisan. Due to
transparency and independence, this group is now planned to become a
national steering committee fully independent of Qualisan.
Audit criteria
Qualisan has developed detailed criteria for the first round of audits, based on
the ten points of interest specified in the Decree.  In the future rounds of
clinical audits, this criteria is planned to be supplemented by more practice-
specific criteria, selected for each round of audits by separate considerations of
the actual needs.
Conclusions
The organization and criteria for practical procedures of clinical audits in Fin-
land have been developed, to provide the radiological units with easy access to
implementing clinical audits. By the time of this writing, the training of
auditors is still going on, while the first clinical audit was carried out in spring
2002 in a diagnostic radiology unit of a local hospital. The main problem so far
seems to be the inadequate resources of the radiological units to build-up the
necessary QS documentation to enable meaningful implementation of the
audits. On the other hand, it has been stressed not to put too high a threshold
for the level of QS before requesting clinical audit; even for a relatively
“modest” quality system, the audit can provided the organization with
important information and guiding for further development or completion of
the system. A supplementary benefit of clinical audit is just to give additional
pressure and guidance for the development of an appropriate QS.
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Radiation doses from computed tomography
T. Cederlund1 W. Leitz1 and A. Persson2
1 Swedish Radiation Protection Authority
2 Department of radiology, Linköping Hospital
Introduction
Computed tomography, CT, has experienced a tremendous development during
the 30 years since its introduction. The first equipment was only able to
produce images of the skull. The acquisition time as well as the reconstruction
time was between 2 and 10 minutes. Even though the image quality at this time
was poor, the new technique proved to be so useful in medicine that the
inventors Allan M. Cormack and Godfrey N. Hounsfield were awarded with the
Nobel Prize in medicine 1979.
Today the development of computers, mathematical algorithms,
detectors and efficient x-ray tubes has made it possible to examine the whole
body in less than 30 seconds and to produce 3D-images. This has lead to an
increase of both the number of examinations and of the dos per CT-
examination.
Justification and optimisation
Ct-examinations contribute with only 7% to the number of x-ray
examinations but to more than 40% to the dose from medical exposure in
Figure 1.
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Sweden (G Szendrö, 1995). This is not a problem if the examinations are justified,
i.e. is doing more good than harm and if the examination is performed in an
optimal way. Then it doesn’t matter if the total use of radiation increases or
decreases, what’s important is whether the examination is useful for the patient or
not. In a study 1999 (W Leitz, 2001) with the purpose to establish diagnostic
reference levels (DRL) in Sweden, patient doses for 8000 examinations were
measured, 3000 of which were CT-examinations. DRL is a by the Swedish
Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) established level that should not be exceeded
with good medical practice. It’s not a limit, but an a investigation level, identifying
potential bad practices. The DRL was chosen somewhat arbitrary as the third
quartile of the dose distribution reported.
Diagram 1. dose distribution for brain-, thorax- and abdomen examinations.
Figure 2. The image shows a slice of the abdomen with a region of  interest marked as
a black circle in the liver.
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The study showed that effective dose could vary with a factor as high as 9
between different hospitals fore the same examination. For brain examinations
the spread was from 1 to 4 mSv, for thorax from 2 to 18 mSv and for abdomen from
4 to 20 mSv. The wide spread in dose between different hospitals indicates that the
examinations are not performed in an optimal way.
There are many factors influencing the patient dose, the tube voltage, the
tube load i.e. mAs-setting, the slice thickness,  the pitch factor i.e. table movement
per rotation, and the scanned volume. All this factors are of course important fore
the dose and imaging quality but in the rest of this paper I will concentrate on the
importance of adjusting the tube load to the individual patient. This because we
have noticed, that at many hospitals no concern is given to the individual patient.
Instead a standard procedure is performed, i.e. the same settings are used for all
patients.
Other factors that influence the noise in the image is the anatomy of the
patient, or how thick the patient is, and the density of the examined organ. When
going from the abdomen to the chest, the tube load (mAs-setting) must be reduced
in order to achieve the same noise level. If not, the patient will receive a higher
dose than necessary because of the higher transmission through the lung with its
lower density. The problem with CT is that this will not be seen in the image let be
that the images noise might be slightly reduced.
Optimisation of the tube load and image noise
By measuring the noise in a region of interest at a low tube load (mAs-setting)
and then repeat the measurement in the same region for higher and higher
tube loads the noise as a function of tube load can be plotted. The noise in the
Diagram 2 . The image noise as a function of tube load.
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image will decreases rapidly in the beginning, but at a certain point this
decrease will disappear and further increase in tube load will not improve the
imaging quality. The point at witch the decrease will disappear is depending on
the thickness of the patient and the density of the organ study.
If the image noise as a function of tube load for two different patients is
compared, one that is weighting 85 kg and the other 55 kg, the potential of dose
savings will be obviously. For the heavier patient the tube load should be
approximately 300 mAs and for the smaller approximately 30 mAs. And
unfortunately many hospitals will examine this two patients at a standard
procedure with the same settings for both patient. This will lead to that the
smaller patient will receive a dose 10 times higher than necessary.
Diagram 3 shows the image noise as a function of tube load for two
different phantoms, one simulating a patient weighting 85 kg and the other one
simulating a patient weighting 55 kg.
Conclusions
Bearing in mind that CT contributes with 40% to the collective dose from medi-
cal exposures, there is a large potential of dose savings. If all examinations are
adjusted to the individual patient’s anatomy the contribution to the collective
dose would decrease without reducing the diagnostic security or the number of
examinations.
Diagram 3.
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Introduction
Intravascular brachytherapy is radiotherapy of the blood vessel to prevent it
from re-narrowing after angioplasty. Angioplasty is a treatment for coronary
artery disease where the artery that supplies the heart muscle with blood is
blocked or narrowed. The radiotherapy is performed to decrease the growth of
normal tissue and thus prevent the risk of restenosis, i.e. prevent it from re-
narrowing. Intravascular brachytherapy after angioplasty has decreased the
restenosis with more than 60%.
Stenosis in coronary artery
There are several different ways of treating stenosis in the coronary arteries.
PTCA (percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty) is a method where a
catheter with a small inflatable balloon on the end is guided through the blood
vessels past the section of the artery that is narrowed. The balloon is the
inflated several times to enlarge the opening in the artery and improve the
blood flow. After the balloon inflation a stent, a thin metal grid, might be placed
at the treatment area to keep the artery open. Up to 30 % of the patients get
restenosis, often because of regrowth of normal tissue. The restenosis can
appear as soon as after a couple of months after the treatment and will require
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another treatment. A stenosis where the artery is totally blocked can result in a
heart attack. In case of a multiple stenosis a by-pass surgery is made, i.e. a new
blood vessel replaces the blocked one.
Intravascular brachytherapy
Intravascular brachytherapy is radiotherapy of the blood vessel and is made
after the balloon inflation or after the stent implantation. The radiotherapy is
given to decrease the growth of normal tissue and in this way decrease the risk
of restenosis. The risk of restenosis has decreased from 30 % to 10-15 % for
these patients.
The treatment is new and is expected to advance. The irradiation can be
made with either beta or gamma emitters, for example 32P, 90Sr or 192Ir. The
treatment can be made in different ways, for example can the implanted stent
contain a radioactive substance or the radioactive substance could be inside a
balloon either as content or incorporated into the wall of the balloon. The
treatment can also be made by sealed sources that are guided to or implanted
at the treatment area. The activity in the radioactive source could be ten or so
GBq, depending on type of treatment.
The most common technique is to guide a wire with the radioactive
source on the end inside a catheter to the treatment area after balloon
inflation. It is brought directly from the machine where it is stored in to the
existent catheter in the patient, with minimal risk for contamination. The
radiation of the blood vessel lasts for a couple of minutes and the typical
Figure 1. Inflatable balloon to enlarge the opening in the artery.
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absorbed dose to the artery is approximately 15 Gy. Considering the radiation
safety for the staff, treatment with a beta emitter is preferable because of the
small radiation dose to the staff. When the treatment is given with a gamma
emitter, like 192Ir, the radiation dose to the staff can be 10 to 20 microGy per
treatment. The uncertainty in the dose planning can be as high as 60 %. In spite
of this the positive effect of the treatment is obvious. Since the treatment is
relatively new no long-time follow-up has been done
Nordic authorities
In the Nordic countries the treatment is given in six different
hospitals, about as many plans to start the treatment. One problem is that
the intravascular brachytherapy treatment procedure needs personnel from
different disciplines and needs cooperation between cardiology, oncology
and medical physics amongst others. Since so many different disciplines are
involved the responsibility must clearly be assigned. The risk for incidents
or accidents is higher since high activities are handled and the therapy is
given in an environment not used to handling radioactive sources.
The authorities’ demands on the different disciplines vary. All the
Nordic authorities demand competence in cardiology and medical physics.
Figure 2. Balloon catheter as a spiral, where the wire with the radioactive source is
centred in the middle.
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In some countries the presence of the medical physicist is needed during the
treatment. The competence in oncology might not be needed or if it is needed
the demand of presence vary. What kind of staff and how many that is supposed
to take the education course offered by the company differs between the Nordic
countries.
The handling of licences varies between the Nordic countries. In some
countries a special licence for intravascular brachytherapy has to be applied
for, while in other countries it is included in the existing licence for
radiotherapy. Who signs the application vary also and the responsibility for the
licence is ranging from the director to the cardiologist and medical physicist.
No common quality assurance program for the Nordic countries has been
developed yet, even though all countries have plans for emergencies and
periodic controls. A Nordic guidance is to be written by the Nordic group on X-
ray diagnostics.
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Abstract
X-ray departments need methods to monitor the doses delivered to the patients
in order to be able to compare their dose level to established reference levels.
For this purpose, patient dose per radiograph is described in terms of the
entrance surface dose (ESD) or dose-area product (DAP). The actual
measurement is often made by using a DAP-meter or thermoluminescent
dosimeters (TLD). The third possibility, the calculation of ESD from the
examination technique factors, is likely to be a common method for x-ray
departments that do not have the other methods at their disposal or for
examinations where the dose may be too low to be measured by the other
means (e.g. chest radiography). We have developed a program for the
determination of ESD by the calculation method and analysed the accuracy
that can be achieved by this indirect method.
The program calculates the ESD from the current time product, x-ray
tube voltage, beam filtration and focus-to-skin distance (FSD). Additionally, for
calibrating the dose calculation method and thereby improving the accuracy of
the calculation, the x-ray tube output should be measured for at least one x-ray
tube voltage value in each x-ray unit. The aim of the present work is to point
out the restrictions of the method and details of its practical application. Our
first experiences from the use of the method will be summarised.
Introduction
The diagnostic reference levels (DRL) were introduced in the EU-legislation by
the Medical Exposure Directive (MED) [1]. Therefore, in order to be able to
compare their dose levels to established DRLs, x-ray departments need
methods for monitoring patient doses.
A working party of professional organisations prepared the UK national
protocol for patient dose measurements in diagnostic radiology [2] using the
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experience from the survey organised in UK in the 1980s [3]. In that protocol,
the entrance surface dose (ESD) was recommended to be used as the quantity
to be measured for individual radiographs [4]; the measurement was based on
the use of TLDs. After that time, the use of dose-area product (DAP) meters and
methods for calculating of ESD have also become common. These methods
result to the determination of the entrance air kerma without backscatter from
the phantom (to obtain the ESD, the DAP method requires also the
determination of the x-ray beam size at the patient entrance plane). In order to
get compliance with TLD measurements, the results must then be multiplied
by the backscatter factor (BSF).
The aim of the present work is to reduce problems in using the ESD
calculation method. We intend to simplify the calculation by publishing a
computer program which will allow the x-ray technicians to perform the ESD
calculations at their departments. Further analysis of the doses and a
comparison to reference levels may also be made using the program. The
program is being developed at the Radiation Metrology Laboratory of STUK
(Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland).
Calculation of ESD
The ESD is defined as the dose absorbed in air at the surface of the patient on the
central axis of the radiation beam, and includes the radiation backscattered from
the patient (although other definitions exist as well, involving the dose in tissue
instead of air and/or exclusion of backscattered radiation). The ESD can be
calculated if the radiation yield of the x-ray tube, the current-time product (Q), the
focus-to-skin distance (FSD) and the backscatter factor are known [5]. Then
ESD = Y100 
. (100 cm/FSD)2. Q . BSF . (1)
Here, Y100 is the output of the x-ray tube (mGy/mAs) measured at 100 cm
distance from the x-ray tube focal point. For a given x-ray system, Y100 depends
mainly on the x-ray tube voltage and filtration. Variability of Y100 between different
x-ray systems exist, and can be addressed to several factors, including at least the
accuracy of indicated values (kV, mAs, filtration), the x-ray tube voltage wave form,
the x-ray tube anode angle, the smoothness of the anode surface, various
attenuating materials in the primary beam and differences in the amount of off-
focal radiation in various units.
Our ESD calculation program uses the method described in Eq (1). The
program is written in Borland Delphi Object Pascal code and can be run under
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Windows 9X/NT/2000/XP operating systems. An essential part of the program
is the automatic calculation of the x-ray tube radiation yield, which was
included to minimise the extra work needed in using of the method in x-ray
departments. The calculation of Y100 uses the method of generating computed x-
ray spectra by the theory of Birch and Marshall[6]. In addition to this, an
empirical curve depicting the x-ray tube output with a fixed amount of
filtration is used. The actual beam filtration is taken into account by modifying
the computed x-ray spectrum by the difference of the actual filtration to the
reference filtration, and calculating the change to the reference radiation yield
that the modified filtration would cause. This calculation results to the
expected radiation output of the x-ray tube, at the x-ray tube voltage and
filtration that are being used. All the factors mentioned above, affecting x-ray
tube output, cannot be modelled in the calculation. The resulting inaccuracy of
the dose calculation can then be taken care of by measuring the x-ray tube
output at one or several high-voltage settings and/or filter choices, calculating
a calibration factor (the quotient of the measured and expected doses) and
using this figure for all high-voltages and filters. The resulting calibration
factor can also be used as quality control tool: a relatively large (> 30 %)
difference between the measured and the expected tube output may indicate
problems in the adjustment of the x-ray system.
The selection of backscatter factors approximated in the program was
based on the technique factors suggested in [9] and typical radiation field sizes
and FSDs used in the examinations. BSFs were taken from data calculated
with the Monte Carlo method [10,11] and measurements [2].
Uncertainties in the calculated ESD
The standard error between the measured and calculated output was
approximately 16 % when no individual calibration data for the x-ray tube was
applied: this corresponds to the observed variability in the output of diagnostic
x-ray tubes at a fixed filtration. However, if the measured x-ray tube output is
used for calibrating the calculation, the agreement between the measurements
and calculated doses gets better. With a single calibration point (a single kV-
setting used for normalisation) for each of the x-ray units considered the stan-
dard error between measured and calculated values was 5 % in the whole range
of kVs and filters that were measured. An example of this is shown in Figure 1,
which shows the improved agreement between calculated and measured data
when the calculated data have been calibrated.
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Regardless of the actual materials in the x-ray beam, the total filtration
of an x-ray tube is normally expressed as a thickness of aluminium. This
equivalent aluminium filtration results to a similar x-ray spectrum shape (and
HVL) as the original filtration, but the intensity of x-radiation may be different
when the materials and their thicknesses are not the same. Typically, the x-ray
beam path of diagnostic x-ray tubes includes glass and insulating oil in
addition to the actual aluminum filter. In some x-ray tubes, the window is made
of beryllium: then, the radiation intensity will be higher than in a glass-window
tube. According to our calculations, the effect could be of the order of 20% and is
only weakly dependent on the x-ray tube voltage.
Our reference radiation yield curve does not consider the effect of the
target angle either, although this factor may have a notable impact to radiation
output and spectrum shape[7]. The difference between x-ray tubes with a 10o
and 22o target angle may be of the order of 20–40 % depending on the
smoothness of the target. The dependence on the x-ray tube voltage seems to be
weak.
A further factor that is not explicitly considered in our reference
radiation yield curve is off-focal radiation (radiation generated outside of the
focal spot). Its amount may vary with the x-ray tube and collimator types, and
be also dependent on the x-ray field size. Birch et al. [7] stated that the
Figure 1. An example of the calculated and measured (circles) radiation yield of x-ray
tube, Y100. The calculated curve is presented with (solid line) and without (dash line)
calibration. One radiation yield measured at 85 kV has been used for the calibration of
the program. The total filtration of the x-ray tube is 3 mm aluminium.
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contribution of off-focal radiation to the total output is between five and ten
percent. According to Weaver et al. [8] the contribution could be as high as 25 %.
Our calculation method does not explicitly consider factors relating to
the actual filter materials, the angle or smoothness of the x-ray tube target, or
off-focal radiation. These factors are included by the calibration method
explained above.
Of course, the accuracy of the indicated values (kV, mAs, filtration) is
essential for the proper functioning of the ESD-program. Therefore, the user
should ascertain that the x-ray tube voltage and the filtration are as indicated.
These can be checked by penetrameter and HVL measurements during quality
control measurements, for example. One should also ascertain that the x-ray
tube output is linear with respect to tube charge (mAs) for the whole mAs-
range used clinically. Often, tube output may be lower than expected for very
short exposures.
Inaccuracies of other data result to uncertainties, too. For example, an
error of 1 cm in the measurement of FSD causes a 3% error in the ESD at FSDs
of the order of 75 cm and the BSFs may vary by a few percent from patient to
patient. There is also variations in backscatter factors due to different tube
voltages and field sizes used in the examinations. The maximum difference
between the BSFs derived from the references mentioned above is
approximately 5%.
Comparison between measured (TLD, DAP) and calculated ESD
The ESDs calculated with the program were compared with patient doses
measured with TLDs and DAP meters in five different x-ray departments. The
total number of examinations was 148. The type of the examinations, current-
time products, tube voltages, total filtrations, FSDs and the patients’ height
and weight were recorded to enable the calculation of ESDs.
Table 1. The averages and standard deviations of the ratios of the calculated ESDs, the
ESDs measured with DAP meter and the doses measured with TLDs. The ESD-
calculation has been made with one x-ray tube radiation yield calibration value for each
x-ray tube.
Type of examination ESDcalc/ESDTLD Std (%) ESDcalc/ESDDAP Std (%) 
Abdomen AP 1,03 8,3 0,94 8,3 
Lumbar spine AP 1,03 6,7 1,04 6,2 
Lumbar spine LAT 1,01 8,9 0,97 6,0 
Chest LAT 0,99 16,6 1,01 8,2 
Chest PA 1,14 11,3 1,07 12,7 
Pelvis AP 1,00 9,4 0,90 6,1 
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The average ratios of the calculated and measured ESDs are presented
in table 1. The values show that there is good agreement between the
calculated ESDs and those measured with TLDs or DAP meters. The slightly
high ratio of calculated and measured (TLD) ESD in chest radiography in table
1 is partly caused by the low doses in those examinations: the doses may have
been too low to be measured accurately with TLDs. In the other than chest
examinations it can be approximated that the inaccuracy of calculated ESD is
between about 13% and 20% when compared to TLD measurements.
Discussion
Several things require special attention in using the ESD calculation method.
For example, errors in measurements of FSD and current-time product have
great impact on total ESD. The theoretical calculation of the radiation yield
decreases possible errors arising from manually using tube output curves by
inexperienced personnel. Anyway, the user must verify that the radiation yield
of the x-ray tube is normal and calibrate the program before using it. By using
the theoretical radiation yield without calibration the uncertainty of the yield
is about 30%. Adding one calibration value in tube information decreases the
uncertainty to less than 10%. The backscatter factors used by the program have
been chosen so that they correspond to typical tube voltages, total filtrations
and field sizes in diagnostic radiography.
If calculational methods or DAP measurements become the main method
of dose assessment, it would be useful to revise the reference doses to be
expressed in terms of the entrance air kerma free-in-air (excluding
backscattered radiation). This would help by removing one of the uncertain
factors in dose assessment.
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ty of  Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
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Introduction
According to the Medical Exposure Directive (97/43/Euratom) the radiation
doses to patients should be measured in every hospital and doses should be
compared to the reference doses established by the competent authorities.
Special attention should be paid to the paediatric x-ray examinations,
because the paediatric patients are more radiosensitive than adult patients.
The requirement of measurements of radiation dose to patients is not yet
included in the Estonian radiation act, but the purpose to join the European
Communities makes the quality control in radiology very actual in Estonia.
The necessity exists to introduce suitable measurement methods in the X-
ray departments of Estonian hospitals for establishing feedback system for
radiologists, radiographers and medical physicists in optimising the
radiation burden of patients and image quality.
Materials and methods
Patient doses in various  paediatric radiographic examinations (of pelvis,
chest, spine and head) were measured in three X-ray departments. Two of
these (H1 and H2) were located in children’s hospitals, and the third (H3)
was in a general hospital. Data were collected for more than 400
radiographs of children referred to the X-ray departments during a period
in 2000 and 2001.
Entrance surface dose (ESD) to patients was estimated from DAP
measurements and by calculations using the data of x-ray tube output and
examination techniques, expressed respectively as ESDDAP and ESDY.
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The dose-area-product  (DAP) was measured with DAP meter and
entrance surface dose (ESD) was calculated by using examination
techniques and DAP data by the formula:
where λ is the calibration coefficient (dependent on tube potential) for
DAP meter, DAPread  is the reading of DAP meter, BSF is the backscatter
factor (dependent on radiation field size and half value layer (HVL)), A is
the field size measured on the film from the patient examination, FSD is the
focus-to-skin distance, FFD is the focus-to-film distance used in this
examination.
The entrance surface dose ESDY (including backscatter) was
calculated by using the formula:
2
2
FSDA
BSFFFDDAP
ESD readDAP
×
×××
=
λ (1)
where Y100 (mGy/mAs) is the X-ray tube yield (dependent on tube
potential and filtration) at a standard distance of 100 cm from the tube
focus, MAS (mA×s) is the product of tube current (mA) and exposure time
(s), FFD100 is the film to focus distance (100 cm) used in the tube yield
measurements.
For dose-area product measurements DAP meter models 840A
(Gammex RMI, USA) and VacuDAP 2004 Type 70157 (VacuTec Meßtechnik
GmbH, Germany) were used in different hospitals. DAP meters were
calibrated in situ (i.e. DAP meter was connected to the collimator) against
the radiation monitor MDH 1015 at various tube potentials.  The MDH 1015
was calibrated in the secondary standard laboratory at the STUK, the
calibration being traceable to the National Physical Laboratory (NPL)
primary standard.
The uncertainty in the DAP and ESD measurements was assessed.
When measuring patient doses, a value of dose-area product is calculated
from the dose-area product meter reading DAPread , multiplying it with the
calibration coefficient λ at the relevant tube potential. Therefore, the
relative standard uncertainty of DAP is calculated by using the relative
uncertainties of both quantities:
2
2
100100
FSD
BSFFFDMASY
ESDY
×××
=
(2)
δu(DAP) = ( ) ( )22 ??u?u +readDAP . (3)
289
STUK-A195
The expanded relative uncertainty at k = 2 (k means coverage factor
and k = 2 means 95% confidence interval) in the DAP measurements was
estimated as ±10 % for DAP results about 100 mGy·cm2 (and at high tube
potentials) and ±17 % for results about 10 mGy·cm2 (at low tube potentials,
with added filtration). These estimates of uncertainty in the DAP
measurements are still well below the maximum acceptable combined
standard uncertainty (k = 2) of ± 25 % stipulated in the international
standard IEC 60580 for dose area product meters.
The relative standard uncertainties in ESDDAP and ESDY
measurements were assessed respectively by the Formulas 1 and 2.  The
expanded uncertainty (k = 2) in entrance dose ESDDAP measurement at
different tube potentials was assessed as minimum as ± 17 % (at 120 kV and
at DAP of 100 mGy·cm2) and as maximum as  ± 23 % (at 50 kV and at DAP of
10 mGy·cm2). For entrance dose ESDY at all values the uncertainty was
assessed as ± 11 %.
Table 1. Measured and calculated dose quantities for different age groups at H1.
Radiographic 
examination 
(projection) 
Age 
group
(years) 
Number 
of pa-
tients 
Mean DAP 
(mGy·cm2)
Mean 
ESD 
(mGy) 
1  - 4 16 15 0.49 
5  - 9 25 18 0.57 
Head Lat 
10  -16 12 24 0.68 
1  - 4 3 104 1.1 
5  - 9 21 134 1.4 
Head AP/PA  
10  -16 25 136 1.5 
<1 32 8 0.067 
1  - 4 5 90 0.48 
5  - 9 3 137 0.45 
Pelvis AP  
10  -16 2 307 0.69 
<1 18 8 0.050 
1  - 4 45 13 0.062 
5  - 9 41 32 0.097 
Chest AP/PA 
10  -16 42 43 0.096 
5  - 9 5 197 0.68 Spine AP 
10  -16 12 352 1.2 
1  - 4 1 200 0.93 
5  - 9 4 249 0.91 
Spine Lat 
10  -16 7 601 2.4 
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Figure 1. Correlation between dose-area product (DAP) and equivalent diameter (De) of
the patient in chest  and pelvis <1 year (without grid) and pelvis >1 year (with grid)
examinations.
Results
Dose-area products (DAP) and entrance skin doses (calculated by DAPs) for
six common head and trunk X-ray examinations of different paediatric age
groups are presented in Table 1. Doses for the same projections in the same
age groups differed usually up to 5 times.
Figure 1 shows the variation of log(DAP) values by equivalent
diameter of the patient De (or  ECD [2], calculated by the formula that
includes weight and height of the patient, thus taking the average density
into consideration) for examinations of chest and pelvis. The linear
correlation is significant for pelvis examination of the age group  >1 y and chest
examinations.
In the age group of infants and occasionally in the next age group (1-4y)
for pelvis AP examinations no grid was used. Comparison of DAP values
derived from fits of the data for log (DAP) versus equivalent cylindrical
diameter De (Figure 1) showed that DAPs for pelvis radiographs without a grid
were 10 % of those when a grid was used for a 14 cm patient.
In Figures 2 to 4 the mean DAPs and ESDs from the hospitals H1, H2
and H3 are compared against the levels of the best practice in paediatric
radiology based on results of UK survey by Cook et al. [1], against the Finnish
survey by Servomaa et al. [2] and against the CEC reference dose levels for 5-
year-old patients [3]. The error bars show the actual data range at H1.
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Figure 2. Mean ESD in pelvis AP examinations at H1 compared with the results from
other surveys by Cook et al. [1], Servomaa et al. [2] and EC [3].
Figure 3. Mean DAP in chest AP/PA examinations at  H1, H2 and H3 compared with the
results from other surveys by Cook et al. [1] and Servomaa et al. [2].
Figure 4. Mean DAP in head LAT examinations at  H1, H2 and H3 compared with the
results from the surveys by Cook et al. [1].
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Conclusions
The measurements reported in this study establish the basis for dose
measurements as part of the radiological quality assurance in Estonia. These
preliminary results are just indicative, but are comparable with the results of
other European surveys. The patient dose measurements are to be continued to
establish the national dose reference levels.
It was shown that ESD can be derived from DAP meter readings to an 95%
uncertainty of ± (17-23) %. The lowest value of ESD measurable by this method
was primarily limited by the resolution of the DAP meter (1 mGy cm2).
However, because of the relatively large uncertainty associated with this
method, ESD can be estimated also by the tube yield and examination
parameters, with the expanded uncertainty of ±11 %.
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Abstract
For more than 25 years scientists and executive regulators from the five Nordic
countries have collaborated within the framework of Nordic co-operation in the
field of radiation protection in X-ray diagnostics. The task group “X-ray
diagnostics” has published a number of recommendations, reports and
scientific papers, and the work in the group is summarised in this paper.
History
In the Nordic countries, a formal and practical co-operation between the
radiation protection authorities has existed for decades. The scope is to
exchange information of mutual interest, discuss regulatory questions, and for
appropriate matters produce common reports and recommendations. The
directors general from the Nordic radiation protection authorities meet
regularly. From this forum dedicated task groups are appointed to solve
various matters. Some working groups have had a more dedicated commission
and were dissolved after finishing their task. On the other hand, the task group
“X-ray diagnostics” has existed for more than 25 years, dealing both with
regulatory questions, and scientific activities. The “chief meeting” nominates
the chairman in this group, and one contact person from each country are
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selected more informally, while other contributors participate on a short notice
depending on the topics.
Many former chairmen and central co-workers such as Jon Flatby, Sten
Grapengiesser, Jonas Karlberg, Tord Walderhaug, Olli Ojala, Gunnar Saxebøl
and Ole Hjardemaal, are remembered for their excellent contributions to
radiation protection in diagnostic radiology, not to discredit the work of many of
the other members throughout the years.
Report series and advisory activities
A certain report series was designated to Nordic co-operation, popularly
called the “Flag-book” reflecting the five flags from each of the Nordic
countries on the front page. The most basic publication in this series was
brought out in 1976, issuing an implementation of the ICRP
recommendations in the Nordic countries1). The task group X-ray
diagnostics have published one report in this series, dedicated protection of
the foetus 2).
Our working group suggested another report series, as a supplement.
The aim was to have a report series with less administration and publishing
expenses. The system is coordinated from the Norwegian Radiation
Protection Authority (NRPA), who prints the covers, front pages and
colophons. The editors of each report supply each country with a master
copy of the content. The report series is dedicated ISSN 0804-5038, and
reports may be ordered from each of the national radiation protection
authorities. The task group X-ray diagnostics has published seven reports
Table 1. Reports published in the series “Report on Nordic radiation protection co-
operation”.
No 1 «Om mammografi» (svensk tekst, 1990) 
«Mammography» (english text, 1994) 
No 2 «Shielding of gonads» (english text, 1994) 
No 3 «Kvalitetskontrol og Tilsyn med Medisinsk Røntgendiagnostisk Udstyr.  
En Oversigt.» (dansk tekst, 1994) 
No 4 «Glandular tissue dose in film-screen mammography»  
(english text, 1995) 
No 5 «Nordic guidance levels for patient doses in diagnostic radiology»  
(english text, 1996) 
No 6 «Radiografutdanningen i Norden-innhold av realfag og strålehygiene» 
(norsk tekst, 1996) 
No 7 «A quality Control Programme for Radiodiagnostic Equipment :  
Acceptance tests» (english text, 1999) 
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Figure 1. Layout of the series “Report on Nordic radiation protection co-operation”.
so far 3 – 9). The titles of the reports reflect the scope of the task group, dealing
with radiation protection of the patient, education and competence of the staff,
quality control of radiological equipment, and the establishment of diagnostic
reference levels. A list of published reports in the series is shown in the table
below, and the layout of the reports can be found in figure 1.
Scientific activities
The task group X-ray diagnostics has also been active in the international
radiological society, and published a set of scientific papers, with emphasis
on the establishment of reference doses in diagnostic radiology. As dose
measure for conventional radiography and fluoroscopy, the Nordic countries
have selected the kerma-area product (KAP), which is measured with a
plane-parallel transmission ionisation chambers intercepting the entire X-
ray beam during examinations10, 11). This quantity is also applied for
interventional radiology, even though the value of entrance skin dose
should always be recognised12). By pooling the data from national
surveys in each of the five countries, the statistical power is increased,
and we have a better foundation for the establishment of the reference
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dose values. An example is shown in figure 2.
A joint survey was also arranged in 2000, considering both patient dose
and image quality in computed tomography (CT)12). The weighted CT
doseindex, the dose-length product, as well as the effective dose, were used as
patient dose parameters. The results from this pilot-study serve as input to the
establishment of reference doses in CT.
Future tasks
In the near future the task group X-ray diagnostics will focus on the following
topics
• Implementation of reference levels in conventional radiology, a process
dependent of the national regulations and the availability of measuring
equipment and local competence
• Establishment of reference levels in CT and in interventional radiology
(one or two procedures) (2002). A need for guidance and teaching in the
hospitals about the understanding of the specific dose quantities introduced
with CT is recognised.
• A pilot study for optimisation of CT protocols for paediatric patients
(2003)
• A recommendation for the management of endovascular brachy therapy
will be published as No 8 in the Nordic report series (2003) in collaboration
with a recently established Nordic working group on dosimetry and
radiotherapy.
Figure 2. Based on measurements in a selection of hospitals in all the five Nordic
countries, the total distribution of the kerma-area product (Gy · cm2) are shown for
examination of chest (Eur. Radiol. 10, 1988 – 92 (2000))11).
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Conclusion
Certainly, the development in diagnostic radiology challenges the radiological
protection society. The widespread use of X-rays in medicine means that such
examinations represent by far the largest man-made source of population
exposure to ionising radiation. The principal concern in radiological protection
is the reduction of unnecessary exposures by requiring adequate clinical
justification of an investigation and by optimisation of the patient
investigations to give minimal dose for sufficient diagnostic information. The
rapid technological development, the digitalisation of the radiological
departments and new modalities introduce the need for constantly new efforts,
and updating of our knowledge. We have for long been aware of the increasing
contribution from computed tomography (CT) to the collective effective dose.
The reduction of exposures by requiring optimisation of CT procedures is
therefore of principal concern in radiological protection. This is especially the
case for paediatric patients. We have seen that some interventional procedures
may give skin burns, and need special attention. The implementation of
reference levels is one of several tools to meet those challenges.
We also need to manage the propagation of new modalities such as
endovascular brachytherapy. What are the requirements of dosimetry, quality
control procedures and safety in source handling? Which categories of physical
and medical professions should be available to get license for conducting such
laboratories? Nordic co-operation is valuable to discuss such matters, and
sometimes we come to a mutual point of view that probably will have a wider
impact in the society compared to each countries separate policy.
References
1. Lindell B. (Ed.) Report on the Applicability of International Radiation
Protection Recommendations in the Nordic Countries. The Radiation
Protection Institutes in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
Stockholm: Liber Trykk, 1976.
2. Nordic Recommendation on Protection of the Embryo and Foetus in X-ray
Diagnostics. Recommenda-tions concerning diagnostic examinations of woman
of reproductive capacity. The Radiation Protection Institutes in Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Stockholm: Liber Trykk, 1989.
3. Leitz W. Mammography. Report on Nordic radiation protection co-operation,
No. 1. Stockholm: Statens strålskyddsinstitut, 1994
298
STUK-A195
4. Backe S. Shielding of gonads. Report on Nordic radiation protection co-
operation, No. 2. Østerås: Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 1994.
5. Hjardemaal O. Kvalitetskontrol og Tilsyn med Medisinsk
Røntgendiagnostisk Udstyr. En Oversigt. Nordisk Rapportserie om
strålskyddsfrågor, No. 3. København: Statens Institut for Strålehygieijne, 1994.
6. Servomaa A., Tapiovaara, M. Glandular tissue dose in film-screen
mammography. Report on Nordic radiation protection co-operation, No. 4.
Helsinki: Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK), 1995.
7. Saxebøl G, Olerud HM. Nordic guidance levels for patient doses in diagnostic
radiology. Report on Nordic radiation protection co-operation, No. 5. Østerås:
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 1996.
8. Olerud HM., Saxebøl G. Radiografutdanningen i Norden - innhold av realfag
og strålehygiene. Nordisk Rapportserie om strålskyddsfrågor, No. 6. Østerås:
Statens strålevern, 1996.
9. Hjardemaal O, Grøn P. A quality Control Programme for Radiodiagnostic
Equipment : Acceptance tests. Report on Nordic radiation protection co-
operation, No. 6. København: National Institute of Radiation Hygiene, 1999.
10. Saxebøl G, Olerud HM, Hjardemaal O, Leitz W, Servoma A, Walderhaug T.
Nordic guidance levels for patient doses in diagnostic radiology. Radiat Prot
Dosim 1998; 80(1/3): 99-101.
11. Grøn P, Olerud HM, Einarsson G, Leitz W, Schoultz BW, Servomaa A,
Hjardemaal O. A Nordic survey of patient doses in diagnostic radiology. Eur.
Radiol. 2000; 10: 1988-1992.
12. Widmark A, Fosmark H, Einarsson G, Gundtoft P, Hjardemaal O. Guidance
levels in the Nordic countries: A preliminary report for selected interventional
procedures. Radiat Prot Dosim 2001; 94 (1/2): 133-135.
13. Olerud HM., Torp C-G, Einarsson G, Grøn P, Leitz W, Servomaa A. Use of the
EC quality criteria as a common method of inspecting CT laboratories– a pilot
project by the Nordic radiation protection authori-ties. In: Radiological
protection of patients in diagnostic radiology, nuclear medicine and
radiotherapy. Proceedings of an international conference held in Malaga,
Spain, 26 - 30 March 2001. Vienna: IAEA, 2001.
299
STUK-A195
7 b Measurement of staff doses in interventional
procedures using LiF TL-detectors and a special
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Introduction
Personal doses vary considerably among the operational staff in cardiac
examination procedures and interventions. Correspondingly, the fluoroscopy
time may vary from a few minutes to more than 1 hour. Large personal doses in
the range of 35 - 41 mSv were registered to some interventional radiologists
and cardiologists in 2001 in Finland. Measurement of doses per intervention
from hands, shoulders and ankles (parts of the body outside the lead apron) are
therefore of interest, but small and highly sensitive dosemeters have not been
commonly available for reliable and practical measurements.
Thermoluminescent detectors of LiF:MgCu,P are sensitive enough, but
residual luminescence from previous uses of detectors and the dose collected
from natural background radiation between preparation for use and readout
may be significant sources of uncertainty. The company Unfors Instrumens AB
(Billdal, Sweden) has designed a light weight diode dosemeter with long cables
between detectors and the electronic part for simultaneous measurement of
doses from various parts of the body. The aim of this work is to report doses of
the operating staff per a cardiac examination or intervention and study the
capabilities of the diode dosemeter in staff dose measurements.
Methods
Measurement quantities
The manufacturer has calibrated the diode dosemeter  Unfors EDD-30 to measure
the personal dose equivalent Hp(10) and Hp(0,07). Because those quantities are not
ideal for extremity dose measurements and to achieve comparability between the
results of the diode and the TL dosemeters, air kerma was used as a measuring
quantity in this study. For an ideal dosemeter, air kerma can be considered as an
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estimate of the (extremity) dose  equivalent Hp (0,07) within 3%. For
convenience, the terms ´ dose’ and ´ dose rate’ are used instead of  ‘air kerma’ and
‘air kerma rate’  when referring to the measurements of personal staff doses.
Tests of diode dosemeter in laboratory conditions
The response of the diode dosemeter EDD-30 for air kerma relative to the X-ray
quality (kV and filtration) and relative to air kerma rate was studied. To
produce low air kerma rates irradiation distances up to 5 m and water slab
beam modifiers were used. Radcal 9015 dosemeter with the 180 and 1800 cm3
ionisation chambers was used as a reference dosemeter in the these tests.
Staff doses measured with TL dosemeters
The ultra sensitive LiF:Mg,Cu,P TL dosemeters were obtained from the
company Doseco Oy (Jyväskylä, Finland). TL- detectors were placed on the
shoulder, ankle and hand of the cardiologist and radiographer before the start
of the examination and intervention (Satakunta Central Hospital, Pori, Fin-
land). After the procedure each detector was disconnected from the staff for
readout later on. Each detector was thus used only during one procedure, and
altogether 200 detectors were needed for the 29 CA (cardioangiography), 12
PTCA (percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty),  and 4 pacemaker
procedures included in the study. The dose-area product (DAP) was also
recorded from each procedure to illustrate the patient doses of procedures. The
TL detectors were calibrated beforehand for air kerma and by X-ray quality of
80 kV and of 3 mm Al.
Comparison of diode and TL dosemeters for measurement of the staff
dose
One diode dosemeter including electronic device and one diode detector was
available for the comparison within TL dosemeters. The diode detector was
fixed close to its reference TL dosemeter either on the shoulder or on the ankle.
The electronic part of the diode dosemeter was fitted on the belt. The
connecting cable was fitted on the body or feet to reduce its mechanical stress.
Eight comparisons consisting of CA, PTCA interventions and placement of
pacemaker were made.
Results and discussion
Tests of diode dosemeter in laboratory conditions
Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the characteristics of the diode dosemeter. For a 4
mmAl filtered beam the response varies within 20% for kV range from 40 to
60 kV (Fig. 1.). The response decreases more deeply towards lower kV
values. For an 82 kV x-ray beam an increased response of the diode
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dosemeter is indicated relative to increased beam filtration (Fig. 2.). Totally
20% change in response is indicated relative to beam filtration studied.
Figure 1. Response of the diode dosemeter for air kerma relative to X-ray tube voltage.
For each kV used, the response is the ratio of the displayed Hp(0,07) by the diode
dosemeter to the air kerma measured by the reference instrument. Measurements are
performed free in air, without a backscatter phantom. Tube filtration 4 mmAl. Air kerma
rate 13 – 240 µGy/min. With each kV value the exposed air kerma 213 -240 µGy.
Figure 2. Response of the diode dosemeter for air kerma relative to X-ray quality
modified by filtration. The response is the ratio of the Hp(0,07) displayed by the diode
dosemeter to the air kerma measured by the reference instrument. Measurements
performed free in air, without a backscatter phantom. Tube voltage 82 kV, air kerma rate
60 – 200 µGy/min. With each filtration value the exposed air kerma 60 -230 µGy.
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Figure 3. shows that the response of the diode dosemeter is independent
of the air kerma rate down to 1,6 µGy / min. At lower air kerma rates the
response drops steeply down. This may be due to the small detector and its
associated low count rate. Further, vigorous shaking of the cable caused noise
signals which could disturb remarkably the measuring signal at low values for
the air kerma or the air kerma rate. Thus, the meter is not very well suited for
very low dose rates and dose measurements behind radiation shields.
Staff doses measured with TL dosemeters
Table 1 illustrates the partial body doses of the operating staff in various
procedures. The mean measured TL doses, the DAP values and DAP ranges
were about the same for the CA examinations and the PTCA procedures, but
were higher for the pacemaker procedures. The extremity doses of the staff
varied considerably especially for hands. The shoulder doses were
systematically larger for cardiologists than for radiographers. Difficulties to
use radiation shields between the patient and cardiologist during some phases
of the procedure explain the largest staff doses (up to 2 mGy for the ankle and
2,7 mGy for hand).
Comparison of diode and TL dosemeters for measurement of the staff
dose
Figure 4 illustrates the doses measured simultaneously on the operating staff
with the diode dosemeter and TL detectors. In six cases the results agreed
within 35%. In two cases the values differed by about a factor of 2. The main
contribution to the differences may be due to sensitivity and set-up of the
Figure 3. Response of the diode dosemeter for air kerma rate. For each air kerma rate
value used, the response is the ratio of the Hp(0,07) displayed by the diode dosemeter
to the air kerma rate measured by the reference instrument. X-ray quality: 82 kV, tube
filtration 4 mmAl.
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Table 1. The shoulder, ankle and hand doses of the operating staff, measured for 45
procedures using TL-detectors. Mean (max.) and range of DAP values is given for each
procedure.
detectors at the steep dose gradients behind the personal radiation shields. For
diode dosemeter the noise signals caused by the microphonic effects of the
cables could cause some uncertainty on the results. Furthermore, some part of
the differences can be explained by the separate calibration procedures of the
TL dosemeters and the diode dosemeter. A clear advantage of the electronic
diode dosemeter is the immediate availability of measurement results after
each examination procedure. The electronic diode dosemeters are quite useful
for personnel dose  monitoring, but they will be more suitable after detector
cabel modifications.
Figure 4. Comparison of doses measured on the cardiologist and radiographer with TL
and Unfors EDD-30 detector in 8 different interventional procedures.
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
0,18
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Examination
Do
se
 
[m
Gy
]
TLD
 Unfors EDD-31
Cardiologist Radiographer DAP 
N
Shoulder 
mSv 
Ankle
mSv 
Hand 
mSv 
Shoulder 
mSv 
Ankle 
mSv Gycm2
CA 29 mean 
max. 
0,05 
(0,17) 
0,02 
(0,14) 
0,05
(0,13)
0,02 
(0,06) 
0,03
(0,12)
39,4
(6,02-135)(***
PTCA 12 mean 
max. 
0,06 
(0,16) 
0,02 
(0,07) 
0,075(*
(0,09)
0,02 
(0,06) 
0,06
(0,12)
38,0
(1,89-126)(*** 
Pace-
maker 
4 mean 
max. 
0,12 
(0,23) 
0,88(*
(1,98) 
2,7(** 0,09(** 0,30(** 62,3 
(13,9-179) (***
All  mean 0,06 0,09 0,27 0,02 0,05 41,1 
 *)  3 interventions,  (* * one intervention  (***range
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Purpose
Nearly 9% of all x-ray examinations in Finland are performed with patients
below 16 years of age. The percentage of x-ray examinations at university
hospitals for patients below 16 years is about 15 %. Paediatric thorax
examinations cover almost 30 % of all children’s examinations. The risk of late
effects due to radiation is assumed to be 3 – 4 times larger for children than for
30 – 40-year-old adults. The EC has introduced recommendations on quality
criteria for paediatric x-ray examinations [1]. The EC Medical exposure
directive (MED) 97/43/Euratom [2] requires medical radiation exposure to be
determined in regular x-ray examinations and the obtained values to be
compared to national reference values. The directive also assumes that the x-
ray examination procedure is evaluated and the use of radiation is optimised in
order to reduce the exposure. Radiation doses to children should be given
special attention[3]. In Finland there are no reference values yet concerning
exposure in paediatric x-ray examinations [4, 5]. In a joint quality project of
HUCH and STUK the aim is to determine the radiation doses and assess the
image quality in paediatric thorax examinations. The purpose is to optimise the
x-ray examination procedure thus reducing the radiation exposure to children
as much as possible.
Material and methods
The doses of radiation exposure for children of different ages were determined at
HUCH Hospital for Children and Adolescents. The breakdown by age was: the
new-born, <30 d, 30 d - <1y, 1 - <5y, 5 - <10y, 10 - <16y. Exposure measurements
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were performed for approximately 300 paediatric thorax examinations. There
were about 530 single images in ap, pa and lateral projections. The dose area
product, DAP (mGy × cm2), was measured by a Gammex RMI 840A Dose Area
Product Meter and Gammex RMI 841-C chamber. The chamber chosen was an
especially sensitive one since the measured dose area product of children X-ray
examinations can be much lower than that of the adult patient. The DAP meter
was calibrated for various filtrations and tube voltages at the hospital. The
entrance surface dose, ESD (mGy), was determined by calculation. For this
purpose the air kerma was measured by an ionisation chamber and Radcal
9015 radiation monitor. The field size of the radiation beam was defined from
all images. Various imaging techniques (anti-scatter grid, tube voltage,
filtration) were tested for optimising the radiation dose and the image quality.
The image quality was evaluated from clinical patient x-ray images by
radiologists and radiographers using an evaluating indicator specially
developed for this purpose. With the aid of PCXMC calculating programme [6]
the results were also used to calculate the effective dose to patients of different
ages.
Results
The results (DAP and ESD) are represented by age groups. The measured doses
were distinctively below the EC recommendation limit. For example, the ESD
doses for 5-10-year-olds were: ap 47 µGy and in lat. projection 85 µGy (the EC
recommendation for 5-year-olds is 100 µGy and 200 µGy, respectively). The
calculated effective dose (ap/pa + lat. projections) caused by this study was 0,02
mSv. By changing the imaging technique (anti-scatter grid, filtering) the
radiation dose was decreased by 30 - 60 % from the original while the image
quality remained good. The image quality was observed to stay good on average
and repetitions were called for very rarely. Without the anti-scatter grid (<5 y)
the image quality was good enough, but then again the quality was more
affected by the image field size and the imaging values, e.g. the mAs value. The
image quality was not satisfactory using 80 k V (1 - <5 y). In examination
situation an assistant was needed for all below 5-year-olds and for half of the 5
– 10-year-olds.
Conclusions
Many children need several recurrent x-ray examinations during their
treatment that may accumulate to a remarkable radiation dose. University
hospitals should pay special attention to the quality of examinations and to
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Figure. Entrance surface dose (ESD) in thorax (ap) examinations by changing the
imaging technique (with and without grid) for children aged 1/12-<1 and 1 – <5 years.
radiation exposure doses. Using the dose area product measuring the DAP-
meter must be sensitive enough for paediatric X-ray examinations. The
obtained doses give a great starting point to determine the national reference
values for paediatric thorax examinations. The results show that with careful
optimising of image quality and other dose-sensitive factors the radiation dose
can be considerably reduced in paediatric examinations.
Table. Dose area product (DAP), entrance surface dose (ESD) and calculated effective
dose (mSv) in thorax examinations. Comparison with quidelines on best practices [7]
and diagnostic reference levels [1].
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0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
grid 12:1 grid 8:1 without grid
ES
D 
(m
G
y)
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1/12-1 y
Dose-area product 
(mGy cm2)
Entrance surface dose  
(mGy) 
Effective dose 
(mSv)  
Exami-
nation  
(proj.) 
Age 
group 
(years) 
Number 
of
pa-
tients 
Mean  
DAP 
Third 
quartie
Cook
[7]
Mean  
ESD 
Third 
quartile
Cook 
[7]
Diagnostic 
reference 
level [1] 
This 
work
Cook  
[7]
Chest < 1/12 15 3,4 4,2 2 0,043 0,045 0,02 0,080 0,01 < 0,01 
(AP/PA) 1/12 - 
<1 
37 6,2 7,3 3 0,042 0,042 0,02  0,01 < 0,01 
 1 –  <5 40 11 14 5 0,047 0,057 0,03 0,100 0,01 < 0,01 
 5 – <10 41 20 22 16 0,057 0,060 0,04 0,100 0,01 < 0,01 
 10 - 
<16
41 32 39 29 0,060 0,068 0,05  0,01 < 0,01 
            
Chest  1/12 -
<1 
37 9,7 11 10 0,067 0,072 0,06  0,02 < 0,01 
(Lat) 1 - <5 40 18 22 23 0,085 0,095 0,08 0,200 0,01 < 0,01 
 5 - <10 41 34 36 23 0,139 0,125 0,08 0,200 0,01 < 0,01 
 10 - 
<16
41 87 113 44 0,209 0,255 0,14  0,02 < 0,01 
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Abstract
Dose-area products (DAP) in paediatric radiography were measured in four
university hospitals in Finland. The entrance surface dose (ESD) was
calculated from the measured DAP value for each radiographic projection. The
purpose was to combine the results with other European studies for
development of diagnostic reference levels for paediatric X-ray examinations.
The study included 740 paediatric patients, and a total of 1500 single
projections were recorded, including 660 projections from extremities. Results
were compared with recommended best practices and diagnostic reference
levels for ESD. Ratios of DAP to ESD were studied to estimate the levels of
DAP corresponding to recommended ESD reference levels. It is desirable for
practical purposes that diagnostic reference levels for radiographic projections
are also expressed in terms of dose-area product.
Introduction
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has
recommended  diagnostic reference levels (DRL), applying to easily measurable
quantities, to be used for the optimisation of protection of medical exposures of
patients [1]. The Medical Exposure Directive (MED) 97/43/Euratom [2]
introduced the diagnostic reference levels into regulatory use as a tool for
optimisation and quality assurance, and required regular assessment of
quantities related to patient dose and comparison of these quantities with
nationally established diagnostic reference levels. The directive also requested
determination of dose distributions and population doses from medical
exposures, and focused special attention on the optimisation and quality
assurance of paediatric diagnostic examinations.
For monitoring patient dose in radiographic examinations, the
entrance surface dose (ESD) or dose-area product (DAP) can be determined.
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For radiographic projections, the diagnostic reference levels are typically
available for ESD only. ESD or DAP values for single projections are also
needed in calculating organ doses for risk assessment or effective dose
determination. Special reference dose levels are needed for paediatric patients,
at least for the smallest children, because optimal patient doses depend
strongly on patient thickness, and because estimated radiation risks to
children are typically higher than to adults receiving equal organ doses. It is,
however, rather complicated to establish diagnostic reference levels for
paediatric patients because of wide ranges of patient size.
European recommendations for DRL values for paediatric patients have
been published in European guidelines on quality criteria for diagnostic
radiographic images [3] and in the Radiation Protection series [4].
Development of diagnostic reference levels in paediatric radiology, including
computed tomography and fluoroscopic examinations, has been discussed in
European research project on radiation protection in paediatric X-ray
examinations [5-8]. Results from dose-area product measurements during the
project in Finland for radiographic projections are reported in this study.
Results from fluoroscopic examinations among paediatric patients in Finland
have been published earlier [9].
Material and methods
Dose-area products among paediatric patients in radiographic examinations
were measured at Helsinki, Turku, Oulu and Kuopio university hospitals.
Patient age, sex, height and weight were recorded for each examination and, for
each projection, the measured DAP value and relevant examination
techniques, such as filtration, tube voltage, current-time product, field size on
the film, focus to film distance and focus to skin distance. Corresponding
entrance surface dose (ESD) was calculated from the DAP value, multiplying it
by the backscattering factor and dividing by the field area at the entrance
surface plane. The dose-area products were measured using a transmission
ionisation chamber (RMI Gammex DAP 840) which was calibrated at the X-ray
laboratory of STUK and at the hospitals for various filtrations and tube
voltages [9].
The study in the four hospitals included a total of 740 paediatric patients,
who were less than 16 years old at examination. A total of 1500 single
radiographic projections were recorded, including 660 projections from
extremities. Patients were classified into four age groups: under 1 year, 1 - 4
years, 5 - 9 years and 10 - 15 years. Because the number of subgroups was high,
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the number of patients was relatively low in many subgroups. The mean,
minimum and maximum values of DAP and ESD were determined, and also
the standard deviation, median and third quartile when relevant. Results were
compared with British guidelines on best practices [10] and European
recommendations for ESD reference levels [3,4]. Ratios of mean DAP to mean
ESD were studied to estimate the levels of DAP corresponding to recommended
ESD reference levels.
Results
Results from 15 examinations and 27 radiographic projections are collected in
Table 1. The number of patients, and the mean values of patient age, height and
weight, dose-area product and entrance surface dose are shown for each
projection and age group. For comparison, the DAP and ESD values
corresponding to the best practice [10] are shown for each subgroup. European
DRL recommendations [3,4] for standard 5-year-old patients are shown at age
groups of 1 - 4 years and 5 - 9 years, according to the guidance [3] of applying
the same levels to both groups. These diagnostic reference levels are only
available as ESD values, not as dose-area products.
The ratios of DAP to ESD, calculated from the best practice DAP and ESD
values [10] and from the mean values of this study, are shown to allow some
comparison and assessment of dose-area products corresponding to established
ESD diagnostic reference levels. Among paediatric patients the DAP/ESD ratio
typically increases with increasing age because it is proportional to X-ray field
area; the ratio is equal to the quotient of the area and the backscattering factor.
Among the four age groups the DAP/ESD ratio typically ranges, approximately,
from 150 cm2 to 300 cm2 for skull, to 400 cm2 for chest lateral and to 600 cm2 for
chest AP projections. The range is about 200 - 600 cm2 for abdomen, 100 - 300
cm2 for lumbar spine, 100 - 200 cm2 for knee, 50 - 150 cm2 for ankle and elbow,
and 50 - 100 cm2 for wrist examinations. The pactices and projections used in
hip and pelvis examinations in the Finnish hospitals are not directly
comparable with the guidelines on best practice [10].
The values of DAP and ESD vary over a large scale and have a skew,
typically lognormal distribution. Calculated value of linear standard deviation
is thus typically high, and the mean value is typically between median and
third quartile. Typical mean ESD values resulting from this study are lower
than European DRL recommendations [3,4]. Measured DAP values are also
typically lower than corresponding ESD reference levels multiplied by an
estimated DAP/ESD ratio related to age, examination and projection.
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Table 1. Dose-area product (DAP) and entrance surface dose (ESD) in paediatric
radiographic examinations. Comparison with best practices [10] and diagnostic
reference levels (DRL) [3,4].
Examination Patients DAP (mGy cm2) ESD (mGy) DAP/ESD (cm2)
(projection) Age  
group 
(years) 
Number 
of       
patients  
Mean 
age 
(years) 
Mean 
height 
(cm) 
Mean 
weight 
(kg) 
Mean, 
this  
work 
Best  
practice 
[10] 
 Mean, 
this  
work 
Best
practice  
[10] 
DRL
[3,4] 
This  
 work 
Best
practice  
[10] 
            
Skull  < 1 8 0,28 59 5,9 95 22 0,61 0,15 156 147 
(AP) 1 - 4 5 3,4 99 16 221 80 0,96 0,48 1,5 230 167 
5 - 9 5 8,2 120 24 342 110 1,07 0,73 1,5 320 151 
10 - 15 3 11,1 138 40 352 204 1,27 0,94  277 217 
Skull  < 1 7 0,26 58 5,6 81 14 0,45 0,09  180 156 
(Lat) 1 - 4 5 3,4 99 16 145 53 0,56 0,30 1,0 258 177 
5 - 9 3 7,3 112 20 196 60 0,73 0,36 1,0 268 167 
10 - 15 3 11,1 138 40 273 112 0,81 0,46 337 243 
            
Chest newborn 
(AP) 0,5-2 kg 29 0,05 37 0,9 3,4 2 0,04 0,02 0,08 91 100 
Chest < 1 37 0,44 62 6,4 8,9 3 0,05 0,02 0,10 181 150 
(AP/PA) 1 - 4 61 2,7 91 13,5 22 5 0,07 0,03 0,10 299 167 
5 - 9 24 7,1 123 24 33 16 0,08 0,04 0,10 417 400 
10 - 15 31 13 155 47 71 29 0,12 0,05 586 580 
            
Chest  < 1 33 0,47 64 6,6 12 10 0,07 0,06 171 167 
(Lat) 1 - 4 60 2,7 91 13,5 35 23 0,14 0,08 0,20 250 288 
5 - 9 23 7,1 123 24 59 23 0,17 0,08 0,20 343 288 
10 - 15 30 12,9 155 47 124 44 0,27 0,14  459 314 
Chest,  < 1 55 0,25 56 5,0 3,4 3 0,021 0,02 0,10 164 150 
heart 1 - 4 8 2,3 88 13,3 26 5 0,08 0,03 0,10 311 167 
(AP/PA) 5 - 9 7 6,6 115 20 34 16 0,09 0,04 0,10 368 400 
10 - 15 9 13 153 48 96 29 0,149 0,05 647 580 
            
Chest,  < 1 54 0,26 56 5,1 5,3 10 0,033 0,06 160 167 
heart 1 - 4 8 2,3 88 13,3 42 23 0,16 0,08 0,20 259 288 
(Lat) 5 - 9 7 6,6 115 20 48 23 0,16 0,08 0,20 298 288 
10 - 15 9 13 153 48 149 44 0,33 0,14  445 314 
Abdomen < 1 4 0,39 62 5,4 27 9 0,11 0,05  245 180 
(AP) 1 - 4 8 3,3 96 16 145 30 0,40 0,16 1,0 363 188 
5 - 9 1 7,9 125 25 248 74 0,39 0,25 1,0 631 296 
10 - 15 6 12,4 151 49 1275 360 2,06 0,66 619 545 
            
Urography < 1 7 0,42 61 6,1 181 1,17 155 
(AP) 1 - 4 10 2,7 93 14,4 456  2,1   218  
5 - 9 5 7,0 123 28 819 2,85 287 
10 - 15 7 12,8 149 42 1846  4,0   465  
Lumbar  < 1 1 0,55 59 5,1 27 10 0,29 0,19  92 53 
spine 1 - 4 4 2,2 88 12 105 48 0,49 0,37 214 130 
(AP) 5 - 9 5 7,5 133 33 234 232 1,08 0,98  217 237 
10 - 15 7 13,3 154 48 764 541 2,43 1,75 314 309 
            
Lumbar  < 1 1 0,55 59 5,1 69 12 0,73 0,14 95 86 
spine 1 - 4 4 2,2 88 12 120 104 0,65 0,70  185 149 
(Lat) 5 - 9 5 7,5 133 33 552 300 3,19 1,52 173 197 
10 - 15 8 13,3 151 46 1346 2216 5,22 8,46  258 262 
Hip < 1 12 0,53 65 7,5 12 5 0,10 0,07  120 71 
(AP) 1 - 4 14 2,6 89 12,6 47 68 0,27 0,22 174 309 
5 - 9 15 6,8 118 23 91 150 0,53 0,42  172 357 
10 - 15 23 12,6 152 48 314 292 1,24 1,13 253 258 
            
Hip 1 - 4 8 3,7 102 18 66 68 0,47 0,22 140 309 
(Med.lat) 5 - 9 9 7,0 123 26 61 150 0,42 0,42  145 357 
10 - 15 20 12,5 152 48 243 292 1,11 1,13 219 258 
            
Pelvis < 1 5 0,5 68 8,3 13 5 0,09 0,07 0,20 144 71 
(AP) 1 - 4 10 2,4 90 14 53 68 0,26 0,22 0,90 204 309 
5 - 9 5 7,4 121 23 170 150 0,57 0,42 0,90 298 357 
10 - 15 4 13,3 154 55 1743 292 2,80 1,13  623 258 
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Table 1. Continues.
Examination Patients DAP (mGy cm2) ESD (mGy) DAP/ESD (cm2)
(projection) Age  
group 
(years) 
Number 
of       
patients  
Mean 
age 
(years) 
Mean 
height 
(cm) 
Mean 
weight 
(kg) 
Mean,  
this  
work 
Best  
practice 
[10] 
 Mean, 
this  
work 
Best
practice  
[10] 
DRL
[3,4] 
This  
 work 
Best
practice  
[10] 
            
Femur 1 - 4 5 2,7 93 21 17 0,08 205 
(AP) 5 - 9 4 7,4 122 25 85  0,24   356  
10 - 15 10 14,2 156 57 246 0,73 338 
            
Femur 1 - 4 3 3,2 102 29 19 0,09 222 
(Lat) 5 - 9 4 7,4 122 25 66  0,19   345  
10 - 15 6 14,1 166 56 116 0,31 380 
            
Knee < 1 1 0,93 71 8,5 2,5 8 0,03 0,09 83 89 
(AP) 1 - 4 1 4,5 106 18 11 11 0,09 0,09  121 122 
5 - 9 4 7,9 129 29 19 20 0,17 0,12 114 167 
10 - 15 22 14,6 163 56 110 19 0,51 0,10  214 190 
Knee  < 1 1 0,93 71 8,5 1,3 8 0,015 0,07  83 114 
(Lat) 1 - 4 1 4,5 106 18 10 12 0,08 0,08 122 150 
5 - 9 3 8,0 132 29 13 20 0,08 0,12  164 167 
10 - 15 29 14,5 163 56 122 20 0,53 0,10 230 200 
            
Lower leg < 1 3 0,51 69 8,7 2,5 0,02 124 
(AP) 1 - 4 8 2,9 92 14 12  0,06   195  
5 - 9 10 7,7 126 26 17 0,08 228 
10 - 15 27 13,9 161 51 29  0,08   345  
Lower leg  < 1 2 0,51 69 8,7 5,6  0,034   166  
(Lat) 1 - 4 8 2,8 91 14 12 0,06 205 
5 - 9 12 8,0 127 27 18  0,08   232  
10 - 15 25 13,9 161 51 33 0,09 352 
            
Ankle 1 - 4 4 3,4 96 14 2,4 5 0,028 0,08 86 63 
(AP) 5 - 9 5 7,6 127 26 18 10 0,14 0,09  129 111 
10 - 15 11 14,0 156 46 35 15 0,22 0,11 159 136 
            
Ankle  1 - 4 4 3,5 92 12,5 4,9 5 0,05 0,08 105 63 
(Lat) 5 - 9 4 7,6 129 26 15 10 0,20 0,09  76 111 
10 - 15 12 13,9 155 45 60 15 0,29 0,11 209 136 
            
Elbow 1 - 4 5 3,5 103 17 11 4 0,10 0,08 105 50 
(AP) 5 - 9 10 7,5 125 25 6,4 8 0,05 0,09  124 89 
10 - 15 7 13 152 43 12 10 0,12 0,11 102 91 
            
Elbow  1 - 4 6 3,5 103 17 10 4 0,10 0,08 96 50 
(Lat) 5 - 9 10 7,5 125 25 5,7 12 0,05 0,09  110 133 
10 - 15 7 13 152 43 12 15 0,12 0,10 97 150 
            
Forearm 1 - 4 6 2,4 80 10 12 0,10 123 
(AP) 5 - 9 14 8,3 128 27 13  0,08   165  
10 - 15 8 13 142 35 12 0,06 198 
            
Forearm 1 - 4 5 2,3 78 9 3,8 0,03 109 
(Lat) 5 - 9 13 8,4 128 28 12  0,07   165  
10 - 15 8 13 142 35 11 0,06 184 
            
Wrist < 1 1 0,8 70 8,3 1,3 2 0,02 0,06 60 33 
(AP) 1 - 4 1 4,9 113 19 6,4 4 0,06 0,07  103 57 
5 - 9 16 6,9 125 26 5,0 6 0,05 0,08 97 75 
10 - 15 26 13 155 46 6,3 8 0,06 0,09  103 89 
Wrist  1 - 4 1 4,9 113 19 5,6 4 0,07 0,07  80 57 
(Lat) 5 - 9 16 7,0 125 26 4,8 6 0,06 0,09 79 67 
10 - 15 23 13 156 47 6,1 8 0,07 0,09  94 89 
a Finnish diagnostic reference level for adult patients, when different from European DRL [3,4] 
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In most examinations the mean DAP and ESD values of this study are
higher, by a factor of 2 to 3, than the values from the guidelines on best practice
[10]. In some subgroups, such as skull lateral (under 1 year) and knee
projections (10 - 15 years), the factor is as high as 5. There are also subgroups in
which the Finnish mean values are slightly lower than the values from ref. [10].
In most of these cases the measured DAP value is very low and may thus have
been affected by large uncertainties due to a nonlinear response of the DAP
meter and insufficient resolution of reading.
Among the subgroups of Table 1, there are a total of 77 subgroups whose
mean values result from two or more hospitals. The mean DAP or ESD of a
single hospital was more than twice the total mean in 21 subgroups: 4 in elbow,
hip and chest projections, 3 in ankle and pelvis, and 1 in forearm, lumbar spine
and chest-heart projections. The distribution of these cases among the four
participating hospitals was 1, 2, 5 and 13 cases per hospital. In 14 cases the
high value was the only result from that hospital in the subgroup.
Conclusions
Comparisons of the measured dose-area products and derived entrance surface
doses between hospitals and with recommended diagnostic reference levels
[3,4] and best practices [10] seem to demonstrate that patient doses in
paediatric radiography can be reduced if optimised imaging techniques are
used. It is thus important to establish national reference levels or other
guidance for the X-ray examinations of paediatric patients. Dose dependence
on patient thickness and wide ranges in patient size are major problems in
developing reference levels for paediatric radiology [7,8]. Dose-area product
depends on patient size more strongly than ESD.
As the dose-area product is proportional to the radiation energy
imparted to the body, it may represent the exposure of patient to radiation even
better than the entrance surface dose. For dose-area product measurements
among the smallest children the sensitivity, linearity and calibration of the
DAP meter are important. Entrance surface dose can be derived from the
measured dose-area product if the field area at the entrance surface plane is
determined accurately, which may be difficult in practice. To avoid repeated
extra calculations from DAP to ESD, the diagnostic reference levels should also
be established in terms of dose-area product.
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7e The effect of image receptor change on
radiation exposure to patients in the intensive care
of chest X-ray examinations
Kettunen A1, Servomaa A2
1Oulu Polytechnic, Oulu, Finland,  2STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority, Helsinki, Finland
Introduction
Digital imaging is becoming increasingly popular in radiology. The use of
imaging plates is now common even in small X-ray departments and health
centers. The effect of the imaging plates on dose and image quality has been
studied and compared with the conventional film-screen system1-5. In the
beginning, the change in image receptor may cause many problems with regard
to the radiation dose to patients. With a film-screen system, the optical density
of the film effectively limits the dose to the patient, but in digital imaging this
limitation does not exist. When a film-screen system is changed to a digital
imaging plate system, there is no evidence indicating whether the dose is
increasing or decreasing. In this study, the dose to the patient in bedside chest
examinations was studied over a five-year period.
Materials and methods
The measurements were made in a university hospital over a five-year period.
The image receptors were changed during the study period as follows: a)
conventional film-screen system (Kodak Lanex Medium and T-Mat E); b) Fuji’s
imaging plates with small film size (digital 1); c) Fuji’s imaging plates with
large film size (digital la and digital 1b); and d) Agfa’s IP imaging plate (digital
2). The staff using the X-ray unit was mainly the same throughout this period6.
In all, 507 chest ap X-ray examinations were performed for patients (aged 18–
90 years, mean age 58.4 years) in the intensive care unit by means of the mobile
X-ray unit. The surface dose (ESD) was calculated on the basis of the radiation
output of the X-ray tube and the examination techniques7. Effective doses were
calculated by using the ODS-60 program8.
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Results
Table 1 shows the entrance surface doses (ESD) and effective doses  (Eeff) with
various image receptors.
The radiation dose to the patient observed in this study is rather high
compared against the European guidelines (0.3 mGy in chest pa). The main
reason for this is the short focus-film distance (range 88–130 cm, average 103.6
cm) when the mobile X-ray unit is used. The total filtration was 3 mmAl. The
average radiation dose to the patient increased after changing to a new digital
image receptor except in the case of the most recent change. The average body
mass index (BMI) with various image receptors are shown in table 1 and in
Figure 2. The exposure area in examinations of female patients became wider
when using all the digital systems except the last receptor (width of the field:
conventional 35.8 cm; digital I 38.4 cm; digital Ia 40.4cm; digital Ib 39.5 cm; and
digital 2 33.7 cm). The size of the exposure area on the image receptor was
measured by the radiographer who made the chest - x-ray examination.
According to the recommendations of STUK9, for being included in dose
measurements for establishing DRL or chyecking compliance with them the
patient’s weight should be between 55 and 85 kg, average 70 kg. The data for
this study comprised 335 patients weighing from 55 to 85 kg. The trend of the
dose was still the same as for all patients (Figure 1).
Conclusion
Introduction of a new image receptor requires a lot of work, especially in the
case of digital imaging plates, which are sensitive to imaging techniques.
The results show that average radiation doses to patients increased rather
than decreased after a new digital imaging receptor was taken into use. One
reason for this may be the high latitude of the imaging plates. The
limitation of radiation field size, the use of a grid and the noise level in
image quality are also affecting the dose level.
Table 1.
Image receptor BMI 
Average             
        ESD (mGy) 
Average          Range 
          Eeff  (mSv)  
Average        Range   
film-screen 29,9                   0,67                0.26-1.03 0.14               0.054-0.25 
digital1 26 0,74                0.38-1.37 0.16               0.085-0.27 
digital1a 17,1 0,82                0.22-1.52 0.17               0.069-0.36 
digital1b 26,5 1,07                0.39-3.39 0.20               0.07-  0.67 
digital2 24,7 0,66                0.27-1.30 0.12               0.03-  0.26 
BMI=body mass index (kg/m2)
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Figure 1. ESD for different receptors with patients of “normal” size.
Figure 2. Body mass index of the “normal” sized patients with different image receptors.
As seen in Figure 2, the patients’ BMI was nearly the same throughout the study, and
was even the lowest for the last digital image receptor.
The use of digital imaging also places new demands on radiographers.
The portable chest radiograph remains one of the simplest examinations used
at the bedside to evaluate the cardiopulmonary status of patients and the
position of lines, tubes and monitoring devices10. According to a study by Wag-
ner et al11, 60% of patients in intensive care units receive life support therapy,
35% have central venous lines, 18% have pulmonary artery catheters and 38%
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receive mechanical ventilation. These facts make x- ray examinations of the
seriously ill patients in intensive care units a very demanding task. Lack of
education and training in the use of digital imaging plates at the beginning of
the 1990s caused many problems with imaging techniques. The image quality
was not as good as the previous image quality. The radiation dose was therefore
increased in order to improve the image quality. In addition, the radiation field
was not limited as strictly as before; this also meant increasing radiation doses.
As the years passed, radiographers got more information on and experience of
how to use the imaging plate system, enabling them to find the optimal
imaging technique for the bedside chest examinations. Now, after the five-year
period, the dose to the patient is at the same level with imaging plates as it was
earlier with a conventional film-screen system.
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Abstract
Health centres play an important role in performing X-ray examinations in
Finland because about 40 % of X-ray examinations are done there. In some
small health centres, people who lack the proper radiation protection education
are performing X-ray examinations. The work of health care personnel
conducting X-ray examinations and their need for education and training in
radiation protection were studied in 16 health centres. Other than
radiographers, about 60% of the staff members participating in this study
replied that their education was not adequate and that they would need
additional education and training.
Introduction
The Medical Directive (97/43/Euratom)1  sets special requirements for health
care personnel’s education and training in radiation protection.
Recommendations concerning continuing education and training after
qualification and after the introduction of new techniques have been put
forward by the European Commission2. In Finland, some 250 health centres
conduct about 40% of all X-ray examinations and roughly 42% of all paediatric
X-ray examinations3. In the health centres, the X-ray studies are conducted by
the radiographers, registered nurses, practical nurses, ambulance attendants
and some other staff groups. Some small health centres delegate X-ray-related
tasks to staff members who have no formal radiation protection education
aside from being experienced in their work.
Health centres are responsible for reporting on various aspects of the
organisation of radiation safety – including staff competence, activities, the
qualifications of the operating personnel and the distribution of
responsibilities – to the radiation protection authority. The purpose of this
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study was to gather information on the use of staff members lacking the proper
radiation safety education to perform X-ray examinations in health centres.
Material and methods
The tasks of health care personnel conducting X-ray examinations and their
need for education and training in radiation protection were studied in 16
health centres4. The adequacy, experience and level of staff members’ formal
knowledge of radiation protection, their experience and preparedness for X-
raying, quality control and patient protection, and staff members’ need for
continuing radiation protection education and their willingness to participate
in such training were studied among health centre personnel by means of
questionnaires. The quality assurance, radiation dose to patients or image
quality performed in practice were not checked in this study.
According to the survey carried out in the health centres concerned, X-
ray examinations are conducted by 16 radiographers, 6 registered nurses, 8
practical nurses, 12 ambulance attendants and 3 health centre assistants;
altogether 45 people.
Results
The personnel participating in this study comprised a total of 33 staff members,
who were distributed as follows: radiographers, 46%; registered nurses, 18%;
hospital and ambulance attendants, 21%; and practical nurses, 9%.
Radiographers conducted about 64% of all X-ray examinations, the others 36%.
Altogether about 66,900 examinations a year are carried out in these
health centres. On average, 4460 studies were conducted per health centre.
The annual number of examinations carried out in a health centre ranged from
1000 to 7500.
Figure 1 shows the total number of examinations and the number of
examinations performed by radiographers in the health centres included in
this study. In 10 of the health centres, radiographers carried out almost all of
the examinations while in the other health centres, a considerable proportion
of examinations was carried out by other staff.
According to the results based on the respondents’ answers, staff
radiographers reported that their education and training was adequate.
Among the respondents who were not radiographers, 61 % reported that their
education was not adequate, 33% was satisfied with their radiation protection
education, and about 6% didn’t respond to this question.
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Figure 1. Total number of X-ray examinations per year and number of examinations
carried out by radiographers in various health centres.
Figure 2 shows the combined average values for the responses concerning
the level of knowledge with regard to X-ray units, radiation protection and imaging
techniques for the various personnel groups.
The figure 2 shows clear difference in the average values for the levels of
knowledge among the various personnel groups. According to the personnel’s own
assessment, radiographers had the best level of knowledge and practical nurses
had the lowest level of knowledge.
The As seen in figure 1 in some health centers  registered nurses, hospital
and ambulance attendants or practical nurses made 50% of the x-ray
examinations. In other places they made only  a small amount during evenings,
nights, weekends and  radiographer’s holiday. They made chest, bone and sinus x-
ray examinations. In addition the ambulance attendants made also lateral skull
and OPTG -examinations. In all groups of no-radiographer the number of  X-ray
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examinations is approximately on the same level, but the amount of the persons in
each varies. That’s why some registered nurses and hospital and ambulance
attendants do not make very often X-ray examinations.
Conclusions
Health centres play an important role in performing X-ray examinations in Fin-
land because about 40% of X-ray examinations are done there. In some small
health centres, people who lack the proper radiation protection education are
performing X-ray examinations. Excluding the radiographers, about 60% of the
personnel groups included in this study reported that they lacked adequate
education and they need additional education and training. The personnel with the
lowest qualifications did not know much about the theory and basic concepts of
imaging.
The current situation poses many questions. The health centre’s medical
doctor (who is not a radiologist) is the radiation safety officer responsible for the
safe use of radiation at the health centre. This appears to cause some problems in
providing the personnel with radiation safety knowledge. One topical task would
be to provide continuing education and training in radiation protection for health
centre personnel. The ultimate goal is to provide all health centres with
radiographers for conducting X-ray examinations. Although the topic of this study
is not a general problem, it is important that the issue is recognised and that all
possible efforts are made to resolve it.
Figure 2. Combined average values for the responses concerning the level of
knowledge with regard to X-ray units, radiation protection and imaging techniques for
the various personnel groups.
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Introduction
The use of ionising radiation in a medical examination of a woman caring a
child is not always possible to avoid. The following situations can occur:
1. The pregnancy of the patient is known and the examination has to be
performed due to  medical reason
2. The pregnancy of the patient  is unknown at the time of examination
Methods to identify pregnant women at radiological departments in
Sweden are already in use, but national rules and methods to calculate the
individual dose to the unborn child for different examinations are less
evaluated. There is a need of standards for the calculations, estimations and
documentation of the radiation dose to the unborn child. According to
directives from the European Commission (EUR 16260 En, 1995 and EUR
16262 EN, 1998), every X-ray examination has to be justified and optimised.
The aim of this study is to determine the absorbed dose to the unborn
child for common radiation diagnostic examinations used in Sweden and to find
a standardised method for dose calculations.
Material and methods
Conventional X-ray
The absorbed dose to fetus has been calculated and measured for the following
examinations: chest, bedside chest, lumbar spine, abdomen, hip, pelvis,
urography, and barium enema at Linköping University Hospital and County
Hospital Ryhov. The absorbed dose to the uterus has been used for simulation
of the dose to the fetus. This approximation can be used for a fetus smaller
than 12 weeks (3 months). The fetus size is starting to change more rapidly
in the weeks 16-20 (after 4-5 months) ( ICRP/22/136/01 Draft Report, 2001).
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Two available calculation programs have been used WinODS (Rados ODS-60
(WinODS) User guide, 1996 and Servomaa et al, 1989) and PCXMC (Tapiovaa-
ra, 1997 and Servomaa and Tapiovaara, 1998). WinODS is based on depth and
profile dose curves and PCXMC on Monte Carlo calculated organ doses.
To verify the calculated doses a female human phantom (CIRS ATOM
female phantom, Model # 702-004, 2002) was used to simulate the examinations of
the patient. The phantom has been loaded with TL-dosimeters (Li2B4O7) in order to
measure the radiation dose in uterus. The dosimeters have been calibrated in
known radiation fields at different energies. The following X-ray units have been
used: Siemens Pendex, Philips Pendla Modul and Siemens Siregraph.
Computed tomography
The following examinations are included in this study: chest, abdomen and
trauma, both sequence and multi-slice spiral examinations at County Hospital
Ryhov. The same phantom was used. Methods described by Nagel (Nagel et al,
COCIR, 2000) have been used together with a computer program (WinDose,
Kalander et al, 1999) for comparative dose calculations. CT (Computed
tomography) units used in this study are Siemens Somatom Plus S and Somatom
Plus 4 VZ.
Nuclear medicine
To calculate the fetal dose at nuclear medicine examinations data given in the
Fetal dose calculation workbook, RIDIC (Stabin, 1998), ICRP 53 (ICRP 53, 1988)
and ICRP 80 (ICRP 80, 1998) have been used. Data on administered activities were
obtained from the Linköping University Hospital. Administered activity can show
great variation between different hospitals (Mattsson et al, 1998). Reference
activities given in European Commission publications (European Commission,
Radiation Protection 109, 1999) are not generally used in Sweden. The type of
radiopharmaceutical and the possibility of placenta transfer also influence the
fetal dose (ICRP 84, 2000).
Results
Conventional  X-ray
Table 1 shows the results of calculated and measured fetal doses. Since the DAP
(Dose Area Product) value is used as a reference dose value of an examination
(European Commission, Radiation Protection 109, 1999) the fetal doses are in this
report given in relation to this value as a conversion factor Cconv. = Duterus/DAP (mGy/
Gycm2) having the following values:
1. Cconv. is < 0.01 if the radiation fields does not include the uterus
2. Cconv is approximately equal to 0.5 when the uterus is only partly included
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3. Cconv is approximately equal to 1.3 if all radiation fields include uterus.
The uncertainty in the evaluation of the conversion factor is less
than ± 30 %.
For examinations where the fetus is not included in the primary
examination fields a simplified general estimation can be done. The dose is then
expected to be less than 1-2 mSv.
In comparison with values of fetal doses for some common examinations in
United Kingdom  (ICRP 84, 2000) this study show lower values for abdomen and
pelvis examinations, probably depending on different sensitivity of film screen
system. The higher value for barium meal in this study must depend on different
examination procedures. Otherwise the dose levels were similar. A comparison
between the used computer programs and the measured values shows that the
PCXMC slightly underestimate the dose when the uterus is outside the radiation
field, while WinODS slightly overestimate it. When the uterus is included in the
radiation field both programs overestimate the dose.
Computed tomography
Table 2 shows the results. The relation between CTDIw value (weighted Computed
Tomography Dose Index) and fetal dose is can be used as a conversion factor CCT =
Duterus/CTDIw (mGy/mGy). The following values are estimated:
1. CCT is < 0.01 if the examined volume does not include the uterus
2. CCT is approximately 1.0 for examinations where the examined volume
includes the uterus
The uncertainty in the evaluation of the conversion factor is less than ± 20
%. Agreements between calculations and measurements are also shown. The dose
levels given by ICRP 84 (ICRP 84, 2000) (Table 4) for common CT examinations in
United Kingdom are in agreement with measured values in this study.
Nuclear medicine
The results of dose calculations for the most common examinations of pregnant
patients at the Linköping University Hospital are shown in Table 3. For one
examination placenta transfer is included. Comparison with values given in
ICRP(ICRP 84, 2000) shows that administered activities in this study are
generally lower, which also gives lower fetal dose.
Discussions
The knowledge of doses from different radiation fields and radiopharmaceuticals
gives the opportunity to optimise the examination of a pregnant patient in order to
minimum the risk to the unborn child. For dose estimates later in the pregnancy
(after 3 months) other organs should be included, for example the GI-tract.
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More measurements and simulations are therefore needed in order to
determine more exact conversion factors.
The DAP dose meter need to be regularly calibrated and the CTDI values
regularly checked in order to obtain reliability estimations. The fetal dose can
be manipulated in X-ray and CT examinations by changing views and
parameter settings in order to avoid direct exposure of the uterus. For nuclear
medicine examinations careful choice of radiopharmaceutical and use of lower
administrate activity can substantially lower the absorbed dose to the fetus.
The examination time then normally has to be increased to obtain sufficient
image quality.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by The Radiation Protection Autority gant SSI P
1114.98.
References
[1] ATOM Adult Female Phantom, Handling Instructions, CIRIS Tissue
Simulation Technology, 2428 Almeda Avenue, Suite 212, Norfolk, Virgina 23513,
USA. www.cirsinc.com,  admin@cirsinc.com, 2002.
[2] Radiation Protection 109. European guidelines on diagnostic reference levels
(DRLs) for medical exposures. European Commission, 1999.
[3] EUR 16260 EN. European guidelines on quality criteria for diagnostic
radiographic images. European Commission, 1995.
[4] EUR 16262 EN. European guidelines on quality criteria for computed
tomography. European Commission, 1998.
[5] ICRP/22/136/01 Draft Report: Basic Anatomical and Physiological Data for Use
in Radiological Protection: Reference Values. To be published.
[6] ICRP Publication 53. Radiation Dose to Patients from Radiopharmaceuticals.
Annals of the ICRP 1988; 18/1-4.
[7] ICRP Publication 80. Radiation Dose to Patients from Radiopharmaceuticals.
Annals of the ICRP 1999; 28/3.
[8] ICRP Publication 84. Pregnacy and Medical Radiation. Annals of the ICRP
2000; 30/1.
[9] Kalander WA, Scmidt B, Zankl M, Schmidt M. A PC program for estimating
organ dose and effective dose values in computed tomography. Eur Radiol 1999; 9:
555 – 562.
331
STUK-A195
[10] Mattsson S, Jacobsson L, Vestergren E. The Basic Principles in Assessment
and Selection of Reference Doses: Consideration in Nuclear Medicine. Radiat
Prot Dosimetry 1998; 80: 23-27.
[11] Nagel HD. Radiation Exposure in Computed Tomography. COCIR,
october 2000.
[12] Rados ODS-60 (WinODS) Userguide doc no 2092 3914 ver 1.0, RTI
Electronics Möndal, 1996
[13] Servomaa A, Rannikko S, Nikitin V, Golikov V, Ermakov I, Masarskyi L,
Saltukova L. A topographically and anatomically unified phantom model for
organ dose determination in radiation hygiene. STUK-A87. Helsinki, 1989.
[14] Servomaa A, Tapiovaara M. Organ dose calculation in medical x-ray
examinations by the program PCXMC. Radiat Prot Dosimetry 1998; 80: 213-219.
[15] Stabin MG. Fetal dose calculation workbook. RIDIC, Radiation Internal
Dose Information Center. Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education,
P.O. Box 117, Oak Ridge.ORISE 97-0961, 1998.
[16] Tapiovaara M, Lakkisto M, Servomaa A. PCXMC. A PC-based Monte Carlo
program for calculating patient doses in medical x-ray examinations. STUK-
A139. Helsinki, 1997.
332
STUK-A195
7h Prenatal Radiation exposures at diagnostic
procedures: methods to identify exposed pregnant
patients.
Håkan Pettersson*, Ebba Helmrot**, Michael Sandborg*, Jonas
Nilsson*, Sara Olsson*, Jan Persliden***, Solweig Hellman*
and Torsten Cederlund****.
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Introduction
Knowledge about frequency and doses to embryo/foetus from diagnostic
radiology is of great importance both in the sense of estimating the radiation
risks but also for optimizing the diagnostic procedures and making decisions
regarding alternative procedures. In addition, the pregnant patient has a right
to know the magnitude and type of radiation risks expected as a result of foetus
exposure. From a risk perspective epidemiological data has shown that the
embryo/foetus together with children experience higher radiation sensitivity in
terms of induced leukemia and cancer compared to an adult population. Recent
estimates give cancer excess lifetime mortality risks for whole body exposures
of children and foetus (0-15 y age) of 0.06% (ICRP84, 2000) up to 0.14% per 10
mSv (BEIR-V 1990). In addition to the risk of cancer induction effects of cell
killing, e.g. CNS abnormalities, cataracts, malformations, growth retardation,
may occur. However, these effects are believed to have a threshold, about 100-
200 mGy (ICRP84, 2000), and such foetus doses are rarely reached in
diagnostic radiology procedures.
There are 2 principal situations where foetus exposures may occur in
diagnostic radiology;
• The pregnancy of the patient is known at the time of examination, but
due to the medical indications the examination can not be postponed or put
forward in time, and there are no suitable alternative non-radiological
procedures.
• The pregnancy of the patient is not known at the time of examination,
either due to the fact that the patient is unaware of her pregnancy or the
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medical personnel failed to obtain this information. The former situation may
occur during the first few weeks from conception, whereas the latter situation
may cover a greater gestation period.
The frequency of foetus exposure is not well documented. In Sweden,
there are well-established routines to track down pregnant patients before
examinations are being performed. However, there are no general obligations
or routines to document the cases either (i) when planned examinations are
performed or (ii) when pregnancies are discovered after performing the
examinations. However, examinations are documented in those cases where
the medical physicists are notified and asked to evaluate the dose and assess
the risk to the foetus.
Material and methods
The survey method
• As a first approach, a survey method was designed. Forms were sent to
diagnostic radiology departments in 3 counties of Sweden to gather
information about examinations performed during pregnancy. The forms were
handled by the head nurses at each radiology department, and fill-in
instruction were given to their staff. The following information was requested;
• routines used to avoid unintentional exposures of foetus,
• medical indication and diagnostic method
• patient data: ID, date of birth, length, weight, gestational age
• exposure data: (i) X-ray diagnostics: X-ray equipment, no of projections,
number of exposures, tube potential, mAs, fluoroscopy duration, field size,
focus-skin distance etc., (ii) CT-diagnostics: tube potental, mAs/slice, slice
thickness, number of slices, etc, (iii) nuclear medicine diagnostics: type of radio-
pharmaceutical, administered activity, hydration, blocking agents etc.
The survey was run for 12 month, from April 1999 to March 2000. Results
obtained from the first quarter showed a very low reporting frequency, and the
head nurses were reminded of the reporting request. For the full study period
about 28 000 examinations of women aged 15-50 years were performed, but
only 21 cases were reported where the patient was pregnant at the time of
examination, which was far less than anticipated. Therefore alternative
methods to identify the true frequency was adopted.
The patient registry method
In Sweden the authorities keep population registries of all individuals residing
in Sweden. Such records are much used in public health-studies, both for
prospective and retrospective studies. Hence, the Swedish hospitals have
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access to some of these registries and we therefore wanted to explore the
possibility to retrospectively obtain data on patients exposed during
pregnancies. In order to use the registries and produce files of patient ID-
records clearance had to be obtained from both the local hospital registry
boards and from the ethical committee at the Linköping University. Data were
then extracted from the hospital RIS (Radiological Information Systems) files
used for registration of radiation diagnostic procedures. For X-ray
examinations patient ID, date of examination, diagnostic procedure (type and
location) was extracted for a 8 months time period. For nuclear medicine
imaging, where patient flow is much smaller than for X-ray diagnostics, the
corresponding data was extracted for a 5-year period (1995-1999).
The data search was then performed according to the following search routine:
1 Extract patient data from the RIS for a given period and export to PC-
Microsoft Excel;
• patient ID (name, date of birth1)
• date and exam type and code (conventional X-ray, CT, nuclear medicine
imaging, MR, ultrasound)
2 Extract data by gender and age; female aged 15-50 years
3 Export date of birth to text-file, send data to the National Tax Board
(RSV)
4 Data generated by RSV and sent to customer (text-file on diskette):
• date of birth for patient and if applicable their children
•  if applicable date of emigration
•  if applicable date of death
5 RSV data imported in PC-Microsoft Excel and data then sorted and
extracted;
• keep only data with patient and children
• extract data including children birth dates within the study period plus 9
months.
6 Manually extract data where patient were pregnant at time of
examination
7 Sort selection by type of examination
8 Calculate foetus age at time of examination
1the birth data also include a 4 digit number (Swedish social number system),
together giving a 12 digit number unique for the person. Thus, name of patient
not needed for the search.
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Results obtained by the patient registry method
X-ray diagnostic procedures
Figure 1 shows the number of pregnant patients examined by different X-ray
diagnostic procedures during the 8 months study period. Out of about 19 000 X-
ray examinations 299 cases of foetus exposures were identified of which 82
cases at the Linköping Univ Hospital, 108 cases at the County Hospital Ryhov,
and 109 cases at the Örebro Univ Hospital. Thus for this patient group about
1.6% were pregnant at the time of X-ray examination. As expected, the pelvis
examinations predominate followed by examinations of extremities, which is
the most common X-ray examination. Also the relatively high frequency of
chest/pulm examinations is expected since chest/pulm problems may occur
during pregnancies.
Only a few of the examination types may result in significant radiation
dose to the foetus. Helmrot et. al (2002) has shown that examinations where the
radiation field does not include the uterus give only marginal doses to the
foetus. These include many of the examinations found in this study, i.e.
extremities, CT skull/brain, cervical spine, sinus/esophagus/hypopharynx,
flebography of leg, mammography, odont panorama, thoraic spine. However, for
the remaining examination types the uterus is partly or completely included in
the radiation field. In the case of chest and pulm investigations the fraction of
uterus exposed highly depends on the gestational age, being insignificant in
early pregnancy.
Figure 1. Number of pregnant patients examined by X-ray diagnostic procedures during
a 8 months study period. The total number of examinations of female patients were
6697, 5814 and 6204 respectively for the 3 hospitals (Linköping Univ Hospital, County
Hospital Ryhov and Örebro Univ Hospital).
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Figure 2 shows the number of pelvis, chest/pulm and urography
examinations versus gestational age. As expected the pelvis investigations are
performed close to the time of delivery. However, the chest/pulm and urography
investigations are more evenly spaced in time, which was the case also for most
of the other examination types. It could be concluded that most of the
investigations were carried out on known pregnancies since very few
investigations were made during the first few weeks after conception when
pregnancy might not be known.
Nuclear medicine imaging procedures
Figure 3a shows the number of pregnant patients examined by nuclear
medicine imaging procedures at the Linköping Univ Hospital during the years
1995 to 1999. The Figure also shows the same data given as the fraction (%) of
the total number of examinations. Out of 4507 examinations 33 cases of
pregnant patient exposure were identified. The predominant investigation is
PMP Pulm Perfusion using 99mTc. Such investigations, together with PMV
Ventilation Study, are expected since lung embolus is not an uncommon
complication during pregnancies. As shown in Figure 3b, the PMP
investigations are quite evenly spaced in gestational age.
Discussion and Conclusions
By using existing radiological information systems (RIS) together with
national population records it has been shown that thorough information about
Figure 2. Number of pregnant patients examined by X-ray diagnostic procedures during
a 8 months study period versus gestational age. Examinations performed at Linköping
Univ Hospital, County Hospital Ryhov and Örebro Univ Hospital.
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both frequency and type of radiation diagnostic procedures performed on
pregnant patients can be obtained. Also the gestational age at exposure could
be determined. To obtain these data by query form surveys proved to be
unsuccessful. However, if needed, it could probably be improved in the future
by supplying pregnancy information directly into RIS.
The study has shown that, apart from pelvis investigations, few of the X-
day examinations result in significant radiation dose to the foetus since the
radiation field does not include the uterus. However, in the case of chest and
pulm investigations the dose highly depends on gestational age, with doses
increasing with gestational age. In the case of nuclear medicine imaging,
studies of lung perfusion/ventilation predominate for pregnant patients. The
time of examinations are distributed among all gestational age.
Figure 3. a) Number of pregnant patients examined by nuclear medicine imaging during
a 5 year study period (1995-1999). Also shown the fraction (%) of patients examined
that were pregnant at the time of examination (in relation to the total number of
examinations of female patients aged 15-50 y (4507 exams). b) Number of pregnant
patients examined versus gestational age.
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The frequency of examinations on pregnant patient aged 15-50 years
were 1.6% and 0.7% for X-ray and nuclear medicine imaging investigations,
respectively. For this age group, in the general population about 6% are
expected to be pregnant, suggesting that for patients of known pregnancies
referral to alternative non-radiation diagnostic procedures is common and/or
the pregnant population are in less demand of radiation diagnostic procedures.
The use of the patient registry method has great potential for large-scale
studies, i.e. national studies of the same kind as this study, but could also be
used for retrospective health studies. For example, studies of low dose cancer
incidence among people exposed as foetus could be performed. However, large
studies would require automatic computer routines/programmes to speed up
data searching and extraction.
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7i  Doskatalogen på internet
Helene Jönsson
Statens strålskyddsinstitut, Stockholm, Sverige
Statens strålskyddsinstitut, SSI, har under ett antal år stött arbetet kring
förbättrade stråldosuppskattningar till patienter vid nukleärmedicinska
undersökningar. Projektets namn var från början “Stråldoser från radioaktiva
ämnen i medicinskt bruk”, men har mer och mer gått under benämningen
“Doskatalogen”. Arbetet började redan 1969 och stödet har lett till ett
mångårigt engagemang inom ICRP:s “Task Group on Dose to Patients from
Radiopharmaceuticals”.
Doskatalogen är en databas över stråldoser från radiofarmaka som
används inom nukleärmedicin och är avsedd att användas av
strålskyddsexperter inom sjukvård och forskning. Doskatalogen används
frekvent inom den svenska sjukvården och består av fler än 190 olika
substanser och radionuklider som presenterats i pappersformat. Nu kan även
stråldoser från ett 60-tal av de vanligaste radiofarmaka beräknas via SSI:s
hemsida, www.ssi.se under rubriken “Sjukvård”. Detta gör Doskatalogen mer
lättåtkomlig för alla som har behov utav den.
I exemplet nedan görs en stråldosberäkning för en vuxen person som
injicerats med 250 MBq Tc-99m perteknetat.
1) Välj radionuklid och substans. Genom att välja en radionuklid ses
enbart substanserna med den nukliden. Då “alla” är vald för nuklider så ses
alla substanser. Kommentarer och referenser till de dosfaktorer som används
kan ses under “Referenser/kommentarer”.
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2) Välj vilken kroppsstorlek som beräkningen ska göras med, de
vanligaste kroppsstorlekarna är vuxen, 15, 10, 5 och 1 år, men för vissa
radiofarmaka finns det även beräkningar för andra kroppsstorlekar. Ange
också vilken aktivitetsmängd i MBq som använts.
 
3) Vid dosberäkningen fås organdoserna och den effektiva dosen.
Resultatet kan sorteras i bokstavsordning alternativt i storleksordning på
stråldosen. SSI XXXX anger det årtal substansen publicerades inom
Doskatalogen.
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Följande substanser som finns inlagda i doskatalogen på SSI:s hemsida.
Ba-133m BARIUMJON i.v. 
C-11 ERYTROCYTER i.v. 
C-11 KOLMONOXID inh 
C-11 TYMIDIN [2-11C] i.v. 
C-11 TYMIDIN [Metyl-11C] i.v. 
C-14 FETTSYROR i.v. 
C-14 UREA p.o. 
Co-57 VITAMIN B12 i.v. (utan bärare) 
Co-57 VITAMIN B12 p.o. 
Co-57 VITAMIN B12 Schillingtest p.o. 
Co-58 VITAMIN B12 i.v. (utan bärare) 
Co-58 VITAMIN B12 p.o. 
Co-58 VITAMIN B12 Schillingtest p.o. 
Cr 51 LEUKOCYTER i.v. 
Cr 51 TROMBOCYTER i.v. 
Cr-51 ERYTROCYTER i.v. 
Cr-51 KROM-EDTAT i.v. 
Cu-64 KOPPARJON i.v. 
Cu-64 KOPPARJON p.o. 
F-18 FDG i.v. 
Ga-67 GALLIUMCITRAT i.v. 
H-3 FETTSYROR i.v. 
I-123 AMFETAMIN i.v. 
I-123 MIAA i.v. 
I-123 MIBG i.v. 
I-123 NATRIUM-o-JODOHIPPURAT i.v. 
I-131 ALBUMIN i.v. 
I-131 JODIDJON (blockerad thyreoidea) i.v. 
I-131 JODIDJON i.v & p.o. 
I-131 JODMETYLNORKOLESTEROL i.v. 
I-131 MIAA i.v. 
I-131 MIBG i.v. 
I-131 NATRIUM-o-JODOHIPPURAT i.v. 
In-111 HUMANT IMMUNOGLOBULIN i.v. 
In-111 OCTREOTID i.v. 
O-15 VATTEN i.v. 
Se-75 GALLSYRA i.v. 
Tc-99m ALBUMIN MIKROSFÄRER i.v. 
Tc-99m DMSA i.v. 
Tc-99m DTPA i.v. 
Tc-99m EC (akut ensidig njurblockering) i.v. 
Tc-99m EC (nedsatt njurfunktion) i.v. 
Tc-99m EC (normal njurfunktion) i.v. 
Tc-99m ECD i.v. 
Tc-99m ERYTROCYTER i.v. 
Tc-99m FOSFATER OCH FOSFONATER i.v. 
Tc-99m FURIFOSMIN (Q12) (arbete) i.v. 
Tc-99m FURIFOSMIN (Q12) (vila) i.v. 
Tc-99m HIG i.v. 
Tc-99m HMPAO i.v. 
Tc-99m LEUKOCYTER i.v. 
Tc-99m LEVER-GALLVÄGSSUBSTANSER i.v. 
Tc-99m MAA i.v. 
Tc-99m MAG-3 i.v. 
Tc-99m OLÖSLIGA MARKÖRER (fast) p.o. 
Tc-99m OLÖSLIGA MARKÖRER (flytande) p.o. 
Tc-99m PERTEKNEGAS inh. 
Tc-99m PERTEKNETAT (Blockering) i.v. 
Tc-99m PERTEKNETAT i.v. 
Tc-99m PERTEKNETAT p.o. 
Tc-99m SMÅ KOLLOIDER i.v 
Tc-99m STORA KOLLOIDER i.v. 
Tc-99m TEKNEGAS inh. 
Tc-99m TETROFOSMIN (arbete) i.v. 
Tc-99m TETROFOSMIN (vila) i.v. 
Tl-201 TALLIUMJON i.v. 
Xe-133 KOKSALTLÖSNING i.v. 
Xe-133 XENONGAS inh. 
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7j The nuclear medical diagnostic procedures at
the hospitals in Sofia over a period of ten years –
from 1990 to 2000 – structure, number and doses
Pavlova Adelina, Kr. Ingilizova, Zdr. Paskalev
National Center of Radiobiology and Radiation Protection Sofia, Bulgaria
Abstract
 The aim of this study is to analyze the structure and the number of nuclear
diagnostic procedures at hospitals in Sofia over a period of ten years (from 1990
to 2000); to calculate the effective doses received by patients; to compare the
results from different hospitals.
We have developed a form in order to collect the necessary information
from hospitals /nuclear laboratories/. The information has been collected
according to examined organ, applied radioactive pharmaceutical and injected
activity [MBq], patient’s age and sex.
The effective doses have been calculated using transition coefficients /1/
for each of the applied radioactive pharmaceuticals and for each of the
diagnostic procedures.
We have received the information and calculated the doses. We have
compared the data from different hospitals /nuclear laboratories/. The results
show that the doctors in different hospitals have used different radioactive
pharmaceuticals and applied different activities for one and the same
procedure.
Keywords
nuclear medicine, low doses radiation, dosimetry, effective dose
Introduction
Radiation exposure of Bulgarian population is due to different sources /table 1/
/2/. The largest contributions are natural background radiation (about 2/3 of
the total) and exposures from medical diagnosis (about ¼ of the total).
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Table 2 shows data of exposure of Bulgarian population due to
radioisotope diagnosis /3/.
Table 1. Distribution of overall exposure by 1990 years.
Table 2. Exposure of Bulgarian population due to radioisotope diagnosis.
The aim of the study
The aim of this study is to analyze the structure and the number of nuclear
medical diagnostic procedures at hospitals in Sofia from 1990 to 2000; to
calculate the effective doses received by patients; to compare the results from
different hospitals.
Number of examinations per 
year 
Mean effective dose [mSv/a] Year
total 
/thousands 
per capita per  
examination
per  
capita 
Collective 
effective dose 
[man-Sv/a]
1970 34 0,004          17,0 0,07 0,6 
1975 70 0,008          13,0 0,10 0,9 
1980         116,4 0,013 8,8  0,115    1,022 
1985         170 0,020 7,0 0,13 1,2 
1990         130 0,015 5,0 0,08 0,7 
1992          85 0,010 5,0 0,05 0,4 
1993          89 0,011 5,3 0,05 0,4 
Source of exposure Mean effective 
 doses  
[µSv/a] 
Collective 
doses  
[man-Sv/a]
% of the  
total  
exposure 
1. Background exposure 2283 19600 68,30 
External  735 6300 22,00 
Internal 1548 13300 46,30 
2. Excess over background  
exposure 
1054 9100 31,70 
Occupational exposure 116 1000 3,50 
X-ray diagnosis 802 6900                 24,00 
Radioisotope diagnosis 81 700 2,40 
Uranium mining 41 350 1,20 
NPP 3 22 0,08 
TPP 3 23 0,08 
Global fallout 2 15 0,05 
Other sources 6 51 0,18 
TOTAL  EXPOSURE 3337 28700 100 
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Materials and Methods
We have developed a form /table 3/ for collecting the necessary information
from hospitals - nuclear laboratories.
Table 3. Nuclear diagnostic procedures.
We have taken “Form 3: Nuclear medicine procedures” – Questionnaire
for a Global Survey of Medical Radiation Usage and Exposure from 1995 to the
present – UNSCEAR /4/ as a pattern and we have included additional columns.
The information has been collected according to the examined organ: bone,
heart, lung, thyroid, kidney, liver, brain and other; applied radioactive
pharmaceuticals and injected activities [MBq]; patient’s age and sex.
The effective doses have been calculated using transition coefficients /1/
for each of the applied radioactive pharmaceuticals and for each of the
diagnostic procedures.
We have taken the “administered activity” [MBq] and the respective
“transition coefficients” [mSv/MBq] to calculate the effective dose [mSv] –
mean and variation. We have compared the results from different hospitals and
we present them on figures and in tables.
Results
A: Number of patients and structure of the nuclear diagnostic procedures /fig1-
fig8/
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The figures show that there are high variations in number of patients
and structure of nuclear diagnostic procedures in different hospitals in Sofia.
B: The doctors from different hospitals have applied different radioactive
pharmaceuticals and they have prescribed different activities. The tables /from
4 to table 11/ show the effective doses [mSv] received by patients at different
hospitals /laboratories: A, B, C, D, E and F/ for each of the diagnostic procedures
according to examined organ: bone, heart, lung, thyroid, kidney, liver, brain and
other.
Table 4. Effective doses received by patients from bone examinations.
Radioactive 
pharma- 
ceutical 
Lab. A 
eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. B 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. C 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. D 
 eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Min and max 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
  Ga Citrat        11,10 - 13,32 11,10 - 13,32 
  Tc HDP  2,38-4,49   3,37 - 5,13      2,38 - 5,13 
  Tc MDP 1,76-2,29 2,00-4,58 0,9 - 1,6 1,76 - 2,29 3,27 - 3,44   0,65 -   4,58  0,65 - 4,58 
  Tc MIBI     6,60 - 8,16    4,88 - 10,88   4,88 - 10,88 
  NaI     225,0 - 136,0 224,96 - 3404 136,0 - 3404,0 
  Tc PYP 1,83-2,33       1,83 - 2,33 
  Tc Chlorid      122,10 - 202,8 122,1 - 202,76 
Table 5. Effective doses received by patients from heart examinations.
Radio- 
active 
pharma-
ceutical 
Lab. A 
eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. 
B eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. 
C 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. D  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff. 
 doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Min and 
max 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Tc MIBI 3,70 -8,16      3,70 - 8,16 
Tc MIBI 
rest 
   4,92 - 6,03   4,92 - 6,03 
Tc MIBI 
stres 
   3,96 - 4,85   3,96 - 4,85 
Tc  
Chlorid 
     12,21 - 202,76   12,21 - 202,76 
Table 6. Effective doses received by patients from lung examinations.
Radio- 
active 
pharma-
ceutical 
Lab. A 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. B  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. C  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. D 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Min and 
max eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Tc MAA 0,92 -1,71 0,82 -  2,85     0,82 - 2,85 
Tc MIBI 
rest 
 9,84 -12,06    1,44 - 12,03 1,44 - 12,06 
Ga Citrat      11,10 - 13,30 11,10 - 13,33 
Tc HSAa           1,48      
a – we have not had the transition coefficients for this radiopharmaceutical for each of the age groups so we 
have not calculated the variations of effective dose 
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Table 7. Effective doses received by patients from thyroid examinations
Radioactive 
pharma- 
ceutical 
Lab. A 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. B  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. C 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. D 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Min and max 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
NaI 8,24 - 19,04    34,04 - 87,14 28,12 - 8288 8,24 - 8288 
Tc Perteh  1,03 - 1,27 0,60 -0,80 1,66 -2,07 0,84 - 1,15 0,58 - 7,25 0,58 - 7,25 
Tc MIBI re  13616 - 16576   7,38 - 9,38    7,38 - 16576 
Table 8. Effective doses received by patients from kidney examinations.
Radioactive 
pharma- 
ceutical 
Lab. A 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. B 
 eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. C 
eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. D  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Min and max 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
I Hipur 0,05 - 0,13   12,32 -12,99  4,95 - 8,66  0,05 - 12,99 
Tc DTPA 2,62 - 3,57 0,96 - 3,48    0,33 - 2,15 0,33 - 3,57 
Tc DMSA 0,59 - 0,99 0,55 - 1,19 0,10 -
0,28 
1,12 - 2,38 5,06 - 5,94  0,10 - 5,94 
Tc MAG3 0,39 - 1,55 1,77 - 5,18  3,70 - 5,18   0,39 - 5,18 
Tc ECa  1,00          1,00 
a – we have not had the transition coefficients for this radioactive pharmaceutical for each of the age groups so we have not 
calculated the variations of effective dose 
Table 9. Effective doses received by patients from liver examinations.
Radioactive 
pharma- 
ceutical 
Lab. A 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. B eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. C  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. D 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Min and max 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Tc SC nor 0,03 - 0,11 0,86 -1,91 0,11 - 0,31   0,59 - 2,29 0,03 - 2,29 
Tc IDA 0,45 - 2,51 1,15 -3,98     0,45 - 3,98 
Tc RBC  3,32 -4,21    1,45 1,45 - 4,21 
Tc Fitata        
Tc  
Pertehnet. 
 2,68 -3,29     2,68 - 3,29 
a – we have not had the transition coefficients for this radioactive pharmaceutical for each of the age groups so we have not 
calculated the variations of effective dose 
Table 10. Effective doses received by patients from brain examinations.
Radio-
active 
pharma-
ceutical 
Lab. A 
eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. B eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. C 
 eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. D 
eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff. 
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Min and 
max 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Tc HMPA       2,22-12,58 2,22- 12,58 
Tc DTPA  3,67-5,00     3,67-5,0 
Tc HSA      1,15-1,40 1,15-1,4 
Tc Perteh-
netat 
 5,90-7,25     5,90-7,25 
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Conclusions
1. In different hospitals there are high variations in number of patients and
structure of nuclear diagnostic procedures;
2. The doctors in different hospitals apply different radioactive
pharmaceuticals and they prescribe different activities for one and the same
procedure;
3. In different hospitals there are high variations in effective doses [mSv].
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Table 11. Effective doses received by patients from other procedures.
/testis, gl.salivares, gl.mammae, melanoma malig., NHL, NL, articulations, lyonf., ISG /
Radioactive 
pharmaceu- 
tical
Lab. A 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. B 
 eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. C 
eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. 
D eff.  
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. E  
eff.
doses 
[mSv] 
Lab. F  
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
Min and max 
eff. doses 
[mSv] 
1.Tc Pertehnetat 5,20-11,40      5,20-11,40 
2.Tc MIBI rest  9,84-12,06     9,84-12,06 
   Tc Pertehnetat  0,87-1,55     0,87-1,55 
3.Tc MIBI  9,84-12,06    7,38-12,06 7,38-12,06 
4.Tc MIBI      2,66-8,16 2,66-8,16 
5.Ga Citrat      14,80-17,76 14,80-17,76 
6.Tc Albumin  2,90-3,54     2,90-3,54 
   Tc SC nor  1,61-2,06     1,61-2,06 
   Tc MIBI rest  9,84-12,06      9,84-12,06 
   Tc NanoColoid     0,11-0,13  0,11-0,13 
   Tc HAS     0,05-0,06  0,05-0,06 
7.Tc Pertehnetat  1,52-1,85     1,52-1,85 
8.Tc NanoColoid      1,07-13,1 1,07-13,1 
9.Tc HSA      2,30-4,74 2,30-4,74 
   Tc MIBI      2,22-10,88 2,22-10,88 
    Tc Chlorid      12,21-20,30 12,21-20,3 
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7k  Nuclear medicine practices in Sweden – the
development during the last 30 years
Mauricio Alvarez
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, Stockholm Sweden
Introduction
Clinics with nuclear medicine practices are obliged since 30 years ago to report
annually to the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) the number of
examinations and treatments performed, including the administered activities.
SSI is putting together these data and these compilations are used for
documentations of statistics and following trends for nuclear medicine
examinations and treatments.
Material
SSI’s compilations of the reports from the clinics are a basis for the calculation
of radiation doses to individuals for the various examinations, and also for the
calculation of the collective dose. The compilations are containing data such as
type of radio pharmaceutical, the mode of administration, number of hospitals,
total number of examinations and treatments, mean value of the administered
activity, the interval of mean values for administered activity for the various
hospitals and the maximum activity for the individual patient. The trends for
the past years are presented and the coming development with new challenges
is discussed.
Results
The total number of examinations has doubled since 1968. 1968 the number
was 48 000, today approximately 102 000 examinations are performed. Figure
1 is giving the total number of nuclear medicine examinations performed in
Sweden between 1968-2001.
The type of radionuclides for the examinations has changed considerably.
In the 1960s iodine isotopes were used frequently, which is seen in the figure
below. In the 1970s Tc-99m became more and more dominant. In 2001 80 000
nuclear medicine examinations were performed with Tc-99m.
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Figure 1. Total number of nuclear medicine examinations in Sweden 1968-2001 (all
types of in vivo examinations are included).
Figure 2. Number of nuclear medicine examinations for the most common
radionuclides.
The distribution of types of examinations has also been changed during
the years. This is demonstrated in the table below (table 1). The changes
depend among other things on the development of alternative diagnostic
methods and on the technical progress concerning equipment but also on the
development of new radioactive drugs.
Table 1. Number of examinations for various types of examinations expressed as
percentage of the total number of examinations.
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1968
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Year Bone scint. Tyroid scint. Brain scint. Liver scint. Lung scint.
Kidney 
clear. Heartscint. 
 Tc-99m I-131 Tc-99m Tc-99m Tc-99m Cr-51 Tl-201 
1968 - 25 2 1 0,1 0,1 - 
1975 6 8 13 13 3 3 0,1 
1985 28 4 4 6 8 9 2 
1997 26 0,6 0,4 0,2 11 5 3 
2001 24 0,1 1 0,1 7 6 0,8 
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Discussion
The collective dose to patients has been reduced by a factor of two. This is
because of the drastic reduction of the use of iodine isotopes being substituted
by Tc 99m. Also other relatively long-lived isotopes have been replaced by Tc
99m.
Other methods, for instance x-ray examinations, have replaced the use of
radionuclides for examination of the liver and the brain. The number of these
examinations has decreased significantly.
There are three examinations that provide the main contribution to the
collective dose: bone-, lung- and kidney-scintigraphy. One of the new challenges
in nuclear medicine is the development of radio nuclides and examination
methods for PET (positron emission tomography) work. A distinctive trait for
PET radio nuclides is their short half-life. This implies that high activities are
handled and administered to the patient which is putting high demands on
radiation protection measures. But the expansion of this method is impeded in
Sweden (as well as in other countries) by the fact that the production costs are
high and that the transportation of the radio nuclides to other hospitals can
have problems.
The nuclear medicine gamma cameras have become more sophisticated
and effective. For instance with a three-headed gamma camera the
administered activity can be reduced and/or the image quality increased or the
examination time reduced. Gamma cameras combined with Computed
Tomography allow a detailed anatomical allocation
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7l  Radiation dose to adult patients in LS spine
X-ray examinations of health centres in one
central hospital district in Finland
Innanmaa L 1, Petäjäjärvi M 1 , Parviainen T 2, Servomaa A2
1 Pirkanmaa Polytechnic, Tampere Finland
2 Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Helsinki, Finland
Introduction
According to the Medical Exposure Directive (97/43/Euratom)1, the radiation
dose to the patient should be measured and the doses compared against to the
national reference doses. The European Commission has issued quality criteria
for x-ray examinations for adults2. The criteria to be considered include clinical
image quality, examination techniques and radiation dose. The radiation dose
caused by x-ray examinations to adult patients should be measured or
calculated for at least ten standard size patients (70 kg ± 15 kg). At every unit
of the department, the radiation dose is determined, at regular intervals, for
the most general examinations, at least in one projection. If the comparison
dose levels are exceeded repeatedly, both the examination techniques and the
radiological units in use must be checked and any corrective actions required
must be carried out.
The Nordic countries defined Nordic reference dose levels for some X-ray
examinations in 19963. In Finland, dose reference levels for adults were given
on 8 December 20004. Table 1 shows the national dose reference levels for LS
spine examinations in Finland, in the EU and in the Nordic countries.
Table 1. Dose reference levels of the EU, the Nordic countries and Finland as the surface
dose (ESD) and as the dose-area product (DAP) for adult LS spine examinations.
Dose quantity EU
AP LAT LSJ 
Nordic countries 
AP LAT LSJ 
Finland 
AP LAT LSJ 
ESD (mGy)   10    30    40     6     -      -        8     25     35 
DAP (Gy*cm 2) - 10 (AP+LAT) 10 (AP+LAT) 
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Statistics on x-ray examinations in health centres
Health centres play an important role in radiology in Finland. A total of 220
health centres perform approximately 37 % of all x-ray examinations5. The 13
health centres located in the central hospital district selected for this study
carried out about 67500 x-ray examinations in 2000. Of these, 3200 were LS
spine examinations. LS spine examinations accounted for about 5 % of all x-ray
examinations. Figure 1 shows some statistics on radiological examinations in
the health centres included in this study.
Figure 1. Statistics on radiological examinations in the health centres of this study.
Number of all examinations and LS-spine examinations.
Material and methods
The radiation doses of LS spine examinations in13 health were measured for
249 patients in the AP and LAT projections and for 97 patients in the LSJ
projection. In all of the health centres, the LS spine examination included 2.4
X-ray films on average. The dose area product (DAP) was measured with a DAP
meter and the entrance surface dose (ESD) was calculated on the basis of the X-
ray tube output, the examination techniques and patient data (height, weight).
The average patient weight varied from one health centre to another from
68.2 kg to 73.7 kg the average weight of all patients being 71.6 kg. The organ
dose (bone marrow, gonades) and the effective dose of various projections were
calculated by using the PCXMC6 dose calculation program. Radiographers
recorded the patient data, examination techniques and dose data on
questionnaires. The DAP monitors were calibrated separately in all of the
health centres before the measurements by comparing the DAP monitors
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against the calibrated radiation meter of MDH in a secondary standard
laboratory. The examination techniques were compared against European
quality criteria and the radiation doses against the national and European
reference levels.
Results
Examination techniques
Table 2 shows the examination techniques used in various health centres for
LS spine examinations.
Table 2. Examination techniques used in various health centres in LS-spine x-ray
examinations.
The tube voltage in the AP projection ranged from 65 kV to 85 kV, in the
LAT projection from 75 kV to 95 kV and in the LSJ projection from 80 kV to 110
kV. The examination techniques used in some health centres differed from
those of the European recommendations3 for adult patients with regard to focal
spot size (EC < 1.3 mm), total filtration (EC >3 mmAl), grid performance (EC
r=8:1/40 1/cm) and nominal speed class of the image receptors (EC 400).
Radiation dose to patients
Figure 2 shows the average dose-area products (DAP), figure 3 the average
entrance surface dose (ESD) and figure 4 the average bone marrow dose, gonad
doses (mGy) and the effective dose (mSv) of the entire LS spine examinations
for both sexes at various health centres.
Table 3 shows the average DAP, ESD, organ and effective dose for all of
the 13 health centres.
Health
centre
Generator Unit Nominal 
focal spot 
Total 
filtration
Grid          Speed class of 
       image receptor 
FFD AEC 
   (mm) (mmAl)  AP Lat LSJ (cm)  
E Finnorgan Multix 1.2 3.5 12:1/40 400 adual 400 115 + 
H ShimazuUD Philips 2.0  3.0 -- 400 400 200  115  + 
L ShimazuUD RS85 1.2 3.0 8:1/40  200 400 400 114  + 
F Medio 50 Philips.diag 1.2 4.0 12:1/36 400 400 250 110 + 
B BR-2002 BR-1700 2.0 5.0 8:1/40 400 Gradual 250 110 + 
A Optimus 50 Bucky diag 1.0 4.8 8:1/36 200 200 800 110 + 
M BR-1001 BR-1700 1.8 5.0 8:1/34 400 Gradual 700 110 + 
D Diagnost 96 Philips.diag 1.3 3.2 13:1/60 250 250 250 110 + 
G BR-2012 BR-1700 2.0 5.0 10:1/40 200 Gradual 200 110 + 
C BR-1001 Philips 1.8 3.0 8:1/36 Digi Digi Digi 115 + 
K BR-2012 BR-1700 2.0 4.0 8:1/40 400 Gradual 400 110 + 
J BR-2012 BR-1712 2.0 2.7 10:1/40 400 Gradual 400 110 + 
I BR-2012 BR-1700 2.0 5.5 - - 200 700 200 110 + 
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Figure 2. Average dose-area products (DAP) of the LS spine examinations at various
health centres.
Figure 3. Average entrance surface doses (ESD) of the LS spine examinations at various
health centres.
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Figure 4. Average bone marrow  dose(BM), gonad doses (Gonad) and effective dose
(Eeff) of the entire LS spine examinations at various health centres.
Table 3. Average DAP, ESD, organ dose and effective dose for all of the health centres.
The sum of the average effective dose of all projections was 1.11 mSv. The
collective dose from LS spine examinations in all health centers was about 4.2
manSv. If image receptors  having a speed class of 200 were replaced by image
receptors with a higher speed class of 400, the collective dose would decrease by
about 20%.
Conclusions
The present study on patient doses and examination techniques has shown
that the doses exceed the national dose reference levels except in two health
centres. The examination techniques don’t meet the European quality criteria
of focal spot size, total filtration, grid performance and nominal speed class of
the image receptors in some health centres.
Dose AP LAT LSJ 
DAP (Gy*cm2) 1.3 3.6 2.1 
ESD (mGy) 4.8 17 26 
Gonads (mGy) 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Bone marrow (mGy) 0.06 0.36 0.43 
Eeff (mSv) 0.31 0.45 0.35 
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The dose variations between the various health centres were found to be
high, as were the dose ranges in a single health centre. The patient dose
exceeded the national reference levels in only a few health centres, whereas in
many health centres the examination techniques did not meet the European
recommendations with regard to focal spot size and the speed index of the
image receptor. Similar results  with respect to the sensitivity of image
receptors were reported earlier in health centres 7. The total dose measured in
this study could be decreased by about 20% if more sensitive screens were used.
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SESSION 8. RADIATION IN INDUSTRIAL USE
Industrial applications – Accidents and regulatory
instruments
Tor Wøhni & Ingvild Engen Finne
Norwegian radiation protection authority
Introduction
Ionising radiation in industry is used in a wide range of applications, and it is
not possible to cover all categories and fields in 20 minutes. The potential for
accidents are clearly greater for radioactive sources compared to X-ray
generators, and this presentation will focus on the application of sealed
radiation sources.
In Norway there are 4 areas of particular importtance in this respect,
partly due to the number of sources involved, and partly to the size of the
sources used. These areas are:
The IAEA categorization refers to IAEA Tecdoc-1191 from December
2000 (1), in which types of sources and fields of application are categorized with
regard to accident risk and with regard to the regulatory requirements that
should be applied.
Accident risks and scenarios
The accident risks and accident scenarios for the various fields differ.
Field of 
application 
Typical source 
specification 
IAEA 
Category 
Volume and number 
Irradiation 
facilities 
40.000 – 200.000 GBq   
137Cs. 
1 Approx. 10 smaller facilities for 
irradiation of blood, and one large 
for sterilization etc. 
Industrial  
radiography 
1500 GBq 192 Ir 1 Approx.150 companies and 500 
radiographers, some hundreds of 
gamma sources. 
Offshore 
logging
100 GBq 137Cs 
600 GBq 241Am/Be 
2 Approx. 10 companies, 50 -100 
sources. 
Industrial 
gauges 
1-10 GBq 
60Co, 137Cs, 241Am ... 
3 Approx. 300 companies,  approx. 
2000 sources  
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Application Accident risk/scenario
Irradiation  
facilities 
Loss of shielding due to fire. Unshielded external dose rates are typical 
10 Sv/h at 1 m distance. The fire department are informed of the 
existence of these sources. In 1982 there was one fatal accident in the 
large facility for sterilization, and UNSCEAR have reported 6 fatal 
accidents worldwide in large sterilization plants like this during a 20-
year period. No accidents in the smaller Norwegian facilities have been 
reported to the NRPA. 
Industrial 
radiography 
Normal use includes moving the source out of and into shielded 
position, and accidents and incidents occur as the source may be stuck 
in the guide tube, detached from the control cable a.o. Accident 
statistics are shown later. The sources are generally under strict 
administrative control, with small risk of getting lost. The source and 
shielded container is portable, and there is thus a certain risk of theft.  
Offshore 
logging.
Sources may get stuck downhole, and have to be abandoned – 
representing   unintended depositing of radioactive sources beneath 
the seabed. Annually typically 2-5 sources are lost this way. The 
boreholes are cemented and closed, and there is little risk of the 
sources ever entering the public domain. 
Industrial 
gauges. 
Stationary sources not subjected to manipulating – thus lower risk for 
accidents. The administrative control by the owner may be less strict, 
with a potential for orphan sources due to closing of factory a.o. A 
typical accident involves a worker being exposed during cleaning or 
maintaining a tank with a level gauge in open position.  
In industrial radiography accidents and incidents are frequently reported to
the Norwegian radiation protection authority (NRPA). The statistics for the
last 7 years are shown in the following table.
Type of accident  - industrial radiography  
1995 - 2002 
Number % Doses involved 
Concluded falsely that the exposure was 
completed or exposure initiated with operators 
working around source. -Alarm dosimeter out of 
use/failed-
11 28% Large doses, up 
to 50 mSv 
Source stuck in projection sheath 6 15% Small doses. Less 
than 1 mSv 
Source could not be returned to container due to 
mechanical failures. 
7 17% 0,1-1,3 mSv 
Barriers not respected 7 17 % 0 – 4 mSv 
Source loose in projection sheath 5 13 % 2-6 mSv 
Miscel1aneous, including 1 case of theft. 4 10 %  
Total 40 100  
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The most frequent and most serious accidents happen when the source is
not where it is expected to be, or when the X-ray generator is activated when it
is supposed to be off.
Various types of technical failures may also cause accidents, but these
are rarely serious as long as the operators know where the source is. The IAEA
state that 75 % of accidents within industrial radiography are operators errors
or failures to follow procedures, 25 % are equipment failures (1).
Regulatory instruments
The following traditional regulatory instruments are applicable to industrial
use of radiation:
• General regulations with requirements concerning use, internal control,
etc.
• Licensing and authorizations
• Requirements for appropriate levels of training
• Technical requirements to radiation sources, systems for type approvals
• Dues and taxes
Dues and taxes are frequently used in Norway in order to influence
human behaviour, but are not being used in radiation protection
administration. In Norway the following regulatory requirements are applied:
FIELD OF 
APPLICATION 
IAEA 
category REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS 
Irradiation 
facilities 
1 Individual licencing of each installation, with some 
requirements for internal control.  Requirements for 
administration of disused sources. 
Industrial  
radiography 
1 Authorization of NDT-companies. Formal requirements for 
training and certification of operator (5 days training 
course). Requirements for internal control and procedures 
for handling radiological emergencies. 
Offshore 
logging
2 Authorization of logging-company. Formal requirements for 
training, but no certification of operators. Requirements for 
internal control and procedures for handling radiological 
emergencies. 
Industrial 
gauges 
3 Individual authorization by licensing of each installation, 
may be reduced to authorization by registration. Modest 
requirements concerning internal control and training. 
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Orphan sources
The Norwegian system as described above complies with requirements and
recommendations in IAEA Tecdoc 1191 (1) and the IAEA Code of Conduct (2)
regarding the safety of  radiation sources, that is the general radiation
protection and emergency handling. The regulatory system has to a lesser
extent been directed towards security, that is measures to prevent
unauthorized access to, and loss, theft and unauthorized transfer of radioactive
sources. In this area there is a potential for regulatory improvement, and the
future regulatory system should address the security issue in a better way.
Internationally, serious radiation accidents have been caused by sources
entering the public domain.
Industrial gauges are particularly at risk in this context. In an ongoing
project at the NRPA, an initial 20 % discrepancy was found between the
number of sources registered in our database, and the number of sources
actually found in the factories and facilities. After an intensive search this
deficit was reduced to 10 %, and we hope to reduce it further before the project
is ended. More frequent reports from the source owners to the authorities may
improve the administrative control of radioactive sources.
Conclusion regarding future regulatory challenges in Norway
• The regulatory system for sealed radioactive sources should to a larger
extent focus on security and orphan source hazards.
• The problem of unintended depositing of radioactive logging sources
beneath the seabed must be given greater attention.
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Transportincident med iridium-192
Robert Hedvall
Studsvik Nuclear AB, SE-611 82 Nyköping, Sverige
Summary in English
Measurements of a shipment containing Ir-192, for radiographic purposes,
showed increased dose levels on arrival at the final destination in New Orleans,
USA. The package containing the radioisotopes left Studsvik the 27th of
December 2001 intact and in an approved transport container. Prior to
departure from Studsvik, the package was measured and displayed normal
dose levels.
The container was opened in February in the presence of Studsvik’s
personnel and different inspectors. The inspection of the container revealed
that two of the three inner containers with Iridium-192 were open and the
radiation was therefore able to penetrate the outer container’s radiation
shielding. Unclear instructions in the certificate are one of the observations.
Tolerance of the inner tap is another.
An investigation of the incident is still (August) ongoing.
Inledning
Den 27 december 2001 skickades en transportbehållare innehållande
strålkällor av radionukliden Ir-192 från Studsvik. Strålkällorna skulle skickas
till Source Production and Equipment Company (SPEC) för tillverkning av
radiograferingsutrustning.
Transporten skedde först med lastbil mellan Studsvik och Arlanda (via
Norrköping). Flyg från Arlanda gick först via Charles de Gaulle Airport i Paris,
Frankrike 29 december, till Memphis, Tennessy i USA och vidare till New Or-
leans, Louisiana, USA. Behållaren hämtades den 2 januari från
flygfrakt-terminalen vid Federal Express (FedEx) lokal i New Orleans av en
person anställd vid SPEC, St Rose. En dosratsmätning på behållaren tolkades
först som att det var något fel på instrumentet eftersom visarutslaget går i
botten. Behållaren körs därefter till SPEC:s lokaler. Vid framkomsten noteras
att persondosimetern visar en dos på ca 1,6 mSv. Total dos senare bestäms till
3,4 mSv. Nya dosratsmätningar gjordes då på behållaren. Mätningarna visade
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dosrater på 3-4 mSv/h på ca 23 meters avstånd från locket och 0,01 mSv/h på ca
4,6 meter från den liggande behållarens sidor.
I den aktuella behållaren (54x43 cm, 126 kg) skickades 1078 st
strålkällor av Ir-192
(21,5 g, totalt 366 TBq). Strålkällorna i form av små “pellets” (diameter
2,7 mm, tjocklek 0,15 mm) placerades i tre kapslar (med 375, 382 och 321 st
strålkällor) av rostfritt stål som förslöts med skruvade lock. Kapslarna (med
yttermått 10 mm i diameter och längden 38 mm) placerades i ett
revolvermagasin (liten cylindrisk stålbehållare utan lock) och därefter i en
innerbehållare av utarmat uran vilken fungerar som strålskärm. Kapslarna
låg förankrade i vertikalled i laddcellen. Innerbehållaren förslöts av en plugg,
även den av utarmat uran, och av ett lock med sex bultar. Innerbehållaren var
placerad i en ytter-behållare av stål och stötdämpande material.
Ytterbehållaren förslöts av ett lock med åtta bultar.
Den 3 januari informerades Studsvik om mätningarna av US
Department of Transportation (DOT). Studsvik kontaktade direkt  SSI och
SKI. Den 4 januari beslutade SSI att alla transporter av radioaktiva ämnen
från Isotopcentralen (IC) i Studsvik tillsvidare skulle stoppas. Detta stopp
upphävs sedan först 28 februari. SSI konstaterade inledningsvis att man inte
kunde utesluta att någon eller några personer fått akuta strålskador. Beslut
fattades även att 7 januari genomföra inspektioner vid alla transportled
(Cargo Center på Arlanda, SAS Cargo i Norrköping, samt i Studsvik). Även
blodprover på viss personal togs vid detta tillfälle (dessa visade inget
onormalt).
SSI gav 9 januari vissa undantag från det tillfälliga stoppet för transport
av radioaktiva ämnen. Den 12 mars lämnar SSI ärendet till åklagare då man
anser att Studsvik brutit mot strålskyddslagen och mot lagen om transport av
farligt gods. SSI ansåg att Studsvik visat grov oaktsamhet i samband  med
transporten av iridium. Studsvik har idag (augusti) ingen information om
tidplanen för den fortsatta processen eller resultat från den amerikanska
undersökningen.
SSI häver 24 april samtliga restriktioner för Studsviks isotoptransporter.
Orsak till de förhöjda dosraterna
Behållaren öppnades i USA i närvaro av bl a Studsviks personal samt
Statens strål-skydds-instituts inspektörer först den 7 februari. Vid
undersökningen av behållaren framkom att två av de tre innerbehållarna
med Ir-192 var öppna.
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Det noterades också att behållaren inte var fastspänd på samma sätt på
lastpallen som när den lämnade Studsvik. Den hade roterats ungefär ett
kvarts varv och ett av de två spännbanden hade lossnat.
I de begränsningar och villkor som angivits i typgodkännandet av
transportbehållaren (2835A) stod bl a:
- att kollit är godkänt för ett innehåll av Ir 192 i form av “pellets” i fast
metall.
- att kollit är godkänt för ett högsta aktivitetsinnehåll av 370 TBq.
Innehållet vid händelsen var 366,04 TBq.
- att kollit är godkänt för en högsta tillåten effekt av 57 W från
strålningen.
- vidare angavs i godkännandet att pellets antingen skulle inneslutas i
kapslar med skruvat lock (screw-topped) eller i slutna (sealed) kapslar. Dessa
skall vara konstruerade så att de enbart kan öppnas genom att kapseln
förstörs. Det konstaterades att formuleringen i det engelska godkännandet
inte var entydigt: “The pellets shall be contained in either screw-topped
capsules or sealed capsules constructed so that they can only be opened by
destroying the capsule.”. Från 18 januari har DOT lagt till texten “screwtopped
capsules with sealed welded caps are acceptable”. Efter ändringar av ägaren
till behållaren, CROFT, har engelska transportmyndigheter den 1 juli godkänt
förändringen “…either sealed metal capsules constructed so that they can only
be opened by destroying the capsule, or in screw-topped metal containers wich
have been lock welded or otherwise positively fastened to ensure that the
closure cannot become loose or detached under routine, normal or accidental
conditions of transport”.
- i godkännandet angavs att lämpligt förpackningsmaterial (suitable
packing) skall användas för att förhindra större rörelser (gross movements) av
kapslarna samt inbördes stötar. Förpacknings-material som förhindrar
vertikala rörelser har använts. Horisontellt kunde kapslarna dock röra sig
mindre än 1 cm. Även denna text har CROFT nu ändrat till “Suitable packing
material must be fitted within the cavity to prevent radial or axial movement of
the primary containers within the shielding pot during transport”.
Studsvik hade under hösten 2001 konstaterat att en liknande
observation inträffat vid en tidigare transport, men då hade inte det skruvade
locket helt gängats upp.
Förbättringar i kvalitetssystemet har gjorts bl a genom tydligare
instruktioner.
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Iridium
Iridium är en silvervit, spröd, extremt hård metall. Den har atomnummer 77 och
dess kemiska beteckning är Ir. Atomvikten är 192,22 och densiteten 22,6 kg/dm3
vilket gör att Ir jämte osmium (Os) är världens tyngsta grundämne. Ir smälter vid
2410 °C och kokar vid 4130 °C. Ir förekommer ofta naturligt i form av legeringar
med platina (Pt) och Os för att göra metallen hårdare.
Den vanligast förekommande radioaktiva isotopen av Ir är Ir-192 som
sönderfaller till Pt-192. Den framställs genom att naturligt Ir (Ir-191, 37,3 % och
Ir-193, 62,7 %) bestrålas med neutroner (n-gamma-reaktion). Även Ir-194 bildas
men har mindre tvärsnitt och kortare halveringstid. Ir-192 har halveringstiden
74 dygn vilket gör den lämplig att användas som strålkälla vid
material-undersökningar och olika patientbehandlingar.
Mätresultat
TL-dosimetrar för de två personer I Studsvik som utförde arbetet med att
färdigställa transportbehållaren utvärderades direkt. Djupa persondos-
ekvivalenten, Hp(10), för de två personerna var 0,0 mSv respektive 0,2 mSv
under december månad. Inget av de registrerade värdena avviker från
förväntade värden.
Vid arbetet i IC-lokaler har inga lokala strållarm eller installerade
detektorer indikerat förhöjda strålnivåer. Fast placerade strållarm finns t.ex. i
de lokaler där transportkollit färdigställdes.
Enligt transportdokumentet skall högsta dosrat vid ytan respektive på 1
meters avstånd från transportbehållaren anges. Mätningarna utfördes med ett
instrument av typ Automess AD5. Dosraten vid ytan uppmättes till 0,6 mSv/h
medan den maximala dosraten på 1 meters avstånd uppmättes till 0,02 mSv.
Mätningarna utfördes enligt mätinstruktion och görs på alla sidor av kollit.
Således har ingen indikation på onormala dosrater erhållits. Ingen onormal
ytkontamination uppmättes (β/γ < 4 Bq/cm2, α < 0,4 Bq/cm2).
Fast i rummet monterade TL-dosimetrar utvärderades också. De avlästa
värdena på miljödosekvivalenten var 0,6 mSv respektive 1,8 mSv. De avlästa
värdena för december månad var ett av de lägre värdena under 2001 och
indikerade inte några onormala strålnivåer.
I närheten av de aktuella arbetsutrymmena finns känsliga
utpasserings-monitorer innehållande gasdetektorer med stora detektorytor
som larmar om kraftigt förhöjda dosrater förekommer i lokalerna. Dessa har
inte larmat under den aktuella månaden.
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Två utomhus placerade dosimetrar vid utfarten från Studsvik visade
heller inget onormalt utan överensstämmer med vad som kan förväntas vara
normala bakgrundsvärden.
9/1 meddelar FedEx France att en doskontroll av kabinpersonal i Paris
inte visat något onormalt.
Inte heller i Sverige konstateras några stråldoser.
Strålskyddsmätningar vid SPEC benämnd “SPEC Event Summary”,
redovisade några mycket höga dosrater från locket. Även i sidled registrerades
strålning från emballaget. Mätresultaten redovisas som citat från rapporten. I
rapporten redovisas också mera detaljerade resultat av
persondosutvärderingar i USA. Slutsatsen av dessa, förutom de 3,4 mSv till
chauffören, blev att ingen person utsatts för höga persondoser i USA.
Franska myndigheter har låtit utföra blodundersökningar på
tranportpersonal i Paris. Resultat av dessa prover anses visa att två personer
fått stråldoser (15 och 100 mSv) med stora osäkerhetsintervall. Ytterligare
information och förutsättningar för dessa mätningar är inte kända.
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Occupational exposures – Radiation Protection at
Swedish Nuclear Power Plants.
The Authority’s retrospective view.
Ansi Gerhardsson and Lars Malmqvist
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority
Occupational dose reduction at nuclear power plants (NPP’s) is important. The
importance comes not only from the health and safety of the labour force. The
associated requirement for a good management system enhances the safety,
quality and reliability of the installation and thus the finance of the plant.
The Alara concept (As Low As Reasonable Achievable) includes social
and economical factors. To strengthen the connection between occupational
exposures and economy the nuclear power industry has put a price tag on
occupational doses. The utility value of 1 averted manSv has the price of 4
million SEK (i.e. about 440 k EUR).
Radiation protection and reactor safety is closely linked. Good radiation
protection coupled with good safety practice enhances the positive effects in
both areas. A well-planned job results in a job performed accurately with good
speed, high quality and security. The need for re-work is minimized and the
occupational exposures can be kept low. Radiation protection should always be
a natural ingredient in every project at a nuclear power plant.
Comparisons and events
In Swedish nuclear power history occupational doses have been kept low.
Comparisons with other countries show good values until 1992. While the doses
in France, Germany, Japan and the USA, which started high, began to decrease
steadily, the traditionally low doses at Swedish plants began to rise. One reason
for the low doses during the second half of the 1980’s was the less amount of
maintenance in combination with good planning performed at the yearly
outages.
Between 1992 and 1997 an increasing dose trend could be seen at Swedish
NPP’s. Two factors are noted. More maintenance was needed due to the aging of
the oldest reactors. The Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate (SKI) required more
extended inspection programs. The first generation of Swedish boiling water
reactors (BWR) Oskarshamn 1 and Ringhals 1 were mostly affected.
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In 1992 the so-called strainer-event occurred, when insulation material
was ripped off causing clogging of the strainers in the safety injection systems.
This event led to considerable modification of all the BWR’s with similar de-
sign. All fibre insulation in the reactor containment was replaced by metallic
insulation. New safety analysis reports were produced, plans for modernisation
of the reactors were created and new test methods were invented. These efforts
contributed to the higher occupational exposures at BWR’s during 1993 and
1994.
In 1995 a change of steam generators at Ringhals 3 (a pressurised water
reactor, PWR) was performed and in 1997 the SPRINT-project  (Säkra
Figure1. Collective dose for different generations of reactors.
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PRimärsystemets INTegritet) at Ringhals 1 was carried out. The SPRINT-
project aimed at securing the integrity of the primary system below the core to
make it comparable with the safety level at reactors with internal pumps.
Lower doses were obtained because of fewer measures due to problems with
inter granular stress corrosion cracking, less amount of testing and reduction
of stellite.
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Figure 3. Annual collective dose per PWR
The dose trend at Swedish NPP’s changed in 1997 and since then the
collective doses have steadily been decreasing. The radiation environment at
the nuclear power plants has changed.  For several of the reactors decreasing
dose rates have been seen as a result of change in reactor water chemistry and
the overall picture shows better circumstances regarding dose rates at all the
plants.
Measures taken by the authority
The Swedish membership in the European Union brought about changes in the
efforts made by the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI). The SSI
collection of regulations had to be rewritten to include the directives from 96/
29/Euratom. These regulations include for example dose limitation, medical
examinations, effluents, waste and filing of documents.
The dose limits for occupational exposures were kept at 50 mSv per year
with a maximum of 100 mSv per five-year period. At that time SSI choose to
exclude the former limit of 700 mSv for a lifetime. The five-year doses have
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been descending during the years and last year, 2001, no one received a five-
year dose exceeding 70 mSv.
SSI states in the regulations that the work shall be performed in such
a way that human exposures are limited as far as reasonably achievable
with social and economical factors taken into account. For this purpose the
licence holder shall ensure that goals and needed actions for control are
established and documented and that needed resources are available. The
goals and actions of control shall be adjusted with respect to the
prerequisite of the plant and be drawn up to take care of the daily as well as
the long-term radiation protection. The practice, including the goals and
actions of control, shall regularly be followed up and evaluated and
documentation on the evaluation shall be sent to SSI.
The licence holders are expected to develop and implement Alara-
programs. The plant management shall strongly declare the importance of
radiation protection all through the organisation from top to bottom and
secure that the labour force knows and abides by the radiation protection
policy. SSI requires education and training programs for all persons
working with matters related to radiation protection, operation and
maintenance. This includes external workers holding posts as foremen. The
education shall be adjusted with respect to the kind and extent of the work
as well as the environment where it is performed.
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The licence holder shall appoint a radiation protection manager. The
manager shall hold sufficient competence on matters related to radiation
protection and shall be the qualified expert on radiation protection at the plant.
She, or he, shall actively work for the complying of regulations and conditions.
The manager shall see to that the work at the plant is performed at an
acceptable level for radiation protection. She or he shall also ensure that local
rules are established in order to avoid unacceptable or unnecessary doses.
To have preparedness for the unwanted but possible problem such as fuel
damage is an important task in the nuclear power plant radiation protection.
Fuel damage can cause increased dose rates and result in problems at outages.
SSI prescribes that the licence holders shall have a documented policy in case
of fuel damage, including the plant’s strategy for avoiding fuel damages to the
most reasonable extent as well as a strategy to handle the situation would a
fuel damage occur.
During the 1990’s SSI have financed research projects in the areas of
effects of reactor water chemistry and different methods for reduction of dose
rate by decreasing activity build-up on surfaces and fuel decontamination.
Both the authority and the licence holders benefits from an open and
constructive dialogue. The Radiation Protection Authority can contribute to the
exchange of experiences between nuclear power plants and authorities within
and outside Sweden. SSI participates in the international radiation protection
community through IAEA, OECD/NEA and the EC/European Alara Network.
Measures taken by the industry
The nuclear power industry has, apart from the requirements from the SSI,
implemented several measures intended to decrease occupational exposures.
Until a few years ago dose rate measurements were performed only
during the yearly outages. Currently measurements are performed
continuously and changes in dose rates can be directly connected to events and
better analysis of operating conditions, like water chemistry, can be achieved.
Many efforts have been made to improve the reactor water chemistry
and to increase the water quality. Cleanliness while working with open system
together with high water quality decreases the risk of activating particles and
the risk for fuel damages.
The nuclide contributing mostly to occupational doses is 60Co. The largest
source of cobalt is stellite. Stellite is an alloy frequently used in valves.
Decreasing the amount of stellite used will reduce the amount of cobalt
released to the reactor water and thus lower the radiation levels.
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The future
The nuclear power industry’s plans for the future makes it clear that we can
expect an increasing extent of maintenance and modernisation in the next few
years to come. This will probably result in higher occupational exposures.
Safety findings and related events at NPP’s within and outside Sweden can
lead to an increasing amount of testing and maintenance at the Swedish
nuclear power plants.
The Radiation Protection Authority expects the open climate for dialogue
and development and research cooperation in radiation protection issues
between the authority and the industry to continue. The ambition to optimise
the radiation protection at the plants is in the interest of both parties. It is the
task of the authority to make sure the licence holders follows stated laws and
regulations to obtain this goal.
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Posters
8a  A brief description of the OMINEX project
“optimisation of monitoring for internal exposure”
T Rahola1, G Etherington2, G N Stradling2, C Cossonnet3,
D Franck3, J-R Jourdain3, B Le Guen4, J L Genicot 5, C Hurtgen5,
J Sovijärvi 6, R Sundell6, P Bérard7
1STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881
Helsinki, Finland
2NRPB, Chilton,Didcot, Oxon, OX11 0RQ,UK7
3IRSN - Institute de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, France
4EDF-GDF, SCAST/LAM, Immeuble Bequerel, BP 114, 93203 Saint Denis
CEDEX 1,France
5SCK.CEN, Low Level Radioactivity Department, Boeretang 200, B-2400 Mol,
Belgium
6TVONS - Teollisuuden Voima Oy Nuclear Services, Finland
 7CEA Saclay,DSP-LABM, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette CEDEX, France
Summary
OMINEX (Optimisation of Monitoring for Internal Exposure) is an on-going
international project part-funded by the European Commission within the 5th
(EURATOM) Framework Programme.
Monitoring of the workforce in the nuclear industries is carried out
primarily in order to demonstrate compliance with European Union Basic
Safety Standards for the protection of the health of workers against the
dangers arising from ionising radiation. There is however no compilation of
information on internal dose monitoring programmes currently in use in the
EU countries.
 The aim of OMINEX (Optimisation of Monitoring for Internal Exposure) is
to provide advice and guidance on designing and implementing internal dose
monitoring programmes in the workplace, in such a way that best use is made
of available resources, while minimising costs. Advice will be provided on both
routine and incident (special) monitoring for a range of specific examples of
exposures to industrial materials. Topics to be covered will include overall de-
sign of monitoring programmes, choice of monitoring method(s), (e.g. excretion
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monitoring vs. in vivo monitoring), choice of measurement technique (e.g. alpha
spectrometry vs. mass spectrometry), monitoring intervals, measurement
frequency, required measurement sensitivity, and resulting uncertainty in
assessed intakes and doses.
The project is being carried out by a consortium of European research/
advisory organisations working together with nuclear industry organisations:
in France, these are the Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire
(IRSN), Electricité de France (EdF) and Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique
(CEA); in the UK, the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB), with
additional input from the UK nuclear industry; in Finland, the Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and Teollisuuden Voima Oy Nuclear Services
(TVONS); and the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK·CEN). The project
has been underway for 20 months, and will conclude at the end of 2003, at
which time a training course will be held to disseminate the results of the
project to radiation protection professionals with responsibilities in this field.
Scientific and technological objectives
The central objective of OMINEX is to provide advice and guidance on the de-
sign and implementation of internal radiation dose monitoring programmes in
the workplace, so that best use can be made of available resources, while
minimising costs. Advice will be provided on both routine and incident (special)
monitoring for a range of specific examples of exposures to industrial
materials. Topics to be covered will include overall design of monitoring
programmes, choice of monitoring method(s), (eg excretion monitoring vs. in
vivo monitoring), choice of measurement technique (eg alpha spectrometry vs.
mass spectrometry), monitoring intervals, measurement frequency, required
measurement sensitivity, and resulting uncertainty in assessed intakes and
doses.
The broad approach to optimisation of monitoring programme design
will be an evaluation of costs versus “benefits”. The latter will be quantified
primarily by assessing the accuracy with which intakes and doses are
determined. Current practice in internal dose monitoring, and the associated
costs of monitoring, will be investigated, as well as the accuracy of assessed
intakes/doses . Work on development of advice and guidance is also conducted.
The main objectives are:
• to collect information on, and provide a critical evaluation of, arrangements
for internal dose monitoring in nuclear and non-nuclear industries
• to collect and evaluate information on the costs of internal dose monitoring
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• to compile descriptions of the bioassay and in vivo measurement procedures
used by EU laboratories for monitoring of workers from the nuclear industries,
and investigate how the available methods and techniques could be exploited
in such a way as to reduce the uncertainties in measurements
• to investigate and quantify the major sources of uncertainty in internal dose
assessed from the results of particular monitoring methods and measurement
techniques
• to provide advice and guidance on the design and implementation of
monitoring programmes
Scientific and technical assessment
Survey of internal dose monitoring programmes
The questionnaire for the survey of internal dose monitoring programmes
requests information on direct (in vivo) and indirect (bioassay and air
sampling) monitoring for internal exposure to fission and activation products,
and to compounds of uranium, thorium, plutonium, americium, mixed oxide
(MOX) fuel, and other actinides. Separate sections cover routine and incident
(special) monitoring.  The complete questionnaire is quite long (55 pages in
total). To encourage Dosimetry Services to respond, only those parts of the
questionnaire that are relevant to the work of a particular organisation have
been sent out. A one-page “pre-questionnaire” was used to establish the
radionuclides monitored and monitoring methods used by each organisation.
Thus, a nuclear power station operator carrying out in vivo and bioassay
monitoring for fission and activation products would receive a questionnaire of
only 14 pages.
It was decided that the questionnaire should be sent to every country
within the European Union (EU) where internal dose monitoring is carried out,
and that coverage of the “Associated States” of the EU should be as great as
possible.
A database for storage and reporting of all information gained was
designed using Microsoft Access 97™.  The database contains 39 tables
arranged according to the subtitles in the questionnaire, starting with general
aspects, continuing with data on monitoring methods for fission and activation
products and actinides, and ending with data on dose assessment methods and
dose statistics. All results from the survey will be kept anonymous.
Data based on information provided both in the pre-questionnaire and in
the full questionnaire show that, at nuclear power plants, fission and activation
products are monitored with whole-body counting. Some organisations also
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monitor tritium in urine routinely but only three with a weekly frequency. All
organisations report that they have well-defined pre-planned arrangements for
internal dose monitoring. Some also report that they sub-contract certain
monitoring to outside organisations. In most organisations monitoring is carried
out to assess individual doses for entry onto a legal dose record. In many
organisations monitoring is also carried out to reassure the workers that they are
not receiving excessive doses.
When applicable, whole-body and thyroid counting is used also for incident
monitoring, complemented with other methods.
Dose calculations are done primarily manually or using own software. Of
commercial dose calculation programs, most popular is LUDEP followed by
IMBA.
Costs of internal dose monitoring programmes
The questionnaire on costs of internal dose monitoring requests information
relating to the costs of individual and collective monitoring (measurement
procedure used, the price of each measurement, number of analyses performed for
each worker, capital cost of equipment used). Information has been requested
mainly on costs of monitoring for exposure to actinides. All results from the survey
will be kept anonymous.
Uncertainties in measurements
Assessment of internal dose relies on results obtained from direct measurements
such as whole-body, lung or thyroid monitoring and from indirect measurements
such as bioassay of urine and faeces For the survey of measurement uncertainties
in bioassay monitoring, the targeted analytical procedures were those set up for
monitoring actinides, while the in vivo monitoring survey additionally covered
fission and activation product monitoring. For bioassay and in vivo monitoring the
answers gathered were provided mainly by laboratories that make these
measurements routinely.
Uncertainties in internal dose assessments
The approach adopted in OMINEX is essentially to optimise the design of a
monitoring programme by minimising uncertainties in assessed intakes
and doses (subject to a consideration of costs and other factors). This
requires the development of a methodology for assessing confidence
intervals on assessed intakes and doses that takes account of the major
sources of uncertainty. Factors contributing to the total uncertainty can be
classified under three headings:
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• uncertainties in measured bioassay quantities
• uncertainties in model parameter values describing the biokinetic and
dosimetric behaviour of the radionuclide(s)
• uncertainties in the assumed intake pattern (time of intake(s), acute
vs. chronic, etc.).
Methodology for the determination of confidence intervals on
assessed dose
Determination of total uncertainties arising from the use of each of the
available monitoring methods for a particular radionuclide and/or compound
will enable specific issues to be investigated, including :
General
• What is the best choice of monitoring method for a particular
radionuclide / compound?
• Is there a benefit to using more than one monitoring method?
• How does total uncertainty vary with the number of measurements?
• Incident monitoring
• For an acute intake, should measurements be performed at fixed time
intervals, or should measurements be more frequent soon after the
intake?
• If the time of intake is unknown, what effect does this have on the
optimum number and times of measurements?
Routine monitoring
• How does total uncertainty vary with monitoring interval?
• What is the best assumption to make about the time(s) of intake (eg
single intake at mid-point; continuous, uniform chronic)?
• If a single intake in each monitoring interval is assumed, should a time
other than the mid-point be assumed?
Conclusions and acknowledgements
Work in the OMINEX project is continuing and the consortium considers that
all the stated objectives will be met. Answers to the questionnaires were not
very easy to get although we tried to approach people known to us earlier.
Enough information to meet the requirements is however available. We thank
all our colleagues for giving us the information we asked for. Without their help
all our conclusions would have been based on published information only.
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8b Radioactive sources in Sweden: a comparison
between registered data and reality
Klas Bergman, Chatarina Honeth, Tord Larsson, Carl-Göran
Stålnacke, Mia Stålnacke and Ann-Charlotte Åkerblom.
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SE-17116 Stockholm
Background and method
In connection with the restructuring of the licensing procedure for Industrial
gauges in Sweden a questionnaire was sent out to 1 100 licence-holders asking
them to report on differences between the registered information they had
received and the physical reality.
The total number of licences of this kind is about 2 500 in Sweden. The
new procedure of licencing is intended to reduce the work at the authority by a
simpler registration procedure.  This will be done by giving only one licence to a
holder of sources and to register the information on sources by a separate
registration procedure. Previously, the holder of sources (licence-holder) was in
most cases given a licence for each source.
Result
The result of the questionnaire can be presented in the form of the following
graph.  Most answers indicate discrepancies between the registered
information and reality. New contact persons were given in 78 % of the
answers, 20 % were corrections of source-related information,  14 % were new
addresses, and  8 % were difficult to interpret. Finally, reorganization of the
holder-company was indicated in 15 % of the answers. For those answers that
could easily be interpreted (about ¼) the sum of the registered source-activity
was about 1 TBq too low.
Conclusion
From a supervisory point of view the discovered discrepancies were alarming.
The new way of licensing will now include an annual confirmation from the
licence-holder of the accurateness of the information registered at the
authority.
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Figure 1.
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SESSION 9. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
Practical experiences in educating radiation safety
officers
Michael Tillander
Laboratory of radiochemistry, Department of Chemistry, University of
Helsinki, P.O.Box  55, FIN-00014  UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI, Finland
Introduction
The Finnish Radiation Act1 requires that a party applying for licence to run a
radiation practice shall submit a  description of organization, inter alia naming
the radiation safety officer and describing the qualifications of other persons
involved in the use of radiation. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) defines the level of qualification required for radiation safety officers
and other persons participating in radiation work or authorized to use
radiation sources independently. The fields of  competence are2:
• Medical use of radiation;
• Use of radiation in industry, research and education; and
• Sale and maintenance of radiation sources.
Each field is subdivided into several subfields or levels of competence.
Prior to 1992 – when the Act  became effective – one could only qualify as
radiation safety officer before a special examination panel, but now it is
possible for STUK to delegate this responsibility to certain educational
institutes. At present 44 such units have this right, 25 of them in the medical
field3.
The course in radiation protection
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry, University of Helsinki, has since 1992
offered a course in radiation protection. The course comprises ten hours of
lectures, a written examination and two laboratory exercises, and its aim is the
competence as radiation safety officer for using open and sealed radiation
sources in industry, research and education. This course has been quite popular,
742 persons have participated, of whom 542 have received the certificate of
competence (1991—2001). Most participants have been university students or
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university personnel, but participation is not restricted to these groups.
Lectures have been offered once or twice annually, and the course has also
twice been held for postgraduate students of the Medical Faculty.
Textbooks
There is no lack of  textbooks on radiation protection, but most of them still use
the old units rad, rem and curie. Even Marttila’s excellent books in Finnish4, 5
were written before the EU Directive on Basic Safety Standards6 (BSS), and
are thus partly obsolete. It would not be realistic to attempt to teach students
the abstract concepts of dosimetry if they are further complicated by different
systems of units and quantities, and terminology like ‘dose equivalent’ against
‘equivalent dose’. It was necessary to compile a textbook or compendium7 for
the course, and also to update it continuously. The contents of the compendium
are:
• Definitions, quantities and units, the detrimental effects of radiation,
laws and directives, safety licences, dose limits, calculating doses,
practical aspects of radiation protection, radiation protection
measurements and handling radioactive wastes;
• The Radiation Act and Decree;
• Ranges of particles;
• Absorption and build-up factors;
• The radiation characteristics of some 100 commonly used radionuclides;
• The absorption classification, dose conversion factors, exemption
activities, ALImin and MAC values for the same radionuclides;
• An example of a radiation safety data sheet for a radionuclide, and
• Contact data of the Authority (STUK).
The written examination
The examination format differs from the usual examinations at the university.
It is not intended to test the memory of the examinee, but rather his or her
ability to apply rules and calculations to realistic situations in dealing with
radiation sources. In such situations the examinee has the role of radiation
safety officer. The examinees can thus use the compendium during the
examination. Usually five tasks are set, e.g.:
• Calculate the external or internal dose from given parameters. Suggest
appropriate action if an employee has received the dose calculated.
• Compile safety instructions for a task involving a certain radiation
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source. Alternatively, find the errors in a researcher’s plan for doing such
a task.
• Find the errors in a series of pictures depicting handling of an open
source.
• An accident or incident has occurred in the laboratory, which may have
exposed personnel to radiation or may have contaminated the premises.
What should the safety officer do? Examples of accidents are found in the
literature, or the examiner can draw on his or her experience.
• Explain how radioactive waste of given composition should be rendered
innocuous.
This type of examination gives a reliable indication of the examinee’s
ability to act as a safety officer. The questions may be arduous to set up, but
judging the answers is easier than judging the more usual essay-type exam.
On an average 60% of the participants in each examination pass.
Laboratory exercises
There are two exercises, together taking roughly one working day. Radiation
protection instruments and simple dosemeters are demonstrated, and the
participants calibrate the meters, and scan surfaces for simulated
contamination. Safe handling of open and closed sources is demonstrated and
practised. The participants write reports on the exercises.
Practical experiences
The course ‘Radiation protection’ originated as in-house safety training for
students of radio-chemistry. Under the new system of training safety officers
introduced under the Act of 1991 the course was aimed at providing formal
competence, which at first was a prerequisite for taking the subsequent
laboratory courses in radiochemistry. This system ensured that all students
had sufficient knowledge of safety procedures before handling radiation
sources in the laboratory. On the other hand many students experienced great
difficulties in passing the stiff examination for safety officer, since many of
them never had seen a radiation source or a radiation laboratory. This problem
was solved by restructuring the curriculum, so that a student starting to
specialise in radiochemistry takes the following courses after passing the
intermediate level in Chemistry:
1. Basic Radiochemistry I, with written examination
2. Lectures in Radiation Safety
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3. Short exam in Radiation Safety, of the multichoice quiz type
4. Laboratory exercises in Radiation Safety, with written reports
5. After passing the short exam and completing the exercises the student
receives one credit unit for Radiation Safety and can participate in laboratory
exercises with radiation sources.
6. It is recommended that students taking Radiochemistry as their main
subject take the examination for Radiation Safety officer after participating in the
laboratory-oriented courses Basic Radiochemistry II, Nuclear Spectrometry  and
Analytical Chemistry of Radionuclides. In any case students are required to attain
competence as Radiation Safety officers before they may work independently in
the laboratory, e.g. as summer trainees or doing their Master’s theses.
This curriculum naturally only applies to undergraduate students. Other
participants attend the course with the sole aim of attaining formal
competence. They usually have practical experience of handling radiation
sources and therefore experience less difficulties in passing the examination
for safety officer.
The examination for Radiation Safety Officer should judge the
examinee’s ability to apply rules and formulae of radiation protection to
realistic situations, rather than his or her ability to remember concepts learnt
by heart.
Feedback from the Authority
The course curriculum was originally planned in cooperation with experts from
STUK. The Authority in 1996 and 2001 requested institutions licensed to issue
certificates of competence to report in detail on courses and examinations held:
numbers of participants in examinations, percentage passed, questions used in
examinations and numbers of certificates issued. Unfortunately STUK has not
had resources available to use the reports as feedback to the institutions.
Digests of the best examination questions would have been especially welcome.
Discussion
Radiation protection and work with radiation require professionals at three
levels of expertise:
• Persons who may perform specified tasks with radiation sources without
supervision, but do not supervise the work of others (responsible users);
• Radiation safety officers, appointed by the licensee and responsible for
the safe use of radiation; and
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• Qualified experts, as defined in the BSS directive6.
It is the duty of the safety officer to ensure that the technical personnel
referred to in the first category receives adequate training. There are not,
however, enough training courses available for non-academic personnel.
There is an adequate selection of courses and examinations for
presumptive safety officers. The third category, qualified experts, is not yet
covered by ST-guide 1.42, but will be considered in a future revision. For the
medical use of radiation the hospital radiation physicists are considered to
have qualified expert status.
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Education, Training, and Qualification of Radiation
Users in Finland
Hannu Järvinen, Ritva Havukainen
STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland
Responsibilities of licence holders
Radiation Act (592/2001) stipulates responsibilities of licence holders to ensure
education and training required for the radiation users. Workers shall be
provided with training and instructions for their duties appropriate to the kind
of work and to conditions at the workplace. Particular attention shall be paid to
information on the health hazards of radiation and on safety-enhancing work
procedures in order to prevent unnecessary exposure to radiation and events
leading to exceptional exposure thereto.
Workers shall comply with the instructions issued, and shall also
otherwise attend to their own radiation safety and to that of others.
An application for a safety licence shall be supplemented with a
description of the radiation user’s organisation (an organisation description),
specifying the name of the radiation safety officer responsible for safety in the
use of radiation.
Having regard to the nature and scope of use of the radiation and to
conditions at the place of use, the organisation description shall also provide
sufficient information concerning:
1) the competence of the persons participating in the use of the radiation,
2) the duties and division of responsibility pertinent to the safe use of the
radiation,
3) other arrangements to ensure safety at the place of use of the
radiation.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority - STUK shall stipulate the
qualifications required of a radiation safety officer and of other persons
working in the user’s organisation, and shall investigate compliance with the
said stipulations. STUK has issued the guide ST 1.4, “Organization for the use
of radiation”, which is under revision. The Guide ST 1.7 ”Radiation safety
training in health care”, is under preparation. A guide concerning the
organizations giving radiation safety training will be prepared in the near
future.
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Qualifications in Health Care
The Requirements of Directive 97/43/Euratom concerning medical exposures
have been implemented to the Finnish radiation legislation by the Amendment
(1142/1998) to the Radiation Act (592/1991) and by the Decree of the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Health (423/2000). Qualifications of the workers involved
in the use of radiation in health care have been stipulated in that Decree as
following:
Responsibility for measures
A physician responsible for a measure causing exposure to radiation shall
possess qualifications consistent with the character of the measure for
assessing the justification and optimisation thereof, and also contributing to
the interpretation of the results of the measure. The practitioner shall be
responsible for meeting the qualification requirements, and the general
qualification requirements to be considered when assessing these shall be:
Radiotherapy: a specialist in oncology or other specialist qualified for
radiotherapy
Isotope medicine: a specialist in clinical physiology and isotope medicine
or other specialist qualified in isotope medicine
X-ray examinations and surgical radiology: a specialist in radiology.
Other consultant physicians responsible for the use of X-ray equipment shall
possess the knowledge of radiation protection necessary for measures
performed in their specialisms. When radiation protection has formed no part
of the studies of a physician the required knowledge may be demonstrated
through the separate radiation protection training, which fills the
requirements defined by STUK.
Dental X-ray examinations: a dental surgeon or other physician with
basic knowledge of the health effects of ionising radiation and of the exposure
of the patient to radiation.
A physician other than those referred to in the foregoing who is
responsible for measures shall possess basic knowledge of the health effects of
ionising radiation and of the exposure of the patient to radiation in the
measure concerned.
Performance of measures causing exposure to radiation
The qualification requirements for a physician responsible for measures shall
apply when a physician performs a measure causing exposure to radiation.
An X-ray assistant (radiographer) may independently perform an X-ray
imaging according to a referral. Under the supervision of a physician
responsible for measures other professional health care staff may assist in the
use of X-ray equipment for the use of which they have been properly trained.
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A person who has vocational education in dental X-ray photography may
perform dental X-ray imaging according to the instructions of a physician.
Any other person participating in the performance of measures causing
exposure to radiation shall possess training and experience in accordance with
the nature of the said assignment.
Radiation safety training in vocational education
Radiation safety training in vocational education is the duty of universities,
vocational high schools and other training organizations. The licence holders
are responsible for the complementary training of workers involved in the use
of radiation. The ST guide 1.7 concerning the radiation training in health care
will give STUK´s opinion on the content and minimum hourly amounts of the
radiation safety training in health care. STUK has asked outside comments to
the draft of the guide from the training professionals and other contact groups.
We got lot of comments and improvements to the guide. The main opinion was
that the guide is needed and the topics which were proposed in the draft to
include in the radiation safety training was considered appropriate. But
changes to the hourly amounts were proposed in the comments.
Radiation safety training of radiation safety officers and operators in charge
STUK has accepted some training organizations to give certificates of radiation
safety officers. The certificate is an expression that a person has past an exam
of the radiation safety officers and he or she can be appointed as radiation
safety officer of a radiation practice. When granting a radiation safety licence
for the use of radiation STUK accepts the radiation safety officer nominated by
the responsible party.
The exam of radiation safety officer is nowadays included in the
specialized studies of radiologists and medical physicists.
Industrial radiography devices can only be used by the radiation safety
officer or by a trained person with the safety officer’s written permission. If,
owing to the nature of the work, the radiation safety officer cannot actively
supervise compliance with the safety regulations, he or she shall appoint an
operator in charge for each place where radiation is used, the operator in
charge being responsible for radiation safety in the place of use and its
surroundings. STUK has accepted some training organisations to give
certificates of the operators in charge.
STUK oversees the training organizations accepted to give certificates.
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Developing company training by making use of
new pedagogical ideas and technology
Tea-Mari Latva, Antti Piirto
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Introduction
In today’s society success is based on applying new technological inventions in
both training and work. From the point of view of learning and training this
means that more attention needs to be paid on the ways knowledge and
information technology can be used in teaching. The primary goal is to create a
continuous and gradually deepening process of learning that motivates and is
meaningful for the learner. The teacher should support the student in his
independent knowledge structuring.
What would be the right way to approach the employees so that they
would gain confidence on themselves as the guides of their own learning? What
are the pedagogical ways that help the teacher in creating an efficient and a
meaningful learning environment? The trainers of the technical field usually
have a strong knowledge on their own area of know-how, but the pedagogical
points of view have been left aside during their time of education. The main
challenge is, how to integrate the theoretical know-how and the didactic skills
of the trainer into a working whole?
The central terms and theories
Pedagogics cf. andragogics = according to the traditional concept,
pedagogism means the art and education of bringing up children.
Netpedagogics is a new way of learning that is based on new information and
communication technology. The basis of it is a database system, which can file
information in the form of text, picture or video. Andragogics is defined as a
science studying adult education, which is built around the specialities of the
learning situations of adults. A central goal in adult learning is continuous
learning that goes on through the lifetime.
investigative learning = a process where the advancement of learning
is guided by the problems set out by the members of the learning community,
conceptions and theories formed by them and the critical evaluation of the
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knowledge they have searched for.
didactics = the central concept of didactics is education, which includes
both teaching and learning. The teaching process can be divided into three
phases: 1. preinteractive phase, fore-planning the teaching, mainly realised by
the teacher, but the learners can also familiarise themselves with the upcoming
learning material, collect material etc. 2. interactive phase, planning the
beginning of the teaching period in co-operation with the students. The teacher
and the students decide the goals, the schedule, the materials and the ways to
work, after which the plan is realised and evaluated at the end. 3. post
interactive phase is for collective consideration on how to improve the teaching
based on the experiences from the previous period.
constructivism = constructivism is the currently dominating learning
concept. Previously learning was seen through behaviourism, according to the
teacher–learning stimulus–student  -concept. Essential aspects of
constructivism are: learning by an active design of knowledge, learning is
involved with action, learning is a process of interaction, a motivation to learn,
to try, to solve problems and understand, the development of self-direction and
the growth of ones self is possible through learning.
Education in the environment of investigative learning
Investigative learning is a new view of a learning process born from the
development of intellect and thinking. In the model of investigative learning
the learning and the construction of knowledge work interactively in the same
way as an individual and a community.
A learning environment can be defined as pedagogically meaningful if it
has cognitive tools to support, guide and expand the learning process. In
addition, you need tools of communication for the co-operation between the
teacher and the learner and between the learners to be possible. A net-based
learning environment gives the student tools for communal construction of
information. Digital learning materials and equipment make most of the
phases of teaching work easier assuming that they are easily available and the
teachers have relatively good computing skills. An essential feature of good
learning material is adaptivity, the possibility of using it in several ways. The
Internet, for example, provides you with learning material quickly, easily and
extensively, the only problem is the need to select the essential and the reliable
knowledge. The model of investigative learning can be divided into six
components.
1) creating a context & anchoring the teaching: In the beginning of
the learning process you need to anchor the problems you are going to deal with
into the learner’s earlier constructions of knowledge, schemes. The problem of
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the process of investigative learning should be complex enough and motivating
for the student. In workplace training it would be important that the trainees
see the solving of the problem as meaningful for their own work.
2) learning through problem solving: New knowledge is not absorbed
right away, it is built by solving knowledge-problems and by creating and
evaluating ones own theories and explanations. The problems that the students
set for themselves have an important meaning.
3) explanatory learning: Creating a students’ own working theories is
another central component of investigative learning. This helps for being aware
of the difference between ones own and the new conception before searching for
the new information.
4) critical evaluation: The students evaluate the advancing of their
study process critically by setting new goals. Critical evaluation calls for
constructive interaction within a learning community so that new ideas and
point of views can be found and developed. Self-evaluation is also important for
the students’ understanding of their own learning and themselves in control of
it (metacognition) to develop.
5) acquiring new knowledge: The goal of an investigative learning
project is to generate new understanding and knowledge. The students’
working theories are tested by searching information from scientific literature,
electrical sources, expert interviews and practical experiments.
6) sharing expertise: It is characteristic for investigative learning that
the whole learning community is responsible for the development of the
knowledge, so by mutual interaction the collective intellectual resources can be
used to advance the study process, without forgetting the tutors input.
A multidimensional learning environment takes different types of
students into consideration
One of the basic skills of a teacher is the skilful and meaningful use of teaching
methods. A multidimensional learning environment favours diverse actions.
For example in a net-based project this means differentiation of assignments so
that every individual can begin their study with an assignment from their own
level. This encourages and motivates the learner to develop himself level by
level and creates positive learning experiences as he can see the progress of his
own learning.
The autonomy of the students and the teaching groupings in a
multidimensional learning context are closely connected to the idea of the co-
operation of learning. It is essential for this concept of learning to divide the
learners into heterogenical groups for the people to learn to work with different
types of people. The differences between the learners can be used, among other
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things, to divide the people into groups where there is one expert from one area
of expertise (groups of two-way teaching) or so that in a group the individuals
are homogeneous (expert groups). The advantage on the first one is that
different groups are equal for example in a project that requires multiple types
of know-how, in the latter one the different groups could teach others their own
area of expertise.
The teaching should take the auditory, visual and audiovisual sense
channel into consideration, because different individuals use different sense
channels to learn. This is especially easy to realise in a computer assisted
learning environment.
Good teacher, competent instructor
Behaviouristic teaching (direct teaching) that highlights directed teaching is
still a part of the whole, for example as the motivational part of the beginning.
Essential for the teachers’ performance is clarity and logically proceeding from
the different parts to the whole.
Cognitive teaching (the processing of information) means the processing
of the study material into meaningful portions where the teachers role is to be
the help of the learners. Cognitive teaching is also the construction of
information into flexible information structures and applying them to realistic
situations.
When the previous teaching methods are connected to the technical side
of information, the humanistic and the social side mainly highlight the
atmosphere of the teaching. The growth into humanity happens through
teaching & learning. A teachers/instructors goal in modern projects of
information and communication technology is to build a “cognitive
apprenticeship” together with the learner. Behind this concept is the idea of
getting to know the culture of expertise by the more experienced expert giving
the trainees a model, after which the learners take part in the processing of the
more demanding assignments. The instructor guides the learners indirectly
and sparingly (scaffold) and little by little gives them more responsibility
which makes it possible for them to rise to the teachers level, possibly even
above it. When you develop teaching, you should also think about the
development of evaluation. A typical way of evaluation is a learning log instead
of tests/examinations. The goal of the evaluation is, in addition to controlling
the progress, to get feedback on your own weaknesses and strong features. This
is important when developing the skills of self-evaluation. It is generally
thought that a poor answer shows the stupidity of the student, when actually
the answers give the teacher valuable feedback about the success of the
teaching, which is the third goal of evaluation.
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Research report
The purpose of this study is to find out how to develop the training of an
industrial company by taking advantage of the pedagogical theories that are
currently popular and the ideas about effective learning. This study will map
out the opinions and the expectations connected to the training of the
employees of an industrial company, when the learning environment would be
based on the model of investigative learning. The research problems are:
Main problem: How to develop the training of an industrial company in
pedagogical ways?
Sub problem 1. What is an effective learning environment in company
training in the opinion of the learners?
Sub problem 2. What qualities do the trainees expect and hope for from their
instructor?
Main problem: Which and how should the principles of investigative learning
be especially emphasized in the training of the different departments of different
organisations?
Research group and meters
The testees on this research all worked on the production and technology
departments of the industrial company that was the research field. The enquiry
was delivered to altogether 62 people, who were randomly picked from the
departments mentioned before. Group managers, work leaders and other
employees were chosen for the tests. From the 30 enquiries that were returned,
22 were chosen to describe the results and make the conclusions. The majority
(53/62) of the people who received the enquiry were men
This research was a quantitative survey- research. The method used in
this research was an enquiry. The enquiry attempted to outline the employees’
opinions on “good training” so that effective ways could be found for the
realisation of training. The respondent had to choose the best answer from
prepared options, put statements into the right order or evaluate statements
on the scale of 1-5 and 1-3. In addition the enquiry involved a few open
questions.
Results
The results are considered from the point of view of how the employees of an
industrial company have experienced training and how it could be developed
according to the model of investigative learning, within a net-based learning
environment.
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The attached bar diagram illustrates what the research group thought
about the goals of training and what was expected of and hoped for from the
training. One can see from the diagram that statement 9 has received most
points (40p.), when statement 5 has the least (1p.).
Requests for training
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The goals of training
1= The training is involved with my own goals of progression in my work
2= The training is realised in a group as project work
3= Training increases my own expertise
4= The goal of the training is to guide us to effectively solve the problems we
face at work
5= the training helps to make you aware of the difference between your own
beliefs and facts
6= I can develop myself as a whole with the help of the training
7= The training makes use of all the latest technology
8= The instructor is professional and knows how to guide the learning of his
students
9= the training gives information of the knowledge and techniques that are
needed in the work
A clear majority felt that effective training is based evenly on both
lectures and the exercises of the students. The people who responded thought
that lecturing does not teach, active making of exercises and conversation is
what teaches. Though it is good for the instructor to first present the new ideas,
basic ideas, by lecturing so that the individual can begin to apply the
information orally/in writing or preferably, if possible, in practise. Also the
repetition of issues was considered as an essential part of the learning process.
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To the question “where you have learned working skills”, clearly the most
common answer was in work life, in practise. It appears that basic training is
only a compulsory intermediate phase for many to get into the work they want.
Effective learning environment
Multiple-choice questions were answered according to the table below. The
table has been put together with the most essential results on the questions
connected to learning environments.
Table 1. Considering learning environment from the point of view of effective learning.
1) It does not really seem to matter how the study situation has been organised.
2) Receiving information visually was clearly seen as the most effective way.
Only one person saw receiving oral information as the most pleasant.
3) A multimedia presentation was voted as the best way of illustration as
video programs were generally seen as ineffective.
4) Favourite study techniques were dependent on the person: learning is a
personal thing.
5) From the issues that need to be learned the easiest to adapt were the
practical things and the wholes, details were difficult to memorise.
Applying the concept of investigative learning in the training of the different
departments of an organisation
The respondents had to evaluate their own know-how by giving a numerical
value on the scale of 1-5 to different areas of know-how. The next picture shows
a comparison between the production and technical departments’ averages
concerning all sectors apart.
EVALUATING LEARNING 
ENVIRONMENT
 % 
1. the most suitable study  
situation (time&place)
does not matter 
not depending on time/place 
tied to time&place 
36
27
32
2. receiving information visually 
orally 
86
5
3. best way of illustration multimedia presentation 
video
50
5
4. best study technique underlining 
writing abstracts 
reading text 
41
32
27
5. what you learn best practical things 
wholes 
details 
50
41
5
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The greatest difference between the departments is in motivation and
perseverance. In the production department these qualities are evaluated as
much weaker in ones on know-how than in the technical department. This
result can perhaps be explained by the natural factor that the work
assignments in the production department are often mechanical and short-
term, when in the technical department you sometimes have to plan for long
before the solution for the problem at hand becomes clear. As you can see in the
picture, working independently and the perceiving of the essential
issues are considered equally strong in both departments.
Evaluating ones own know-how
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
K 13.1
K 13.2
K 13.3
K 13.4
K 13.5
K 13.6
K 13.7
K 13.8
K 13.9
K 13.10
average
(production)
average
(technology)
13.1 co-operation skills 13.6 evaluating ones own learning
13.2 perceiving the essential issues 13.7 motivation
13.3 working independently 13.8 perseverance
13.4 ability to solve problems 13.9 tolerating insecurity & taking risks
13.5 ability to associate information 13.10 applying information to practise
The respondents evaluated their computer skills on the scale of 1-5.
According to the results the technical department sees their computer skills as
stronger than the production department. The difference between the two
departments was very even in all the sectors of computer skills, but the
greatest difference was on the control of the operating system on ones
workstation.
Only a few of the respondents had taken part in a computer assisted
learning project. The experiences on them were very faint, which in itself is not
a surprise because projects like that are still mostly on the development phase.
Most people imagined for a computer-assisted project to demand plenty of self-
discipline and own interest. Generally this type of learning was seen as self-
instruction with the help of a program. If you were not studying manual
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skills, a learning method based on computers was thought to be effective, but
the control of the teaching technique was considered problematic. In addition,
the control of the learning results would be an absolute necessity.
Conclusions
When you consider how an industrial company could develop its training in
pedagogical ways, based on this study you can say that the training should be
involved with the problems and the difficult situations that have presented
themselves in the work. The training motivates working if the individual feels
that he can make use of what he has learned in practise. A clear majority says
that they have learned the most important knowledge and skills they need in
their work by “working”. The teacher should highlight practical examples and
gather wide organised wholes of the issues. These back up the deep
understanding of things. Training that is only based on lectures “makes you
passive and sleepy”.
Only few of the respondents had been involved in a project that had
applied the principles of investigative learning, but some answers showed that
the thoughts involved in this model were appreciated. For example on the good
teacher –statements the majority saw the teacher as the instructor of the
construction of information and the learning as a gradually deepening research
process. According to this study it would seem that the teacher is no longer
considered as the informant and instead the interaction between him and the
students is essential. It is important for the learner to have influence on for
example the contents of the teaching and the planning of the learning
environment. The main responsibility of the absorbing of the information is
with the student, but the teacher is expected to be ready to guide if necessary.
The goal of work place training should, in addition to the content, be the
development of the individual’s personality. It is clear that a motivated
employee is usually more productive than a person who is bored with his work.
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SESSION 10. RADIATION BIOLOGY AND
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Hereditary minisatellite mutations among the
offspring of Estonian Chernobyl cleanup workers
Kiuru A1, Auvinen A1, Luokkamäki M1, Veidebaum T2, Tekkel M2,
Rahu M2, Hakulinen T3, Servomaa K4, Rytömaa T5, Mustonen R1
1 Research and Environmental Surveillance, STUK-Radiation and Nuclear
Safety Authority, 00881 Helsinki, Finland
2 Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Institute of Experimental and
Clinical Medicine, 11619 Tallinn, Estonia
3 Finnish Cancer Registry, 00170 Helsinki, Finland
4 North Savo Environmental Centre, 70210 Kuopio, Finland
5 Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Kuopio, 70211 Kuopio,
Finland
 Possible transgenerational effects of exposure to ionising radiation have been a
concern since early days of radiobiological research. Despite numerous animal
studies, evidence concerning the genetic effects of low radiation doses in humans
remains poorly known. Previous studies have generally not revealed increased
frequency of mutation rates or genetic diseases in the offspring of persons exposed
to radiation. A serious limitation of earlier studies has been the low sensitivity of
the monitoring systems for hereditary effects. This limitation has recently been
overcome by methods based on genetic minisatellite mutations. Minisatellites are
DNA regions characterised by a variable number of tandem repeats of identical 6-
100 bp units. They are found with a relatively high frequency throughout the
genome and exhibit a high spontaneous mutation rate. Minisatellite mutations
consist primarily of gains or losses of one or more repeat units. The phenotypic
effect of these mutations is unclear at present.
 A single accidental event, such as the fallout released from the Chernobyl
reactor 16 years ago, may expose millions of people to non-natural environmental
radiation. Following the Chernobyl reactor accident, 4833 Estonian men were sent
to Chernobyl to decontaminate the environment. They worked in Chernobyl
between 1986-1991 and got a mean radiation dose of 110 mSv. In order to evaluate
the hereditary effects of low radiation doses, we compared the minisatellite
mutation rate among children born to Chernobyl clean-up workers. Minisatellite
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mutation rates were compared within a family, i.e. between children born before
and after their father was exposed to radiation. The comparability of genetic and
other factors between exposed and unexposed groups was thus maximised.
Blood samples were obtained from 147 Estonian families. The post-
Chernobyl children (n = 155) were conceived within 33 months of the father’s
return from Chernobyl. Siblings (n = 148) born prior to the accident formed the
reference group. DNA was extracted from isolated blood lymphocytes and
paternity was confirmed using five minisatellite probes. Eight additional
minisatellite probes were used to screen for minisatellite mutations.  Mutants
were identified as novel DNA fragments present in the children that could not
be seen in either parent. Only paternal, independently repeatable mutations
were studied, assuming that they were derived from the paternal allele closer
in size.
The parental origin and germline length change were determined for 94
de novo mutations found at the eight tested loci (52 mutants among post-
Chernobyl children and 42 among pre-Chernobyl children). The minisatellite
mutation rate was slightly increased among post-Chernobyl children (0.042
versus 0.036 per offspring band, OR 1.33, 95% CI 0.80-2.20). Furthermore,
workers with recorded doses ≥200 mSv had a three-fold mutation rate
compared to those with lower doses (95% CI 0.97-9.30). The mutation rate was
not associated with the father’s age (OR 1.04, 95% CI 0.94-1.15), the sex of the
child (OR 0.95, 95% CI 0.50-1.79) or the time interval between the birth of the
child and the father’s return from Chernobyl (OR for children born ≥49 weeks
after the return date was 1.45, 95% CI 0.84-2.52).
Conflicting results have been obtained on radiation-induced
minisatellite mutations in humans. No increase in minisatellite mutation rate
has been detected in the offspring of atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki1-3, in human sperm following radiotherapy4, or in children of
Chernobyl clean-up workers in Ukraine5-6. Yet, roughly doubling of the
minisatellite mutation frequency has been reported among children in Bela-
rus7-8 and around the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan9.
In this study, maximised comparability was achieved by comparing the
children born before and after paternal radiation exposure within the same
family. We found a slight, non-significant increase in the minisatellite mutation
frequency in post-Chernobyl children when compared to their pre-Chernobyl
siblings. However, workers with doses ≥200 mSv had a three-fold increased
mutation rate. Our findings suggest that genetic effects may occur at lower
doses than has previously been assumed.
The full study will be published in Radiation Research in 200310.
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Minisatellite mutations and retrospective
biodosimetry of population living close to the
Semipalatinsk nuclear test site
C. Lindholm, R.I. Bersimbaev, Y.E. Dubrova, M. Hulten,
A. Koivistoinen, M. Tankimanova, Z. Mamyrbaeva, L.
Djansugarova, R. Mustonen and S. Salomaa
During the period between 1949 and 1989 nuclear weapon testing carried out
at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS) resulted in local fallout affecting
the residents of Semipalatinsk, East Kazakhstan and Pavlodar districts of
Kazakhstan and Altai region of Russia. The Semipalatinsk nuclear polygon in
Kazakhstan has been the site for 470 nuclear tests, including 26 tests
performed on the ground and 87 in the atmosphere. More than 1.5 million
people living in the vicinity of the test site were repeatedly exposed to ionizing
radiation.
The objectives of the study were: 1) to establish a biosample database of
blood samples of families in three generations living close to the STS and
control families in three generations from clean areas, 2) to determine the
minisatellite mutation rates in the three generations of exposed people and the
control families of the same ethnic origin living in non-contaminated areas, and
3) to determine the chromosomal translocation frequencies by FISH
chromosome painting in the lymphocytes of the exposed and the control people
in order to determine the radiation exposure. The aim of the study was to select
the population living near to the STS and subjected to the greatest radiation
exposure. Of particular interest was the first test  of 29th of August 1949, as this
was reported to have caused heavy fallout along a narrow trajectory extending
north-east from the Polygon, also covering parts of the Altai region of Russia
and parts of Pavlodar and Karaganda regions in Kazakhstan. This first
explosion occurred at an altitude of 30 m above ground with an energy release
of 22kT. The wind velocity at the time of the test was 45-50 km/h, and within 2
hours  a radioactive cloud reached densely populated areas inside a 100 km
radius from the hypocentre. Population living in the villages of Dolon, Bodene,
Cheremushki, Mostik, Kanonerka,Chagan and Karamyrza settlement (close to
Kanonerka) of the Beskaragai District of Semipalatinsk region was selected for
the study.
402
STUK-A195
The subjects available for the study (three-generation families) were
defined by a feasibility study identifying altogether 1029 persons in 83 families
living in 7 villages in the Beskaragai district of the Semipalatinsk region. These
villages were affected by the fallout from the first nuclear test in August 1949.
Families for the final study were selected according to preset criteria ensuring
that the grandparent generation was exposed at the time of the nuclear test,
that their children were conceived after the main exposure (born after
September 1950), and that there was an adequate number of family members
available for genetic analyses. Finally, members of 40 families (361 individuals)
were interviewed and sampled.
The inhabitants of Dzerzhinsk, Zhanatalap and Ushtobe villages of
former Taldy-Kurgan District were included  in the study as a control group.
After careful interviews and matching (age, ethnic origin, socio-economic
factors) of the controls, a group of 28 control families (total 250 people) were
chosen. Background data on family, residential history, radiation exposure,
ethnicity, age, gender, smoking habit and lifestyle of all studied families were
recorded using a questionnaire to all members of both cohorts, and controls
were matched by these characteristics.
Minisatellite mutation analysis
The analysis of germline mutations at tandem repeats minisatellite loci has
previously been used to evaluate genetic consequences of exposure to ionizing
radiation in humans and mice.  The results of these studies have shown that, in
sharp contrast to traditional genetic systems, radiation-induced changes in
mutation rate can be detected in very small population samples and following a
relatively low-dose exposure to ionizing radiation. Using this approach,
germline mutation rates were estimated in the exposed cohort of families from
the rural area near the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and in a control group of
families of the same ethnic origin living in non-contaminated areas. The study
has been published in 2002 (Dubrova et al. 2002).
Briefly, blood samples were collected from 40 three-generation families
(parental year of birth 1926-1948) inhabiting the rural areas of the
Semipalatinsk District and from 28 three-generation control families (parental
year of birth 1920-1951) inhabiting the rural area of the Taldy-Kurgan District.
All families were profiled using eight hypervariable single-locus minisatellite
probes B6.7, CEB1, CEB15, CEB25, CEB36, MS1, MS31 and MS32, chosen for
their relatively high spontaneous mutation rate. Minisatellite mutation
analysis was performed on samples from 516 persons. Parental allele sizes and
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allele-length frequency distributions were indistinguishable between the
control and irradiated families. However, minisatellite mutation rate in the
cohort of P0 parents directly exposed to radioactive fallout from the surface and
atmospheric nuclear tests was 1.8-fold higher than in the control non-exposed
population from the Taldy-Kurgan District. Less marked 1.5-fold increase was
also found in the F1 parents from the affected area. Most importantly,
minisatellite mutation rate in the cohort of F1 parents from the affected area
showed a significant negative correlation with the year of birth, consistent with
the decay of radioisotopes after the cessation of surface and atmospheric
nuclear tests. Despite an elevated mutation rate in the exposed group, the size
spectrum of mutants in control and exposed group were similar. The results of
our study provide support for our previous findings showing an elevated
mutation rate in the families exposed to the post-Chernobyl radioactive fallout
(Dubrova et al. 1996, Dubrova et al. 1997) and are important for the further
studies of genetic risks of ionizing radiation for humans.
Retrospective dosimetry using FISH translocations
Translocation analysis using FISH (fluorescence in situ hybridization)
chromosome painting was performed to evaluate the magnitude of cumulative
exposure to ionizing radiation among the population living close to the
Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in the Beskaragai district in Kazakhstan. The
study has been published in 2002 (Salomaa et al. 2002). Altogether 60 persons,
all males, were selected from the cohort living in seven villages in the area
affected by the fallout and 40 persons, all males, from the control cohort living
in non-contaminated areas. In both groups, approximately half of the subjects
represented the P0 generation. Individuals for the control cohort were chosen to
match the exposed cohort with respect to, among others, age, smoking and
ethnic background.
FISH analysis of almost 2000 metaphases per subject was performed.
Similar translocation frequencies were observed in the Semipalatinsk cohort
(7.0 per 1000 cell equivalents C.E.) and in the matched control group (7.9 per
1000 C.E.). In the P0 generation, i.e. individuals who lived in the area of
radioactive fallout from the first nuclear test in August 1949, translocation
yields were almost equal to the corresponding controls (10.0 and 10.2 per 1000
C.E., respectively). Neither was there a difference in the mean translocation
frequencies between the various test villages. Assuming translocation stability
in peripheral blood lymphocytes over several decades, these findings suggest
that on average, the magnitude of exposure to the studied cohort in the
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Semipalatinsk area has been considerably smaller than that reported in the
literature (Gusev et al. 1997). Previously reported doses in the order of 1-4.5 Gy
cannot be confirmed by the present data. In the multiple regression analysis
performed to evaluate the effect of various confounders, only age had
statistically significant relationship to the translocation frequency. Due to the
uncertainties involved, a positive dose effect can be considered to be present if
doubling of the age-dependent control level is observed. In the P0 group studied
here, using the linear coefficient of the dose effect curve, which is valid in
chronic exposures, a minimum average dose of 0.5 Gy, mainly received through
external exposure, would have been reliably detected by the technique. Thus,
we conclude that the studied subjects, who lived in the area of radioactive
fallout in 1949, have received cumulative doses of less than 0.5 Gy.
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Introduction
It has been commonly accepted that the biological consequences following
radiation exposure are attributable to DNA damage and expressed within one
or two cell generations. Recent evidence, however, has now been emerged to
challenge this classical paradigm. Changes in non-irradiated bystander cells
may lead to transmissible genomic instability. This phenomenon has been
termed “non-targeted” and in addition to genomic instability, includes also
radiation-induced bystander effects. Various types of genomic damage can be
observed in affected cells for many generations after irradiation. After alpha-
particle irradiation, delayed non-clonal chromosomal aberrations were seen in
surviving cells of cultured haematopoietic stem cells from CBA/H mice. These
aberrations were mostly of non-identical chromatid type, showing that they
had arisen for many generations after the irradiation (Kadhim et al. 1992).
Although radiation-induced genomic instability has been observed in
several in vitro and in vivo experiments, the mechanisms involved in the
induction and transmission of genomic instability remain unknown. The
purpose of this work was to provide new information about the delayed or
persistent effects of radiation on expression of genes associated with
chromosomal instability phenotype. It has been assumed that this phenotype is
linked to sustained alterations in gene expression rather than to specific gene
mutations. The delayed gene expression changes in cells after irradiation have
not been extensively studied. Human syndromes expressing chromosomal
instability have been demonstrated to have a role in the evolution of
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malignancy. Thus, the role of radiation-induced genomic instability in radiation
oncogenesis is of importance. The work is part of the joint EU-funded project
called “Genomic instability and radiation-induced cancer” (RADINSTAB). The
aim of the RADINSTAB project was to investigate health effects of genomic
damage, predisposition to cancer and correlation of genomic instability
endpoints with radiation-induced cancer.
Gene expression changes in human fibroblast cells at delayed time points
after alpha particle irradiation were studied. The aim was to identify genes
playing pivotal role in inducing genomic instability.
Materials and methods
A normal human fetal fibroblast cell line, designated HF19, was used. These
cells have been previously shown to express radiation-induced chromosomal
instability (Kadhim et al. 1998). Before irradiation, the height of the cell
monolayer was determined with confocal microscopy in order to ensure the
ability of alpha particles to traverse the monolayer. HF19 cells were irradiated
with a dose of 0.375 Gy and 0.75 Gy (figure 1).
Alpha irradiation with
0,375 & 0,750Gy doses
HF19 cells
Culture for 0, 1, 20 &
30 population doublings
RNA isolation &
Metaphase preparation
HF19ALPHA
0,375Gy
HF19CONTROL HF19ALPHA
0,750Gy
Figure 1. The experimental setup.
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Cells were allowed to go through 0, 1, 20 and 30 population doublings
after irradiation. The first sample was taken 2 hours after irradiation, the
second 3 days, the third 38 days and the fourth 58 days after irradiation. Cells
irradiated with 0.75 Gy were used only at the first two time points. At each time
point part of the cells were harvested and RNA was isolated. Metaphase
preparations were made at all time points except the first. The gene expression
changes were studied using cDNA array hybridisation method (Clontech
AtlasTM) and confirmations were made with semi-quantitative RT-PCR method.
The expression of cancer-related genes was investigated with cDNA array
hybridisation method. Genes of approximately twofold difference in mRNA
expression levels (measured as normalised intensities of dots) were accepted
for RT-PCR confirmation. Semi-quantitative RT-PCR was performed using
gene specific primers. Two housekeeping genes were amplified in parallel to
the genes of interest. Samples were taken between 18-38 cycles of PCR and run
on agarose gel. The normalised intensities of the bands were compared and
genes of approximately twofold difference in intensities were considered as
confirmed gene expression changes. The metaphase preparations were
analysed by solid staining and mFISH for chromosomal instability.
Results
The results of chromosome analysis by solid staining method showed
transmissible chromosomal instability in cells irradiated with a dose of 0.375
Gy. The mFISH analysis is in progress. The data shows that 0.375 Gy α -
particles induced transmissible chromosomal instability as defined by non-
clonal chromosomal aberrations with a high frequency of chromatid type
aberration. The substantial number of non-clonal chromosomal aberrations in
irradiated cells studied at delayed times after irradiation confirmed the
induction of chromosomal instablility also in this experiment.
Analysis of cDNA array showed upregulation in 22 genes and
downregulation in 9 genes, most of them at the early time points. With cDNA
array, upregulation of CDKN1A (p21/Waf) gene was detected at early time
points after irradiation with both doses. These findings were re-examined with
semi-quantitative RT-PCR method. RT-PCR confirmed upregulation of five
genes and downregulation of two genes. Six of the confirmed changes were
found in samples irradiated with 0.75 Gy, taken at the first two early time
points after irradiation. Only one of the changes was in a sample irradiated
with 0.375 Gy, taken at the first time point. Two hours after irradiation, the
CDKN1A (p21/Waf) was upregulated in cells that had received 0.75 or 0.375 Gy.
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This gene was expected to be upregulated after irradiation, since it is normally
induced after many kinds of cellular damage. p21/Waf protein can induce G1
arrest and block entry into S phase. Overexpression of CDKN1A results in G1
arrest and has been shown to suppress effectively tumor growth in vitro and in
vivo. Increased expression of Hexabrachion (HXB) in cells irradiated with 0.75
Gy was detected at two hours after irradiation. This protein is an important
extracellular matrix hexameric glycoprotein, which is selectively expressed at
sites of tissue remodeling in developing and pathological connective tissues. A
high Hexabrachion expression has been found during carcinogenesis in almost
all organs. Hexabrachion increases rapidly after inflammation or injury, so it
was no surprise to observe upregulation of this damage responsive gene also
after irradiation. Matrix metalloproteinase 11 gene (MMP-11) was upregulated
in cells irradiated with 0.75 Gy three days after irradiation. This protein is a
member of the family of metalloproteinase enzymes, which degrade the
extracellular matrix. MMP-11 production has been associated with malignant
phenotype, tumor invasion and metastasis. Increased expression of MMP-11 in
HF19 cells may participate in an early step towards malignancy. Another gene
expression change observed three days after irradiation was downregulation of
a DNA excision repair protein, ERCC1, in cells that had received 0.75 Gy. This
protein is involved in the early steps of the excision of DNA damage; it serves as
an excision nuclease. Decreased expression of a repair gene in HF19 cells may
be one of the initiating steps in destabilisation of the genome.
Conclusions
Our results show that radiation-induced changes in gene expression were
detected in cells irradiated with 0.75 Gy of alpha-particles. Upregulation of cell
damage and stress induced genes were seen two hours after irradiation. The
changes in expression of carcinogenesis related genes and in a repair gene
already three days after irradiation may play a role in events leading to
destabilisation of the genome. Gene expression changes were observed only
relatively soon after irradiation and mainly in cells irradiated with the higher
dose. Changes in mRNA levels could not be detected at delayed time points.
These data indicate that changes in gene expression, in general, may be most
reliably detected in samples irradiated with high doses. A notable amount of
cells expressing chromosomal instability was observed at delayed time points
among the cells irradiated with the lower dose; thus detection of genes
responsible for maintaining this instability would have been expected.
According to this study there seems not to be any specific changes in expression
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of any gene that could be shown to be responsible for maintaining the
chromosomal instability at delayed times after alpha-particle irradiation.
Investigation of chromosomally unstable cell clones could perhaps provide
more data on gene expression changes related to genomic instability.
Unfortunately, production of cell clones was not possible in the scope of this
study.
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Introduction
The worst nuclear accident in the world so far took place April 26, 1986, in
Chernobyl, Ukraine. At the time of the accident there was a group of Finnish
construction workers in the city of Kiev, situated about 100 km south from the
nuclear power plant. Since there was a concern about the possible health
effects of the accident, the radiation exposure of this group was measured and a
cancer analysis was conducted.
Materials and mehtods
The total number of subjects in the exposure assessment and cancer analyses
was 139 (123 men and 16 women), mostly middle-aged male construction
workers. The radiation exposure assessment of this cohort was retrospectively
based on three different methods: film dosimetry, whole-body counting and
chromosome analysis. They were performed during 1986 and 1987 both in Kiev,
Ukraine and in Helsinki, Finland. The background information of the study
population was collected from the Population Register Centre, and all cancer
cases in the cohort from April 26, 1986 to December 31, 1999 were collected
from the Finnish Cancer Registry. The actions for radiation exposure
assessment were conducted by STUK and the cancer analysis by the Finnish
Cancer Registry.
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Results
The radiation doses among the study population were minor. According to the
film dosimetry the mean external dose was 3.3 mSv and according to the whole
body counting measurements the mean internal dose and the mean thyroid
dose were 0.5 mSv and 11 mSv, respectively. The chromosome analyses showed
no differences from normal background values. The mean frequency of
dicentric chromosomes was 0.0008, and that of total chromosome aberrations
was 0.005. The total observed cancer incidence in the study population was,
however, higher than expected (SIR 2.69, 95% CI 1.16-5.30).
Conclusions
The radiation exposure of the Finnish group was quite insignificant but the
cancer incidence in the study population was nevertheless higher than
expected. Since the study population was so small and the observed cancer
types not usually associated with radiation exposure, the role of chance and
bias needs to be carefully considered.
412
STUK-A195
10c Occupational Radiation Exposure to Low
Doses of Ionizing Radiation and Female Breast
Cancer
Pavlova Adelina , V. Bliznakov, A. Bairacova
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Abstract
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between past occupational
radiation exposure to low doses of ionizing radiation and cases of diagnosed
and registered breast cancer [probability of causation - PC] among Bulgarian
women who have used different ionizing radiation sources during their
working experience.
The National Institute of Health (NIH) in US has developed a method for
estimating the probability of causation (PC) between past occupational
radiation exposure to low doses of ionizing radiation and cases of diagnosed
cancer. We have used this method.
A group of 27 women with diagnosed breast cancer has been studied. 11
of them are former workers in NPP – “Kozloduy”, and 16 are from other sites
using different sources of ionizing radiation. Analysis was performed for 14
women, for whom full personal data were available. The individual radiation
dose for each of them is below 1/10 of the annual dose limit, and the highest
cumulative dose for a period of 14 years of occupational exposure is 50,21 mSv.
The probability of causation (PC) values in all analyzed cases are below
1%, which confirms the extremely low probability of causation (PC) between
past occupational radiation exposure to low doses of ionizing radiation and
occurring cases of breast cancer.
Keywords:  probability of causation (PC), breast cancer, occupational radiation
exposure, low doses of ionizing radiation
Introduction
The statistical data show that the incidence of cancer is increasing nows days.
At the head of the list in Bulgaria as well as in the whole world is breast cancer.
This is demonstrated by trends of cancer incidence among white women in the
US, 1947 – 1985 (figure 1) /1/ and in Bulgaria, 1981 – 1995 (figure 2) /2/.
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It is well known that a great number of endogenous and exogenous
factors can be connected with breast cancer. Among them the occupational
factors are of great importance, and many researchers study them using
different methods: administrative, cohort and case-control studies (figure 3).
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The aim of the study
 The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between past occupational
radiation exposure to low doses of ionizing radiation and diagnosed breast
cancer [probability of causation – PC] among Bulgarian women who have used
different ionizing radiation sources during their working experience.
Materials and Methods
 An ad hoc Working Group in NIH has developed a method, based on
radioepidemiological tables, for estimating the probability of causation (PC):
the relationship between past radiation exposure and a specific cancer /4/. We
applied this method in our study.
The probability of causation (PC) is defined as a part of risk for cancer
disease in different age groups. The probability of causation (PC) is expressed
by the relation between the increase of the probability of development of cancer
in case of radiation exposure and the actual probability of this cancer to be
developed at similar conditions. The probability of causation (PC) takes into
account the role of different characteristics for both probabilities. The Relative
Excess Risk (R) has been introduced to facilitate the calculation of probability
of causation (PC). The Relative Excess Risk (R) is a product of several numbers,
which we can take from tables or we can calculate them easily.
R = F/D/ . T/Y/ . K/A,S/          /1/
where: F/D/  expresses the influence of dose of ionizing radiation on the risk;
 T/Y/ expresses the variation of the risk according to the latent period;
 K(A,S) expresses the changes of the risk related to sex (A) and age(S) at
the time of    exposure
The occupational radiation exposure is usually repeated during the
whole working experience. We have accepted that the Relative Excess Risk (R)
for the whole period of exposure is a sum of annual risks because there is no
more precise method. The confidential interval is 90% for each of the calculated
probability of causation (PC) values.
                                          PC =                      /2/
We need definite background personal data for the estimation of
probability of causation (PC): the date of birth, the year of breast cancer
diagnosis, the individual radiation dose per year for the whole period of
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exposure. We have taken these doses from Dozimetry Unit in NPP – “Kozloduy”
and from laboratory “Dozimetry of external exposure” in the National Center of
Radiobiology and Radiation Protection.
In this study have been included women who have met both conditions:
diagnosed and registered breast cancer and past occupational radiation
exposure. The women in the study have had different professions: workers in
NPP – “Kozloduy”, radiologists, technicians in radiology, chemists and a
bookkeeper.
27 women meeting both conditions have been registered in the
Department of Radiation Medicine and Epidemiology in the National Center of
Radiobiology and Radiation Protection. We have had full background personal
data only per 14 of them and only these have been included in the study.
Results
We have ascertained the fact that the personal radiation exposure for each of
the cases is below 1/10 of the annual dose limit and the highest cumulative dose
for a period of 14 years of occupation is 50,21 mSv. The calculated probability of
causation (PC) values with 90% CI are showed in table 1 and on figure 4.
Table 1. The calculated PC with 90% CI .
Initials PC (%) 90% CI Initials PC (%) 90% CI 
AIB 0,00 0,00 VGP 0,004 0,003 – 0,009 
VVF 0,00 0,00 VSS 0,01 0,004 – 0,017 
MCK 0,10 0,062 – 0,214 DPV 0,00 0,00 
PIK 0,96 0,600 – 2,050 EGT 0,00 0,00 
SSC 0,00 0,00 SVV 0,00 /right/ 0,00 
AGV 0,00 0,00  0,03 /left/ 0,012 – 0,042 
AOS 0,00 0,00 SGK 0,14 0,088 – 0,302 
VVP 0,02 0,009 – 0,032    
We can not give an exact estimation of the relationship between past
occupational radiation exposure to low doses of ionizing radiation and cases of
diagnosed breast cancer at this stage of knowledge for risk from ionizing
radiation.
The reasons are as follows:
1. There are a lot of inexactness in radioepidemiological studies;
2. Many extrapolations are made and they are not always correct:
extrapolation of risk from higher to lower doses and dose rate of radiation;
extrapolation from one population to an other population without taking into
account their specific characteristics;
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   The probability of causation (PC) for each of the investigated cases is below 1%.  
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3.The method allows the risk to be estimated for lifetime, but exposed
populations have never been followed till death;
4.This method does not take into account most of the individual
characteristics although they influence radiosensitivity;
5.This method does not take into account the total effect of a combination
of several cancerogenic factors.
Conclusions
1.  Radiation dose for each case is below 1/10 of the annual dose limit;
2.  The highest cumulative dose for a period of 14 years of occupation is 50,21
mSv.
3.  The probability of causation (PC) for each of the investigated women is below
1%;
4. We do not find a relationship between past occupational exposure to low
doses of ionizing radiation and cases of diagnosed and registered breast cancer
[probability of causation – PC] among Bulgarian women who have used
different ionizing radiation sources during their working experience.
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SESSION 11. RADIOECOLOGY AND MONITORING
Gaussian plume model analysis of atmospheric
dispersion measurements of radioactive releases
from the BR1 research reactor in Mol, Belgium
Martin Drews and Bent Lauritzen
Risø National Laboratory, Denmark
Abstract
Data from an atmospheric dispersion experiment using a visible tracer along
with the routine releases of  41Ar from the BR1 air-cooled research reactor in
Mol have been analysed in terms of a Gaussian plume model. Measurements of
plume geometry and of the radiation field from the 41Ar decay are compared to
model calculations and good overall agreement is found between model and
experiment.
Introduction
Recently, a full-scale atmospheric dispersion experiment was performed at the
BR1 research reactor at the Belgium Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN) [1].
The experiment was carried out as collaboration between Nordic Nuclear
Safety Research (NKS) and SCK•CEN, with participants from Risø National
Laboratory, SCK•CEN, Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) and
the Technical University of Denmark (DTU). The aim of the experiment was to
obtain data characterizing radioactive releases from a nuclear installation with
the purpose of testing atmospheric dispersion and dose rate models.
In the experiment a visible tracer was released from the 60-m reactor
stack along with the routine emissions of argon-41 from the air-cooled reactor.
Simultaneous measurements of the plume characteristics were performed
including source term, meteorology, aerosol plume geometry and downwind
radiation field from the decay of 41Ar. The measurements covered approx. 6
hours of continuous reactor operation spanning three days during the period
October 1-5, 2001, with the remaining two days used for set-up and calibration.
A further 6 hours of radiation data were obtained without the aerosol tracer
measurements. The main wind advection direction during the measurements
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was more or less constant, the wind speeds low and the estimated atmospheric
turbulence predominantly stable to neutral.
The radiation measurement data have been analysed and arranged in a
database, that can be used to test atmospheric dispersion and dose rate models
but also in developing data assimilation models for atmospheric dispersion of
radioactive releases. The present paper describes the analysis of atmospheric
dispersion and 41Ar radiation field data based on a Gaussian plume model.
Measurements
During the experiment, the reactor output was kept at 700 kW. At this effect
atmospheric air is led through the reactor at a rate of 9.4 m3 s-1 giving rise to a
constant 41Ar emission rate of approx. 1.5 x 1011 Bq h-1. The 41Ar activity
concentration inside the stack is recorded continuously using a plastic
scintillator mounted with a photo multiplier.
Meteorological observations of wind speed and direction, temperature
and precipitation were performed by an array of permanent instruments
mounted on the weather mast of SCK•CEN. Observations were recorded every
minute and subsequently used to estimate the dispersion scaling parameters
for 10-minute intervals using the micro-meteorological pre-processor by Astrup
et al. [2].
The geometry of the radioactive plume in the experiment was
determined using a Lidar scanning technique [3]: a white aerosol tracer was
injected into the stack at about 30 m height and the aerosol plume emitted from
the top of the stack assumed to be well mixed with the argon plume. Crosswind
plume profiles were determined by scanning the plume with a pulsed laser
beam, using a high-resolution aerosol-backscatter Lidar system. Aerosol
positions are determined from the time delay of the echo, the strength of which
is related to the aerosol particle concentrations in the plume. From the cross-
section measured, the plume dispersion coefficients (σy, σz) were derived along
with the mean position and elevation of the plume and made available for this
study [4].
The radiation field was monitored using two arrays of four NaI(Tl)-
detectors supplemented by two high-resolution germanium detectors. One
array of NaI(Tl) detectors provided by DEMA had thermally insulated 3" x 3"
crystals and recorded 512-channel energy spectra every 30 seconds while four
detectors provided by SCK•CEN consisted of non-insulated 2" x 2" crystals
connected to a single-channel counter yielding an integrated count rate every
minute. The NaI(Tl)-detectors were deployed along two lines perpendicular to
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the main wind advection direction at distances up to 1,500 m from the stack –
in one case the detectors were grouped two by two along a single line for
calibration purposes. On each line, the detectors were placed approximately
100 m apart.
Using the spectral radiation measurements the natural background for
each detector position was estimated and the background-subtracted full-
energy-peak count rate for 41Ar decay at 1293.6 keV derived. From the net
window count rate, n, the fluence rate was obtained as
nφ
ε
= ,
where ε is the mean detector efficiency (the peak response). The mean
detector efficiency was determined from a Co-60 calibration experiment. For
the non-insulated NaI(Tl) detectors, background count rates and detector
efficiencies were determined from the inter-calibration experiment with the
DEMA NaI(Tl) detectors.
The germanium detectors were mounted along the plume centreline or
next to the NaI(Tl) detectors, providing further calibration measurements.
From the germanium measurements it was determined that the emissions
from the reactor contained no measurable traces of other radioactive isotopes
apart from 41Ar [5].
Gaussian plume model analysis
The measurement results have been compared to the Gaussian plume model
for atmospheric dispersion. In this model, the 41Ar activity concentration is
given by
where Q is the source term, σy and σz the dispersion coefficients, u the
wind speed, and h the effective release height. The coordinate z is the height
above the ground and y is the horizontal distance from the plume centreline.
The fluence rate is obtained as
where µ is the linear attenuation coefficient in air.
The model plume dispersion coefficients (σy, σz) are obtained using a
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modified power law representation of the Pasquill-Gifford stability curves [6].
To account for an initial vertical dispersion close to the release point, a term σz0
was added quadratically to yield the effective vertical dispersion,
Fig. 1. Dispersion coefficients from Lidar measurements and from Gaussian plume
model at a distance of approximately 400 m from the stack. The increase of the
dispersion coefficients with time reflects increasing turbulence during the experiment.
In Fig. 1, the atmospheric dispersion parameters obtained by the Lidar
measurements for Friday Oct. 5 are compared to the model results, using σz0 =
20 m. Good agreement between the measured values and the model results is
observed, both with respect to the horizontal and vertical dispersion. Similar
results were obtained for the measurements Wednesday and Thursday.
The fluence rate was calculated within the Gaussian plume model using
an asymptotic approximation [7]. The results obtained for Friday are shown in
Fig. 2 along with the measurements. Again, the model calculations are seen to
reproduce the overall behaviour of the data, the experimental results, however,
exceeding the model by roughly a factor 1.5-2.
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Fig. 2. Calculated fluence rates compared to measurements. The NaI detectors DK-D,
DK-C, DK-A, DK-B are placed approx. 200 m from the stack and 0 m, 100 m, 200 m and
300 m from the plume centreline, respectively.
Fig. 3. Gaussian plume model calculations compared to mean crosswind fluence rates
measured on Oct. 3 and Oct. 5 over a period of 40 and 90 minutes, respectively. In
bottom panels the ratio ϕmeas/ϕmodel are shown.
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Fig. 3 shows the mean fluence rates obtained for Wednesday and Friday.
The model results shown in the top panels in both cases follow the bell-shaped
crosswind form expected from the Gaussian plume model. The distribution
observed for Wednesday is wider than the distribution observed Friday,
because the detectors were placed approx. four times as far away from the
stack. In both cases, the ratio ϕmeas/ϕmodel between measured and calculated
fluence rates grows with the distance from the plume centreline, more
pronounced on Wednesday (left bottom) than Friday (right bottom). This
indicates that the actual crosswind distribution is wider than given by the stan-
dard Gaussian plume model.
Conclusions
Measurement data from an atmospheric dispersion experiment at the BR1
research reactor in Mol, Belgium have been analysed and arranged in a
database suitable for evaluation and development of atmospheric dispersion
and dose rate models for nuclear emergency preparedness.
Gaussian plume model calculations have been compared to the
measurement data, and reproduce well both the atmospheric dispersion
parameters measured by Lidar scanning, and the gross radiation field
measurements. The measured fluence rates, though, are found on average to
exceed the model predictions by a factor 1.5-2, or even more at large distances
from the plume centreline.
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The radiation environment in western Sweden
Mats Isaksson, Håkan Grundin & Raine Vesanen
Department of Radiation Physics, Göteborg University
Introduction
In case of an accidental release of radionuclides it is important to be able to
make a fast, but reliable, estimation of both the radiation dose to people in the
affected area and the extent of the fallout. These estimations may be made with
greater accuracy if background ambient dose levels and concentrations of
radionuclides in the ground, within the particular area, are known prior to the
fallout. Such background measurements are preferably performed at
predetermined (reference) sampling sites. A frequent monitoring of
background data at the reference sites will also make it possible to follow
variations in the concentration of anthropogenic, as well as, naturally
occurring radionuclides in the environment and hence to study the radiation
dose to people and biota.
The aim of this project was therefore to survey the radiation environment in
western Sweden by
soil sampling, field gamma spectrometry and intensimeter measurements at
pre-chosen reference sites for collection of background data estimating the
background radiation doses to the inhabitants by TLD worn by a group of
people living in the area
Materials and methods
Reference sites
In this work, western Sweden is defined as the area within approximately 100
kilometres from the city of Göteborg. In this area, 25 communities were chosen
as reference communities, due to their relatively large population. In each
reference community, a reference site for field measurements and soil sampling
was chosen in the central part of the community. All the sites were plane, grass-
covered surfaces, as large as possible. In the reference community Göteborg,
the largest community in the examined region, 6 reference sites were chosen
which had all previously been used as reference sites for in situ measurements
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and soil sampling (Edbom, 1996; Ghiasi, 1997; Rask, 1999; Standar, 2002).
At all reference sites, an in situ measurement, using a HPGe detector
(efficiency 10 % and resolution 1.9 keV @ 1332 keV) connected to a multi
channel analyser and a laptop computer, was performed. The detector was
placed 1 m above the ground, looking downwards and the sampling time for the
acquired spectra was 1000 s each. The in situ measurements were performed at
the same locations as the soil sampling.
The soil samples were collected with a cylindrical corer of 8 cm diameter.
At each site three cores were taken, sliced in 2 or 3 cm layers, down to a depth
of 15 cm. The soil from corresponding layers in each core was then combined to
one sample (Isaksson & Erlandsson, 1995). After homogenisation and mixing
the soil samples were put into 60 ml plastic containers for measurement with a
well-calibrated HPGe detector (efficiency 38 % and resolution 2 keV @ 1332
keV), surrounded by a 10 cm thick lead shield, for 48 hours.
Dose rate measurements were performed at all reference sites with the
detector RNI 10/SR, placed 1 m above ground, pointing downwards. The
measuring time was 5 minutes and an average value of the dose rate was
calculated. In addition to the measurements at the reference sites, 20 dose rate
measurements were performed at different locations within the city of Göte-
borg.
TLD-measurements
A group of 25 persons living in the Göteborg area was equipped with 2 TLD
(LiF) each, that were carried close to the body 24 hours a day for a period of
eight weeks. The persons were instructed not to spend any time outside the
area, as defined above as western Sweden, during the measurement and they
were also not allowed to fly with airplane. Those who, for some reason, did not
wear the detectors were excluded from the study (6 persons). All TL-dosimeters
were calibrated before, as well as, after the measurements.
Results and discussion
Reference sites
The results from the reference sites in western Sweden are shown in Table 1.
Due to technical problems with questionable data from three of the sites, only
22 of the 25 sites are shown in the table. A comparison between soil samples
and field gamma measurements shows a good agreement for the naturally
occurring radionuclides, which are supposed to be relatively homogeneously
distributed in the ground. For 137Cs the in situ measurements show an
equivalent surface activity that is generally a factor of 3-4 smaller than the
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activity per unit area calculated from the soil samples. This is, however, a
discrepancy of reasonable size, considering the migration of 137Cs down into the
soil (Isaksson et al., 2000).
The dose rate measurements at the 22 reference communities vary
between 0.09 and 0.16 µSv/h and the dose rates seem to be mostly correlated
with the activity of the naturally occurring radionuclides, especially 40K (r =
0.94). The correlation with 137Cs is weaker (r = 0.33).
Results from the measurements at the 6 reference sites at Göteborg are
shown in Figure 1. The ratios between soil sample activities and activities
determined in situ are similar to those found in the larger examination area.
The variation in 137Cs activity within the town area may partly be due to soil
disturbances since the Chernobyl accident 1986, but may also (at some places)
Table 1. Results from the measurements at the reference communities. The activity for
137Cs calculated from the in situ measurements is reported as equivalent surface
deposition (not corrected for decay) and for the naturally occurring radionuclides a
homogeneous distribution is assumed. Also shown are the ratios between soil and in
situ measurements.
137Cs 40K 208Tl 214Bi  
Site Soil 
In
situ Ratio Soil 
In
situ Ratio Soil 
In
situ Ratio Soil 
In
situ Ratio
Dose
rate
  Bq/m2 Bq/m2   Bq/kg Bq/kg   Bq/kg Bq/kg   Bq/kg Bq/kg   µSv/h
Skara 959 232 4,1 634 643 0,99 8,5 8,9 0,96 24,0 22,8 1,05 0,13 
Uddevalla 1027 342 3,0 559 632 0,88 8,0 8,0 0,99 23,6 25,2 0,94 0,09 
Trollhättan 938 250 3,8 747 839 0,89 8,7 10,0 0,87 22,3 24,8 0,90 0,14 
Vara 914 313 2,9 648 724 0,89 6,1 7,8 0,78 17,2 25,8 0,67 0,11 
Ljungskile 957 235 4,1 632 614 1,03 7,1 7,2 0,98 25,4 28,6 0,89 0,12 
Lilla Edet 1635 512 3,2 627 749 0,84 9,5 9,4 1,01 30,2 33,2 0,91 0,12 
Stenungsund 1029 268 3,8 613 644 0,95 7,5 9,3 0,81 29,8 34,9 0,85 0,11 
Lödöse 1288 314 4,1 566 653 0,87 6,7 8,3 0,81 32,8 41,8 0,78 0,11 
Älvängen 1265 398 3,2 713 782 0,91 7,1 8,9 0,80 27,6 33,8 0,82 0,16 
Vårgårda 994 305 3,3 566 633 0,89 8,3 9,7 0,86 32,3 37,3 0,87 0,10 
Alingsås 897 233 3,8 764 836 0,91 7,2 8,9 0,81 27,3 31,6 0,86 0,15 
Kungälv 983 315 3,1 798 874 0,91 8,9 10,2 0,87 27,6 31,7 0,87 0,16 
Ulricehamn 1593 366 4,4 800 822 0,97 9,3 11,6 0,80 23,0 28,5 0,81 0,16 
Lerum 990 214 4,6 688 702 0,98 6,5 6,8 0,95 30,5 33,2 0,92 0,13 
Borås 1447 399 3,6 702 764 0,92 7,1 8,4 0,85 30,4 33,1 0,92 0,14 
Hindås 842 265 3,2 542 584 0,93 7,8 8,5 0,92 24,5 26,9 0,91 0,09 
Landvetter 890 312 2,9 565 593 0,95 6,4 8,1 0,78 21,4 25,9 0,83 0,10 
Mölnlycke 966 276 3,5 649 765 0,85 6,7 8,1 0,83 20,1 25,8 0,78 0,12 
Kinna 717 243 2,9 646 691 0,93 6,1 7,3 0,84 26,8 28,9 0,93 0,13 
Kungsbacka 1450 414 3,5 791 833 0,95 9,0 9,2 0,97 24,0 27,8 0,86 0,15 
Svenljunga 1134 413 2,7 721 778 0,93 7,3 8,2 0,89 25,0 28,5 0,88 0,14 
Varberg 1405 376 3,7 608 714 0,85 8,8 9,2 0,96 27,5 30,1 0,91 0,12 
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be a result of the city topography, which influences the amount of precipitation
and thereby the deposition. At these sites measurements have previously been
performed and the activities of the naturally occurring radionuclides are
rather constant, but the activity of 137Cs fluctuates and shows no obvious trend.
The reason for this may be that the sites have been disturbed between the
measurements and therefore it is assumed that the present measurements
serve as a best estimate of the background activity.
The twenty selected sites for dose rate measurements in Göteborg cover
a large part of the town and the dose rates vary between 0.09 and 0.16 µSv/h,
with a mean of 0.12 ± 0.02 (1 σ) µSv/h. This variation in dose rate at different
places in the city is due to both the composition of the ground and the type of
ground cover (e.g. asphalt, cobble stones, concrete). The dose rate could thus
easily vary by almost a factor of two over a relatively small area and this should
be taken into account when selecting reference sites for repeated dose rate
measurements.
TLD-measurements
Of the 25 TL-dosimeters handed out 19 were worn during the whole time
period (8 weeks) and the mean value for the 19 subjects is 0.11 ± 0.06 (1 σ) µGy/
h, which is in good agreement with the dose rates found at the 20 measurement
points in Göteborg (mean 0.12 µSv/h).
However, for the 6 TLD:s which were not worn (but left in the person’s
homes) the mean dose rate is higher: 0.38 ± 0.05 (1 σ) µGy/h. These 6 persons all
Figure 1. Activity in soil samples from the reference sites in Göteborg.
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live in apartment buildings. Similar results have been found in measurements
at Gävle (Erlandsson, 2001) and imply that the main part of the dose is
received from indoor sources. The ground contamination level may thus have a
minor impact on the radiation dose.
Taking this into consideration it may seem strange that the agreement
between TLD-measurements and outdoor dose-rate measurements are so good.
The TLD-exposure ought to be higher since the persons wearing the TLD:s
spend most of their time indoors. However, the radiation environment at the
workplace may differ considerably from the radiation environment in the
homes where the non-worn TL-dosimeters were exposed. Also, the dosimeters
worn by the subjects are shielded to some extent by the body, which could
explain the lower signal. The number of TLD:s left at the subject’s homes are
also too few to draw any firm conclusions and this will be further investigated
in a subsequent study planned for 2003.
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Removal of Contaminated Sediments in the Nitelva
River
Steinar Backe, Trygve Bjerk, Gordon C. Christensen, Trygve
Gravdahl, Rita Nordvi, Lise Nystuen, Tore Ramsøy, Anne B.
Ruud, Aud Raaum, Elisabeth Strålberg and Kristin Østmo.
Institute for Energy Technology, P.O.Box 40, N-2027 Kjeller, Norway
Abstract
Since 1967 Institute for Energy Technology (IFE), Kjeller, has discharged low-
level radioactive wastewater through a special pipeline called the NALFA-
pipeline to the nearby river Nitelva. In October 1999 IFE was asked by the
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) to work out a plan for
removing radioactive contaminated sediments from the end of this pipeline. A
plan was presented in February 2000 and the contaminated sediments were
removed during the spring 2000. A total of approximately 180 m3 of sediments
were removed from the river bottom, 16 m3 from a 10 m2 area around the end of
the pipeline, and the rest from an area of approximately 250 m2 mainly
downstream. The 16 m3 of sediments from the “hot spot” were filled in 125
drums. Except for 5 drums that are stored at IFE to be used in future research
activities, these drums have been deposited in the KLDRA-Himdalen
repository in Norway.  The remaining 160 – 170 m3 of sediments were stored in
37 containers and were finally filled in the empty hole after the radioactive
waste in the old near-surface repository at IFEs premises at Kjeller had been
retrieved.
Introduction
A pipeline called the NALFA-pipeline has been used since 1967 for discharges
of low-level radioactive wastewater from IFE to the nearby river Nitelva. The
discharges have always been below the discharge limits specified by the
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA).
Decommissioning of the Uranium Reprocessing Pilot Plant at IFE-
Kjeller in the period 1967 – 1970 resulted in an increased discharge of
plutonium and other fission products but still below the discharge limits.
Samples of sediments taken in 1971 from the area around the end of the
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pipeline showed that this area was contaminated. Plutonium, which is known
to bind effectively to sediments, was apparent in the samples.
As a part of a program for radiological survey of contamination in the
Nitelva, samples of sediments from the end of the pipeline are analysed every
year and the results reported to the authorities. Because of the sedimentation
process in the river, the area contaminated by plutonium and other fission
products from discharges in 1967 – 1970 has been covered. Profiles of
sediments taken in 1996 and 1999 showed that the main plutonium
concentration was located in a layer of 30 – 50 cm below the river bottom.
The water level of the river and the lake Øyern is lowered every year to
meet the flood situation caused by snow melting. This caused the contaminated
river bottom to be exposed to air and thus be accessible to the public for shorter
periods. In autumn 1999 IFE was requested to remove the contaminated
sediments and NRPA asked IFE to work out a report on the extent and level of
contamination and a plan for removal. This report was presented in February
2000. Based on this information the NRPA concluded that contaminated
sediments containing 239Pu + 240Pu + 241Am above 10 Bq/g (dry weight) should be
removed and treated as radioactive waste.
Mapping of the contaminated area and levels of contamination
Mapping of the area of contaminated sediments was carried out in the winter 1999/
2000 and in March 2000 while the river was still covered by ice. Holes were drilled
though the ice and profiles of sediments were sampled down to approximately 60
cm below the river bottom where this was possible (Figure 1). Totally 74 profiles
were sampled in the area covering 50 m x 20 m where the end of the pipeline was
supposed to be buried in the sediments. The profile samples were sliced in 6 cm
sections resulting in more than 500 samples. The content of 241Am in these samples
was analysed by g-spectrometry at IFE-Kjeller. Based on earlier measurements of
plutonium in these sediments a ratio of 26 between plutonium and americium (dry
weight) was used to calculate the concentration of Pu. The measurements and
calculations showed that the most contaminated sediments were located between
30 cm and 60 cm below the river bottom. The calculations resulted in a map
showing the area where sediments had a concentration of 239Pu + 240Pu + 241Am
above 10 Bq/g and therefore had to be removed. Because of the uncertainty in the
measurements and in the Pu/Am ratio it was decided to remove sediments having
a contamination level of 7 Bq/g and above. The area where the sediments were to
be removed is shown in Figure 3. The end of the pipeline is marked with a star. The
area represented approximately 260 m2 and was marked by sticks through the ice.
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Removal of contaminated sediments
A private company specialized in underwater technology was hired to perform
the work of removing the sediments from the river bottom. Before the work
could start, the ice covering the area was removed and a barrier against
flooding of the area was established (Figure 2). The water level in the river was
slightly lower than the area of the contaminated sediments when the
excavation started. Excavation of the sediments was performed with a grab
mounted on a mobile crane with an arm that could reach 50 meters outwards
(Figure 4 and Figure 5). The crane was parked on the riverbank close to a
bridge over the river (Figure 3 and Figure 4). The area along the riverbank, the
parking area of the mobile crane and the work area for receiving and
pretreatment of sediments were classified as a controlled area and fenced off in
order to prevent access by unauthorized persons.
The excavation work started 29 March 2000 and was finished at 3 April
2000. Approximately 16 m3 of sediments from 10 m2 around the end of the
NALFA-pipeline were loaded into 125 drums and transported to IFE-Kjeller
for further treatment (Figure 6). The end of the NALFA-pipeline was located,
and the part of the pipeline inside the excavation area was removed. Sediments
from 250 m2 outside this “hot spot” were removed down to about 70 cm and
loaded into containers. During the excavation samples were taken and
analyzed to ensure that the contamination level in the riverbed was below 10
Bq/g in the excavated areas. All together 160 – 170 m3 of sediments outside the
“hot spot” were loaded into 37 containers and transported to IFE.  The local
authorities had specified in advance which route to use for transportation out
of the area.
During the last days of the work it started to snow and the water level in
the river increased and flooded the area thus making the excavation task
rather difficult.
Radiation protection measures and doses
To prevent contamination of the riverbank where the sediments were brought
ashore and the work area for loading drums and containers these areas were
given a thick plastic cover.
Personnel working in close contact with the sediments were required to
use special working cloths and were checked for contamination after work.
Work inside the controlled area required use of personal dosimeters from IFE’s
radiation protection service. Doses to IFE-personnel in March and April 2000
showed no increase above a normal level of 0 – 0.5 mSv/month. Doses to hired
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personnel were below the detection limit of 0.1 mSv/month for the TL-
dosimeters.  Dose rate measurements made during the work showed a level of
0.1 – 0.15 µSv/h, the natural background level in the area.
Personnel working in close contact with the contaminated sediments
were required to use personal air monitors (PAS). The filters in the PAS’ were
not changed during the preparation and excavation period and were measured
with a contamination monitor every day. After the excavation work was
finished the filters were measured by a NaI-detector. It was not possible to
detect any α-, β- or γ-radioactivity on these filters. The nine filters from the
PAS’ were also analysed in search for plutonium. Only one of these analysis
was successful. The committed dose that could be calculated from the Pu-
activity on this filter was 0.2 µSv.
Two air monitor stations were in use 12 hours a day in the period 27
March to 3 April 2000. The two monitors were located at the riverbank facing
the contaminated area. The monitors pumped air thought the filters at a rate of
20 l/minute. The filters were not changed during the period. Radioactivity on
these filters was measured every day by using a contamination monitor and
was used to decide if use of breathing masks was necessary. These
measurements and a final measurement of these filters by a NaI-detector
showed no traces of γ-radioactivity. The filters were also analysed by a
radiochemical method to detect plutonium. The results of concentration of
plutonium in air from these measurements were 3.9×10-8 Bq/l and 2.6×10-8 Bq/
l. The background level of plutonium in air was later measured at IFE to be
2.5×10-8 Bq/l. From the average value measured by the two monitors on the
riverbank and corrected by the background level an average committed dose of
0.04 µSv could be calculated from the work of removing the contaminated
sediments.
Waste treatment of contaminated sediments
Sediments in the 125 drums from the 10 m2 at the end of the pipeline were mixed
with concrete. Five drums were stored at IFE-Kjeller to be used in future research
activities. The rest of the drums have been disposed of in the KLDRA- Himdalen
facility.
The 37 containers with sediments from the 250 m2 area outside the “hot
spot” were stored at IFE for a while. By applying a systematic program for
sampling and analysis of the content in these containers it could be proved that the
average concentration of  239Pu + 240Pu + 241Am was below 10 Bq/g in all of them.
Permission was therefore given by the NRPA to fill these sediments into the old
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empty near-surface repository at IFE-Kjeller after the radioactive waste was
retrieved. This was done in early November 2001.
Figure 1. Mapping of the contaminated area
Figure 2. Barrier against flooding of the area
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Figure 3.  The area with contamination  Above 10 Bq/g.
Figure 4. The mobile crane .
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Figure 5. Excavation with a grab.
Figure 6. Loading of sediments into drums.
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Expanded sediment sampling from Institute for
energy technology’s waste discharge point,
downstream the river Nitelva and into the lake
Øyeren.  Preliminary  report.
Arne Sæbø, Lise Nystuen, Trygve Bjerk
Institute for Energy Technology, Kjeller, Norway
Abstract
“Knowledge is the small part of ignorance that we arrange and classify”
Ambroce Bierce.
After a long time of discharging low-activity waste from the Institute of Energy
Technology (IFE) into the waters system, a broad sediment sampling research
program was initiated to investigate the distribution of radioactive material in
the recipient. The research was formed as a project and named ALT-ØYERN. It
started in 1998. The intention was to plan and carry out a comprehensive
sediment sampling program, including the complete Nitelva/Øyeren water
system. A great deal of samples is now collected. The project has adapted and
tried out new equipment for sampling. The sampling procedure makes use of
plastic test tubes to make sediment cores. The cores are divided into segments
making it possible to determine activity depth profiles. The great amount of
samples will undoubtedly increase the competence of the section in sampling,
sample preparing and radiochemical analysis. The project monitoring will be of
great importance as a background status, if IFE in the future wants to perform
consequence analysis of its cleaning up of radioactive materials around its
former discharge point. As the project still is in the beginning, this paper is to
be considered as a preliminary status report.
Introduction
IFE, Institute for Energy Technology has since the early sixties controlled their
amount of discharges of radioactive materials and the radiological status in its
recipient. The results are reported annually in special reports to the NRPA,
Norwegian radiation protection agency. A project named ALT-ØYEREN was
started in 1998. A comprehensive sampling of sediments in the river from IFEs
former discharge point and downstream to lake of Øyeren was planned. The
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main intention was to gain adequate information about the dispersing of any
anthropogenic nuclides in the water system. At present moment a systematic
sampling of sediments from the water system, additional to the regular control
samples, is executed. In the sampling procedure new sampling equipment was
tested. The equipment makes possible the sampling of sediment cores, which
can be divided in segments to observe radioactive depth profiles. Additional
reason to run the project is to secure useful information about the
circumstances in the recipient, making a background status, before the institu-
te started to clean up radioactive materials around the former discharge point.
This paper also brings forward a tabular form of earlier sediment
samples from the river, which might indicate a migration of plutonium. The
project will hopefully be able to give more information and knowledge about
this.
To sum up, the samples are collected in to:
• Investigate and determine any dispersal of radioactive materials in the
water system
• Investigate and determine any migration of radioactive materials from
the former discharge point downstream the water system
• Escalate the quality of our analyses program and the all over competence
of the staff working in the radiological section.
Sampling positions
The sampling positions are located with a GPS- global position system, shown
in figure 1.  The GPS position finder is shown in figure 2.
Sampling
 Three samples collection were carried out in September 1998. See figure 1.
• The fourth of April samples from Bingsfoss were collected for
background measurements
•  The eighth of September samples were collected over a distance of 3 km
from Nitelven Bridge downwards to a delta called Svellet. Samples nr 21 to 26
was collected over a distance of 750 m between Lillestrøm Bridge and Rælingen
Bridge. Samples 31 to 35 were collected over a distance of 3 km in the lower
part near the outlet of Nitelva. Sample from point 36 was collected in the
middle of the delta Svellet, 2 km from sample point 35.
• The fifteenth of September samples were collected from Teigsåa further
down in the watersystem .
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Teigsåa, 24 km from discharging point, is a small affluent running out
into Øyeren close to Sæter. It is well suited for sampling.
Sammerud, representing the most southerly sampling point in the
watersystem, is situated 37 km from discharge point.
Bingsfoss is a background point in Glomma, 12 km from IFEs discharge
point.
Equipment, procedure
Special sediment sampler providing sediment cores was used for sampling. See
figure 2.
A 2,5 cm diameter plastic tube is mounted in a metal holder. The holder is
pressed into the sediment and a core sample is produced in the plastic tube. The
plastic tube is demounted, closed in both ends to preserve the sample. The
plastic tubes are stored in a refrigerator. Two or three samples were collected
from the regular sample points. Four samples were collected from the
background point. The length of the cores is between 20-35 cm conditioned by
Figure 1. Sampling points.
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the bottom status. The equipment can be used down to 1,5 m depth. Sampling
from greater depth has to be done by a diver.
Samples treatment in the laboratory
In the laboratory the samples are kept in a refrigerator. The sample is partly
melted to suitable consistence before dividing into segments. The upper 10 cm
of the core is divided into 2 cm thick segments, 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6-8, 8-10 cm. The
lower part is divided in 5 cm segments, 10-15, 15-20, 20 -25, 25-30 cm. The
segments are dried to stable weight at 105 0C and analysed gamma
spectrometric. Some samples are going to be analysed for plutonium.
Figure 2. Sampling equipment.
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Figure 3. 137Cs results sediment.
Results
The only nuclide showing values above the detection limit is 137Cs. The results
of 137Cs are presented graphically in figure 3. Concentrations in Bq/g are shown
along the x-axes, and the different depth samples are given in the y-axes. The
figure shows some variations in parallel samples from the same samplings
point.
Pu-migration
As IFE over a long period of time has controlled and reported the discharging of
waste to the Nor-wegian authorities, a considerable amount of sediment
sample results exist. The following table shows the values of plutonium from
five sample points in the water system, reported since 1985 to 1998.   The
sampling points are shown in figure 4. The discharge point is situated ca 30 m
above sampling point Nybrua.
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Year Kjellerholen 
SD 1 
Nybrua SD 
4
Rælingsbrua 
SD 5 
Svellet SD 7 Øyeren SD 
8
1985 0,60 15 9 1,3 0,22 
1986 0,30 0,6 26 0,6 0,6 
1987 0,8 2,9 2,5 0,9 0,3 
1988 0,30 16 5,4 2 0,06 
1989 0,70 8,1 14 1,7 0,07 
1990 0,38 4,3 1,4 4,7 0,8 
1991 0,29 7,5 0,56 0,58 0,015 
1992 0,33 17 2,6 0,28 0,1 
1993 0,48 5,4 4,1 0,5 0,083 
1994 0,31 31 7,1 0,49 0,025 
1995 0,095 5,2 3,6 0,49 0,035 
1996 0,092 2,8 8,7 0,64 0,059 
1997 0,2 4 3,4 0,34 0,019 
1998 0,014 3,3 4,3 0,32 0,035 
Average 0,34 8,8 6,6 1,1 0,17 
 The table seems to reveal a migration of plutonium. To enfeeble or to confirm a
migration, the project will perform plutonium analyses on a selected part of
samples.
From the start of IFEs waste treatment plant and till all discharge of alpha-
activity was stopped in 1971, a total of 5 g plutonium is reported discharged. Later
calculations related to the cleaning up procedure in year 2000, was reported to be
0,3-0,5 g plutonium in the most contaminated 6 m2 area, 1 m depth. The
calculations are based on exact segments analyses connected to the Ecopraque
project (ref 1). The contaminated area is now free-classed. The difference between
the total plutonium discharges, 5 g in 1971 and the reported total value in
connection with the cleaning up analyses, 0,3-0,5 g and the decreasing values
shown in the table, may indicate that some plutonium has migrated down the
water system. The project is aware that the two calculations incommensurable.
Summary
The project was started up by enthusiasm and commitment of some research
workers who regarded it as an important radio ecological study. The project will
not only gain radio ecological knowledge of the water system, but will also by
the great number of samples to handle, increase the quality of pre-treatment
and analyses in the section. The driving forces are enthusiasm, interest and
curiosity. New equipment constructed to sample sediment cores is tested, and
many samples are collected. 406 segment samples are analysed. The great
number of samples will additionally increase the overall competence of the
section in sampling, preparing, analysing, categorizing and reporting.
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Scientifically the project will bring forward a greater knowledge of
dissemination of anthropogenic radioactive materials in the water system,
before and after IFE cleaned up the contamination of radioactive materials
around its former discharge point. This knowledge will be of great importance
if IFE later on will perform consequences analyses in the water system. All
project work is done as teamwork. The project is not given high priority and is
not given a budget. It is only performed as time makes it possible. As the project
still is in beginning, this paper is to be considered as a status report.
Consequently, conclusions at this stadium cannot be drawn. It will hopefully in
the in the future end up in a final report. Just before this conference started,
the project collected new samples from all sampling points.
Reference 1. Final report ECOPRAQE project, R.N.J Comans (Editor). EC-
C-99-104
Figure 4. Sampling points in Nitelva.
443
STUK-A195
Radioecology and management of contaminated
forests
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1Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
2Forest Research Institute (Metla), Parkano Research Station
Introduction
Dose pathways from contaminated forests to man are related to stay in forests
and use of forest products. Their contributions to radiation dose vary according
to time after deposition and by groups of people. Wild foods are the major
source of long-term internal radiation in areas where people collect
mushrooms, berries and herbs, or are hunting for their own use, amounting to
at least a few kilograms per capita and year. External radiation exposure will
hardly exceed internal, even for forest workers. In early phase of fallout
situation intercepted radioactive material will retain in tree canopies for a
relatively short time. In dense young forests where trees are not too high
external exposure is then at maximum because the radiation source in canopy
is so close to people in forests and also due to appearance of short-lived
radionuclides.
Non-wood forest products are of concern to the public for a long time, but
slow contamination of timber can in serious fallout situations cause the most harm
to forestry. More than 80% of the income of multiple-use forestry in Finland comes
from wood. The availability of domestic timber is a major issue and, if disturbed,
also socio-economic consequences of contamination would become substantial.
Multiple-use forestry, in addition to wood production comprises hunting,
picking of berries, mushrooms and medical herbs, decorative materials,
Christmas tree market, hiking and other recreational use of forests. Only few of
these activities as such mean substantial addition to human radiation doses.
Regulations for activity concentrations in commodities, also in various forest
products in international market, are probably to be applied in the near future
as a result of an IAEA project. Long-term internal exposure through wild foods
is of most concern to local citizens from the point of view of radiation protection.
The multiple-use forestry in northern Europe includes increasing sectors of
recreational services and activities for the public. Credible and well-informed
intervention is important for all those involved in forestry and using forests.
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The aim of this paper is to describe the evidence for effectiveness in
reduction of 137Cs uptake, and to appraise practicability of some forest
management methods having potential for remediation of contaminated forests.
Intervention
The mitigation of radiation problems in forestry should be in accordance with the
general principles of intervention: justification, protection of individual, and
optimisation. They are essential and if followed, prevent making bad mistakes in
implementation of countermeasures. There are cost-effective strategies for
lowering of collective dose through restrictions for the use of wild foods. Less
emphasis has hitherto been put on production of acceptable timber using methods
that reduce contamination of wood and other forest products. Through efficient
surveillance of the contamination the timber resources not contaminated above
the acceptable level can be used timely. Remedial actions are needed when
adjusted timing of harvesting timber is not sufficient.
Goals of radiation protection concerning contaminated forests are parallel to
the goals for assuring access to forests and availability of forest products. However,
the stakeholders representing forestry can differ in priorisation of actions from the
views of radiation experts, due to their different standpoints. The changes in
emphasis of environmental and other ‘non-radiation’ values among stakeholders
are obvious and reflected by forest law in most countries having significant forest
industry, in all Fennoscandian countries among others (Hubbard et al., 2002).
Principle of sustainable forestry, certification of the whole production chain of
timber, increase and development of activities in the field of multiple-use forestry
will add to the attributes that are important in intervention. Conservation of
nature, protection of forest ecosystem, and consideration of interests of people
using and owing forests will set frames for remedial methods that are accounted as
acceptable.
The tools for showing the need for intervention are above all measurements
of radioactivity, particularly in forests, and predictive dynamic models provided
with a data base relevant for the site and stand conditions. Model predictions give
guidance for timing of remedial measures, wheras site-specific measurements and
known growth conditions direct the choice of intensity of remedial operations. The
stand condition and radiation level refer to urgency of the treatment if normal
harvesting times are important to forest owners. Options like “no-need to harvest
in the next decades” – no action, can also be realistic, depending on later
strategies of the forest owner.
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The management strategy prepared and accepted before contamination
gives a relevant starting point for intervention. Such plans provide value also
to on-site adaptation. The same holds true for national forest intervention
policy, regional goals and locally.
In the north European conditions the improvement of nutrient status of
forests through increased availability of mineral nutrients in soil can
significantly reduce the contamination of trees (Table 1). Such methods,
namely fertilisation, liming, soil preparation, and prescribed burning are also
accepted according to the criteria of sustainable forestry.
Remedial methods for forestry
Field experiments, initiated as early as in the 1960’s, have shown that various
soil management methods have a significant mitigating influence on radio-
caesium contamination of forest vegetation. Applying these methods lowers
radiation doses to people in the whole field of forest product utilisation. A series
of studies related to soil improvement on various sites and with varying stands
are reviewed in Table 1.
Options for soil management
Fertilisation. Fertilisers (N, PK, wood ash) are used to improve site nutrition
and nutrient cycling in order to maintain or increase tree growth. Nitrogen is
normally growth-limiting nutrient in forested mineral soils and phosphorus
and potassium in drained peatlands in Finland. Nitrogen and phosphorus are
being applied by using slow-release fertilisers to minimise leaching losses of
nutrients and to maximize the fertilisation duration.
Liming. Liming agents have been used to neutralise soil acidity and
increase the soil’s capacity to buffer changes in pH (Derome et al. 2000).
However, the detrimental effects of liming on the growth of Scots pine and
Norway spruce in Finland appear to be greater than the benefits of liming
(Derome et al. 2000).
Soil preparation. Humus layer is partly broken in order to facilitate
artificial or natural regeneration, to decrease the competition of ground
vegetation and to increase the temperature of the mineral soil. These effects
improve growth conditions and result better regeneration.
Prescribed burning. Understorey vegetation, most of the logging residues
and a varying amount of the organic layer are burnt to promote forest
regeneration. During the latest decades prescribed burning was replaced by
mechanical site preparation because of practical problems, i.e. work
dependence on weather conditions, a danger of fire getting out of control and a
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risk of nutrient leaching. Nowadays prescribed burning is becoming more
common in Finland. Prescribed burning releases nutrients from the organic
material, improves temperature conditions in the soil and reduces the acidity
of the organic layer (Mälkönen et al. 2000). The sites most suitable for this
measure are moist and dryish till soils, which do not require draining.
Practicability of soil improvement methods
The effect of a treatment on reduction of caesium uptake by plants can be
assessed in advance using data from comparable field experiments and
considering the uncertainties in the actual radiation situation. The effects of
performed treatments on stands should be surveyed and the gained
information used in further planning of intervention.
       
Method Site Plant 
species 
Material Time (years) from Reducing Reference 
    application/fallout effect, %  
       
NPK+NPK fert. Mineral 
soil 
Norway 
spruce 
Wood, bark, 
branches, 
needles 
18, 13 / 12 73-92 Aro et al. 
2002
NPK fert. Drained 
peatland 
Scots pine Wood, bark, 
branches, 
needles 
34 / 9 8-23 Kaunisto et 
al. 2002a 
PK/NPK+NPK+PK 
fert. 
Drained 
peatland 
Scots pine Wood, bark, 
branches, 
needles 
38, 18, 1 / 9 33-58 Kaunisto et 
al. 2002a 
PK/NPK fert. Drained 
peatland 
Scots pine Needles 25 / 4 47 Kaunisto et 
al. 2002b 
PK/NPK+NPK fert. Drained 
peatland 
Scots pine Needles 25, 13 / 4 60 Kaunisto et 
al. 2002b 
NPK+NPK fert. Mineral 
soil 
Ground 
vegetation 
Above-ground 
parts
18, 13 / 12 50-85 Moberg et 
al. 1999 
PK+K fert. Drained 
peatland 
Ground 
vegetation 
Above-ground 
parts
22, 9 / 12 32-62 Moberg et 
al. 1999 
Ash fertilisation Mineral 
soil 
Lingonberry Berries 2 and 7 / 6 and 11 23-78 Levula et 
al. 2000 
Prescribed burning Mineral 
soil 
Lingonberry Berries 7 / 11 55 Levula et 
al. 2000 
Liming Mineral 
soil 
Scots pine Woody parts 
Needles 
5 / 6 
5 / 6 
17-28 
15-17 
Rantavaara 
& Raitio 
2002
Soil preparation Mineral 
soil 
Scots pine Woody parts 
Needles 
5 / 6 
5 / 6 
46-58 
57-62 - “ - 
Liming + soil 
preparation 
Mineral 
soil 
Scots pine Woody parts 
Needles 
5 / 6 
5 / 6 
58-71 
66-69 - “ - 
       
Table 1. Reducing effect of some soil management methods on 137Cs concentrations in
different plant material collected from various mineral and drained peatland soil sites 4
– 12 years after the Chernobyl fallout.
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There are restrictions for forestry operations arising from environmental
and landscape protection. For instance, large clear cutting areas should be
avoided because of landscape values, biodiversity, susceptibility to erosion and
increased risk of contamination of shallow ground waters. Also protection of the
ecosystem is taken care of, when soil preparation is not deep ploughing but
rather harrowing, scarifying or mounding.
Demand for protection of biodiversity is delicate in the short term for
instance when fertilisation or soil amendment with wood ash changes the
structure of species in field vegetation. Later such changes often gradually
disappear and the initial state returns to the site. Big mammals prefer grass
feed if available in summer, and thereby fertilisation reduces also
contamination of game meat. For example, elk does come to fertilised sites,
abundant in grass, for feed. The microbial activity in humus will probably
change after amendment of soil using wood ash (Perkiömäki & Fritze, 2002),
but is it harmful or not, has not been clarified sufficiently. Methods based on
good forest management practices would mostly be acceptable, if stakeholders
are well informed of the plans, expected effects, implementation, costs, and
follow-up of intervention.
The costs for remedial measures are typically estimated comprising
working time, material and equipment costs, and possibly secondary costs for
wastes. However, wastes are not generated in the operations referred to. The
profitability of fertilisation as a remedial method can often be shown, which is
a noteworthy factor when the scale of intervention is designed.
Technical feasibility of forest management methods and capacity for
implementating them as countermeasures are based on local use of the actual
methods. Eventual capacity problems can be reduced by adjusting the schedule
of intervention; some flexibility in timing is possible as changes of radioactivity
in timber are slow.
Harmful socio-economic consequences of forest contamination would be
reduced through improved functioning of the whole field of forestry.
Remediation for acceptable timber will also improve the availability of
acceptable wild foods.
Conclusions
Cost-effective, practicable remediation of contaminated forests can be based on
customary forest management methods, if designed using relevant
multidisciplinary expertise. It is possible to make profitable investments and
yield timber at normal harvesting times during the rotation period while the
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local contamination exceeds the level for production of acceptable timber
without intervention. The actual intervention causes hardly any, or very low,
direct costs for forestry operations, if the sites are carefully chosen concerning
the expected effect of remediation, and related harvesting plan. This should
motivate authorities and industry for systematic measurements of
radioactivity, which would further improve the results through guidance for
timing and adjustment of intensity of remediation. There is potential for
successful remediation with methods which simultaneously fulfil the goals of
forestry and reduce the uptake of radiocaesium. Forest owners and their
consultants need practical advice and options prepared for their remediation
planning. An optimised response to a contaminating event can largely prevent
any disturbance of round wood market and utilisation of forests by local people.
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Introduction
Radiological contamination of the environment is caused by nuclear activities
on the globe: nuclear weapon tests and the Chernobyl accident. The transfer of
radionuclides to the organism via ingestion is one of the sources of doses
obtained by people. To assess the doses received by humans the intake of
isotopes with daily diet was defined. The concentration of radionuclides in
foodstuffs was determined.
 The network of Service for Measurement of Radioactive Contamination
systematically controls all kinds of important agricultural products such as
milk, meat, vegetables, fruit, cereals and forest products: mushrooms,
blueberries etc. Measurement stations involved in food monitoring act within
Sanitary-Epidemiological Stations, Veterinary Hygiene Units and Chemical -
Agricultural Stations. All activities are co-ordinated by the Central Laboratory
for Radiological Protection [1].
The level of activity of caesium isotopes has regularly been monitored in
collected samples originating from different administrative districts of Poland.
Since 1994 the 134Cs concentration has been below the detection limit. The
activity of 137Cs has been measured to determine long-term effect of the
accident on the contamination of milk, meat and other foodstuffs.
Materials and methods
The sampling rate has been dependent on the radiological situation. Before
the Chernobyl accident food samples were collected on monthly, quarterly or
annual basis of all administrative districts in sampling points. Shortly after
the Chernobyl accident milk was collected daily, meat, fish, poultry and eggs
weekly. The most common kinds of vegetables and fruit were sampled daily,
particularly these ones, which were ready for consumption at that time.
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Since 1987 a special sampling program has been valid. Milk has been collected
weekly and the average monthly sample has been tested. Meat (of different
kind), fish and poultry have been collected once per 3 months, eggs once a year,
and the most popular vegetables and fruit while harvesting.
 The activity of caesium isotopes was determined by radiochemical
method or gamma spectrometry. For radiochemical determination the samples,
after ashing and dissolving in nitric acid, were filtered through a radiochemical
funnel with ammonium molybdophosphate (AMP) bed, selective for caesium.
The activity of caesium in the bed was determined using a counter with thin
plastic scintilator.
 For the spectrometric measurement in Marinelli geometry a gamma
spectrometer with HPGe or NaI(Tl) detector was used.
Results and discussion
Before the Chernobyl accident activity of 137Cs in foodstuffs was below 1 Bq kg-1.
The regional differences were not observed over the whole territory of Poland. 137Cs
in foodstuffs was the consequence of 137Cs accumulated in soil as a follow up of
nuclear weapon tests. The situation changed drastically immediately after the
Chernobyl accident (April, 1986) when the 137Cs and 134Cs nuclides appeared in
large quantities, both in air and total fallout, resulting in the soil, pasture and
plants contamination. The pasture season for cows begins early in May in Poland.
The distribution of contamination was non-uniform with significant local
differences. The north-east area and south part of Poland were the most
contaminated area. The low level of contamination was registered in west Poland
[2].
Milk is important for the monitoring of radioactive contamination as
radionuclides appear in it immediately after a cow has eaten contaminated
fodder, as well as the fact that it has great share in our diet. Mean activity of
137Cs and 134Cs in milk was 25 Bq l-1 and 13 Bq l-1 respectively in May 1986. In
samples of milk from some cows the activity of several hundreds Bq l-1 was
found. In June the contamination level decreased approximately by half,
during the next months was dropping gradually. From the beginning of 1987 an
increase was observed again. This was caused by feeding cows with hay
collected in June 1986 [3].
In the following years the activity of caesium isotopes in milk was
decreasing and it reached a level of approx. 1 Bq l-1 at the end of 1992. Activity of
134Cs has been below detection limit in most samples of milk since 1992. Figure 1
shows the changes of 137Cs in mean monthly samples of milk in Poland during the
period between 1986-2001.
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Figure 1. Mean monthly activity of  137Cs in milk  in Poland, [Bq l-1].
Four kinds of meat were tested: pork, beef, mutton and horse meat. Until
the middle of May 1986 the concentration of caesium isotopes did not exceed 26
Bq kg-1 of 137Cs and 14 Bq kg-1 of 134Cs but it increased later because of the
accumulation of these isotopes in animal organism. In some cases between
June and August 1986 the concentration of both caesium isotopes exceeded 500
Bq kg-1 – 800 Bq kg-1 in single samples. Table 1 shows the activity of caesium
isotopes in different kinds of meat in 1986 -1988.
 134Cs + 137Cs
Bq kg-1
Beef Mutton Horse Meat Pork 
1986 mean    
range    
50
<5 – 527 
57 
<5 – 860 
65 
7 – 594 
35
6 -316 
1987 mean    
range    
45
<5 - 622 
53 
<5 - 533 
61 
<5 - 501 
21
<5 - 106 
1988 mean    
range    
19
<5 - 226 
21 
<5 - 209 
 32 
<5 - 728 
10
<5 - 44 
Table 1. Activity of  134Cs + 137Cs in meat in Poland in 1986-1988, [Bq kg-1]
During the few years the level of meat contamination has been
decreasing systematically. Since 1994 the activity of 134Cs was below the
detection limit in most samples. The average activity of 137Cs has been on the
level of 2 - 3 Bq kg-1  reaching 50 Bq kg-1 in few samples. The differences in
activity between kinds of meat were less visible. In 1986 the contamination of
poultry and fish was below some tens of Bq kg-1 and decreasing gradually. At
present the activity of 137Cs in poultry is below 1 Bq kg-1. Mean concentration in
fish is on level of the 2 Bq kg-1 reaching 20 Bq kg-1  in single samples.
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The season of vegetation starts in May and during summer month most
of fruit and vegetables is harvested. Contamination of the environment after
the Chernobyl accident caused high contamination of these plants. The highest
average activity of 134Cs+137Cs in fruit was registered in currant 200-400 Bq kg-
1, in single samples even 2000 Bq kg-1. Fruit picked in September and later was
less contaminated. Activity of both caesium isotopes in vegetables and cereals
was less significant except leafy vegetables picked in May and June, in which
the activity exceeded some hundreds of Bq kg-1. Already in 1987 the content of
accumulated radionuclides significantly decreased in comparison to 1986 and
since 1989 the average activity has been below 1 Bq kg-1 as is shown in table 2.
Fruit Bq kg-1 Vegetables Bq kg-1
 mean range  mean range 
1986
black currant 
other currant 
gooseberry 
raspberry 
strawberry 
apple 
plum
385
291
120
79
28
31
29
31 –2201 
26 – 1769 
13 – 1219 
<5 – 546 
<5 – 205 
<5 – 323 
<5 - 141 
   cabbage 
   carrot 
   potatoes 
   other            
   vegetables 
13 
17 
17 
28 
   <5 – 93 
   <5 – 93 
   <5 – 49 
   <5 - 215 
1987 currant 
other fruit 
10
3,8
<5 – 44 
0,3 – 35,7 
   all kinds of 
   vegetables 
  1,2    0,3 –15,4 
1988 currant 
other fruit 2,0
<5 – 20 
0,3 – 9,8 
   all kinds of 
   vegetables 
  1,0    0,3 –17,9 
1989 -
2001 
all kinds of 
fruit 
0,8 – 0,5 <0,1 – 19,2    all kinds of 
   vegetables 
0,9 – 0,5  <0,1 –11,4 
Table 2. Activity of 134Cs+137Cs  in fruit and vegetables in Poland, [Bq kg-1]
Summary and conclusions
The Service for Measurement of Radioactive Contamination has assured a continuous
monitoring of the foodstuffs on whole territory of Poland. During the period between
1986 –2001 some hundreds of each kind of tested samples were analysed. The great
amount of samples has allowed a good statistic dose assessment [4].
Before the Chernobyl accident there were no territorial differences in the
radioactive contamination foodstuffs. Fallout originating from nuclear explosions
in the world covered Poland uniformly. After the Chernobyl accident the situation
changed. There have been regional and even spot differences in contamination.
Radioactive contamination of 134Cs according to half-life lost importance in 1994.
As the long-term effect on environment the activity of 137Cs has been determined.
Since 1994 mean contamination of fruit, vegetables, cereals, eggs, poultry has been
on the same level as it was before the accident. Higher radioactivity remains in
milk, meat, fish and forest products.
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Based on the data concerning activity of caesium isotopes in different
kinds of foodstuffs and statistical data of mean intake of these foodstuffs,
annual mean intake of 134Cs and 137Cs via ingestion has been calculated . Also
an annual effective dose related to the consumption of contaminated food could
be assessed for the period between 1985 and 2001. Table 3 presents annual
mean intake and the doses of 134Cs and 137Cs obtained by population of Poland.
Having considered the diversity of dietary habits of consumers and their place
of living, the effective dose received via ingestion may even be five times higher.
In Poland the accepted effective dose caused by contamination of the
environment with artificial radionuclides is 1 µSv. The doses obtained by the
population were some percent of this value.
 Annual mean intake 
[Bq per year] 
Annual mean effective dose [µSv] 
134Cs 137Cs 134Cs 137Cs
1985 - 325 - 4 
1986 2054 4324 34 54 
1987 805 2246 13 28 
1988 247 1014 4 13 
1989 – 1992 136 – 39 939 – 605 3 – 1 12 – 8 
1993 - 2001 <25 - <1 about 500 - 6 -7 
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The role of fungal mycelium in the transfer of
radionuclides in forest soil
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The activity concentrations of Cs-137 in fruitbodies of fungi have been studied
intensively after the Chernobyl accident. The levels of Cs-137 in fungal
fruitbodies have been high – in some species very high. The typical range has
been 10 to 100 times higher than that found in plants from the same forest area
(Olsen 1994). There are several pathways for the transfer to man. By picking
mushrooms and consume them the intake of Cs-137 can be significant
particularly if we eat some of the high-levels species. Another pathway is via
animals – for example game animal (Johanson 1994) which eat large quantities
of mushrooms and we eat meat from them. These are the two pathways which
often have been discussed but, additionally, fungi is involved in nearly all of the
transfer of Cs-137 from soil or litter to the fungal mycelium and the transfer
further to nearly all plants of the forest ecosystems. An important role of fungi
in the forest soil ecosystem is to decompose organic substanses, to accumulate
various mineral nutrients and also caesium and in exchange with
photosynthetic products from the plants transfer these mineral nutrients to
the plants. In a mineral nutrient poor forest soil nearly all mineral nutrients
will pass through the fungal mycelium. In exchange about 10 to 20% of the
photosyntetic products produced by the plants will be supplied to the fungi
(Smith & Read 1997).
The role of fungal mycelium in the metabolism of Cs-137 in forest soil is
ignored by many radioecologists – many of the models trying to explain Cs-137
tansfer from forest soil do not mention fungi at all and also in reviews of Cs-137
and organic substances in soil fungi is often not mentioned at all. Thus the most
important parameter is not used in the attempt to explain the binding and
accumulation of Cs-137. One of the main problems is to find methods for
studying the various transfers – soil-fungi-plant. The biological controls could
be found at various parts of this chain of events. First, the uptake of caesium
from soil or even directly from litter and minerals to the fungal mycelium can
be under biological control. Second, there could be some “excretion” of mineral
nutrients from the fungal mycelium, and whether these include caesium is not
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known. As a third step, we have the transfer or exchange of caesium occurring
from the mycorrhizae formation to the plants in exchange of photosynthetic
products. There must be a strict biological control of this exchange since the Cs-
137 activity concentration in the fungal part is 10 to 100 times higher than in
the plant part. One reasonable strategy for the fungi seems to be to take up as
much mineral nutrients as possible and transfer as little as possible to the
plants.
There are many difficulties in studying the dynamics of the caesium
transfer in the fungal systems but it is possible to take some small steps, and
we have used two approaches. The first was to use a mechanical fractionation
instead of a chemical extraction (Nikolova et al 2000). Soil samples were
collected from various forest stands – normal forest soil, sandy soil and peat
soil. In the laboratory the soil samples were mechanically separated on 2 mm
mesh into three fractions: bulk soil, rhizosphere fraction and a residue which
we called the soil-root interface fraction. As a mean value, the percentage of
organic matter in the bulk soil fraction was 69%, in the rhizosphere fraction
70% and in the soil-root interface fraction 95%. Of the total Cs-137 activity in
the soil, 45% as a mean was found in the bulk soil fraction, 37% was found in the
rhizosphere fraction and 18% in the soil-root interface fraction. The highest Cs-
137 activity concentration – usually 3 to 4 times higher than in other fractions
- was always found in the soil-root interface fraction. The results thus show
that 10 to20 % of the Cs-137 inventory of the soil was in some way associated
with the biological part of the soil.
Another approach was to isolate the fungal mycelium from soil (Vinichuk
& Johanson 2002). Fruitbodies of various species were collected in Ukraine,
and soil samples in close vicinity of the fruitbody were also collected and sliced
into 1 cm layers. The mycelium was prepared from the soil using tweezers
under a microskop (64X magnification). The Cs-137 activity was determined
both in soil and in mycelium. The highest Cs-137 activity concentrations were
found in the upper part of the soil profile both in the soil and in the mycelium.
The Cs-137 activity concentration was usually higher in the fruitbodies
compared with the mycelium with a mean concentration ratio of 10. The
percentage of the total Cs-137 inventory in the soil found in the fungal
mycelium ranged from 0.1 to 50% with a mean value of 15%. Both studies
showed that a rather large part of the Cs-137 in the soil – 10 to 20% - was
already within or at least associated with the fungal mycelium. In the above
ground part of the vegetation in a forest between 5 and 10 % is usually found.
Thus the fungal mycelium seems to act as a sink of Cs-137, as suggested
by Olsen et al (1990), and seems to have the capacity to accumulate most of the
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plant available Cs-137 in the soil. It is known that mycorrhizae fungi also can
decompose organic matter although the saprophytes (decomposers) seem to be
more effcient to performe that. There might be a direct transfer of Cs-137 from
litter to mycelium when the mycorrhizae fungi decompose organic matter, but
it has also been suggested that there is a similar direct transfer from the
saprophytic fungi to the mycorrhizae fungi (Lindahl et al. 2002). If so, there are
pathways for Cs-137 from litter to saprophytes and further to mycorrizae and
plants without passing the soil solution.
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Posters
11a Nuclear fuel particles in the environment -
characteristics, atmospheric transport and skin
doses
Roy Pöllänen
STUK
In the present thesis nuclear fuel particles are studied from the perspective of
their characteristics, atmospheric transport and possible skin doses. These so
called hot particles can be released into the environment, as has happened in
the past years because of human activities and different incidents and
accidents, for example in a severe nuclear accident causing an acute health
threat. Nuclear fuel particles with diameter of tens of micrometers, referred
here to as large particles, may be hundreds of kilobecquerels in activity and
even an individual particle may produce deterministic health effects.
Health threat caused by hot particles differs to that of uniform
contamination. Although their number in the air is small and, thus, the average
concentration of radionuclides is small, there is a possibility that a particle may
come in contact with tissue. A highly active beta-emitting particle may then
cause a large but very local dose to the tissue, whereas at distances larger than
about one centimetre from the source the dose is negligible. Quantities such as
effective dose equivalent are then not necessarily appropriate for
characterising health effects caused by hot particles.
Detection of individual nuclear fuel particles in the environment, their
isolation for subsequent analysis and their characterisation are not
straightforward and requires well-designed sampling and tailored analysis
methods. In the present study the need of the development of particle analysis
methods is highlighted. It is shown that complementary analysis techniques
are necessary for proper characterisation of the particles. Methods routinely
used for homogeneous samples may produce erroneous results if they are
carelessly applied for the particles. Consequently, they may misrepresent the
threat caused by hot particles.
Large nuclear fuel particles are transported in the atmosphere
differently compared with small particles or gaseous species. Thus, the
trajectories of gaseous species are not necessarily adequate for calculating the
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areas that may receive fallout of the large particles. A simplified model and a
more advanced model based on real-time weather information were applied in
the case of the Chernobyl accident for calculating the transport of the particles
of different sizes. The models were appropriate in characterising general
properties of the transport but were not able to properly predict the transport
of the particles with aerodynamic diameter tens of micrometers, detected in the
environment hundreds of kilometres from the source, using only the present
knowledge. Either the effective release height has been higher than reported
previously or convective updraft may have influenced on the transport. Models
applicable to large particles dispersion in a turbulent atmosphere should be
further developed.
Large particles are poorly inhalable because of their size. They may be
deposited in the upper airways but are not easily transported deep into the
lungs. Instead, deposition onto the surface of skin is relevant with respect to
acute deterministic effects. In the present work skin doses are calculated for
particles of different sizes and different types by assuming that particles are
deposited on the body surface. The deposition probability as a function of the
number concentration of the particles in air is not estimated.
The doses are calculated at the nominal depth of the basal cell layer and
averaged over a square centimetre of the skin. Calculated doses are compared
to the annual occupational skin dose limit for the public (50 mGy at depth of
0,07 mm and averaged over 1 cm2). After the Chernobyl accident the most
active nuclear fuel particles detected in Europe, even hundreds of kilometres
from the source, would have been able to produce a skin dose exceeding this
limit within one hour when deposited onto skin. However, the appearance of
deterministic effects necessitates more than one day lasting contact to skin.
Health hazards caused by nuclear fuel particles must be taken into
account in estimating the consequences of a severe nuclear accident.
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Abstract
The sampling station for both radioactive air- and deposition samples at Gävle,
Sweden, was reopened in December 2000.  During the 13 months from January
2001 to March 2002, 131I has been detected at eight occasions. There is only one
other station in Sweden (Visby), which has reported 131I but on one occasion
only.  The source of radiation has to be local.  The air sampling station is
situated at the sewage treatment plant Duvbacken where samples of sewage
sludge have been collected  and the activity concentration of 131I and several
other radioactive nuclides have been measured.   At the same time
meteorological observations of wind direction and speed have been made not
far from the sewage treatment plant.  We have found a good correlation
between  the administration of cancer treatment doses for tyroidea cancer at
the general hospital at Gävle, favourable wind direction from the sludge
thickeners to the air filter, and the concentration of 131I  in air filters and in
outgoing sludge from the sewage treatment plant.
Introduction
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986 the network of sampling stations for ground
level air in Sweden was extended with 7 stations in the Gävle area.  These were in
operation until the end of 1990 and at the end of 2000 only 6 stations were working
in Sweden.(Vintersved and De Geer, 1982). In connection with the extensive
sampling of sewage sludge from the sewage treatment plant Duvbacken at
Gävle and as there were indications that much of the 7Be and 137Cs in the
sewage sludge was due to resuspension air sampling station was restarted at
the end of 2000.  Normally it is only the naturally occurring radon daughters,
7Be (due to the cosmic radiation) and 137Cs which is due to the Chernobyl
accident that are detected in the air filters. Just after the accident a lot of
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shortlived nuclei were also detected both in the air filters and in the sewage
sludge.  Among them 131I with a half life  of 8.04 d. But already after about 2
month all traces of this nucleus had vanished.
 Materials and methods
The air sampler has a capacity of 105 m3/week (Vintersved and De Geer, 1982).
The air sample filters are collected weekly and compressed into small discs
with a diameter of 60 mm and thickness of 13 mm.  These samples are
measured 3 - 4 days after collection with a well shielded HPGe - detector.
Samples of outgoing water and sludge have also been collected at the
sewage treatment plant.  The water was passed through paper filter, and anion
and cation exchangers.  The resins were dried and measured in 180 ml tubs
with a HPGe - detector and the activity concentrations of 7Be, 40K, 131I, 137Cs,
228Ac, 238U, and 226Ra were determined. (Erlandsson and Mattsson,1978;
Ingemansson, et al 1981)    The ratio between the activities in the sludge and
the outgoing water is 2.5 ± 0.5 % for 131I.  (Erlandsson and Eklund, 2001).
Meteorological observations of  wind speed and direction have been made
at a station 5 km from the sewage treatment plant.
Results and discussion
The results from both the air filter and sewage sludge measurements are
shown in Table I.  Also shown in the table are the date of administration of all
treatment doses for tyroidea cancer and the strength of the doses during the
period of observation.
Date Air filter Date Adm. activity Date Sew. sludge 
 Act. Conc.    Act.conc. 
(µBq/m3)  (MBq)  (Bq/kg) 
2001      
 15/1-22/1 1.5 ± 0.3 15/1 3700 17/2-23/2 970 
5/2-12/2 0.6 ± 0.2 9/2 1200 24/2-2/3 130 
12/2-19/2 3.0 ± 0.3 12/2 7400 3/3-9/3 182 
24/9-1/10 2.4 ± 0.5 24/9 3700 13/10 –19/10 133 
10/12-17/12 0.6 ± 0.3 11/12 3700 22/12-28/12 222 
2002      
31/12-7/1 0.6 ± 0.3 9/1 7400 12/1-18/1 284 
7/1-14/1 1.7 ± 0.3 9/1 1300 26/1-1/2 230 
11/3-18/3 0.8 ± 0.3 11/3 7400 30/3-5/4 113 
Table I.  Activity concentration of 131I in air filters, sewage sludge and administered
treatment doses.
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Most of the 131I which has been given to patients at the General Hospital
at Gävle is excreted with the urine within a couple of days.  It takes about 24
hours before the 131I reaches the first sludge thickener, where it stays for 12 to
36 h in the sewage treatment plant.  The thickeners are basins with a diameter
of 15 m and the first is situated only 18 m from the air sampling station.  The
lay-out of parts of the sewage treatment plant  is shown in Fig 1. There are 3
thickeners where the sewage water is treated so that the dry substance is 5-6%.
Because the thickeners have such a large area and because the distance is
short the air filter is surrounded all the time when 131I is passing the thickeners
by an evaporation cloud.  Favourable wind directions may enhance the
transport of 131I .  The air filter is placed almost due east of the first thickener
(Fig. 1) and the most favourable wind direction should be between WSW and W,
which is covered by the sectors WSW and W which have a high frequency of
direction readings. Frequencies of wind directions are shown in Table II. Not
only is there a registration of  131I in the air filter every time a big dose of 131I
have been administered but also 2 to 3 weeks after, there is a marked peak in
the activity concentration curve in the outgoing sludge (Table I).
We have also on some occasions measured 131I at Visby, but we have not
been able to find the source.
In an example we will follow the transport of the activity of a treatment
dose of 3700 MBq administered 24/9 2001. The airborne 131I- activity leaving
the plant can be estimated as follows.  In the air filter for the week 24/9 to 1/10
an activity concentration of 2.4 ± 0.5 µBq/m3 was measured. The air volume
Fig. 1.  Orientation of sludge thickeners and air sampler at Duvbacken, Gävle.
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 NNE+NE ENE+E ESE+SE SSE+S SSW+SW WSW+W WNW+NW NNW+N 
2001 15-22/1   7 11 44 9 2 7 
5-12/2    28 27 2 2  
12-17/2    9 27 27 25 13 
24/9-1/10 4   9 27 25 14 9 
11-17/12    2 22 15 15 38 
        
2002 31/12-7/1 4   5 43 17 4 5 
7-14/1    4 54 41 3  
11/18/3 4  4 11 21 32 4 10 
Table II. Frequency of wind directions (%).
that had penetrated the filter was 103 700 m3.  This means that a total of 0.25
was captured on the filter.  The glass fibre filter used can be regarded as 100%
efficient for particles of all sizes but will not capture iodine in gaseous form.
Since we do not know how much of the iodine that leaves the basin in gaseous
form we assume that only 10% of the iodine is attached to particles, which was
roughly the case for the the activity from the Chernobyl accident.  Thus the
total activity passing through the filter area of 0.314 m2  is 2.5 Bq at an
approximate distance of 25 m from the source. If the activity from the basin was
evenly distributed through a half sphere of radius 25 m the total activity
leaving the basin would be (2.5/0.314) x 2π x 252 Bq = 31 kBq.  Since the sampler
is effective for iodine leaving the basin only when the wind direction is SSW,
SW, WSW and W we assume that the captured iodine is a sample from an
evenly distributed activity into a quarter of the half sphere which gives 8 kBq
as the source activity.  From the frequency of win directions presented in Table
II, one can see that during this week the wind direction was in the four sectors
52% of the time.  Thus our 8 kBq should be doubled which  means that roughly
16 kBq leaves the thickener via the air.  This activity is negligible compared to
the activity leaving the plant via the sludge phase 88.7 MBq and via the water
phase 3550 MBq
 The activity concentration in the sludge is given in Table III, column 2
and the total activity of the sludge in column 3.  The maximum activity leaves
the plant 2 – 3 weeks after the injection.  The activity corrected for the half-life
(8.04 d) is given in column 4.  Because of the short half-life the correction factor
is rather big.  The activity is not only due to the big dose but also to smaller
doses of 300 to 500 MBq administered about once a week which affect the total
activity concentration in the sludge.  The summed activity in the sludge is 88.7
MBq and with a sludge to water ratio of 2.5 ± 0.5 % the overall The activity
leaving the plant is 88.7 MBq(sludge) + 3550 MBq(water) + 0.016 MBq(air),
which gives a total of 3600 ± 750 MBq compared to the administered dose of 3700.
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The agreement is rather good and the activity concentration over the thickener
is well below the allowed dose.  Although the activity leaving the basin through
the air is negligible compared to what is leaving the plant through the sludge
and water it is still enough to give a clear signal in the airfilter.  This
investigation points out the importance of accurate knowledge about the
medically used radionuclides detected in sewage sludge.
Acknowledgements
The authors are in great debt to medical physicist Mikael Backlund, Gävle
general hospital, for valuable information about the administration of  131I at
the hospital.
References
[1] Erlandsson, B. and Mattsson, S. (1978). Medically used radionuclides in
sewage sludge. Water, Air, and Soil Pollution. 9, 199-206.
[2] Ingemansson, T., Mattsson, S. and Erlandsson, B. Sewage sludge - A possible
indicator for radionuclides released to the air from nuclear power stations.
Health phys. 41, 815-822.
[3] Erlandsson, B., Bjurman, B. and Mattsson, S. (1989). Calculation of
radionuclide ground deposition by means of measurements on sewage sludge.
Water, Air, and Soil Pollution, 45, 329-344.
[4] Erlandsson,B. and Eklund, C. (2001).  Private communication.
[5] Vintersved, I. and De Geer; L.E. (1982). The Swedish air monitoring
network for particulate radioactivity. IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. NS-29, 827-831.
Date Sludge  Sludge (total) Sludge (time corr.) 
2001 (Bq/kg) (MBq) (MBq) 
3-7/9 9 0.273  
8-14/9 20 0.600 0.60 
15-21/9 86 2.606 5.66 
22-25/9 127 4.077 14.85 
28/9-5/10 133 3.830 25.51 
6-12/10 69 1.795 21.30 
13-19/10 36 0.634 14.12 
20-26/10 10 0.176 7.16 
27/10-2/11   Sum  88.7 
Table III. Activity balance.
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11c Airborne Cesium-137 in Finland After the
Chernobyl Accident Based on the Measurement of
Archived Air Filter Samples
Veijo Aaltonen, Jussi Paatero, Juha Hatakka and Yrjö Viisanen
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Air Quality Research, Sahaajankatu 20E,
FIN-00880 Helsinki, Finland (Email: Veijo.Aaltonen@fmi.fi)
Introduction
The huge pressure and explosions in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
accident caused a release of artificial radionuclides into the atmosphere. 10 –
20 % of the volatile nuclides, e.g. 137Cs, present in the reactor inventory was
distributed into the environment. The energy released in the hydrogen
explosion and heat produced by burning graphite and decaying fission products
caused the radioactive debris to reach considerable altitudes, where high wind
speeds were prevailing. This caused the debris to spread quickly in the
atmosphere. The plume was distributed practically all over the northern
hemisphere, its advance being monitored both by measurements and by air-
mass trajectory calculations.
The Finnish Meteorological Institute has collected weekly aerosol
samples for radioactivity monitoring purposes at ten stations (Figure 1) in Fin-
land since the 1960s’.
The samples are measured at the FMI’s laboratory e.g. for long-lived beta
activity (total beta activity five days after the end of sampling). This long-lived
beta activity consists of lead-210 and artificial beta emitters. After the
measurement the samples are archived. In 2001 a number of filters, which
were collected soon after the Chernobyl accident, were retrieved from the
archive and analysed for 137Cs with scintillation gamma spectrometry.
Methods and results
The filter material was either paper (Whatman 42) or glass microfibre
(Whatman GF/A), with weekly air volumes about 1000 m3 and 5000 m3,
respectively. Usually the filters are changed once a week, but due to a strike in
Finland some filters were not changed on time. Due to the same reason, air flow
readings were not available in some cases, and they were estimated based on
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Nurmijärvi
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Vaasa
Figure 1. Location of sampling stations. The calculated path of the radioactive plume
has been marked with an arrow and a broken line (Valkama et al., 1995).
air flow of longer period than a week. In summer 2001 the filters collected
during April–June 1986 were retrieved from the archive and analysed for 137Cs
with a scintillation gamma spectrometer with 4" x 2" NaI(Tl) detector.
Measuring time was 24 hours, and background filter samples were measured
during weekends. The detection limit was about 30 µBq/m³.
The observed weekly 137Cs activity concentrations in the air are
presented in logaritmic scale in Figure 2. The one sigma counting error varied
between 0.5 and 5.6 per cent. The values below detection limit were plotted as
equal to the detection limit (= 30 µBq/m³). The weekly concentration values
decreased with an effective half-life of 4 – 9 days.
Conclusions
Trajectory calculations show that the initial Chernobyl plume arrived to Fin-
land from south-west (Figure 1). Aircraft measurements indicate that the main
part of the plume arrived at an altitude of 1000 – 2000 m (Sinkko et al., 1987).
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Figure 2. Cs-137 activity concentration in ground level air in Finland after Chernobyl
accident.
A weather front located at the Kajaani latitude blocked the way of the plume to
northern Finland which explains the relatively low concentrations found at
Kajaani, Rovaniemi and Kevo (Figure 2). The highest 137Cs activity
concentrations in ground level air during the first few days after the accident
were found at stations of Nurmijärvi, Mariehamn, Helsinki and Joensuu. The
concentration was an order of magnitude lower at Helsinki compared to Nur-
mijärvi although the distance between these stations is only about 40 km. The
cold surface of the Baltic sea cooled the surface air over the sea and coastal
areas creating an inversion layer that the Chernobyl plume was unable to
penetrate. The inversion layer did not reach Nurmijärvi 40 km inland and 105
m above sea level. Thus the afternoon convective flows brought the Chernobyl
activity close to the ground. The inversion layer also protected ground level air
at Mariehamn where at first only hot particles were observed. These particles
were large enough to be able to cross the inversion layer due to the
gravitational settling (Mattsson and Hatakka, 1987). The results of this study
agree reasonably well with other studies. For example, Sinkko et al. (1987) has
found that the maximum concentration was observed in the evening of April 28
at Nurmijärvi. Concentrations declined rapidly because of the change in
weather conditions in Finland and because the direct transport of air masses
from Chernobyl to Finland ceased on April 29 (Arvela et al., 1987). The increase
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in 137Cs concentration after 1986-06-07 might be related to resuspension after
the melting of snow and beginning of agricultural activities and to air masses
coming from heavily contaminated regions in eastern Europe.
The aerosol particles collected onto filters might be affected by the 15
years long storage. Thus the most volatile radionuclides might have partially
evaporated. However, this seems not to be a problem in the case of 137Cs which
has been successfully measured even after almost 40 years of storage (Aaltonen
et al., 2002). Long-term collection and storage of environmental samples is still
important as in most cases a retroactive sample collection is not possible.
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Åsa Tjärnhage1, Karolina Stark2 and Torbjörn Nylén1
1Swedish Defence Research Agency
2Swedish Radiation Protection Authority
Introduction
In the beginning of the 1990th airborne gamma spectrometry measurements
identified local geographical anomalies in the 137Cs load in the Gävle region in
Sweden (Figure 1). The process behind and prevalence of these anomalies is not
yet known. One of these areas, situated in Utnora 10 km north of the town
Gävle, is the subject for a closer study (Tjärnhage et al. 2000, Nylén et al. 2001,
Stark 2001). In this area the load of 137Cs is approximately 10 times higher than
in surrounding areas that received a deposition of >100 kBq/m2 of 137Cs.
The area is situated in an outflow area along the stream draining the
lake “Hille” and is surrounded by coniferous forest. The upstream part of the
Figure 1. The study area.
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outflow area consists of an alder forest that is generally flooded in the spring,
while the down stream part, that ends in a nearby estuary in the Baltic Sea (2.5
km downstream lake Hille), consists of a belt of common reed (figure 1). Theses
types of wetland constitute transition zones between terrestrial and aquatic
systems and serve as nurseries and feeding areas for aquatic and terrestrial
fauna. The high concentrations of 137Cs may be a stress factor for the
endangered groups of animals e.g. frogs, in this area.
A project with the aim to study the dynamics and exposition in the area
is conducted as cooperation between the Swedish Radiation Protection
Authority (SSI) and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). The part of
the project presented here describes and compares the distribution of 137Cs and
90Sr in the hill slopes and out stream areas.
Experimental
Samples have been taken in two different out stream areas along Verkmyrån
and from the adjacent hill slopes:
• An alder forest consisting of mature alder trees with an understorey of
grass and herbaceous plants. The forest is flooded during the spring
flood.
• A downstream reed area that is more or less constantly saturated by
water and situated at the outlet of the stream
• The coniferous hill slopes higher up in the terrain surrounding the
wetland and not in direct contact with the stream.
The area has been scanned with “Back Pack” field GPS-Gamma
measurements during 1998 to 2001 resulting in a clear overlap of vegetation types
and 137Cs load (Tjärnhage et al. 2000, Nylén et al. 2002). From the results of these
measurements the positions for soil samples have been chosen to calibrate the field
measurements and to investigate the depth distribution of 137Cs and 90Sr. For this
purpose three replicate soil (ca 40 cm depth) and vegetation samples have been
taken in each area described above. All samples were measured at the NBC-
analysis laboratory at FOI (Nygren et al. 2002, Nylén et al. 2001). At the time for
this abstract just one of the samples from the coniferous forest had been analysed
for 90Sr. Therefore these results are preliminary and will be further analysed in the
future.
Results
Load of 137Cs and 90Sr
The region (Gävle) received the highest deposition of 137Cs in Sweden (Moberg 1991).
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Figure 2. Load of 137Cs and 90Sr in the study area evaluated from the soil samples. The
number of profiles analysed are three per area except for the coniferous forest where
only one profile was evaluated. The lines above the bars are error bars.
The load of 137Cs in the study area is elevated by a factor 7 to 15 in the
alder forest and reed areas (table 1) compared to the hill slope that has values
within the expected range in this region. The load of 90Sr shows no such trend
and is within the range expected from a Chernobyl fallout of 137Cs of ca 100-200
kBq/m2. A small spruce groove of 5x5 m in the upstream part of the alder area
has the highest load of 137Cs detected (1.5 MBq/m2). A trend of decreasing load
towards the sea is observed for both 137Cs and 90Sr. According to these
measurements 137Cs has been accumulated only in the areas that are flooded
during the spring peak, while 90Sr shows no such accumulation. Further more
the accumulation seems to be more effective in the upstream part of the out
stream area.
20.02Coniferous 
forest
60.002Outer reed
480.002Inner reed
250.003Alder forest
S.D.
%
Ratio1
90Sr/137Cs
Area
Table 1. The ratio between 90Sr and 137Cs. One sample profile per area is evaluated.
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90Sr/137Cs ratios
The calculated ratios between 90Sr and 137Cs in one soil profile per area are
presented in table 1. Only the coniferous forest, that has the ratio 0.02, falls
within the range 0.01-0.03 expected from the Chernobyl fallout (Moberg et al,
1991), while the other areas as a result of the high load of 137Cs show lower
ratios.
Vertical distributions of 137Cs and 90Sr
Although the geographical distribution differs between the two nuclides and
137Cs seems to have been more effectively accumulated the soil profiles show
resemblance between the vertical distribution of 90Sr and 137Cs (figure 3). There
is no clear trend of higher mobility for 90Sr and the peak is in both cases about
5 cm below the soil surface.
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Figure 3. Examples of vertical distributions in the alder forest and the reed area.
Discussion
Flooding during the spring 1986 followed by an effective retention of 137Cs has
most likely caused the high load of 137Cs in the alder forest and the reed areas.
A sharp gradient in load of 137Cs between the alder forest (high load) and the
adjacent and topographically elevated coniferous forest (low load) determined
by a backpack technique also supports this hypothesis (Tjärnhage etal, 2000).
The deposition in the coniferous forest is consistent with what is measured in
other places around the coastal area. Hence it is likely that the accumulation in
the alder forest and reed area must be due to redistribution from the lake
“Hillesjön” via the stream Verkmyrån. The main contribution to the elevated
values in the alder forest and reed areas should have occurred during the
spring flood in 1986 when a main fraction of the intercepted fallout still was in
the water phase of the lake (Moberg, 1991). It is likely that the contribution
during later years have been less significant. Larger fallout from air in this
narrow area in the outlet from Verkmyrån is less likely to be the explanation.
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The Load of 90Sr in the outflow areas seems to be far lower than of 137Cs.
This could be due to a less effective interception in the out stream areas during
flooding or more effective interception of 90Sr in the lake Hillesjön preventing a
drainage of 90Sr via the stream. A slower process of less effective retention in
soil over the years elapsed after the Chernobyl accident is not supported by the
similar depth distribution between the two nuclides.
This study will continue with a more detailed mapping with nuclide
specific and TLD field measurements, calculations of exposition in different sub
areas and budget calculations for 137Cs.
References
[1] Nygren U, Tjärnhage Å, and Bergman I. Methods of Radioanalytical
Chemistry at FOI NBC Defence. FOI-R—0039—SE. 2001.
[2] Nylén T,Tjärnhage Å,  Bergman I, Nygren U. A survey of caesium-137 and
strontium-90 in the lower part of the stream Verkmyrån. FOI-R—0319—SE. 2001
[3] Moberg, L. The Chernobyl fallout in Sweden. SSI. 1991
[4] Stark K. 2001. Uppskattning av stråldos till grodor från Cesium-137 I en
våtmark norr om Gävle. Projektrapport Nr 80. Ekotoxikologiska avdelningen
Uppsala Universitet
[5] Tjärnhage Å, Plamboeck A, Nylén T, Lidström, K. Ågren G, Lindgren, J.
Geographical redistribution of radionuclides in forest and wetland. FOA-r—00-
01756-861—SE. 2000
474
STUK-A195
11e Radionuclides in algaes from the bay just north
of Barsebäck nuclear power plant
M.Zakaria, C.L.Rääf and S.Mattsson
Department of Radiation Physics, Lund University, Malmö University
Hospital, SE-205 02 Malmö, Sweden
Abstract
The activity concentration of Cs-137, I-131, Zn-65, Co-60, Co-58, Mn-54, and K-40
were determined in samples of brown seaweed (Fucus) using high-resolution gam-
ma-spectrometry. The algaes were sampled in the bay just north of the Barsebäck
nuclear power plant (55.4 N, 12.6 E) in the south of Sweden to study the variation
in contamination levels in the shallow waters. Significant levels of the typical
neutron activation products Zn-65 (up to 3 Bq/kg dw), Co-60 (100-300 Bq/kg dw),
Co-58 (1-7 Bq/kg dw) and Mn-54 (12-27 Bq/kg dw) were found in the algae samples.
The results were compared with those of similar studies at the same location
performed 25 years ago. The current concentrations were found to be considerably
lower especially for Zn-65 and Co-58. The activity concentration of gamma
emitting radionuclides in Fucus from the bay just north of Barsebäck is today
dominated by (in order of decreasing concentration): natural K-40, Co-60 from the
plant, Cs-137 from Chernobyl, Mn-54 and Co-58 from the plant. Further studies
will show if some parts of the bay are suitable for studies of absorbed doses and
possible effects on various biota.
Keywords: Barsebäck NPP, Fucus, activation products, marine environment.
Introduction
The Barsebäck nuclear power plant (Barsebäck NPP) is one of four nuclear power
plants that provide Sweden with 44% of its annual electricity consumption. Until
recently, the plant consisted of two reactors in operation, Barsebäck-1 and
Barsebäck-2, both of boiling water type, having an electrical effect of 600 MW, or
1700 MW thermal powers each. The location of the plant is controversial since it is
located 30 km away form the Danish capital, Copenhagen and has in total around
2 million inhabitants within a distance of 30 km. At the end of November 1999,
Barsebäck-1 was shut down, while Barsebäck-2 is still in operation.
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During normal operation of a nuclear power plant, small controlled
releases mainly of neutron activation products are common and will occur through
the cooling water outlet. There are also external sources of Cs-137 and I-131 in the
marine environment in the form of debris from the Chernobyl accident (Cs-137)
and releases from hospitals and patients (I-131). In the case of Barsebäck, currents
through the Öresund transport Cs-137 from the Chernobyl fallout in the Baltic Sea
to the area. Furthermore, Cs-137 from reprocessing plants (e.g. Sellafield) and
from the global fallout from nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere have also
been shown to contribute to the Cs-137 concentration in Swedish coastal waters
[1].
Levels of various radionuclides in the vicinity of Barsebäck NPP are
followed by a monitoring programme conducted by the Swedish Radiation
Protection Authority (SSI) [2]. This study will in more details investigate how the
radionuclides are distributed in the near vicinity of the plant. Even though the
discharged radionuclides from the Barsebäck NPP are dispersed into large
volumes of water, the bio-indicator used (Fucus) has the ability to accumulate and
concentrate several of the radionuclides of interest [3,4,5] into its biomass.
The results are compared with those of a similar research performed in
1977, but with longer distances between sampling sites at that time. It is also
aimed at investigating the relation between the activity concentration in Fucus
and in other organisms in the bay.
Material and Methods
The location where collection has been made is situated around 1 km north of the
discharge pipe (Fig.1.)
Samples of Fucus were collected in May 13, 2002 from water depths around
0.5 m. During sampling, the wind speed was slow and the waves were mild. The
samples were collected from different distances from the Barsebäck NPP (see
fig.1.). These samples were dried in room temperature for 5 days. Then the samples
were ground, packed in 150 ml plastic beakers, and weighed.
Sample ID B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 
Distance 
from the 
point of  
release (m) 
780 880 960 1060 1130 1190 1210 1280 1310 1440 
Table.1. Sample ID and the sampling distances from the Barsebäck NPP cooling water
discharge pipe.
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The activities of Cs-137, I-131, Zn-65, Co-60, Co-58, Mn-54 and K-40 were
determined by gamma-ray spectrometry with acquisition times between
100,000-150,000 s. The measurements were performed using HPGe (EG&G
Ortec) detector of 36% efficiency, and energy resolution of 1.8 keV at 1.33 MeV.
The spectrometer was calibrated by sources of known activity. The accuracy of
the measurements has been evaluated through an inter-comparison with
sources prepared by Risoe National Laboratory, Denmark.
Fig.1. Map of the Barsebäck NPP and the spots where samples of algae were taken.
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Fig.2. Activity concentration in Fucus in relation to the distance from the outlet of
Barsebäck NPP in May 2002. Power functions were fitted to the observed data. Error
bars indicate the uncertainty of the pulse statistics (1 Standard deviation).
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Results and discussion
The activity concentrations of Cs-137, Co-60, Co-58, Mn-54, K-40 in the Fucus
samples in relation to the distance from the outlet of Barsebäck is given in
Fig.2.
The results (Fig.2.) show that the activity concentrations of Co-60, Co-58,
and Mn-54 decrease with distance from the point of release and that the
dependence of distance can be described by a power function as in 1977 [5]. The
main part of the Cs-137 found is most likely from Chernobyl fallout over the
Baltic. In some of the samples, significant concentrations of I-131 were found.
Radionuclide Physical half-life Radionuclide  
concentration,  
June 12, 1977  
(Bq/kg dw) 
Radionuclide  
concentration,  
May 13, 2002  
(Bq/kg dw) 
Zn-65 244 days 150 1.8 
Co-60 5.27 years 1000 199 
Co-58 71 days 500 3.5 
Mn-54 312 days 100 17.6 
Table 2. Comparison of variation of main concentration levels of radionuclides in June
1977 and May 2002.
Comparison with previous results
The average activity concentrations of neutron activation products in the
Fucus samples in the bay are compared with the results that were obtained in
the year of 1977 (Table 2). It is evident that all activity concentration levels in
2002 are significantly lower than those in 1977.
The data are also compared with the values obtained by the SSI in the
year 2000 [2]. For Cs-137, which does not exhibit any distance dependence, the
data is in fair agreement.
Conclusions
The activity concentration of gamma emitting radionuclides in Fucus from the
bay just north of Barsebäck is today dominated by (in order of decreasing
concentration): natural K-40, Co-60 from the plant, Cs-137 from Chernobyl,
Mn-54 and Co-58 from the plant. The concentration of Barsebäck-produced
radionuclides is lower per MWe than in 1977.
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11f Long-term behaviour of 90Sr and 137Cs in
surface water in Finland
Ritva Saxén
 STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O. Box 14, FIN-00881 Helsin-
ki, Finland.
Introduction
Activity concentrations of two long-lived radionuclides, 90Sr and 137Cs, have
been determined from water of five large rivers discharging from the mainland
to the Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Bothnia since 1965, and of several lakes and
rivers in various large drainage areas in Finland since 1986. In the 1960s those
radionuclides originated from athmospheric nuclear weapon tests. In the
1970s and 80s small peaks in surface water were caused by the Chinese nuclear
weapon tests. The depositions of 137Cs and 90Sr during the nuclear weapon test
period were distributed almost evenly in Finland. 137Cs/90Sr in deposition
varied within 1.4 + 0.2 at various survey stations. The Chernobyl depositions of
137Cs and 90Sr, on the contrary, were most unevenly distributed in Finland.
Material and methods
Water samples from the mouths of five rivers, Kymijoki, Kokemäenjoki, Oulu-
joki, Kemijoki and Tornionjoki since 1965, and from several lakes and rivers in
each of the large drainage areas 1-11 (Fig. 1) in 1986-1992, were analysed for
137Cs and 90Sr (1-2).
Results and discussion
In the fallout period the 90Sr content in water was clearly higher than that of
137Cs. 137Cs was lowest in the Kokemäenjoki river. Since the deposition was
almost the same in all the areas, the differences in the activity concentrations
in water from the river mouths reflect the impact of the catchment area on the
behaviour of these nuclides.. The abstention of 137Cs in the catchment area of
the Kokemäenjoki river was evident. The increase of 137Cs and 90Sr due to the
Chernobyl deposition was highest in the Kokemäenjoki and Kymijoki rivers
and much slighter in the other rivers. The increase of  90Sr was negligible in
Kemijoki and Tornionjoki (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 1. Drainage basins of Finland (areas 1-11) and the rivers Ky= Kymijoki, outlet river
of area 4; Ko=Kokemäenjoki, outlet river of area 5; Ou=Oulujoki, outlet river of area 7;
Ke=Kemijoki, outlet river of area 9; To=Tornionjoki, outlet river of area 10.
11
7
3
6
Ou?
9
8
10
To
Ke
??
2 1
4
1
Ky
5Ko ?
?
After the Chernobyl deposition 137Cs in water decreased more rapidly
than 90Sr. During 1986-1988 activity concentrations of 137Cs decreased from the
top values by 84% in the Kymijoki and Kokemäenjoki rivers, and 90Sr by 33%
and 41%, respectively. Already in 1994, and thereafter, activity concentrations
of 90Sr have been higher than those of 137Cs in the rivers of northern Finland.
Ecological half lives of 137Cs and 90Sr detected in the rivers during the
fallout period 1965-1985 were almost the same for these nuclides, that is 7-8
years. The ecological half life for 90Sr was longest (about 12 y, in 1989-2001) in
the Kemijoki and Tornionjoki rivers, where the increase by Chernobyl
deposition was low. In 1988-2001 137Cs decreased more rapidly than 90Sr in all
the rivers, their ecological half- lives being 4.2-6.5 y. Because activity
concentrations of 90Sr in the Kemijoki and Tornionjoki rivers stayed almost
unchanged due to the Chernobyl deposition, ecological half times for 90Sr were
also estimated for the whole time period 1965-2001. They were approeximately
12 y and 10 y for Kemijoki and Tornionjoki, respectively. (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2. Activity concentrations of 137Cs and 90Sr (Bq/m3) in Kymijoki, Kokemäenjoki, Oulu-
joki, Kemijoki and Tornionjoki rivers in 1965-1998 or 1965-2001. Ecological half times (y)
for 137Cs and 90Sr in 1965-1985 and 1989-2001are also given in the figure.
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The ratio 90Sr / 137Cs was highest (about 10) in the fallout period in
Kokemäenjoki, then decreased due to Chernobyl accident to 0.04 and is now
increasing gradually. In the Kemijoki and Tornionjoki rivers the ratio is
approaching the pre-Chernobyl value (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3. 90Sr/137Cs in the water of Kymijoki, Kokemäenjoki, Oulujoki, Kemijoki and Tornion-
joki rivers in 1965-1998 and 1965-2001.
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Fig. 4. Average transfer coefficients for 137Cs from deposition to surface water (TFw = (Bq/m
3
in water)/(Bq/m2 deposited)) in various drainage areas. The areas are given in Fig. 1.
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After the Chernobyl deposition average transfer coefficients from
deposition to lake and river water in the drainage areas differed from each
other, being highest in the area 7 (Fig. 4).
Radiation dose from 137Cs and 90Sr in drinking water to people in
southern Finland, where lake water from the area of highest Chernobyl
deposition in Finland is used as raw water, was estimated to be 0.4 - 0.5 µSv in
2001. About 44% of this dose was caused by 90Sr and 56% by 137Cs. The relative
contribution of 90Sr increases the longer the time after the deposition is,
because 90Sr is, differently from 137Cs, only slightly removed from water by
natural processes and not at all in the water treatment of waterworks.
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11g Radiocaesium in NE Estonian Soil
M.Lust, E.Realo and K.Realo
Institute of Physics, University of Tartu, 51014, Tartu, Estonia
Our first countrywide study carried out in 1991-1993 determined both
geographical and depth distributions of the deposited 134Cs and 137Cs in the
Estonian soil. According to the results of this study and an independent air-
borne scanning, radiocaesium originating from the 1986 Chernobyl accident
with the mean deposition of 2 kBq m-2 was extremely unevenly distributed over
the country [1,2]. The mapped distribution is presented in Fig. 1. Our estimates
demonstrated that about 2/3 of the total 137Cs inventory in Estonia was
deposited in Ida-Virumaa County, NE Estonia, where the maximum
depositions reached 40 kBq m-2.
The re-gion was revisited for soil sampling in 1998-2001. Undisturbed
soil profiles down to a depth of ~ 20 cm were collected and the 2-3 cm sample
core slices analyzed using a low-back-ground HPGe gamma spectrometer (42%
efficiency and 1.7 keV resolution). As in the previous study, both total
depositions and depth distributions of the deposited 134Cs (where possible) and
137Cs activity concentrations were determined. Depth distributions of the
deposited activity showed considerable site-specific variations. In addition, it
appeared that in comparison with our previous study, clear features of time-
dependent migration to deeper soil layers were evident.
The preliminary modeling has demonstrated that a lognormal
distribution with varying parameters fits satisfactorily the determined depth-
distributions of the Chernobyl radiocaesium activity concentration. An attempt
was made to apply a single model to describe the observed time-de-pendent
depth-distribution pattern over the time period of 1986-2001. We started from
the multi-compartmental migration model for undisturbed soil [3] (here Model
RP72), presented in Fig. 2. This model has been elaborated bas-ing on
experimental migration results for Pu for a time period up to 30 y. For our
application, the model is modified to account for the radioactive decay of 137Cs.
The results of modeling using the original transfer parameters are given in Fig.
3 (a).
A numerical analysis of the model confirms that, while the lognormal
depth-distri-bution of activity concentration is correctly described, the
averaged transfer coefficient values, derived for Pu migration in [3], should be
slightly modified to fit our results: w~0.03t and xc~0.3t (Fig. 4). The calculated
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Fig. 1. Cs137 from Chernobyl fallout (1986).
Fig. 2. Compartmentl model RP72 [3].
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Figure 3. Time-dependent depth distributions for 137Cs: (a) Model PR72 [3] and (b) the
model fitting our data.
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model fitting our measured results is presented in Fig. 3 (b). The ratio of time-
and depth-dependent activity concentrations obtained using these two models
is given in Figure 5.
In general, a slow migration rate and consequently a strong effective
retention of radiocaesium in upper soil layers follow from the found relatively
weak time-dependence of the fitting parameters.
The authors acknowledge a partial support by the ESF grants.
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11h Migration of137Cs in Swedish soil profiles
Klas Rosén, Ida Hermansson and Enok Haak
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, SLU, Department of Soil Science,
Box 7014, Uppsala, Sweden
Introduction
The study comprises eight grass field sites in that part of Sweden, which
received high 137Cs fallout from the Chernobyl accident in 1986. The soils, six
mineral soils and two peat soils, were sampled to certain depths during the
years 1987-2000, one of the peat soils also in 2002 (Rosén et al., 1999;
Hermansson, 2000). The aim was to study the migration of 137Cs in the soil
profiles since 1986 and relate this migration to soil characteristics. During the
first years the effect of K-status on plant uptake of 137Cs was also studied.
Materials and methods
The sites received 16- 200 kBq per m2 of 137Cs in 1986 (Rosén et al., 1999) and
have not been ploughed after the fallout event. Some data to describe the sites
are given Table 1.
Sampling procedure
On each site 3 circle formed plots with 5 m radius were selected (A, B and C), as
shown in the figure below. In each plot 5 soil cylinders were taken, the surface
10-cm soil with a conventional auger, diameter 5.7 cm, the next 10-60 cm with a
special Ultuna auger, diameter 2.2 cm. During 1987- 1995 samples were also
taken down to 25 cm, and during 2000-2002 down to 60 cm on all the sites. The
soil cores were divided in 1-cm layers down to 10 cm and then in 2.5-cm layers
down to 60 cm.
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20 1987 200,1
1989
1994
2000
2002
Möjsjövik 59o13′N 17o15′E 20 1987 650 Peat Terric 70,5
1994 Histosol
2000
Skogsvallen 60o10′N 17o11′E 40 1987 566 Silty clay Dystric 92,4
1992 Cambisol
1994
2000
Ramvik 62o50′N 17o49′E 25 1987 Silt loam Eutric 62,3
1994 Regosol
2000
Hammarstrand 63o06′N 16o22′E 125 1989 539 Silt loam Eutric 45,3
1994 Regosol
2000
Blomhöjden 64o36′N 14o44′E 460 1989 754 Sandy 
loam
Typic 
15,7
1994 Haplocryod*
2000
Stora Blåsjön 64o51´N 14o08´E 480 1989 699 Sandy 
loam
Dystric
37,8
1994 Regosol
2000
Åsenmossen 60º35´N 17º14´E 75 2000 563 Peat Fibric Histosol 43,5
*Soil taxonomy acc.Soil Survey Staff 1992, 
Sampling site Longitude  and  Latitude Altitude, 
m
Sampling 
year
Precipitation, 
yearly, mm    
1961-1999
Soil type Soil taxonomy, 
FAO-legend 
1988
Deposition 
1986, mean,  
kBq/m2
Peat Histosol
703
Hille 60º45´N 17º13´E 617
Table 1. Description of sites, sampling times and deposition of 137Cs in 1986
Prior to soil sampling the grass vegetation was cut in each plot, 0.25-1.0
m2 in size. Totally 3-5 grass samples were cut 5 cm above the soil surface, dried
at 90 °C, ground and pooled to-gether (A+B+C). The soil samples were dried at
40°C for at least 5 days, crushed in a mortar, passed through a 2 mm sieve and
weighed. The dried plant and soil samples were transferred to plastic
containers for activity analysis.
Calculations
Deposition and distribution in the soil profiles of 137Cs-activity, Bq/m2, are given
in detail in appendix, from which Table 2 and Table 3 have been calculated to
establish three deposition-independent parameters for comparison of
migration between the sites.
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      Firstly the nuclide distribution was calculated as fraction or percent
of the total 137Cs-content found in each soil layer. Secondly the mean migration
depths were calculated in two ways, as statistical median depth for the years
1987-1994 (Rosén, 1999) and as migration centre for the years 2000-2002
(Hermansson, 2001). The migration centre, (x, cm), defined as the gravity point
of activity in the soil profile (Arapis et al., 1997), was calculated as
0)(
1
=−∑
=
i
n
i
i qXX
where Xi (cm) is the depth from the surface to the centre of soil layer i and
qi the nuclide frac-tion in the same soil layer. Thirdly the migration rate (cm/
year) was calculated by dividing, the median depth or the migration centre, by the
number of years elapsed since the deposition in 1986. The latter, weighted method,
gives slightly smaller values than the former, unweighted method, of mean depths
and migration rates (Forsberg, 2000).
Results
Distribution of 137Cs
Table 2 shows the distribution of 137Cs-activity in the soil profile at different years.
Generally the 137Cs-activity was redistributed between 0-5 cm layer and the 5-25
cm layer with time up to 1994. Later a small part of the 137Cs-activity migrated
down below 25 cm. Largest redistribution was found at the Hille site, where the
activity in the 0-5 cm layer changed from 90 % in 1987 to 40 % in 2002 and in the 5-
25 cm layer from 10 % in 1987 to 59 % in 2002. On all other sites the 137Cs-activity
was highest in the 0-5 cm layer at the end of the observation period.
Table 2. Percent of total 137Cs- activity, present in the soil layers 0-5, 5-25 and  the layer
25-60 cm, at different years after fallout in 1986.
Depth, 
cm
1987 1989 1994 2000 2002 1987 1994 2000 1987 1992 1994 2000
0-5 90,0 87,6 49,5 42,0 40,3 91,8 81,3 68,7 97,7 96,3 91,5 82,9
´5-25 10,0 12,4 50,5 54,0 59,0 8,3 18,7 24,0 2,3 3,7 8,5 15,8
25-60 - - - 0,0 0,7 - - 7,3 - - - 0,3
Depth, 
cm
Åsen-
moss
en
1987 1994 2000 1989 1994 2000 1989 1994 2000 1989 1994 2000 2000
0-5 95,7 70,6 52,0 88,5 74,4 70,5 90,5 82,5 83,7 90,6 72,2 64,8 33,7
´5-25 4,3 29,4 47,3 11,5 25,6 25,3 9,5 17,5 12,1 9,4a 27,8 25,7 53,6
25-60
- -
0,7
- -
4,2
- -
4,2
- - 9,5b 12,7b
a) 5-10 cm,   b) 25-40 cm
Hille Möjsjövik Skogsvallen
Ramvik Hammarstrand Stora 
Blåsjön
Blomhöjden
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Mean depth and migration rate
Table 3 shows the mean depth (cm) and migration rate (cm/year). Largest mean
depth was found at Åsenmossen, 9,3 cm, and smallest at Skogsvallen, 3,1 cm. On
all the sites the initial migration rate was highest at first registration, 1987 or
1989. Highest migration rate in 1987 was found at Hille and Möjsjövik, 1.0 cm/year
and lowest at Skogsvallen, 0,6 cm/year.
Sampling site Soil type
1987 1989 1992 1994 2000 2002
Hille Peat 1,0 1,5 - 5,1 7,1 7,5
Möjsjövik Peat 1,0 - - 2,6 5,8 -
Skogsvallen Silty clay 0,6 - 0,9 2,3 3,1 -
Ramvik Silt loam 0,9 - - 3,5 7,1 -
Hammarstrand Silt loam - 1,7 - 3,3 5,5 -
Stora Blåsjön Sandy loam - 1,4 - 2,7 3,4 -
Bjomhöjden Sandy loam - - - 2,4 6,0 -
Åsenmossen Peat - - - - 9,3 -
Sampling site Soil type
1987 1989 1992 1994 2000 2002
Hille Peat 1,0 0,2 - 0,6 0,5 0,4
Möjsjövik Peat 1,0 - - 0,2 0,8 -
Skogsvallen Silty clay 0,6 - 0,1 0,2 0,3 -
Ramvik Silt loam 0,9 - - 0,4 0,6 -
Hammarstrand Silt loam - 0,6 - 0,3 0,4 -
Stora Blåsjön Sandy loam - 0,5 - 0,2 0,1 -
Bjomhöjden Sandy loam - - - 0,3 0,7 -
Åsenmossen Peat - - - - 0,8 -
Mean depth, cm
Migration rate, cm/year
Table 3. Mean depth, (cm), and migration rate (cm/year), for the years 1987-2002.
Discussion
During the years 1986 to 2002 the 137Cs-activity migrated downward in all the
eight soil pro-files examined. During the years 1986-1994, with exception for the
site Hille, the lowest 137Cs-activity was found in the layers below 5 cm. This shows
that 137Cs migrate slowly with time. Table 2 shows that in 1987 as much as 90 % or
more of the total activity was found in the 0-5 cm layer. After 14-16 year 137Cs had
migrated downwards, more on the three organic soils than on the five mineral
soils.
Mean depth and migration rate of 137Cs varied between the sites. In the year
2000 the mean depth was below 5 cm on all sites except Skogsvallen and Stora
Blåsjön, Table 3. With respect to migration rate the sites can be divided in two
groups. The lowest group, 0.1-0.4 cm/year comprised the sites Skogsvallen,
Hammarstrand and Stora Blåsjön, all three mineral soils. The highest group, 0.6-
0-8 cm/year, comprised the organic soils Hille, Möjsjövik, and Åsenmossen and the
sandy soils Ramvik and Blomhöjden.
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Depth, cm Hille
Year 1987 1989 1994 2000 2002 1987 1994 2000 1987 1992 1994 2000
0-5 cm 153,76 150,32 100,12 101,41 84,76 70,86 52,35 46,31 89,15 89,18 82,93 72,7
5-25 cm 18,08 18,39 99,27 131,46 93,12 6,38 11,91 16,14 2,15 3,40 7,39 13,9
25-60 cm - - - 8,48 3,17 - - 4,90 - - - 1,08
>2 mm - - 8,80 - - 2,61 - 2,20 2,25 3,08
Total 171,84 168,71 208,19 241,35 210,48 77,24 64,30 69,96 91,30 94,78 92,57 90,8
Mean 200,1 70,5 92,4
Möjsjövik Skogsvallen
Depth, cm Åsen-
mossen
Year 1987 1994 2000 1989 1994 2000 1989 1995 2000 1989 1994 2000 2000
0-5 cm 45,28 40,28 34,97 39,27 19,76 44,23 39,91 17,93 37,32 11,86 9,14 12,82 14,64
5-25 cm 2,72 16,48 45,87 5,43 6,62 15,88 5,15 3,53 5,39 1,24 3,51 5,02 23,27
25-60 cm - 0,97 - - 2,61 - - 1,86 - -  1,15a   5,54a
>2 mm - 0,34 0,86 1,02 0,12 - - 2,27 - 1,61 0,73 -
Total 48,00 56,76 82,15 45,56 27,40 62,84b 45,06 21,46 46,84 13,10 14,26 19,72 43,45a
Mean 62,3 45,3 37,8 15,7 43,5
a) 25-40 cm
Stora Blåsjön BlomhöjdenRamvik Hammarstrand
Appendix Table. Distribution of 137Cs in soils, kBq/m2, for different years. The 25-60 cm
layer was only registrated in 2000 and 2002. Values for the years 1987-1995 are from
Rosén et al, (1999).
Some of the 137Cs deposited in 1986 after the Chernobyl was taken up by the
grass vegetation. As shown earlier (Rosén, 1996), the uptake was highest the first
years after fallout.
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Introduction
The decrease rates of 90Sr and 137Cs in milk were studied in the years following the
atmospheric nuclear weapon testings and after the Chernobyl accident in 1986.
The highest 90Sr and 137Cs concentrations in the 1960’s in Finnish milk were
recorded in Lapland even though the deposition of 90Sr and 137Cs did not
significantly differ between other localities in Finland, and they were not greater
in northern Finland. This was mainly due to the high proportion of peat soils and
nutrient deficiency of the pastures in Lapland. 137Cs deposition after the Chernobyl
accident in 1986 in Lapland was less than 1 kBq m-2, and 90Sr deposition was so low
that there was no detectable increase in the 90Sr concentration in milk. The
ecological half-lives were estimated for the decrease in the concentrations of 137Cs
and 90Sr after the end of nuclear weapon testings period and the Chernobyl fallout
during short and longer time intervals.
Material and methods
Long-lived radionuclides 137Cs and 90Sr have been regularly analysed at STUK
since the 1960’s in dairy milk and, after 1986, also on farm-specific milk samples in
Finnish Lapland. Milk sampling was started in the Kursu dairy in 1963, and it was
continued up until the end of 1987. Samples from the dried-milk factory in Rova-
niemi were taken during June 1966 – 1975, and dairy milk from the Rovaniemi
dairy  from 1986 onwards. Farm-specific milk was sampled by the research station
of MTT Agrifood Research, Finland at Apukka in Lapland (17 km NE from Rova-
niemi) during September 1975 - January 1977 and May 1986 - August 1991, and at
Pöykkö farm in Vikajärvi (30 km NE from Rovaniemi) from June 1991 onwards.
The dairy milk represented the whole sampling area of the dairies, and was
sampled weekly and combined monthly for 137Cs and 90Sr analysis. Farm-specific
milk samples were taken once a month and represented one to three days’ milk.
494
STUK-A195
Fig.1. Sampling areas of Kursu and Rovaniemi dairies and sites of farms at Apukka and
Vikajärvi.
The dominant soil type in Lapland is peat, and 40% of the cultivated soils
are peat soils, 25% till and 35% fine-sand soils. The pastures are poorer, with
lower concentrations of potassium and calcium, as well as pH, than in other
parts of Finland. There are no clay soils, typical of southern Finland, in the
area.
The ecological half-lives for the decrease in 137Cs and 90Sr were estimated
using log-linear regression analysis performed on monthly or annual mean
values.
Results and discussion
Although total 137Cs deposition from nuclear weapon testings was about the
same as the deposition after the Chernobyl fallout, the 137Cs concentrations in
495
STUK-A195
milk during the 1960’s were considerably higher than those after the
Chernobyl accident. The pre-Chernobyl fallout, which was characterized by an
annual maximum in summer, resulted in significant direct contamination to
growing crops, whereas the Chernobyl deposition occurred before the start of
the growing season in Lapland. The direct contamination of growing crops
resulted in higher contamination levels compared to the short-term deposition
after the Chernobyl accident before the start of the growing season (foodchain
hay – cow milk). The time trends of 137Cs and 90Sr concentrations in milk are
shown in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
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Kursu dairy
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T1/2: 2.2 years(1987-1989) 
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T1/2: 5.3 years (1975-1985) 
Fig. 2. 137Cs concentrations in milk in Lapland 1963-2001.
The increase in the 137Cs contents in milk due to the Chernobyl fallout
was clearly visible in July, and the peak lasted until summer 1987. At the
beginning of 1987 the 137Cs concentrations in Kursu dairy milk were twice as
high (5 – 7 Bq l-1) as in milk from the Rovaniemi dairy (3.5 Bq l-1). The difference
was due to the high frequency of peat soils and to the higher fallout in the area
of Kursu dairy compared to the average deposition in Lapland. The peak
concentrations in the Apukka farm milk were at about the same level as in
Kursu dairy milk,  and decreased after summer 1988 to below the level of the
Rovaniemi dairy milk. The concentrations of 137Cs in Vikajärvi farm milk were
similar to those found in Rovaniemi dairy milk.
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Fig. 3. 90Sr concentrations in milk in Lapland 1963-2001.
90Sr in milk in Lapland mainly originates from fallout from nuclear
weapon testings. There was no difference in the 90Sr concentrations in milk from
the Kursu and Rovaniemi dairies in July – December 1986 (0.1 Bq l-1), and no
increase was noticed in 1987. The concentrations in the Apukka farm milk were
slightly lower.
After the nuclear weapon testings period the fallout continued at lower, but
not negligible levels for several years. The half-lives of 137Cs and 90Sr in milk after
the peak values in 1963 were similar for both radionuclides: 2 years in 1963-1966,
and 5 years in 1966-1975. Later on, during 1975-1985, the half-life of 137Cs
remained at 5 years, but that of 90Sr increased to 10 years, due to the fact that the
long-term bio-availability of 90Sr in the environment is higher than that of 137Cs.
The half-lives of 137Cs in milk after the peak concentrations resulting from the
Chernobyl accident were similar to the half-lives in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
The half-lives of 90Sr, were after the first rapid decrease in the 1960’s, almost
twice as high as those for 137Cs.  The half-lives for 137Cs in dairy milk and farm milk
were about the same (7-8 years) during the 1990’s, as well as those for 90Sr during
the 1970’s. There were larger fluctuations in the monthly concentrations of 137Cs in
farm milk than in dairy milk, but the annual decrease was about the same.
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Period T1/2 (years),
 137Cs T1/2 (years),
 90Sr
 Kursu Rovaniemi Kursu Rovaniemi 
1963-1966 2.0  2.2  
1966-1975 4.8 3.2 5.1 6.1 
1975-1985 5.3  10  
1987-1989  2.2  14 
1989-1993  4.1  6.9 
1993-2001  7.6  16 
Table 1. The ecological half-lives for the decrease in activity concentrations of 137Cs and
90Sr after the nuclear weapon testings fallout period and the Chernobyl fallout for short
and longer time intervals.
There were annual variations, with maximum concentrations in
summertime, for 137Cs and 90Sr in milk originating from southern Finland. The
same variation was also be seen for 90Sr in milk produced in Lapland, but not
for 137Cs. The reason for this difference in behaviour is so far unknown, but it
may depend on differences in soil types, pasture hay species and fertilization
practises.
The whole of Lapland is vulnerable to radioactive contamination. The
transfer of  137Cs into milk from peat soils  is more than two times higher than
in the clay soils of southern Finland, and the half-lives observed in milk in
Lapland are twice as long as those in intensively-cultivated clayish pastures.
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Introduction
The 137Cs concentration in reindeer meat varies throughout the year due to
changes in food selection. During summer, the reindeer eat herbaceous
vegetation, and in the autumn large amounts of mushrooms - if available. In
winter they prefer to eat ground and arboreal lichen, and these have a much
higher radiocaesium concentration than the vegetation eaten during summer.
The increase in the reindeer stock in Finland as well as in Norway and Sweden,
has lead to overgrazing and degradation of the lichen ranges. The range of
winter fodder available for reindeer today is not the same as that in the 60’s
and 70’s following the nuclear weapons fallout period and the previously used
ecological half-life values may no longer be applicable to the present situation.
After the accident at Chernobyl in 1986 an extensive program was
started to monitor 137Cs concentrations in the reindeer meat produced in Fin-
land. At the present time the program, which is carried out every 5th year,
covers the whole of the Finnish reindeer herding area, i.e.56 co-operatives. In
addition STUK annually measures samples from the 11 northernmost Sami
reindeer herding co-operatives as well as from 3 co-operatives close to the
Russian border. In this paper the decrease in the 137Cs concentration in
reindeer meat in three co-operatives, Paistunturi, Ivalo and Kemin Sompio, are
presented and ecological half-lives estimated. The locations of the co-operatives
are shown in Fig. 1.
Materials and methods
The meat samples were provided by the reindeer co-operatives and represent
meat from the neck of the animal. Pure meat was separated from the cervical
vertebrae and sinew, dried at 105oC, homogenised and measured
gammaspectrometrically in 35 ml or 100 ml plastic jars. In Finland the
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reindeer production year starts on June 1st. The slaughtering season is from
September/November to February/March, depending on the latitude,
temperature and thickness of the snow cover. The annual average winter 137Cs
concentrations for the Paistunturi, Ivalo and Kemin Sompio co-operatives
presented in this paper represent reindeer slaughtered during the period
October 1st to April 30th. The few samples obtained after May 1st and before the
end of green vegetation period represent animals feeding on summer fodder.
These reindeer were calves or adults killed in traffic or other accidents.
Fig. 1. Location of the Paistunturi, Ivalo and Kemin Sompio reindeer co-operatives on a
map showing all the co-operatives in Finland.
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Result and discussion
Although the amount of Chernobyl fallout in Northern Finland was low there
were some regional  differences.  According to lichen sampling in 1986-1987,
the 137Cs concentrations1 were lowest in the northernmost part of the reindeer
herding area (the Kaldoaivi co-operative), the Paistunturi area received
significantly more, the Ivalo area had low levels, and Kemin Sompio more. In
addition to the Chernobyl fallout, the lichen pastures also contained 137Cs from
the global fallout period. The unevenness of the Chernobyl fallout was visible in
the reindeer meat obtained during the first slaughtering season (1986-1987)
after the accident. In Paistunturi and Kemin Sompio the average 137Cs
concentration was 1100 Bq/kg, and in Ivalo 600 Bq/kg.
During 2001-2002, 15 years after the accident, the caesium
concentrations in Ivalo and Paistunturi reindeer had decreased to the level of
150 Bq/kg, and in Kemin Sompio reindeer to 300 Bq/kg (Fig. 2). The ecological
half-lives for the decrease were estimated using loglinear regression analysis.
In Ivalo the 137Cs concentrations had decreased steadily with an effective
ecological half-life of about 6 years. In Paistunturi there had been a rapid
decrease during the first year (half-life about 1 year), and since 1987 a half- life
of 6.5 years. In Kemin Sompio the concentrations had decreased during the
first three years with a 3-years half-life, and since 1989 with an 8-years half-
life.
The trends of the 137Cs concentrations in meat also reflect the condition of
winter pasture, because the concentrations in the meat during the
slaughtering season correlate with the availability of radiocaesium in the
fodder. According to our results the reason for the decrease in 137Cs in the
Paistunturi reindeer meat to the same level as in the Ivalo reindeer is due to
the decrease in the availability of  lichen fodder that occurred soon after the
Chernobyl accident. The shortage of ground lichen was also evident during
STUK’s sample collection trips. In Ivalo there did not seem to be any major
changes in winter fodder availability. In the area of the Kemin Sompio co-
operative, the lichen pasture situation seems to be still relatively good. It is
located in a forest area, in contrast to the rather barren treeless mountain
(fjeld) area at Paistunturi. In Ivalo area there are more forest than barren
mountains. The pre-Chernobyl concentrations in lichen in Kemin Sompio have
also been higher, because one reindeer meat sample from the 1985-1986
slaughtering season contained 137Cs 580 Bq/kg, while the average concentration for
the whole reindeer herding area was 300 Bq/kg.
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Fig. 2. Time series for annual average 137Cs concentrations in fresh reindeer meat in the
Paistunturi, Ivalo and Kemin Sompio reindeer co-operatives after the Chernobyl
accident. Winter slaughtering period October 1st - April 30th. The summer
concentrations  represent a few animals killed in accidents.
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Abstract
After the Chernobyl accident systematic measurements of 134Cs and 137Cs
activity in forest mushrooms were conducted. The samples, mainly of three
kinds of mushrooms, were collected all over Poland. The ratio  activity of 137Cs
to134Cs was also estimated. This ratio has been higher than in fallout and other
tested foodstuffs. The analysis of mushrooms showed that the activity of
caesium is much higher than in other foodstuffs until now. The results of 137Cs
activity are presented in mushroom samples collected during season June-
October 2001.
Introduction
The Chernobyl accident brought into problem of radioactive contamination of
forest mushrooms. The activities of caesium in mushrooms were much higher
than in other tested foodstuffs. Such a situation continues  nowadays.
Higher contamination of mushrooms results from the specificity of
caesium behaviour in forest ecosystem. Caesium slowly penetrates soil and
accumulates in litter, lichen and mosses, where the mushroom spawn lives. The
durability of this accumulation is confirmed by high concentration of 137 Cs in
forest mushrooms measured  in 1985. The range of results is from a few dozen
to above hundred Bq·kg-1 fresh mass, while the activity of 137Cs in other tested
agriculture products and foodstuffs was below 1 Bq·kg-1.
The activity ratio of 137Cs to 134Cs, released during the Chernobyl
accident, was 2 to 1.
The same ratio, 2.03±0.02, was registered in total fallout and non-forest
foodstuffs in May 1986. This ratio, corrected on 28 April 1986, was 2.60±0.08 for all
kinds of forest mushrooms. It can be assumed that about 25%-30% of 137Cs registered in
forest mushrooms in 1986 resulted from fallout of nuclear weapon tests [1].
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Material and methods
Sampling
Forest mushrooms:  Boletus  edulis, Cantharellus  cibarius  and Xerocomus
badius, the most popular species of mushrooms in Poland, were picked up in 6
forest regions in Poland in consecutive years to analyse changes of radioactive
contamination with time (figure 1). These  regions cover the parts of the count-
ry where different level of caesium contamination occurred in 1986. About 1500
samples of mushrooms were collected in 2001.
Figure 1. Forest regions in Poland.
Sample preparation and analytical methods
Samples were cleaned from leaves, needles and lichens and homogenised. The
caesium activity, in Marinelli geometry, was determined by gamma
spectrometry with NaI(Tl) or HPGe detectors. Calibration of the spectrometers
was performed using mix-g  standard solution. The correctness of calibration
was checked in international comparisons organised by Society for the
Promotion of Quality Control in Medical and Radiotoxicological Analysis
(PROCORAD) and IAEA.
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Results and discussion
The mean activities of 137Cs in forest mushrooms were on the level of several
hundred     Bq per kg fresh mass, in single samples a few thousands Bq·kg-1 in
1986. The mean activities increased in 1988-1989. Litter and mosses,
contaminated by caesium directly, decomposed and caesium accumulated in
them became absorbed by mushroom spawn. It is very difficult  to recognise a
trend towards decrease of 137Cs activity in forest mushrooms in the following
years. The mean and range of activities of 137Cs in mushroom samples in 1986-
2001 are presented in table 1. The activity of 134Cs in mushrooms was about
35% of 137Cs activity in 1986 and decreased quickly with radioactive decay  to
below 1% in 2001 [2,3].
Considerable difference of radioactive contamination of different kinds
of forest mushrooms, sampled from the same forest area in the same time, was
observed. This is caused by different properties of absorption and mechanism of
accumulation by individual kinds of mushrooms.
Boletus edulis (Bqkg-1)
      mean            range 
Cantharellus cibarius 
(Bqkg-1)
      mean            range 
Xerocomus badius 
(Bqkg-1)
      mean            range 
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
36
38
90
62
75
69
102
89
37
48
92
60
80
67
59
61
12-135 
14- 94 
38-233 
7-164
11-217 
14-224 
23-610 
8-427
5-66
10-103 
14-433 
18-138 
7-254
<5-1002 
<5-678
<5 - 401 
67 
64 
46 
37 
77 
135
49 
50 
27 
46 
31 
20 
48 
61 
50 
47 
  8-511 
  9-612 
13-129 
16-117 
18-351 
 8-750 
11-196 
 5-300 
 5-132 
 9-172 
 5 - 77 
<5 -  61 
<5-267 
<5-603 
<5-557 
<5 - 294 
380
377
634
669
551
509
525
371
363
373
197
462
373
261
166*
172**
60-1547 
87-2312 
57-1730 
89-2100 
36-1909 
134-1284
90-1959 
19-1190 
43-838
156-1017
47-453
59-1058 
63-1863 
17-1191 
20-662∗
6 - 578∗∗
 * excluding one sample of 3146 Bq·kg-1
 ** excluding one sample of 1215 Bq·kg-1
Table 1. Activity of 137Cs in forest mushrooms in Poland in 1986-2001 (Bq·kg-1 fresh
mass).
In the first years after the Chernobyl accident, an attempt could be made
to compare the mean concentration of 137Cs in forest mushrooms taken from
different regions in Poland    to 137Cs activity in total fallout in these regions in
1986 [4,5]. But high dispersion of activity of individual samples taken from the
same region and the same forest was observed. Local differences of radioactive
contamination of the lowest forest part were caused by e.g. keeping of caesium
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isotopes by tree-tops. The falling leaves and needles increase the level of
caesium in litter as a consequence.
The results show that 137Cs activites are still on a high level in
mushrooms. The mean activities in Boletus edulis and Cantharellus cibarius
samples are on the same level as in previous years. A decrease of activity in
Xerocomus badius samples can be observed, but it may be connected with small
number of samples of this species.
The activity of 137Cs in mushrooms from sampling regions in Poland in
2001 is shown in table 2.
Table 2. Activity of 137Cs in mushrooms in forest regions in Poland in 2001 (Bq·kg-1 fresh
mass)
Figure 2. The regions of different level of contamination in 1986 (A-lower level, B- higher
level).
Region Boletus edulis Cantharellus cibarius Xerocomus badius 
N Mean Range N Mean Range N Mean Range
1 337 63 <5-401 340 40 <5-159 80 144 6-259 
2 82 61 14-178 97 55 5-201 5 263 170-498 
3 64 57 <5-262 167 56 <5-149 7 225 32-455 
4 36 46 6-133 109 43 <5-212 11 319* 21-578∗
5 9 71 9-156 10 96 16-195 3 141 90-177 
6 23 58 16-96 105 51 <5-294 4 183 150-220 
* excluding one sample of 1215 Bq·kg-1
506
STUK-A195
In 2001 there was no relationship between the mean activities from
particular regions and fallout in these regions in 1986. Figure 2 shows the
irregularity of radioactive contamination of total fallout after the Chernobyl
accident. The forest region 1 is situated in low level area of contamination (A),
regions: 3,4,5 – in higher level (B), regions: 2,6 – in intermediate level. But a
wide range of results in particular samples of each mushrooms species in each
region is observed. It testifies that clear local differences of 137Cs contamination
in forest litter do not change.
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Abstract
A compilation of data on the whole-body burden of 134Cs, 137Cs och 40K in various
Swedish populations between 1964 and 2002 has been made. The compilation
was carried out in co-operation with the Department of Radiation Physics in
Malmö, the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI), the Swedish
Defence Research Agency Department (FOI) and the Department of Radiation
Physics, Göteborg University. Individual body burden values have been
inserted into a calculation spread sheet, with data on body weight, gender, age,
occupation (if available) and place of residence. The database enables a study of
the time-pattern and geographical dependence of radiocaesium transfer from
ground deposition to man, and the associated absorbed dose. The Swedish
government has assigned SSI the responsibility for obtaining and assuring one
of Sweden’s national environmental quality objectives, A Safe Radiation
Environment. A natural consequence of this responsibility is that a means for
quantifying progress towards the objective is necessary. The data compilation
discussed here is one important component in the national environmental
monitoring programme that is currently (2002) being developed at SSI. The
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new program for monitoring environmental radiation has the goal of following
geographical and ecological differences in the radiological effects to both
mankind and the environment, and assessing relevant doses and risks.
During the period between 1964 and 2002, fallout of radiocaesium from
nuclear weapons tests (only 137Cs) and from the Chernobyl accident in 1986
(both 134Cs and 137Cs) have occurred in Sweden. The ground deposition of the
radiocaesium has gradually been transferred through different ecological
pathways to man. From the database it can be deduced that large regional
variations in the body burden of radiocaesium in man have occurred through
this period. Three populations exhibit considerably higher body content levels
than others; i.) reindeer herders in central Sweden (both pre- and post-
Chernobyl fallout in 1986), ii.) hunters in the region of highest Chernobyl
fallout, and iii.) urban and rural populations outside the city of Gävle (Gävle
was the most affected community in Sweden by the Chernobyl fallout). The
estimated time-integrated effective dose during a period of 50 years from the
Chernobyl fallout is about 10 mSv for reindeer herders, which is, on average, 10
to 100 times higher than urban populations in the three major Swedish metro-
politan areas (Malmö, Göteborg and Stockholm). The main reason behind these
differences is a combination of two factors; i.) large regional variations in the
ground deposition of radiocaesium and ii.) large variations in the dietary habits
of the different investigated populations.
Introduction
The Swedish government has assigned SSI the responsibility for obtaining and
assuring one of the fifteen national environmental quality objectives, A Safe
Radiation Environment(1). One of the criteria for a safe radiation environment
is that no human receives dose contributions from the sum of all man-made
sources higher than 1 mSv per year. It is therefore important to compile
existing experimental data on internal contamination levels in man, and relate
these values to the levels of fallout and dispersion of radioactive contaminants
in the environment. During spring 2001 a project was launched, with the SSI as
the co-ordinator, where data records on body burdens of radioactive caesium in
various Swedish populations, studied during the past four decades by different
Swedish organisations, were compiled into a single database for a general
assessment (Table 1). The aim of the assessment was to study the effects in
terms of radiation dose and late effects from different exposure pathways and
identify which of these pathways could be of most importance in a future
exposure scenario. The database is also intended to be integrated into a general
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database that includes contamination levels of man-made radionuclides in
various species, and used as reference data for the environmental monitoring
programme at SSI.
The global fallout of fission products such as 90Sr, 131I, and 137Cs from the
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests during the 1950’s and 60’s initiated a
number of studies on the body burden of radiocaesium in a number of human
populations in Sweden(2-6). In a study from 1960 it was revealed that reindeer
herders had significantly higher body burden levels of 137Cs compared with
what was found in urban areas in Sweden(2). During the following decades
several studies on the body burden of 137Cs in reindeer herders in the Nordic
countries were carried out as well as in other Arctic populations(7,8). Certain
ecosystems were then demonstrated to be more sensitive to transfer of
radioactive deposition to man, especially within the Sub-Arctic ecosystems that
include a minimum of modern day agriculture and forestry(9). Individuals who
consumed reindeer meat or game as well as forest products such as mushrooms
and wild berries were a special group at risk. At the same time long-term
studies on the caesium body burden in humans living in large urban areas were
carried out as a reference for the more critical populations investigated(3,6).
After the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed by the superpowers in 1963, the
number of atmospheric detonations decreased considerably, leading also to a
gradually decreasing global fallout.
The studies began again due to the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which
resulted in a large fallout of 134Cs and 137Cs in Sweden. This time the deposition
was much more inhomogeneously distributed, where certain communities
obtained more than 100 kBq/m2, compared with 2-3 kBq/m2 that was deposited
from the earlier global fallout from atmospheric detonations(10-11). Apart from
the reindeer herders, which had already been identified as a critical group in
terms of potential transfer of radioceasium, large studies were then also
conducted on other populations at risk in Sweden, such as hunters and farmers
living in regions with a high deposition of radiocaesium(5). These categories
were found to have higher body burdens of 134Cs and 137Cs, but in general the
contamination levels in the Swedish populations were lower in relation to the
ground deposition, when compared with the 1960’s(12).
Materials and methods
Data on individual body burdens in different study groups that were conducted
by the Swedish Defence Research Agency Department (FOI), the Swedish
Radiation Protection Authority, as well as two university departments;
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Dept. of Radiation Physics in Malmö (Lund university) and in Göteborg (Göte-
borg university), were compiled to one single database. Prior to the data
compilation the reporting format and the parameters to be considered were
agreed upon by the different participating departments. In addition to the
whole-body contents of 137Cs, 134Cs and 40K (an important physico-chemical
analogue to caesium, omnipresent in most living organisms), values on the
investigated individuals age, sex, body weight, lieu of residence and main
occupation or profession (if available) were included in the database. The latter
parameter was used to categorise the study of populations in the following
categories: i.) farmers, ii.) hunters (leisure time or professional) iii.) reindeer
herders, iv.) fishermen or v.) urban populations. Table 1 gives an overview of the
studied populations and the departments in charge of the studies.
Table 1.
The concentration of 137Cs and 134Cs as a function of time could be
determined from the database. The effective dose rate (mSv y-1) was estimated
by using the relationship between body burden of 134Cs and 137Cs and effective
dose described by Leggett et al. in 1984(13). Curve fitting of exponential
expressions describing the gradual decrease of the human concentrations of
radiocaesium with time was employed enabling time-integration of the
Reindeer herders in Västerbotten (FOI Sami)  1988 – 2001 
Hunters in central Sweden (FOI Hunters)   1994 – 1998 
The Swedish Defence 
Research Agency (FOI) 
Reference group in Lapland (FOI Reference)  1991 – 1996 
Reference group: Employees at SSI 
(Stockholm) 
1966 – 2001 
National survey of subjects (randomly selected 
subjects in Sweden; stratified for the regional 
variation in 137Cs-deposition) 
1987 and 1994 
Rural inhabitants outside the city of Gävle 1986 – 1998 
The Swedish Radiation 
Protection Authority (SSI) 
Urban inhabitants in the city of Gävle 1986 – 1998 
Dept. of Radiation Physics in 
Göteborg
Reference group: Employees at Göteborg 
(Göteborg)
1986 – 1989 
Reference group: Employees at Dept. of 
Radiation Physics in Malmö (urban population 
living in Malmö) 
1986 – 1994, 
2002
Reference group: Employees at a factory in 
Lund (Skåne) 
1964 - 1994 
Reindeer herders in Härjedalen (bordering to 
Norway) 
1965 - 1976 
Depts. of Radiation Physics 
in Malmö and in Lund 
Inhabitants living outside the Barsebäck NPP 1974 - 1975 
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effective dose during a 50-year period. Using annual deposition data from
1950-1990 from Denmark(14), a country neighbouring to Sweden, a coarse
estimation of the time-integrated effective dose to the populations investigated
in the 1960’s could be obtained for the period 1945 – 1995.
Results
In Fig. 1 the annual effective dose from 137Cs and 134Cs to the various Swedish
populations is plotted as a function of time. Swedish reindeer herders exhibit
the highest values both before and after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 with
peak dose rates at 1–2 mSv y-1. In Table 2 is given the estimated individual time
integrated effective dose during a 50-year period due to nuclear weapons and
Chernobyl fallout respectively.
Population Global Fallout 137Cs
(1945-1995) 
Chernobyl 137Cs
(1986-2036) 
Chernobyl 134Cs
(1986-2036)
FOI Sami (Most Affected Areas) N/A 11 2.4 
FOI Hunters a N/A 1.2 N/A 
FOI Reference N/A 0.6 N/A 
SSI Control group 0.27 0.1 0.03 
Gävle inhabitants (urban) N/A 0.5 0.13 
Gävle inhabitants (rural) N/A 1.2 0.37 
Göteborg N/A 0.034 0.02 
Skåne (Malmö group) N/A 0.08 0.02 
Skåne (Lund Reference Group)  0.22 0.033 0.007 
Härjedalen Sami 27 N/A N/A 
National survey N/A 0.13 0.042 
a Average over  three different hunting teams at different locations in Sweden. 
Table 2. Mean individual time-integrated effective doses in mSv calculated from the
average 137Cs-concntertaions in different Swedish populations.
Conclusions
The data show that of the Swedish populations studied the reindeer herders
have obtained, on average, the largest individual effective doses from internal
radiocaesium contamination. The time integrated effective dose to reindeer
herders in Härjedalen is estimated at 27 mSv from nuclear weapons fallout
(1945-1995) and for reindeer herders in the most affected areas of the
Chernobyl fallout an additional 10 mSv is estimated to be received during the
period 1986 – 2036. Furthermore, hunters and farmers exhibit about 10 times
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higher effective doses from the Chernobyl fallout than urban residents in the
Swedish metropolitan areas (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö).
The national average values of the time-integrated effective dose for an
individual is estimated to be between 1.3 – 1.6 mSv in Sweden, Finland and
Norway according to food consumption data compiled by Aarkrog in 1994(7).
This can be compared with 0.13 mSv (137Cs only) estimated from the national
survey conducted in Sweden. However, using whole-body counting data from
control groups in Helsinki (Finland) and Sel (Norway) from the years 1986 to
1990(7), indicates that the difference between these countries is somewhat less;
with the Swedish values being a factor of 5 times lower.
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11n Assessment of radionuclide content in the
human body. The influence of inhomogeneously
distributed activity.
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Abstract
In a fixed mode whole-body measurement, a single fixed position of the detector
relative to the person to be measured is used. A fixed mode measurement does
not give information about the distribution of activity in the body.
Consequently, the same amount of activity in the body can result in different
detector responses depending on the activity distribution. The accuracy of an
assessment of the total body content therefore depends on how well the activity
distribution, used in the calibration of the whole-body counter, resembles the
actual distribution in the body. The Risø whole-body counter is a fixed mode
counter. To investigate the influence of different activity distributions on the
counting efficiency a detailed calibration of the Risø whole-body counter has
been made. The calibration was made with an anthropomorphic brick phantom.
A series of measurements were made to determine the counting efficiencies for
60Co and 137Cs activity placed in single bricks at different positions in the
phantom. The counting efficiency for an arbitrary activity distribution can be
calculated from proper weighting and summing of the measured efficiencies for
activity in the single bricks.
Introduction
Whole-body counting of body contents of radionuclides is primarily done in two
ways, the scanning mode and the fixed mode. In scanning mode measurements
are made while the detector is moved along the person. This is usually done
with a collimated detector along the centre axis of the person and information
on the activity distribution is obtained directly. In fixed mode measurements a
single fixed position of the detector relative to the person is used, and thus
measurements will not give information about the activity distribution in the
body. Consequently, the same amount of activity in a body can result in
different detector responses depending on the distribution of activity. This is
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predominantly due to the variation in counting efficiency with distance to the
detector and due to the shielding effect of body tissue. The accuracy of an
assessment of the total body content therefore depends on how well the activity
distribution used in the calibration of the whole-body counter resembles the
actual distribution in the body.
The Risø whole-body counter is a fixed mode counter. In this counter the person
is sitting in a chair with the front facing the detector (Ge-detector). Most points
on the front side will in this position have almost the same distance to the
detector, and thus the geometry to a certain extent compensates for the lack of
knowledge about the activity distribution. Usually a homogeneously activity
distribution is assumed when assessing the body content although most
radionuclides are distributed unevenly in the body.
 To investigate the influence of different activity distributions on the counting
efficiency a detailed calibration of the Risø whole-body counter has been made
at 662 keV (137Cs), 1173 keV (60Co), and 1332 keV (60Co) and a less detailed
calibration at 122 keV (57Co). From these calibrations, ratios of apparent
activity (homogeneous distribution assumed) to true activity have been
calculated for a few activity distributions and energies.
Measurements
Measurements were made with the anthropomorphic phantom “IRINA”,
developed by the “Research Institute for Industrial and Sea Hygiene” in St.
Petersburg, Russia. The phantom is made from  tissue-equivalent bricks with
mass 0.88 kg (whole brick) and 0.40 kg (half brick) respectively. Two rods with
activity can be placed in each brick. The phantom is provided with four sets of
rods, namely sets with 57Co, 60Co, 134Cs (not used), and 137Cs.
The phantom configuration (P4) used in the calibrations is build from
sixty-nine whole bricks and two half bricks. The head and neck are made of 4
whole and 2 half bricks, the chest of twenty whole bricks, the arms of 8 whole
bricks, the abdomen of 13 whole bricks, the thighs of 14 whole bricks, and the
legs of 10 whole bricks. The phantom is shown in Figure 1. The labelling letters
refer to head, breast, arms, stomach, thighs and legs respectively.
In two measurements series (60Co and 137Cs) rods were placed
successively in each brick of the phantom (except for a few bricks) and the
counting rates were measured. Bricks placed symmetrically (seen from the
detector) for example T51 and T57, were measured at the same time (two rods
in both bricks) in order to save time. The counting rate for one brick was
afterwards set to be half the measured rate for both bricks. This symmetry
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Figure 1. The “IRINA” phantom (configuration P4) used in the measurements. The
phantom represents a person of height 170.5 cm and with a weight of 61.5 kg. The
labelling letters on the left drawing refer to head, breast, arms, stomach, thighs and legs
respectively. The phantom was measured in”sitting geometry” as shown on the photo.
assumption was confirmed from measurements on B9 and B14 (at the back).
Three counting rate measurements were made with 57Co, one with rods
in S43-S44, one with rods in T50-T56 and one with rods in all the bricks of the
phantom.
Results
The maximum counting rate (pr. activity unit) at 662 keV was measured when
the 137Cs activity was placed in S47, whereas the maximum counting rate at
1173 keV and at 1332 keV was measured when the 60Co activity was placed in
B22. Figure 2 presents the measured counting rates for activity placed in the
different bricks expressed as a percentage of the maximum counting rate
measured at the given energy. The calculated relative counting rates are equal
to relative counting efficiencies.
From the measurements with 57Co activity the ratio of the counting rate
for activity in S43-S44 to the counting rate for activity in T50-T56 was
calculated to be 20 ± 3. The ratio reflects that T50 and T56 are more shielded
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(towards the detector) than S43 and S44.
When the relative counting efficiencies, ri, are known for all the bricks in
a phantom, as was the case for 662 keV, 1173 keV, and 1332 keV (the few bricks
in the head region that were not measured were assigned efficiencies based on
measured efficiencies of the other head bricks) the ratio, R, of the apparent
activity - when a homogeneous distribution is assumed - to the true activity, can
be calculated for an arbitrary distribution as:
       N
i i
r
i i
rif
R ⋅∑
∑ ⋅
=                                                                       (1)
where fi is the fraction of the total body activity that is situated in brick i, and N
is the total number of bricks.
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Figure 2. Relative counting efficiencies (measured counting rates for activity placed in
the different bricks expressed as a  percentage of the maximum counting rate measured
at the given energy) for 662 keV, 1173 keV,  and 1332 keV photon. For two-label entries
on the x-axis, the shown efficiency applies to each of the two bricks.
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R-ratios were calculated from equation (1) for 662 keV, 1173 keV, and 1332
keV photons for four inhomogeneous distributions of activity. The distributions
were: 1) all activity in the lungs, 2) all activity in the stomach, 3) all activity in the
liver, 4) 4/5 of the activity in the liver and 1/5 of the activity distributed
homogeneously in the body. The organs were formed by three or four elements:
lungs (B10, B11, B12, B13), stomach (S43, S44, S35, S39), and liver (B16, B17,
B24).
Table 1 presents the calculated ratios for the four distributions.
Uncertainties are one standard deviation and arise from counting statistics on the
primary data. An assumption of a homogeneous distribution will underestimate
the activity when R<1 and overestimate the activity when R>1.
Equation (1) could not be used to calculate R-ratios from the 57Co
measurements; hence an approximate method was used. This method envisages a
given distribution of activity in the phantom as a linear combination of the two
types of bricks known for 57Co, namely a shielded brick (T50-T56) and a shallow
lying brick (S43-S44). From the number of shielded and shallow bricks, Nd and Ns,
and the measured counting rates from the shielded brick, the shallow brick and the
phantom with all bricks filled with activity (rd, rs , and rtot),  R-ratios are calculated
as:
     N
totr
sr
sNdN
sN
dr
sNdN
dN
R ⋅
⋅
+
+⋅
+
=
)()(
                                                        (2)
The linear combination is independent of energy and thus the coefficients Nd
and Ns will be the same for any radionuclide (energy), therefore the coefficients can
be obtained from the measurements with 137Cs. For a given distribution the R-
value calculated from equation (1) for 137Cs is inserted into equation (2). Solving
this equation together with the constrain,  that the total number of bricks in the
distribution (e.g. four in the case of all activity in the lungs) equals Nd + Ns, gives
Nd  and Ns.
Table 1. Ratio of apparent activity of  60Co (1173 keV and 1332 keV),  and 137Cs (662 keV)
in the body (homogeneous distribution assumed) to true activity calculated from
equation (1) for four activity distributions.
γ-energy All activity in the lungs 
All activity in 
the stomach 
All activity in 
the liver 
4/5 of activity in the liver, 
1/5 uniform in the body 
  662 keV (137Cs) 0.75 ± 0.02 0.88 ± 0.02 1.24 ± 0.02 1.19 ± 0.02 
1173 keV (60Co) 0.94 ± 0.02 0.87 ± 0.02 1.18 ± 0.02 1.15 ± 0.02 
1332 keV (60Co) 0.92 ± 0.02 0.87 ± 0.02 1.22 ± 0.02 1.15 ± 0.01 
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R-ratios at 122 keV (57Co) were calculated from equation (2) for the four
distributions mentioned above. The feasibility of the method was tested by
calculating R-ratios for 1173 keV photons for the four distributions. These results
are shown in Table 2 together with the  Nd  and Ns values for the four distributions.
Comparing the 1173 keV values in Table 1 and Table 2 gives some confidence in the
method used.  Uncertainties are one standard deviation and arise from counting
statistics on the primary data.
Conclusion
From Figure 2 it is seen that the counting efficiency varies as a function of where
the activity is placed in the body. As expected positions away from the detector (legs
and head) and positions well shielded (e.g. S38) have lower counting efficiencies
compared to unshielded positions close to the detector (B22 and S47). The variation
of the relative counting efficiencies is almost the same at 662 keV, 1173 keV, and
1332 keV.
From Table 1 it is seen that activity located solely in the lungs or in the
stomach will be underestimated if a homogeneous distribution is assumed and
counting is made at 662 keV, 1173 keV, or 1332 keV, whereas activity located
mainly in the liver will be overestimated. The deviations are within ±25 % of the
true value; a deviation figure also considered valid at all energies between 662 keV
and 1332 keV. Such deviations will in most cases give minor contributions to the
overall uncertainty when body contents are used to calculate internal doses.
At 122 keV (see Table 2) activity located solely in the lungs or in the stomach
will result in a larger underestimation of activity compared to counting at 662 keV,
1173 keV, or 1332 keV, whereas activity located mainly in the liver will be
overestimated to the same extent.
Table 2. Ratio of apparent activity of  57Co (122 keV) and 60Co (1173 keV ) in the body
(homogeneous distribution assumed) to true activity calculated from equation (2) for
four activity distributions.
γ-energy
All activity 
in the lungs 
Nd = 2.9 Ns
= 1.1 
All activity in 
the stomach 
Nd = 2.1 Ns = 
1.9
All activity in 
the liver 
Nd = 0.0 Ns = 
3.0
4/5 of activity in the liver, 
1/5 uniform in the body 
Nd = 0.2 Ns = 3.5
  122 keV (57Co) 0.39 ± 0.08 0.60 ± 0.08  1.21 ± 0.10  1.13 ± 0.09 
1173 keV (60Co) 0.81 ± 0.09 0.91 ± 0.08  1.18 ± 0.10  1.14 ± 0.08 
